One thing that struck me in the 2011 survey was that 90% of LW respondents were under age 38. I'm 57 myself. It seems that often rationality in planning our lives depends on estimates of what values and utility functions we will hold in the future. Has anyone looked systematically at what projected older versions of themselves would think, based on what relevant groups of existing older folks think?
"You'll understand when you're older" is an annoying form of argument. Arguably there's some grain of truth there when a 7-year-old tells you that sex is disgusting and he or she will never ever think it's anything but incredibly gross. But you could explain hormonal changes that as a matter of empirical fact change opinions on that subject in the vast majority of cases. I can't think of anything that dramatic that distinguishes 60-year-olds or 80-year-olds from 20-year-olds.
My dim recollection of studies is that on the whole as people age they tend to be less idealistic, more resigned to society the way it is rather than how it might be, and more constrained by realities of politics and economics (for starters).
I don't presume to offer anything in this regard based on my age, and in any case I'm only a single person (a nihilist when pressed, but one who finds himself happier pretending not to be and working sporadically for rationality, truth, justice, love, and all that good stuff).
When I read of cryonics, what comes to my mind is the escalating costs of health care and (as I see it) the need to curb the development of expensive life-extending medical procedures. Cryonics sounds instead like an extremely expensive procedure. Maybe no one is suggesting it be covered by health insurance, and it's just an option that some people pay out of pocket for. Even so, the "health care is a right, not a privilege" sentiment will mean that if it was shown to work, everyone would want it, and (in my estimation) society would go completely haywire in an unpleasant way.
Now, the substance of the above has probably been discussed elsewhere at length; I raise it is an example because when I was 21 I would have thought of it very differently than I do now.
The essay you link is pretty unconvincing to me. But even if I grant what Eliezer says there, I'm not sure how it applies to Bart's thought experiment. I can see the argument that the indefinite extension of human lifespans is just a natural extension of uncontroversial humanism (even though I disagree with the argument). We'd all agree that it would be a good thing to extend lifespans by 10 years, so why not 500 or a a million? A good ethical theory shouldn't build in arbitrary thresholds.
I don't see the analogous argument for Bart's thought experiment. Why is reviving people who are already dead (many of whom have been dead for long enough that they do not have any living acquaintances who mourn their passing) a natural extension of humanism? Could you explain why you think Eliezer's essay is relevant to Bart's question?
If you value life over death, then choosing to leave people dead when you could restore their life seems like an exception to me.
If we revive only those who are mourned by the currently living, those newly currently living people we just revived will mourn others. After some amount of iterations, we will have revived everybody.