From the last thread:
From Costanza's original thread (entire text):
"This is for anyone in the LessWrong community who has made at least some effort to read the sequences and follow along, but is still confused on some point, and is perhaps feeling a bit embarrassed. Here, newbies and not-so-newbies are free to ask very basic but still relevant questions with the understanding that the answers are probably somewhere in the sequences. Similarly, LessWrong tends to presume a rather high threshold for understanding science and technology. Relevant questions in those areas are welcome as well. Anyone who chooses to respond should respectfully guide the questioner to a helpful resource, and questioners should be appropriately grateful. Good faith should be presumed on both sides, unless and until it is shown to be absent. If a questioner is not sure whether a question is relevant, ask it, and also ask if it's relevant."
Meta:
- How often should these be made? I think one every three months is the correct frequency.
- Costanza made the original thread, but I am OpenThreadGuy. I am therefore not only entitled but required to post this in his stead. But I got his permission anyway.
Meta:
- I still haven't figured out a satisfactory answer to the previous meta question, how often these should be made. It was requested that I make a new one, so I did.
- I promise I won't quote the entire previous threads from now on. Blockquoting in articles only goes one level deep, anyway.
Counterexample:
A man seduces a female movie star into a one night stand and secretly records a sex tape. He would prefer to blackmail the movie star for lots of money, but if that fails he would rather release the tape to the press for a smaller amount of money + prestige than he would just do nothing. The movie star's preference ordering is for nothing to happen, for her to pay out, then lastly for the press to find out. The optimal choice is for her to pay out, because if she pre-commits to not give in to blackmail, she will receive the worst possible outcome.
This seems to fall squarely under blackmail, yet requires no pre-committment, iteration, or bluffing.
That's a promise, not a threat, by Schelling's terminology. Once the movie start upholds her end of the bargain, the man has no incentive to keep his promise, and every incentive to break it.
Is there something game-theoretic about blackmail that makes it an identifiable subset of the group threats + promises? Note that Schelling also describes a negotiating position that is neither threat nor promise, but the combination of the two. And that's not exactly blackmail either. I suspect you could come up with a blackmail scenario that fits any of the three groupings.