I've written a prior post about how I think that the Everett branching factor of reality dominates that of any plausible simulation, whether the latter is run on a Von Neumann machine, on a quantum machine, or on some hybrid; and thus the probability and utility weight that should be assigned to simulations in general is negligible. I also argued that the fact that we live in an apparently quantum-branching world could be construed as weak anthropic evidence for this idea. My prior post was down-modded into oblivion for reasons that are not relevant here (style, etc.) If I were to replace this text you're reading with a version of that idea which was more fully-argued, but still stylistically-neutral (unlike my prior post), would people be interested?
I believe that even if this argument is fundamentally irresolvable on empirical grounds, that does not preclude an effective resolution on logical grounds. So I think that throwing up your hands and making it just an arbitrary matter of priors — if that was your intention — is premature.
Well, I have nothing more to say at the moment.