Here is a new paper of mine (12 pages) on suspicious agreement between belief and values. The idea is that if your empirical beliefs systematically support your values, then that is evidence that you arrived at those beliefs through a biased belief-forming process. This is especially so if those beliefs concern propositions which aren’t probabilistically correlated with each other, I argue.
I have previously written several LW posts on these kinds of arguments (here and here; see also mine and ClearerThinking’s political bias test) but here the analysis is more thorough. See also Thrasymachus' recent post on the same theme.
Having your beliefs converge on the truth is the desired outcome.
Values don't have a truthiness property. If your beliefs and your values converge, something else is going on.
Since you were talking about values in a political context, I assumed they were political values, which usually presuppose some facts. Policies are rarely preferred entirely deontologically.
Do you have specific examples of the values you were referring to?