Crossposted from my blog: mzuo.ca

Some of the observations by these Soviet intellectuals may be of interest to LW readers...

"

This obscure letter offers a fascinating glimpse into the main concerns that preoccupied leading Soviet intellectuals in the beginning of the 1970s. It also represents an excellent example of the methods of communication employed by this group to express their concerns to leading party and state authorities of the USSR.

It also provides their perspective towards the changes in Soviet, Western, and World society and the interactions between the constellation of forces causing such changes.

Some interesting parallels can be drawn with modern day society and events.

As I am not a native Russian speaker, this is mostly a machine translation of the original with some minor adjustments and amendments based on limited knowledge of the leading party, states and academic bodies of the period, along with the scientific, technological, economic, and socio-cultural developments of the period. Therefore the translation may sound funny or bizarre in parts.

This is the only full translation into English, that I know of, so I welcome any comments or suggestions to improve the translation via my email: michaelyzuo AT gmail.com


Authors: Sakharov A.D., Turchin V.F., Medvedev R.A.
Title: Letter to party and government leaders

Soviet scientist academician A. D. SAKHAROV, as well as physicist V. F. TURCHIN and historian R. A. MEDVEDEV, wrote this letter and sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. BREZHNEV, to the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. KOSYGIN, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. B. PODGORNY, letter of the following
content:


Dear Leonid Ilyich!

Dear Alexey Nikolaevich!

Dear Nikolai Viktorovich!

 

This letter discusses and develops a point of view, which can be summarized in the form of the following theses:

I. At present, it is imperative to carry out a number of activities aimed at further democratization of public life in the country. This need stems, in particular, from the close connection of the problem of [organizational] feasibility, scientific management methods with issues of freedom of information, transparency and competition. This need also stems from other domestic and foreign policy problems.

2. Democratization should contribute to the preservation and strengthening of the Soviet socialist system, socialist economic structure, our social and cultural achievements, and socialist ideology.

3. Democratization led by the CPSU in cooperation with all sectors of society should preserve and strengthen the party’s leadership role in the economic, political and cultural life of society.

4. Democratization must be gradual to avoid possible complications and disruptions. At the same time, it should be deep, consistent, and on the basis of a carefully developed program. Without radical democratization, our society will not be able to solve the problems it faces, [and therefore] it will not be able to develop normally.


There is reason to believe that the point of view expressed in these theses is divided to some extent by a significant part of the Soviet intelligentsia and the advanced part of the working class. This point of view is reflected in the views of students and working youth and in numerous discussions in a narrow circle. However, we consider it appropriate to present this view in coherent written form in order to promote a broad and open discussion of critical issues. We strive for a positive and constructive approach acceptable to the party and state leadership of the country, we strive to clarify some misunderstandings and unfounded fears[1].

Over the past decade, threatening signs of discord and stagnation have begun to appear in the national economy of our country, and the roots of these difficulties date back to an earlier period and are very deep. The growth rate of national income is steadily decreasing. The gap between [production facilities] necessary for normal development and the actual commissioning of new production facilities is widening. There are numerous facts of errors in determining technical and economic policy in industry and agriculture, and unacceptable red tape in solving urgent issues. Defects in the system of planning, accounting and promotion often lead to a conflict between local and departmental interests and national and supranational interests. As a result, production development reserves are not properly identified or used, and technological progress is slowing down dramatically. For the same reasons, the country’s natural resources are often destroyed uncontrollably and with impunity: forests are cut down, water bodies are polluted, valuable agricultural land is flooded, soil erosion and salinization occurs, etc. It is well known that there is a chronically difficult situation in agriculture, especially in animal husbandry. Real incomes of the population have hardly increased in recent years, nutrition, medical and consumer services have improved very slowly and territorially unevenly. The number of scarce goods is growing. There are clear signs of inflation in the country.

The slowdown in the development of education is particularly alarming for the future of the country: our total spending on education of all kinds is three times lower than in the United States, and is growing more slowly. Alcoholism is tragically increasing and drug addiction begins to reassert itself. Crime is systematically increasing in many parts of the country. In some places, the symptoms of corruption are becoming more noticeable. In the work of scientific and scientific-technical organizations, bureaucracy, departmentalism, [overly] formal attitude to their tasks, and declines in initiative are increasing.

The decisive final factor in comparing economic systems is, as you know, labor productivity. And here the situation is in the worst condition. Our labor productivity is still many times lower than in capitalist countries, and its growth has slowed sharply. This situation seems particularly alarming when compared to the situation in the leading capitalist countries and, in particular, in the United States. By introducing elements of state regulation and planning into the economy, these countries got rid of the devastating crises that previously tormented the capitalist economy. The widespread introduction of computer technology and automation into the economy ensures rapid growth in labor productivity, which in turn contributes to the partial overcoming of some social difficulties and contradictions (for example, by establishing unemployment benefits, reducing working hours, etc.). Comparing our economy with the U.S. economy, we see that our economy lags behind not only in quantitative terms, but – and most sadly – in qualitative terms. The newer and more revolutionary any aspect of the economy, the greater the gap between the United States and us. We are ahead of America in coal mining, lag behind in oil, gas and electricity production, ten years behind in chemistry and endlessly behind in computing. The latter is especially significant, because the introduction of computers into the national economy is a phenomenon of crucial importance, radically changing the appearance of the production system and the entire culture. This phenomenon was rightly called the Second Industrial Revolution. Meanwhile, the power of our fleet of computers is hundreds of times less than in the United States, and as for the use of computers in the national economy, the gap is so large that it cannot even be measured. We just live in a different era.

The situation is no better in the field of scientific and technical discoveries. And here you cannot see the increase in our role. Rather, on the contrary. In the late fifties, our country was the first country in the world to launch a satellite and send a man into space. In the late sixties, we lost leadership in this area (as in many other areas). The first people to set foot on the moon were Americans. This fact is one of the external manifestations of a significant and growing difference in the breadth of the front of scientific and technological work in our country and in the West.

In the twenties and thirties, the capitalist world experienced a period of crises and depression. At this time, using the rise of national energy generated by the revolution, we created industry at an unprecedented rate. Then the slogan was thrown out: to catch up and overtake America. And we’ve really been catching up with her for several decades. Then the situation changed. The second industrial revolution has begun, and now, in the early seventies of the century, we see that without catching up with America, we are lagging behind it more and more.

What’s the matter? Why didn’t we not only become the instigators of the second industrial revolution, but even unable to go on a par with developed capitalist countries in this revolution? Does the socialist system provide worse opportunities than the capitalist system for the development of productive forces, and [therefore] capitalism wins the economic competition between capitalism and socialism?

Of course not! The source of our difficulties is not in the socialist system, but, on the contrary, in those features, in those conditions of our lives that go against socialism, [those that] are hostile to it. This source is the anti-democratic traditions and norms of public life that developed during the Stalin period and have not been finally eliminated to this day. Extra-economic coercion, restrictions on the exchange of information, restrictions on intellectual freedom, and other manifestations of anti-democratic perversions of socialism that took place under Stalin are considered by some as costs of the industrialization process. It is believed that they have not had a serious impact on the country’s economy, although they had severe consequences in the political and military fields, for the fate of large segments of the population, and entire nationalities. We leave aside the questions of how justified this point of view is for the early stages of development of the socialist national economy – the decline in the pace of industrial development in the pre-war years rather indicates the opposite. But there is no doubt that with the beginning of the second industrial revolution, these phenomena have become a decisive economic factor, have become the main obstacle to the development of the country’s productive forces. Due to the increase in the volume and complexity of economic systems, management and organization problems have come to the fore. These problems cannot be solved by one or more persons in power that “know everything”. They require the creative participation of millions of people at all levels of the economic system. They require a wide exchange of information and ideas. This is the difference between the modern economy and the economy of, say, the countries of the Ancient East.

However, we face insurmountable difficulties in the exchange of information and ideas in our country. Truthful information about our shortcomings and negative phenomena is classified on the grounds that it “can be used by hostile propaganda.” The exchange of information with foreign countries is limited for fear of “penetration of hostile ideology.” Theoretical generalizations and practical proposals that seemed too bold to someone are suppressed. Fundamentally, without any discussion under the influence of fear that they may “undermine the foundations.” There is a clear distrust of creatively thinking, critical active personalities. In this environment, conditions are created for promotion not for those who are distinguished by high professional qualities and integrity, but for those who, in words, are distinguished by dedication to the cause of the party, who are in fact distinguished only by devotion to their narrowly personal interests or passive diligence.

Restrictions on freedom of information lead to the fact that not only is it difficult to control leaders, not only the initiative of the people is undermined, but also intermediate leaders are deprived of both rights and information and turn into passive performers, officials. Heads of higher bodies receive too incomplete, smooth information and are also deprived of the opportunity to effectively use their powers.

The economic reform of 1965 is a highly useful and important undertaking designed to solve the cardinal issues of our economic life. However, we are convinced that purely economic measures are not enough to perform all its tasks. Moreover, these economic measures cannot be carried out completely without reforms in the field of management, information, and [organizational] transparency.

The same applies to such promising undertakings as the organization of firms of complex production associations with a high degree of independence in economic, financial and personnel matters.

Whatever specific problem of the economy we take, we will very soon come to the conclusion that its satisfactory solution requires a scientific solution to such general, fundamental problems of the socialist economy as forms of feedback in the management system, pricing in the absence of a free market, general principles of planning, etc. Now we have a lot of talk about the need for a scientific approach to the problems of organization and management. That’s right, of course. Only a scientific approach to these problems will make it possible to overcome the difficulties encountered and realize the opportunities in economic management and technical and economic progress that the lack of capitalist property in principle provides. But a scientific approach requires completeness of information, impartiality of thinking and freedom of creativity. Until these conditions are created (and not for individuals, but for the masses), talk about scientific management will remain an empty phrase. Our economy can be compared to traffic across the intersection. While there were few cars, the [traffic] regulator easily coped with his tasks, and the movement proceeded normally. But the flow of machines is constantly increasing, and now there is a traffic jam. What to do in such a situation? You can fine drivers and change regulators, but this will not save the situation. The only way out is to expand the intersection. Obstacles to the development of our economy lie outside it, in the sphere of socio-political, and all measures that do not remove these obstacles are doomed to inefficiency.

The remnants of the Stalin period negatively affect the economy not only directly, because of the impossibility of a scientific approach to the problems of organization and management, but no less indirectly, through the overall decrease in the creative potential of representatives of all professions. But in the conditions of the second industrial revolution, it is creative work that is becoming more and more important for the national economy.

In this regard, it is impossible not to mention the problem of relations between the state and the intelligentsia. Freedom of information and creativity is necessary for the intelligentsia by the nature of its activities, by its social function. The desire of the intelligentsia to increase this freedom is legitimate and natural. The state suppresses this desire through all kinds of restrictions, administrative pressures, dismissals from work, and even lawsuits. This generates a gap, breeds mutual distrust and deep mutual misunderstanding, and which makes it difficult to cooperate fruitfully between the party-state layer and the most active, that is, the most valuable segments of the intelligentsia for society. In modern industrial society, when the role of the intelligentsia is constantly increasing, this gap cannot be characterized as but suicidal.

The vast majority of intellectuals and young people understand the need for democratization, also understands the need for caution and gradualness in this matter, but cannot understand and justify actions of a clearly anti-democratic nature. Indeed, how to justify the detention in prisons, camps and psychiatric clinics of persons, who although are opposition, are those whose opposition lies in the legal field, in the field of ideas and beliefs? In some cases, it is not about some opposition, but simply about the desire for information, for a bold and unbiased discussion of socially important issues. The content of writers’ imprisonment for their works is unacceptable. It is also impossible to understand and justify ridiculous, harmful steps as the exclusion from the Writers’ Union of the largest and most popular Soviet writer, deeply patriotic and humane in all his activities, as the defeat of the editorial office of the New World, which united the most progressive forces of the Marxist-Leninist direction!

It is also necessary to reiterate ideological problems.

Democratization with its completeness of information and competition should return to our ideological life (social sciences, art, propaganda) the necessary dynamism and creativity, eliminating the bureaucratic, ritual, dogmatic, official-hypocrite and mediocre style that now occupies such a large place in it.

The course towards democratization will bridge the gap between the party-state apparatus and the intelligentsia. Mutual misunderstanding will give way to close cooperation. The course towards democratization will cause a surge of enthusiasm comparable to the enthusiasm of the twenties. The best intellectual forces of the country will be mobilized to solve economic and social problems.

Carrying out democratization is not an easy process. Its normal current will be threatened, on the one hand, by individualistic, anti-socialist forces, on the other hand, by fans of “strong power”, fascist-style demagogues who can try to use the country’s economic difficulties, mutual misunderstanding and distrust of the intelligentsia and the party-state apparatus, and the existence of petty bourgeois and nationalist sentiments in certain circles of society. But we must realize that our country has no other way out, and that this difficult task must be solved. Democratization on the initiative and under the supervision of the highest authorities will make it possible to carry out this process systematically, ensuring that all parts of the party and state apparatus have time to switch to a new style of work, which differs from the previous one by greater transparency, openness and wider discussion of all problems. There is no doubt that most of the employees of the apparatus – people brought up in a modern highly developed country – are able to switch to this style of work and will very soon feel its advantages. The screening of a small number of incapable will only benefit the device.

We propose the following sample program of activities, which could be implemented within four to five years:

1. Statement of the highest party and government bodies on the need for further democratization, on the pace and methods of its implementation. Publication of a number of articles containing a discussion of democratization issues.

2. Limited dissemination (through party bodies, enterprises and institutions) of information on the situation in the country and theoretical works on public issues, which are not yet advisable to make the subject of wide discussion. Gradual increase in the availability of such materials until the restrictions are completely lifted.

3. Wide organization of complex production associations (firms) with a high degree of independence in matters of production planning, technological process, sales and supply, in financial and personnel matters. Extension of the same rights for smaller production units. Scientific definition after careful studies of the forms and scope of state regulation.

4. Termination of jamming of foreign radio programs. Free sale of foreign books and periodicals. Our country’s entry into the international system of copyright and editorial rights protection. Gradual (3-4 years) expansion and facilitation of international tourism in both directions, facilitation of international correspondence, as well as other measures to expand international contacts, with the advanced development of these trends [oriented] towards CMEA countries.

5. Establishment of an institute for public opinion research. First limited and then full publication of materials showing the attitude of the population to the most important issues of domestic and foreign policy, as well as other sociological materials.

6. Amnesty for political prisoners. Resolution on the mandatory publication of full verbatim records on trials of a political nature. Public control over places of detention and psychiatric institutions.

7. Implementation of a number of activities that contribute to improving the work of courts and prosecutor’s office, their independence from the executive branch, local influences, prejudices and connections.

8. Cancellation of the indication in passports and nationality questionnaires. Unified passport system for city and villagers. Gradual abandonment of the passport registration system, carried out in parallel with the alignment of territorial heterogeneities of economic and cultural development.

9. Education reforms. Increasing allocations for primary and secondary schools, improving the financial situation of teachers, their independence, the right to experiment.

10. Adoption of the law on press and information. Ensuring the possibility of creating new printed organs by public organizations and groups of citizens. Complete abolition of preliminary censorship in all its forms.

11. Improving the training of management personnel who know the art of management. Creating interns’ practice. Improving the awareness of managers at all levels, their right to independence, to experiment, to defend their opinions and to test them in practice.

12. Gradual introduction into practice of nominating several candidates for one seat in elections to party and Soviet bodies at all levels, including indirect elections.

13. Enlargement of the rights of Soviet bodies. Expansion of the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

14. Restoration of all the rights of nations forcibly resettled under Stalin. Restoration of national autonomy of resettled peoples and provision of the possibility of resettlement (where it has not yet been implemented).

15. Activities aimed at increasing transparency in the work of governing bodies within the limits allowed by the state interests. Creation of advisory scientific committees at the governing bodies at all levels, including highly qualified specialists of various specialties.

This plan, of course, should be considered as an approximate plan. It is also clear that it should be supplemented by a plan of economic and social measures developed by specialists. We emphasize that democratization alone does not solve economic problems, it only creates prerequisites for solving them. But without creating these prerequisites, economic and technical problems cannot be solved. From our foreign friends you can sometimes hear a comparison of the USSR with a powerful truck, the driver of which presses with one foot hard on the gas, and the other – at the same time – on the brake. It’s time to use the brake more wisely!

The proposed plan shows, in our opinion, that it is quite possible to outline a democratization program that is acceptable to the party and the state and meets, in the first approximation, the urgent needs of the country’s development. Naturally, broad discussion, in-depth scientific, sociological, economic, general political research, life practice will make significant adjustments and additions. But it is important, as mathematicians say, to prove the “theorem of the existence of the solution.”

It is also necessary to dwell on the international consequences of our country’s commitment to democratization. Nothing can contribute more to our international authority, the strengthening of progressive communist forces around the world than further democratization, accompanied by the strengthening of the technical and economic progress of the world’s first country of socialism. Undoubtedly, opportunities for peaceful coexistence and international cooperation will increase, the forces of peace and social progress will strengthen, the attractiveness of communist ideology will increase, and our international situation will become safer. It is especially significant that the moral and material position of the USSR towards China will be strengthened, our ability (indirectly, by example and technical and economic assistance) to influence the situation in this country in the interests of the peoples of both countries will increase. A number of correct and necessary foreign policy actions of our government are not properly understood, since citizens’ information on these issues is very incomplete, and in the past there have been examples of clearly inaccurate and biased information. This, of course, does not contribute to trust. One example is the issue of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. 50 years ago, workers in war-torn Europe provided assistance to those dying of hunger in the Volga region. Soviet people are no more callous and selfish. But they must be sure that our resources are spent on real assistance, on solving serious problems, and not on building pompous stadiums and buying American cars for local officials. The situation in the modern world, opportunities and tasks of our country require broad participation in economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, in cooperation with other states. But for the public to correctly understand these issues, verbal assurances are not enough, it is necessary to prove and show, and this requires more complete information, this requires democratization.

Soviet foreign policy in its main features is the policy of peace and cooperation. But incomplete public awareness is a matter of concern. In the past, there have been some negative manifestations in Soviet foreign policy, which were in the character of messianism, excessive ambition, and which force us to conclude that it is not only imperialism that is responsible for international tensions. All negative phenomena in Soviet foreign policy are closely related to the problem of democratization, and this connection is bilateral. The lack of democratic discussion of such issues as assistance to weapons to a number of countries, including, for example, Nigeria, where there was a bloody war, the causes and course of which are very poorly known to the Soviet public, is very worrying. We are convinced that the UN Security Council resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict is fair and reasonable, although not specific in a number of important points. It is, however, worrying – isn’t our position far beyond this document, isn’t it too unilateral? Is our position on the Statute of West Berlin realistic? Is our desire to expand influence in places far from our borders always realistic at a time of difficulties of Soviet-Chinese relations, at a time of serious difficulties in technical and economic development? Of course, in certain cases, such a “dynamic” policy is necessary, but it must be consistent not only with the general principles, but also with the real capabilities of the country.

We are convinced that the only realistic policy in the age of thermonuclear weapons is the course towards increasing international cooperation, to the persistent search for lines of possible rapprochement in the scientific, technical, economic, cultural and ideological fields, to the fundamental rejection of weapons of mass destruction.

We take this opportunity to express the opinion on the advisability of unilateral and group statements by the nuclear powers on the principled renunciation of weapons of mass destruction by principle.

Democratization will help the public to better understand foreign policy and eliminate all negative features from our policy. This, in turn, will lead to the disappearance of one of the “trump cards” in the hands of opponents of democratization. Another “trump card” – a well-known misunderstanding of government-party circles and the intelligentsia – will disappear in the very first stages of democratization.

What awaits our country if there is no course towards democratization?

Lagging behind capitalist countries during the second industrial revolution and gradual transformation into a second-rate provincial power (history knows such examples); increasing economic difficulties; aggravation of relations between the party-government apparatus and the intelligentsia; the danger of breakdowns right and left; aggravation of national problems, because in national republics the movement for democratization coming from below inevitably takes on a nationalist character. This prospect becomes particularly threatening, given the danger of Chinese totalitarian nationalism (which in historical terms we consider as temporary, but very serious in the coming years). We can resist this danger only by increasing or at least maintaining the existing technical and economic gap between our country and China, increasing the ranks of our friends around the world, offering the Chinese people an alternative with cooperation and assistance. This becomes obvious if we take into account the large number of the preponential enemy, his militant nationalism, as well as the large length of our eastern borders and the weak population of the eastern regions. Therefore, economic stagnation, slowdowns in development combined with insufficiently realistic foreign policy (and often too ambitious) on all continents can lead our country to catastrophic consequences.

Passive waiting tactics will eventually lead to the same result. Now we still have the opportunity to get on the right track and carry out the necessary reforms. In a few years, maybe it will be too late. It is necessary to understand this situation throughout the country. It is the duty of everyone who sees the source of difficulties and the way to overcome them to point this path to their fellow citizens. Understanding the need and possibility of gradual democratization is the first step towards its implementation.

March 19, 1970

A. D. Sakharov

B. F. Turchin

R. A. Medvedev

 


From http://antology.igrunov.ru/authors/saharov/1125404394.html

 

  1. ^

    The following note is given to the letter: Since January 1970, “letter to Brezhnev”, signed by the surname “Sakharov” or “Academician Sakharov”, has been widely distributed in Moscow. This letter was later published in various versions in the Western press. In No. I for 1970, the emigrant anti-Soviet magazine “Sowing” published an article under the pretentious title “The Truth about Modernity” signed “R. Medvedev.” The same article, full of nonsense fabrications, was then transmitted in Russian by the radio station “Freedom” (Germany). We declare that none of us is the author of the above letter and article. These “documents” seem to us to be obvious fakes and are distributed, apparently, for provocative purposes. R.A. MEDVEDEV – A.D. SAKHAROV.

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Wow. Imagine how different history would have been if this advice had been taken. Unfortunately, it seems almost ridiculously idealistic to me.

Except that this advice was taken. Gorbachev implemented a series of reforms related to freedom of information, freedom to criticize the state, other democratic/human rights reforms, and even some market freedoms/forms of capitalism. (To be clear, I'm not trying to imply that the Gorbachev years were some pinnacle of human civilization; they were not. I'm also not an expert on any of this.) Some believe that it was this opening up led to the ultimate downfall of the Soviet system.

Interestingly, there's an argument that Gorbachev's reforms may have actually reduced democracy, and the standard of living of the middle class, achieving the opposite of their intentions. Because the reforms only really got going in 1988  many historians argue that it was too late by then, as nobody under the age of 75 by 1988 had any experience living or participating in an entrepreneurial economy, unlike China where the gap was only a single generation long.

However, the party elites that lived abroad and/or had full access to western media still obviously had the savvy here and there. So the reforms effectively forced a highly stratified economic oligarchy of a few thousand into existence out of the party nomenklatura and their relatives, and some lucky hanger ons, who numbered in the tens of thousands.

Oh.

Well, now I 1. am embarrassed at my lack of historical knowledge and 2. am befuddled about how it was possible for something so huge and sweeping and seemingly idealistic to actually get implemented. Like, I cannot imagine America ever doing something like that. (Partly because it already is a democracy, partly because everyone in the government is corrupt and inept.)

Understanding some background is necessary to realize the importance of the recipients of this letter. The Central Committee of the CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had overlapping membership and would have contained practically everyone of serious authority in the Soviet Union.

And since they were, theoretically, supposed to represent every major group, if they approved a course of action there shouldn't have been any internal forces capable of derailing the plan.

Like spending vast resources on an even more sophisticated version of the Space Shuttle in the waning days of their country just because they couldn't figure out why the Americans made something so obviously inefficient and thus must have had some secret, nefarious, purpose, and therefore required a Soviet response.

Or spending incredible amounts on weapon systems to counter the mostly paper SDI projects that some smart folks in the Reagan Administration dreamed up. They even launched a demo version of their orbiting laser battlestation. At a time when shortages of consumer goods became the norm...

Naturally, since these projects were done under the tightest secrecy, the common people had difficulty figuring out why the ostensibly mighty Soviet economy with such a huge industrial base couldn't even keep sausages in stock and so became ever more skeptical.

How big is this megaproject effect when compared for example the fraction that black budjets grab US attention today?

Since the true details of the black budget in the US are mysterious to me as well, I'd rather not speculate. 

But here's an anecdote involving Kosygin about how detached politics and economics can become, even if everyone of high authority in the country are literally on the same committee. Which may partially answer your question.

"I would say that he [Kosygin] was a man who wanted to engage not in politics, but only in economics. He didn't like Khrushchev, he didn't like Brezhnev very much. When I asked him about the program of transition to communism by the year 2000, which is part of the CPSU program, he replied: "It does not concern me, I did not participate in this matter." But somehow, when we were alone, I asked: "But where did the numbers come from? It should have passed through you, shouldn't it?" "No," he says, "I wasn't consulted." "But you showed me your report, there are other figures." And he answers: "Well, it's clear that we don't do what's written." I say, "So where do these numbers come from?" He silently points his finger at the ceiling."

  • T.I. Oyzerman

Fascinating. Perhaps I should read about Soviet history. Seems there's a lot of lessons to learn here.

The Space Shuttle could pick satellites out of orbit. There was a reference mission that the military demanded the shuttle be capable of, involving grabbing a (possibly enemy) satellite and landing immediately. This mission drove (compromised) the design. There was also the possibility of using the shuttle for rapid first strike capability, destabilizing MAD. The Soviet military was right to be concerned.

I haven't looked at the USSR's budget but I'm skeptical that Big Science is the cause of their downfall. There was also the Afghan War, the fundamental weakness of socialist economics, the high costs of autarky and the geographic disadvantages of Russia. I bring this up because Big Science spending is a frequent target in the modern West among people who think "our money is better spent elsewhere." These types don't know (or don't care) that Big Science is tiny fraction of our economy and the government's budget.

The supposed military mission of a satellite snatcher doesn't make sense as by the late 70s both sides had the means to monitor all their satellites 24/7 and could detect if a satellite was taken or modified somehow, and could supply credible evidence to every other country, the UN, etc., of such an event. Needless to say, this would just lead to an escalation spiral and/or be an embarrassment.

Which is likely why the US never tried to snatch a Soviet/Russian satellite, and the capability remained unused.

Maybe the US Air Force and/or Pentagon knew this already but insisted anyways just so they could get a veto on the project they knew would be unaffordable on a purely civilian basis. i.e. this would imply they sabotaged NASA to preserve their importance.

The more prosaic reason for such an inefficient design is simple pork barrel politics.