Today's post, Hold Off On Proposing Solutions was originally published on 17 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Proposing Solutions Prematurely is dangerous, because it introduces weak conclusions in the pool of the facts you are considering, and as a result the data set you think about becomes weaker, overly tilted towards premature conclusions that are likely to be wrong, that are less representative of the phenomenon you are trying to model than the initial facts you started from, before coming up with the premature conclusions.
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Sense of urgency makes it harder to apply learned-but-not-grokked heuristics like "discuss, then solve".
They think of a possible solution immediately, and don't want to risk forgetting it, or someone else proposing their solution and getting credit.
They expect to gain status for solving, not for proposing discussions of, problems.
They think "hold off on proposing solutions" applies to some limited domain of problems only.
This is the biggest problem of these, and needs a solution even in the cases you end up not proposing solutions since many useful solutions are forgotten this way.