I recently read (in Dawkins' The Ancestor's Tale) about the Alu sequence, and went on to read about transposons generally. Having as I do a rather broad definition of life, I concluded that Alu (and others like it) are lifeforms in their own right, although parasitic ones. I found the potential ethical implications somewhat staggering, especially given the need to shut up and multiply those implications by the rather large number of transposon instances in a typical multicellular organism.
I have written out my thoughts on the subject, at http://jttlov.no-ip.org/writings/alulife.htm. I don't claim to have a well-worked out position, just a series of ideas and questions I feel to be worthy of discussion.
ETA: I have started editing the article based on the discussion below. For reference with the existing discussion, I have preserved a copy of the original article as well, linked from the current version.
Hmm. I do understand that, but I still don't think it's relevant. I don't try to argue that Premise 1 is true (except in a throwaway parenthetical which I am considering retracting), rather I'm arguing that Premise 2 is true, and that consequently Premise 1 implies the conclusion ("transposons have ethical value") which in turn implies various things ranging from the disconcerting to the absurd. In fact I believed Premise 1 (albeit without great examination) until I learned about transposons, and now I doubt it (though I haven't rejected it so far; I'm cognitively marking it as "I'm confused about this"). That's why I felt there was something worth writing about: namely, that transposons expose the absurdity of an assumption that had previously been part of my moral theory, and by extension may perhaps be part of others'.
Edit: well, that's one reason I wrote the article. The other reason was to raise the questions in the hope of creating a discussion through which I might come to better understand the problem.
Further edit: actually, I'm not sure the first reason was my reason for writing the article; I think I was indeed (initially) arguing for Premise 1, and I have been trying to make excuses and pretend I'd never argued for it. Yet I still can't let go of Premise 1 completely. Thought experiment: imagine a planet with a xenobiology that only supports plant life - nothing sentient lives there or could do so - and there is (let us assume) no direct benefit to us to be derived from its existence. Would we think it acceptable to destroy that planet? I think not, yet the obvious "feature conferring ethical value on humans and chimps" would be sentience. I remain confused.
I think this scenario is a little difficult to visualize- an entire biosphere we can't derive a benefit from, even for sheer curiosity's sake? So, applying the LCPW: the planet has been invaded by a single species of xenokudzu, which has choked out all other life but is thriving merrily... (read more)