I can think of one big advantage of charity over politics: Giving to politics is rent-seeking behavior. If you give money to support politicians against/for dairy tariffs, then you encourage the other side to give money to their politicians who are for/against dairy tariffs. In this game matrix, "cooperate" is don't give money.
I have a hard time swallowing the ten trillion dollar figure. I don't think the two parties are really that different, and there's good, game theory for them to be that way.
I think there is a market for some sort of organization by which a person who wants to donate $50 to the Democrats can contact a person who wants to donate $50 to the Republicans and mutually agree to donate their collective $100 to some third-party cause like world hunger instead.
I like this idea, but how do you verify that the donation would have gone to the political party? If I'm inclined to give $50 to a non-political-party charity, then there's incentive for me to claim it would go to the party I prefer in order to get one of my political opponents to divert money from the Bad Guys to another cause.
Perhaps the matched donors have to agree on a charity and an amount: you pay into the system, and if you get matched, then the non-political charity gets your money, and if you don't (after some waiting period), then the political charity does. This means you have to at least not mind the money going to the political charity, or be willing to gamble.
Tangientially, this post assumes that there are only two reasons to vote: to affect policy directly, or to signal/express affiliation. But what about structural voting?
More important to me than any specific political issue is my desire to live in a country roughly like the US and the rest of the industrialized world: rich, relatively well-administered and safe, and not dictatorial. Of course there are relative strengths and weaknesses of different countries and different political factions, but these are all overshadowed by the fact that we all think it's pretty great not to be North Korea.
Civic engagement of various sorts probably helps keep that fate away. On the margin, your vote contributes practically nothing to preventing your home country from looking like North Korea. But a political/structural catastrophe would be so very bad that voting might be worth it on those grounds alone.
(This is related to Eliezer's point in "The American System and Misleading Labels" where he argues that the voter's real power is to threaten to throw the bums out, or even foment revolution. The vote doesn't give you a great deal of power to enact your favorite legislation; it does provide a rough sort of check against any politician doing something ridiculously, impossibly awful. Prevention of "ridiculously awful" behavior is much more important, in my view, than fine-scale policy manipulation.)
I think there is a significant bias to overestimate the impact of who wins the Presidential election on policy. Look at how many of the Bush policies were continued by Obama. Normally that's used as a condemnation of Obama, but I think it's much better interpreted as evidence that the guy at the top doesn't matter that much - whoever wins is subject to almost the same set of pressures from interest groups, constraints based on who has what powers & goals, etc, which has a huge effect on policy.
In the tribe, you saw everyone, so you saw everyone with political influence. In the modern world, you only see a few politicians, and so you assume that's where the influence is, but you don't see the millions of unelected bureaucrats, and they also have power.
She estimates that she has a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of casting the deciding vote
Why is this not a confusion? It seems on the face of it that since voters' decisions are correlated, your decision accounts for behavior of other people as well, and so you are not only casting one vote with your decision, but many votes simultaneously.
Do you believe that my decision to vote is as like to acausally influence my opponents into voting as it is my supporters? If so, and if we can expect about equal amounts of both, doesn't that produce the same problem?
Acausal influence stems from other processes similar to you. This can be a simulated version of you, on whose action the simulating agent's choices depend. Or it can just be someone else like you, who's likely to some degree to decide the same thing for some of the same reasons.
It also bears noting that humans are social creatures: even ignoring acausal considerations, you getting out to vote will increase the probability that people who know you will also get out to vote. E.g. researchers in one study visited two-person households and encouraged them to go out and vote. Afterwards, it was shown that the people the researchers talked to were 10 percent more likely to go out and vote (as compared to people in a control group who were encouraged to recycle, IIRC). But the other person in the household, who had not been spoken to, w...
She estimates that she has a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of casting the deciding vote, for an expected value of $0.02 from improved policy.
But suppose she is a member of a cheese-lover's club with 10,000 members nationwide. If the club votes as a bloc, the chance that the bloc's votes are decisive is 1 in 100, and the expected gain per club member is $200, enough to motivate the effort and time of voting.
So how does the club handle the "free rider" problem? Well, one way would be to organize car pools to bring groups of 4 voters to the polls. Peo...
Doesn't your chance of swaying an election depend on how close it is? If your favored candidate is way ahead or way behind, then changing a few thousand votes doesn't matter. Whereas charity always has some marginal effect.
Also, influencing an election depends on the difference between the candidates. Which not only may be small, but may be difficult to predict, both due to reneging on campaign promises and to specialization - one candidate may do better in a recession, the other in a war. If you pick the wrong guy, your money has negative effect. All...
Politicians look at election results, and calibrate their political platforms accordingly. If they win by a lot, they keep doing what they were doing, and some are encouraged to become even more extreme.
See Voting Kills for more on this topic.
In a 'direct democracy' system where the general population vote directly to change and implement policies, then discussing about the behavior of these individual voters would be sensible.
But in a 'representative democracy', like the United States, the people don't vote directly for policies. They vote for representatives in Congress to 'represent' their interests. It is these representatives that actually vote to change and implement policies. The chance of these represenatives casting the deciding vote is 1/535 (1/100 in Senate, 1/435 in the HoR), and th...
The key question, however, is:
What is the relationship between purchased votes and policy outcomes?
It seems to me that the entire running theme of this post greatly underestimates the uncertainty of any feasible answer to this question, and that it also greatly overplays the strength of this relationship. In modern Western political systems, the effective role of elected politicians is far smaller and subject to much stronger and more complicated constraints than people who care about day-to-day politics commonly imagine.
Another source of great uncer...
multifoliaterose:
What evidence do you have to support this claim?
To answer your question fully, I would have to expound my entire theory of the modern state, which would unfortunately require much more time and space than can be dedicated to a blog comment. So what I write will be very cursory, simplified, and incomplete.
The basic insight is that elected politicians are transitory and in constant danger of having their careers destroyed by bad PR, while the bureaucrats are entrenched like the rock of Gibraltar, constantly running circles around politicians and preventing them from doing anything that deviates significantly from the direction in which things are carried by the bureaucratic inertia. Politicians lack any means to dislodge the bureaucrats, who can in turn make their life miserable in many different ways. In case there's a direct conflict, the politician loses without exception. The only sensible strategy, which successful politicians inevitably follow, is to simply give up any thought of such conflict.
Of course, the bureaucrats won't mind if politicians do things that create more bureaucracy, but even in that case, the actual consequences of such measures are pri...
MichaelVassar:
It looks to me like the Carter and Reagan administrations in the US and the Thatcher administration in the UK really did greatly cut back the bureaucracy fairly successfully.
Carter's (of all people!) deregulation of airlines and the subsequent phase-out of the CAB was indeed a rare example of politicians effectively shutting down an entire bureaucratic agency. The rest of Carter's record is very different, though; for one, his administration created the federal departments of education and energy. (And frankly, I'd be surprised if any major CAB bureaucrats actually got laid off rather than transferred to equally cushy positions.)
Regarding Reagan, I disagree. His ascent was indeed seen back then -- with hope or horror, depending on whom you asked -- as a reactionary tsunami that would sweep away huge parts of the federal bureaucracy, and he openly campaigned on this sentiment. Yet, in practice, he achieved almost nothing. This tremendous populist momentum crashed against the Washington bureaucracy while barely making a dent in it. Reagan didn't even manage to eliminate the fledgling education and energy departments that Carter had just created, which he promised ...
Thanks for writing this, Carl. I'm going to post a link in the GWWC forum.
Here are some papers you should add to your bibliography, if you haven't already:
What is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference? Voting as a Rational Choice
In the first paper, his probability estimate is 1 in 60 million on average for a voter in a US presidential election, 1 in 10 million in the best cases (New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado).
If you focused on the best case, that could mean an order of magnitude for you.
Politicians might have been tricked by an initial baseless belief in the efficacy of campaign spending, with the most popular candidates also raising the most money and creating a spurious self-fulfilling correlation. However, selection over time would be expected to wear away at such mistaken beliefs.
Not if incumbency advantage exerts such a powerful effect that selection on this trait has relatively little influence. Honestly, I do think that money helps politicians get elected, but it seems worth pointing out that there are structural reasons to sus...
I take it that you're using the standard wrong classical causal decision theory (in which no one is responsible for the election outcome unless one side wins by a single vote, in which case millions of voters are all solely responsible for the entire election outcome) out of either misguided humility about the probability of an SIAI-originating decision theory being correct, or because you're planning to publish this paper elsewhere and you don't want to invoke Hofstadterian superrationality in place of the standard wrong decision theory?
I don't think this should be downvoted (was at -2 when I wrote this). I generally downvote only those things that are either trolling or that will have the same effect because the discussion will spiral in horribly non-truthy directions. This comment seems to me like it is a legitimate question, with a legitimate answer, that may lead to productive plans for the future.
The question is legitimate because UDT/TDT/etc are concepts that are basically novel to LW but that we would hope could be developed to the point of practical utility if LW is going to be shine in some way other than being a popularizing mechanism for academic research.
The answer follows from the same thinking that explains why the question is legitimate.
With classical decision theory you're basically just trying to figure out the costs and benefits of multiple options with some uncertainty mixed in. Then you pick the one that adds up to "the best thing". The formal math basically exhorts you to simply perform numerical multi-pronged due diligence which most people don't do for most things but that "decision theory" can encourage them to do in a structured way. It gives them a research keyw...
Bush did not kill 10 billion current people (at $1,000 per life) and he massively increased health-oriented foreign aid to Africa
Bush wasn't a candidate in the 2008 presidential election, so it itself it's irrelevant what he did or didn't do. (Of course, you could make the meta argument that a Republican president is likely to behave similarly to another Republican president).
Jane estimates the probability of her vote tilting the presidential election at 1 in 1,000,000; Eric estimates the probability of his vote tilting the presidential election at 1 in 100,000,000. I find both of these estimates orders of magnitude too low.
Eric presumably is modeling the election by saying that with 100,000,000 voters (besides himself), there are 100,000,001 outcomes of their votes, only one of which is a tie which his vote will break. But his conclusion that the odds of deciding the election are about 1 in 100,000,000 assumes that all of thes...
What is the probability your vote will make a difference? seems to be the state-of-the-art in the "deciding vote" type of reasoning. It concludes "On average, a voter in America had a 1 in 60 million chance of being decisive in the presidential election."
Interesting post, but I remain skeptical of electoral politics as charity because I am skeptical that even an extremely strong rationalist can identify the best candidate.
But here is an experiment that would reduce my skepticism.
Find a pair of experimental subjects I would consider strong rationalists who have both informed themselves about some election past or present. Since it would be convenient for our pool of potential subjects to contain people who want the experiment to succeed or want it to fail, ask the subjects to swear that they have never com...
Doesn't it seem that politics and charity are not always substitutes?
If you want, say, money to go to disease eradication in Africa, voting in the US doesn't help much for that, but donating to private charity does.
The question becomes interesting when the same aim could be served either by voting or by charity, and we want to estimate which is more effective. There are two main examples I can think of: social services to the poor in one's own country (which can be provided either by government or by private charity), and changing laws (which can be a...
If the cost of voting is $50 to $500, that is very efficient for most people. However if the value of voting is maybe an order of magnitude less (a number I chose because it "felt right" and without heavy analysis) the value of voting is potentially around $5.
So that means, voting is worthwhile if it will be fast, if it will have signalling benefits, or if you make less than $10/hour or so.
On the other hand, if there is a campaign with a huge amount of value between candidates, the value of a vote could skyrocket to $500 and make it worthwhile for everyone to vote, even if it takes over an hour.
Do people agree with this (admittedly hasty) analysis?
Related to: Shut up and multiply, Politics is the mind-killer, Pascal's Mugging, The two party swindle, The American system and misleading labels, Policy Tug-of-War
Jane is a connoisseur of imported cheeses and Homo Economicus in good standing, using a causal decision theory that two-boxes on Newcomb's problem. Unfortunately for her, the politically well-organized dairy farmers in her country have managed to get an initiative for increased dairy tariffs on the ballot, which will cost her $20,000. Should she take an hour to vote against the initiative on election day?
She estimates that she has a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of casting the deciding vote, for an expected value of $0.02 from improved policy. However, while Jane may be willing to give her two cents on the subject, the opportunity cost of her time far exceeds the policy benefit, and so it seems she has no reason to vote.
Jane's dilemma is just the standard Paradox of Voting in political science and public choice theory. Voters may still engage in expressive voting to affiliate with certain groups or to signal traits insofar as politics is not about policy, but the instrumental rationality of voting to bring about selfishly preferred policy outcomes starts to look dubious. Thus many of those who say that we rationally ought to vote in hopes of affecting policy focus on altruistic preferences: faced with a tiny probability of casting a decisive vote, but large impacts on enormous numbers of people in the event that we are decisive, we should shut up and multiply, voting if the expected value of benefit to others sufficiently exceeds the cost to ourselves.
Meanwhile, at the Experimental Philosophy blog, Eric Schwitzgebel reports that philosophers overwhelmingly rate voting as very morally good (on a scale of 1 to 9), with voting placing right around donating 10% of one's income to charity. He offers the following explanation:
[Disclaimer: the above $10 trillion estimate is not mine. Bush did not kill 10 billion current people (at $1,000 per life) and he massively increased health-oriented foreign aid to Africa, which can expiate many sins in the GWWC calculus. Politics is the mind-killer, this is not about blue and green, etc.] So we have a model of politics as charity, on which it is more plausible that voting on policy could be rational. But why stop there? If voting (wisely) is a charitable activity, then spending money on political contributions to convince or mobilize others to vote (wisely) could be as well. For those who don't have moral objections to politics as charity (see the comments in this discussion for examples of such objections) political influence affect the voting behavior of others can be as well (provided compared to spending on tuberculosis treatment. We can attempt to remedy or analyze the "incredibly problematic" components to make better and better estimates. When thinking about effective philanthropy, would the marginal dollar do more good as a political campaign contribution or as a charitable donation for tuberculosis treatment?
Politics as effective charity?
This is not a new question for those interested in optimizing the impact of their charity. Giving What We Can (GWWC), founded by Future of Humanity Institute associate Toby Ord, is a group of people who have pledged to give at least ten percent of their incomes "to whichever organizations can most effectively use it to fight poverty in developing countries." GWWC notes that political advocacy may have high expected value, but has not recommended any organizations in that category, mentioning the difficulties of analysis as well as hope that it will be done in the future.
While those who care about future generations and existential risk might not choose to focus their charitable efforts on the task of GWWC, thinking about how political activity relates to it can still provide them a good example for a Fermi calculation. For instance, charity evaluator GiveWell, which posts its analysis online, estimates the cost of saving the life of a poor person alive today via their recommended charities as on the order of $3,000, giving a reasonably clear benchmark for political activity to exceed.
This post and its successors will lay some further groundwork for that Fermi calculation.
Are votes worth buying?
To make the comparison between political activity and GiveWell-style anti-poverty organizations as clear as possible we focus solely on money spent to convince or mobilize the votes of others (as opposed to one's own vote, which may be easy enough to exercise to be worthwhile, even if efforts to influence others are not).
We can then break up the initial analysis into three parts.
How much political spending is required to elicit a vote for a candidate under various conditions?
What is the relationship between purchased votes and policy outcomes?
What is our probability distribution over the value (in lives of the poor saved, for this example) of those policies?
We could then delve deeper into questions of decision theory, value, signaling and bias that are raised by the basic empirical picture. Today's post will focus on the first prong, the cost per vote elicited via political spending (in the context of a two-boxing decision theory, for the moment).
How much do votes sell for?
To begin the analysis, we can consider as our example contests for the most powerful elected office today: President of the United States. Three lines of American evidence stand out as relevant to assessing the cost per vote of campaign spending: the revealed behavior of politicians, correlational studies of spending and electoral outcomes, and experimental evidence from randomized trials. The first and third indicate relatively low cost per vote, while the second suggests higher costs. For the causal judgments we wish to draw, randomized experiments offer the most powerful evidence, and this analysis will lean heavily on them.
Revealed preference
In the United States, politicians dedicate an enormous proportion of their time to fundraising. Prima facie, this suggests that politicians, experts in getting elected, believe that fundraising will be at least as helpful to their election as other activities like personal appearances or actual governance. This is made more plausible by the tendency of politicians to spend more time fundraising and raise more money when facing serious challengers in their next election. Politicians might have been tricked by an initial baseless belief in the efficacy of campaign spending, with the most popular candidates also raising the most money and creating a spurious self-fulfilling correlation. However, selection over time would be expected to wear away at such mistaken beliefs.
Correlation studies
A number of correlational studies have been cited to advance the idea that 'campaigns don't matter' in U.S. presidential elections. Using information such as party identification, unemployment, economic growth, and the approval rating of the incumbent, political scientists can predict election outcomes surprisingly well before campaigning even begins. These correlations are only weak evidence of causation, however, since the fundamentals also predict fundraising capacity (more popular candidates do better at raising money from the public, and organized interests are more interested in buying influence with a candidate who looks likely to win). To be confident that additional spending will buy votes, one would ideally want robust randomized experiments capable of clearly indicating causal relationships.
Randomized experiments
Fortunately, the last several decades have seen a proliferation of randomized experiments and scientific methods in political campaigning. In these experiments, parties and political organizations randomly apply particular campaigning methods, often with the supervision of political scientists or other academics, and record the votes thus secured. One reference is Donald Green and Alan Gerber's Get Out the Vote, which reviews dozens of experiments bearing on the cost-effectiveness of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts.
The key results are summarized in a table on page 139 (viewable on the Google Books preview). The strongest well-confirmed effect is for door-to-door GOTV drives, which average 14 voters contacted to induce one vote (plus spillover effects), with a cost per vote of $29 (including spillover effects) assuming that staff time costs $16/hour for staff. Phone banks require more contacts per vote, but are cheaper per contact, with Green and Gerber estimating the cost per vote at $38 for campaign volunteer callers, and $90 for untrained commercial callers.
In recent years, the U.S. political parties have adjusted their GOTV strategy in line with these experiments, and turnout has increased. For instance, in 2004 Green and Gerber predicted predicted that the parties would increase GOTV spending by some $200 million using methods averaging $50 per vote, for an increase in turnout of 4 million, and the turnout data seems consistent with that. This money was concentrated in swing states, and in 2004 turnout increased 9% to 63% in the twelve most competitive states, while increasing 2% to 53% in the twelve least competitive states (while clearly leaving many potential voters home).
However, publication biases likely inflate the cost-effectiveness estimates here, perhaps drastically, and to get a solid (likely worse) estimate would require a detailed investigation of such biases. Many of these studies are weakly significant, inconsistent across circumstances, or involve degrees of freedom. The true cost per vote could easily be $1,000+.
Diminishing returns
But how finely targeted can GOTV efforts be? Adding n votes to both candidates in a two-candidate race is a disappointing result for those interested in affecting who wins in elections. A GOTV which mobilizes 1000 votes at the margin, but has 250 of them go to the non-preferred candidate, will be only half as effective as one that solely mobilized supporters of the preferred candidate. Fortunately for electoral campaigners, the candidate citizens will vote for (if mobilized) is often easy to determine. Voting behavior is highly predictable from rural vs urban location, ethnicity, age, past party registration, neighborhood, etc. With increasing spending on GOTV, increasingly less selected populations would need to be contacted. Depending on how much money is available (and accompanying diminishing returns as less polarized populations are approached) this might easily double or triple the cost per vote at the margin.
A further problem is that, since the forecast likelihood of a vote making the difference in an election varies widely across the country, other donors will also apply their resources disproportionately to closely contested elections. For instance, Gelman et al find that a U.S. presidential election vote in New Hampshire is around a hundred times as likely to make a difference as one in California. National presidential campaigns can efficiently allocate their resources in order of priority, with additional dollars going to relatively marginal regions. In non-national elections candidates may call in favors and tap war chests to deal with particularly close races, and empirical data do indicate increased spending in tight races. We can sanity-check an estimate of the cost per vote against total spending by national campaigns, e.g. the 2008 U.S. presidential race:
Candidate (Party)
Amount raised
Amount spent
Votes
Average spent per vote
Barack Obama (D)
$532,946,511
$513,557,218
69,498,215
$7.39
John McCain (R)
$379,006,485
$346,666,422
59,948,240
$5.78
Ralph Nader (I)
$4,496,180
$4,187,628
738,720
$5.67
Bob Barr (L)
$1,383,681
$1,345,202
523,713
$2.57
Chuck Baldwin (C)
$261,673
$234,309
199,437
$1.17
Cynthia McKinney (G)
$240,130
$238,968
161,680
$1.48
Excludes spending by independent expenditure concerns.
Source: Federal Election Commission[1]
These amounts are surprisingly small (relative to, e.g. the U.S. federal budget), and also include all non-GOTV interventions. Negative campaigning which reduces turnout for an opposing candidate is just as effective in winning elections (per vote) as increasing turnout for one's preferred side. Interventions which push 'swing voters' to vote for one candidate rather than the other are twice as effective as either per voter influenced.
Some ballpark VOI guesstimates
Much more analysis can obviously be done here, but as a first-pass estimate, it seems likely that the marginal cost per vote from spending on U.S. presidential general elections is higher than the $50 per vote Green and Gerber estimate for GOTV efforts, so consider a range of $50-$5000. Note that these are after-tax dollars if contributed directly to political campaigns, and non-profit efforts are constrained in their ability to back particular candidates and coordinate with their campaigns (although many activities can be funneled through non-profit vehicles).
What would that be worth? For those considering how to spend their effectiveness-focused philanthropy budget, we could use Eric's quick guesstimate of a 1 in 100,000,000 probability of a marginal vote swaying a presidential election. But if we consider ex ante close elections the number might be one in tens of millions (if one holds one's donations for close elections, although Gelman's figure of 1 in 10 million was for a specific election, using polls from immediately prior to election day, exaggerating the degree of certainty). Say we take 1 in 25 million as our number, assuming one waits for close elections to donate, but can't wait until just before election day.
Then in order for campaign spending to outperform the Against Malaria Foundation saving one child from death by malaria for ~$3,000+, the victory of the preferred candidate would need to be expected (given extensive uncertainty about candidates' future behavior, future conditions, and the effectiveness of various policies) to do good equivalent to preventing over 400 thousand to over 40 million extra malaria deaths, with higher numbers more likely.
With higher estimates of the campaign spending cost per vote, political donations would look less attractive, but voting oneself has potentially lower cost, the opportunity cost of reliably informing oneself (an essential cost) and voting. So carefully voting oneself might be useful volunteering, even if political donations are not worthwhile in this framework. One might think of it as spending a gift of political power from the state.
Continued in: Probability and Politics