Very comprehensive analysis by Brian Tomasik on whether (and to what extent) the simulation argument should change our altruistic priorities. He concludes that the possibility of ancestor simulations somewhat increases the comparative importance of short-term helping relative to focusing on shaping the "far future".
Another important takeaway:
[...] rather than answering the question “Do I live in a simulation or not?,” a perhaps better way to think about it (in line with Stuart Armstrong's anthropic decision theory) is “Given that I’m deciding for all subjectively indistinguishable copies of myself, what fraction of my copies lives in a simulation and how many total copies are there?"
I don't quite follow what the objection is. Suppose Alice and Bob design a simulation. They design it so that once started it will run with no interference from either of them or anyone else until it is done. Then Alice enters, while Bob does not; it then begins.
To the extent that this sim has gods, Alice is one. But there is no one outside with control. Also, the civilization did not all hop into the sim.
This is the case of the "dream-maker on full autopilot", right?
But I'm curious about Bob. Can Bob meddle with the simulation if he decides he wants to? Can he hit the off switch? Cut the wires? Smash the computing substrate into tiny little pieces?
Why so? Alice is not a god. She has no special ("supernatural") powers. Since we are talking about our empirical re... (read more)