What is "real world intentionality"? If that's the only difference between your definitions of a tool and an agent, it's probably important to spell out explicitly what you mean.
It is intentionality as required for following an English statement 'maximize paperclips' to the spirit of it, instead of doing what the tools we can make for maximizing paperclips would do (which is very distinct from maximizing paperclips).
edit: Basically, the 'paperclip maximizer' as defined here would follow lines of reasoning like 'if I modify my sensory processing module in such a way that increases number of paperclips it outputs, that will decrease the expected number of paperclips in the real world, and so I will refrain from doing so', same for any self modification that breaks the correspondence between real world paperclips and the number with which agent represents them. The tool would not follow such line of reasoning. It is easy to see, from external perspective, if an action breaks this correspondence. Internally you don't have extra definition of real world paperclip spring out of nothingness and tell you, no this breaks the correspondence.
Understanding this definition would require me to understand your distinction between tools and agents, which already depends upon the definition of "real world intentionality".
Can you tell me what it means in simpler terms?
hmm did you see edit?
I think putting it as distinction between tools and agents is perhaps not very clear, but there isn't a lot of words to choose from. The good way to understand would be to understand how the software which we know how to make, and do make, works, and what it does, and how it is fundamentally different from compressed English statement like 'paperclip maximizing'.
In simpler terms, say, you have children. You want your children (in real world) to be safe; you do not want mere belief that they are safe while they are not. This is real world intentionality. It seems very simple but it gets very elusive when you note that 'your children' is defined within your mind, their safety is defined within your mind, and that you can't do anything but work towards a state of belief.
Most interestingly still, you can update definitions, so that e.g. you can opt to destructively mind upload children into a remote backup if you anticipate high likelihood of imminent destruction of your household by a meteorite strike, and have no non-destructive scanning. At same time this ability to update makes other people kill their children and themselves to go into heaven. This flexibility is insecure against your own problem solver.
Does "real world intentionality" amount to desiring both X and desiring that X hold in the "real world"?
If the simulation hypothesis is true, are humans still agents?
I don't think humans do have such real world volition, regardless of simulation hypothesis being true or false. Humans seem to have a blacklist of solutions that are deemed wrong, and that's it. The blacklist gets selected by the world (those using bad blacklists don't reproduce a whole lot), but isn't really product of reasoning, and the effective approach to reproduction relies on entirely fake ultimate goals (religion), and seem to work only for a low part of intelligence range.
Agents includes humans by definition, but doesn't mean humans will have attributes that you think agents should have.
If not even humans satisfy your definition of agent (which was, at least a couple comments ago, a tool possessing "real world intentionality"), then why is your version of the tool/agent distinction worthwhile?
My impression is that the tool/agent distinction is really about whether we use the social-modeling parts of our brain. It's a question not about the world as much as about what's a fruitful outlook. Modeling humans as humans works well -- we are wired for this. Anthropomorphizing the desires of software or robots is only sometimes useful.
We may need another word for "agent with intentionality" - the way the word "agent" is conventionally used is closer to "daemon", i.e. tool set to run without user intervention.
I'm not sure even having a world-model is a relevant distinction - I fully expect sysadmin tools to be designed to form something that could reasonably be called a world model within my working lifetime (which means I'd be amazed if they don't exist now). A moderately complex Puppet-run system can already be a bit spooky.
Note that mere daemon-level tools exist that many already consider unFriendly, e.g. high-frequency trading systems.
A more mundane example:
The Roomba cleaning robot is scarcely an agent. While running, it does not build up a model of the world; it only responds to immediate stimuli (collisions, cliff detection, etc.) and generates a range of preset behaviors, some of them random.
It has some senses about itself — it can detect a jammed wheel, and the "smarter" ones will return to dock to recharge if the battery is low, then resume cleaning. But it does not have a variable anywhere in its memory that indicates how clean it believes the room is — an explicit representation of a utility function of cleanliness, or "how well it has done at its job". It does, however, have a sensor for how dirty the carpet immediately below it is, and it will spend extra time on cleaning especially dirty patches.
Because it does not have beliefs about how clean the room is, it can't have erroneous beliefs about that either — it can't become falsely convinced that it has finished its job when it hasn't. It just keeps sweeping until it runs out of power. (We can imagine a paperclip-robot that doesn't think about paperclips; it just goes around finding wire and folding it. It cannot be satisfied, because it doesn't even have a term for "enough paperclips"!)
It is scarcely an agent. To me it seems even less "agenty" than an arbitrage daemon, but that probably has more to do with the fact that it's not designed to interact with other agents. But you can set it on the floor and push the go button, and in an hour come back to a cleaner floor. It doesn't think it's optimizing anything, but its behavior has the result of being useful for optimizing something.
Whether an entity builds up a model of the world, or is self-aware or self-protecting, is to some extent an implementation detail, which is different from the question of whether we want to live around the consequences of that entity's actions.
The agent/tool distinction is in the map, not the territory — it's a matter of adopting the intentional stance toward whatever entity we're talking about. To some extent, saying "agent" means treating the entity as a black box with a utility function printed on the outside: "the print spooler wants to send all the documents to the printer" — or "this Puppet config is trying to put the servers in such-and-so state ..."
My roomba does not just keep sweeping until it runs out of power. It terminates quickly in a small space and terminates slower in a large space. To terminate it must somehow sense the size of the space it is working in and compare it to some register of how long it has operated.
Roombas try to build up a (very limited) model of how big the room is from the longest uninterrrupted traversal it can sense. See "Can you tell me more about the cleaning algorithm that the Roomba uses?" in http://www.botjunkie.com/2010/05/17/botjunkie-interview-nancy-dussault-smith-on-irobots-roomba/
It's very hard to avoid apparent teleology when speaking in English. (This is particularly troublesome when talking about evolution by natural selection, where the assumption of teleology is the number one barrier to comprehending how it actually works.)
Very good point on need for another word.
To think about it, I think what we need is understanding of enormous gap between the software we design when we have some intent in mind, and fulfilling that intent itself.
For example, if I have intent to get from point A to point B on terrain, I could build a solution consisting of 2 major parts:
A philosopher thinking about it could think up a mover-from-point-A-to-point-B which directly implements my 'wish' to get from A to B. It will almost certainly expose me to non-survivable accelerations, or worse yet, destroy buildings on its path (because in the wish i forgot to tell not to). That is because when you employ verbal reasoning you are thinking directly starting from intent.
Alas, we do not know how to reduce intent to something that is not made of intent.
edit: that is, in the mind of philosopher, the thing is actually minimizing - or maximizing - some metric along a real world path. We don't know how to do that. We do not know how we do that. We don't even know we actually do that ourselves.
edit: We might figure out how to do that, but it is separate problem from either improvements to my first bullet point, or my second bullet point.
Other thing that I forgot to mention: the relationship between the solver and the model is inherently different than the relationship between self driving car and the world. The solver has god's eye view, that works in high level terms. The car looks through sensors. The solver can not be directly connected to the real world, or even to a reductionist detailed physics simulator (too hard to define the comfortable path when the car, too, is made of atoms).
Note that mere daemon-level tools exist that many already consider unFriendly, e.g. high-frequency trading systems.
There's the AK47 rifle: you pull trigger, the bullets come out one after another...
heh. An AK-47 is more on the "tool" level. That variety of unfriendliness on the "daemon" level would be an automated motion-sensing gun turret.
But to someone from muzzle-loader times, AK47 would look rather daemon-like, it auto reloads and fires... and to someone with a self driving battle tank squad that runs itself using an AI from Starcraft or something, the motion sensing turret is just another land mine.
True. It's a gradient, not entirely discrete. C was once a high-level language, now it's a portable assembler. Tools get ridiculously more sophisticated as we ride up Moore's Law, while still being creatures of computer science that instantiate discrete mathematics.
As I said over in that other thread, a necessary (though not sufficient, I think) difference between "daemon" and "independent agent" will be the optimisation of thinking up new optimisations. I would expect that compiler writers are all over this stuff already and that there's a considerable body of work on the subject.
And then there's deciding if a lossy optimisation will do the job, which is where as a sysadmin I would not be entirely comfortable with my tools doing this unsupervised. (loose analogy: I know I can't tell a 320kbps MP3 from a 24/96 FLAC, but it took ten years of A/B testing on humans for MP3 encoders not to suck.)
Hmm, in my view it is more of a goal distinction than abilities distinction.
The model popular here is that of 'expected utility maximizer', and the 'utility function' is defined on the real world. Then the agent does want to build most accurate model of the real world, to be able to maximize that function the best, and the agent tries to avoid corruption of the function, etc. It also wants it's outputs to affect the world, and if put in a box, will try to craft output to do things in the real world even if you only wanted to look at them.
This is all very ontologically basic to humans. We easily philosophize about such stuff.
Meanwhile, we don't know how to do that. We don't know how to reduce that world 'utility' to elementary operations performed on the sensory input (neither directly nor on meta level). The current solution involves making some part that creates/updates mathematically defined problem that other part finds mathematical solutions to, and then the solutions are shown if it is a tool or get applied to the real world if it isn't. The wisdom of applying those solutions to the real world is an entirely separate issue. The point is that the latter works like a tool if boxed, not like a caged animal (or a caged human).
edit: another problem i think is that many of the 'difficulty of friendliness' arguments are just special cases of general 'difficulty of world intentionality'.
The model popular here is that of 'expected utility maximizer', and the 'utility function' is defined on the real world.
I think this is a bit of a misperception stemming from the use of the "paperclip maximizer" example to illustrate things about instrumental reasoning. Certainly folk like Eliezer or Wei Dai or Stuart Armstrong or Paul Christiano have often talked about how a paperclip maximizer is much of the way to FAI (in having a world-model robust enough to use consequentialism). Note that people also like to use the AIXI framework as a model, and use it to talk about how AIXI is set up not as a paperclip maximizer but a wireheader (pornography and birth control rather than sex and offspring), with its utility function defined over sensory inputs rather than a model of the external world.
For another example, when talking about the idea of creating an AI with some external reward that can be administered by humans but not as easily hacked/wireheaded by the AI itself people use the example of an AI designed to seek factors of certain specified numbers, or a proof or disproof of the Riemann hypothesis according to some internal proof-checking mechanism, etc, recognizing the role of wireheading and the difficulty of specifying goals externally rather than using simple percepts and the like.
Just to correct some side-points you touched on: paperclips maximizers are robust against the wireheading failure mode because they recognize that forcing one's sensors to deviate from the true world state introduces a corresponding discount in the value of making its reading reach a desired level.
Certainly, one could theoretically hijack a clippy's sensors into giving them bad information about the rate of paperclip production, but this is different from saying that a clippy would someone decide to maximize (in violation of its causal diagram heuristics) the imperfect value of an approximator when it is knowably in a dangerously wrong setting.
How do they define the true world state, anyway? And discriminate between actions that decrease deviation vs increase deviation?
Why would tools for which the failure-mode of the tool just wireheading itself was common be built?
Ugh, because we don't know other way to do it?
You don't need to implement 'real world intentionality' (even if you can, which may well not be the case) to prevent any particular tool from wireheading. You just make it non general purpose enough, which simultaneously prevents foom, but if you don't believe in foom, what do you lose?
To clarify some point that is being discussed in several threads here, tool vs intentional agent distinction:
A tool for maximizing paperclips would - for efficiency purposes - have a world-model which it has god's eye view of (not accessing it through embedded sensors like eyes), implementing/defining a counter of paperclips within this model. Output of this counter is what is being maximized by a problem solving portion of the tool. Not the real world paperclips
No real world intentionality exist in this tool for maximizing paperclips; the paperclip-making-problem-solver would maximize the output of the counter, not real world paperclips. Such tool can be hooked up to actuators, and to sensors, and made to affect the world without human intermediary; but it won't implement real world intentionality.
An intentional agent for maximizing paperclips is the familiar 'paperclip maximizer', that truly loves the real world paperclips and wants to maximize them, and would try to improve it's understanding of the world to know if it's paperclip making efforts are successful.
The real world intentionality is ontologically basic in human language and consequently there is very strong bias to describe the former as the latter.
The distinction: the wireheading (either direct or through manipulation of inputs) is a valid solution to the problem that is being solved by the former, but not by the latter. Of course one could rationalize and postulate tool that is not general purpose enough as to wirehead, forgetting that the issue being feared is a tool that's general purpose to design better tool or self improve. That is an incredibly frustrating feature of rationalization. The aspects of problem are forgotten when thinking backwards.
The issues with the latter: We do not know if humans actually implement real world intentionality in such a way that it is not destroyed under full ability to self modify (and we can observe that we very much like to manipulate our own inputs; see art, porn, fiction, etc). We do not have single certain example of such stable real world intentionality, and we do not know how to implement it (that may well be impossible). We also are prone to assuming that two unsolved problems in AI - general problem solving and this real world intentionality - are a single problem, or are solved necessarily together. A map compression issue.