Today's post, Timeless Causality was originally published on 29 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Using the modern, Bayesian formulation of causality, we can define causality without talking about time - define it purely in terms of relations. The river of time never flows, but it has a direction.
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Is there any clever maneuver we can use to distinguish between right and left causality, if it's assumed to be deterministic? Can we distinguish between right and left causality, under the following conditions:
We allow the functions 'from (L1,L2) to R1' and 'from (L1,L2) to R2' not to be identical (assuming rightward causality). In other words, the rule that the system uses to produce the next state of V1 by looking at the current states of V1 and V2, doesn't have to be the same rule as the one to produce the next state of V2 from the current states of V1 and V2.
Both functions are known to be surjective.
We don't know the functions.
Both V1 and V2 may have any natural number of states, and they need not have the same number of states.
(edit):
Those conditions are really just a suggestion, if you have better ones, use them. And share 'em too plz.