Reaction to: Yudkowsky and Frank on Religious Experience, Yudkowksy and Frank On Religious Experience Pt 2, A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies
Frank's point got rather lost in all this. It seems to be quite simple: there's a warm fuzziness to life that science just doesn't seem to get, and some religious artwork touches on and stimulates this warm fuzziness, and hence is of value.1 Moreover, understanding this point seems rather important to being able to spread an ideology.
The main problem is viewing this warm fuzziness as a "mystery." This warm fuzziness, as an experience, is a reality. It's part of that set of things that doesn't go away no matter what you say or think about them. Women (or men) will still be alluring, food will still be delicious, and Michaelangelo's David will still be beautiful, no matter how well you describe these phenomenon. The view that shattering mysteries reduces their value is very much a result of religion trying to protect itself. EY is probably correct that science will one day destroy this mystery as it has so many others, but because it is an "experience we can't clearly describe" rather than an actual "mystery," the experience will remain. The argument is with the description, not the experience; the experience is real, and experiences of its nature are totally desirable.
The second, sub-point: Frank thinks that certain religious stories and artwork may be of artistic value. The selection of the story of Job is unfortunate, but both speakers value it for the same reason: its truth. One sees it as true (and inspiring) and likes it, the other sees it as false (and insidious) and hates it. I think both agree that if you put it on the shelf next to Tolkien, and rational atheists still buy it and enjoy it, hey, good for Job. And if not, well, throw it out with the rest of the trash.
Frank also has a point about rationality not being the only way to view the world. I think he's once again right, he's just really, tragically bad at expressing his point without borrowing heavily from religion. His point seems to be that rationality isn't the only way to *experience* the world, which is absolutely, 100% right. You don't experience the world through rationality. You experience it through your senses and the qualia of consciousness. Rationality is how you figure out what's going on, or what's going to be going on, or what causes one thing to happen and not another. Appreciating art, or food, or sex, or life is not generally done by applying rationality. Rationality is extremely useful for figuring out how to get these things we like, or even figure out what things we should like, but it doesn't factor into the qualitative experience of those things in most cases. For many people it probably doesn't factor into the enjoyment of anything. If you don't embrace and explain this distinction, you come out looking like Spock.
This seems to be a key point atheists fail to communicate, because it is logically irrelevant to the truth of their propositions. A lot of people avoid decisions that they believe will destroy everything that makes them happy, and I'm not sure we can blame them. It's important to explain that you can still have all kinds of warm fuzziness, and, even better, you can be really confident it's well-founded and avoid abysmal epistemology, too! Instead, the atheist tries to defeat some weird, religiously-motivated expression of warm fuzziness, and that becomes the debate, and people like their fuzzies.
We experience warm fuzziness directly,2 through however our brains work. No amount of science is likely to change that, no matter how well it understands the phenomenon. This is a good thing for science, and it's a good thing for warmth and fuzziness.
1- I have admittedly not read his book. It's quite possible he's advocating we actually go through religion and make it fit our current sensibilities, then take it as uber-fiction. If that's the case, I have serious problems with it. If that's not the case, and he just thinks that some of it contains truth/beauty/is salvagable as literature, then I have serious problems with the argumentum-ad-hitlerum employed against him, as it seems to burn a straw man.
2 - I'm not saying there's warm fuzziness in the territory and we put it in our map. There's something in the territory that, when we map it out, the mapping causes us to directly experience a feeling of warm fuzziness.
His reaction wasn't all that hostile. And a request being mild doesn't make the request reasonable, or make it unreasonable to be annoyed by it.
Not really? This is a baffling take. How does writing one comment about being annoyed by something compare to potentially years of committing to gender-neutral language, not just by using singular "they" (for example), but by replacing entire sentence clauses like "Women will still be alluring" with "The touch of another person's skin will still be wonderfully sensuous" (what??), even when you're obviously writing said sentence to reflect your own sensibilities more than the audience's and the sentence is easily generalizable anyway?
Not to mention that it's the principle of the thing. If you genuinely don't see any good reason why you should do a Thing at all, and perhaps even see some reasons why you shouldn't, it makes little to no difference that the Thing is supposedly "really easy" to do. That doesn't by itself constitute a good reason to do the Thing. (I realize part of conchis's argument against this in the first place is the burden it imposes, but I don't perceive that as their only argument. But even if that was their only argument, it still holds as long as "doing the Thing" is not strictly easier than not doing it. As opposed to only being easier than jumping through hoops.)
"Stuff like this" is a very broad category. I'm sure it wasn't deliberate, but you're essentially sneaking in anything vaguely related, including things that are reasonable to get upset about, to make conchis's position look worse.
For my part, I don't think it's illegitimate to be bothered by all "stuff like this"; but I do think it's illegitimate to be bothered by this specific sentence that Emily et al. complained about.
You're conflating the actual contested issue, "wanting this specific sentence, and perhaps similar sentences in similar contexts, to be gender neutral", with the broader and much less contested issue "wanting to be included". They are not equivalent. I am reminded of some webcomic's (forget which) sly attempt at discrediting people who are against political correctness, by replacing "being PC" with "being nice to people", even though "being nice" is not what political correctness often boils down to in practice, and is rarely what opponents are talking about or why they take issue.
I am a woman too, and I want to be included too. And yet, the sentence "Women will still be alluring" doesn't bother me at all. Because I am not excluded at all by that sentence. The fact that some women seem to perceive being excluded does not imply that this is what's actually happening.
If anything, I feel more excluded by the fact that the sentence was ultimately changed as a result of the complaints of a few women, even though I, also a woman, don't think it should have been changed. Why does my opinion matter less? (I'm not suggesting my perception of being excluded is well-founded, or worthy of demanding remedy; but my point is made either way.)
Not to mention that, just like "being nice", "being inclusive" is not always an imperative or even a reasonable restriction. It often is, but there are times where it isn't.
I believe conchis's argument is that the particular sentence under discussion shouldn't affect anyone personally. I'm inclined to agree.