About a month ago, Anna posted about the Importance of Less Wrong or Another Single Conversational Locus, followed shortly by Sarah Constantin's http://lesswrong.com/lw/o62/a_return_to_discussion/
There was a week or two of heavy-activity by some old timers. Since there's been a decent array of good posts but not quite as inspiring as the first week was and I don't know whether to think "we just need to try harder" or change tactics in some way.
Some thoughts:
- I do feel it's been better to quickly be able to see a lot of posts in the community in one place
- I don't think the quality of the comments is that good, which is a bit demotivating.
- on facebook, lots of great conversations happen in a low-friction way, and when someone starts being annoying, the person's who's facebook wall it is has the authority to delete comments with abandon, which I think is helpful.
- I could see the solution being to either continue trying to incentivize better LW comments, or to just have LW be "single locus for big important ideas, but discussion to flesh them out still happen in more casual environments"
- I'm frustrated that the intellectual projects on Less Wrong are largely silo'd from the Effective Altruism community, which I think could really use them.
- The Main RSS feed has a lot of subscribers (I think I recall "about 10k"), so having things posted there seems good.
- I think it's good to NOT have people automatically post things there, since that produced a lot of weird anxiety/tension on "is my post good enough for main? I dunno!"
- But, there's also not a clear path to get something promoted to Main, or a sense of which things are important enough for Main
- I notice that I (personally) feel an ugh response to link posts and don't like being taken away from LW when I'm browsing LW. I'm not sure why.
Curious if others have thoughts.
Weird, this comment thread doesn't link to our prior discussion, there must be some kind of mistake. =)
A Bayes net can have whatever nodes I think it should have, based on my intuition. Nobody ever suggested that the nodes of a man-made Bayes net come from anywhere except intuition in the first place.
If I am trying to predict the outcome of some specific event, I can factor in as many "conflicting perspectives" as I want, again using my intuition to decide how to incorporate them.
I want to predict whether it will rain tomorrow. I establish one causal network based in a purely statistical model of rainfall frequency in my area. I establish a second causal network which just reflects whatever the Weather Channel predicts. I establish a third causal network that incorporates Astrological signs and the reading of entrails to predict whether it will rain. You end up with three nodes: P(rain|statistical-model), P(rain|weather-channel-model), P(rain|entrails-model). You then terminate all three into a final P(rain|all-available-knowledge), where you weight the influence of each of the three submodels according to your prior confidence in that model. In other words, when you verify whether it actually rains tomorrow, you perform a Bayesian update on P(statistical-model-validity|rain), P(entrails-model-validity|rain), P(weather-channel-model-validity|rain).
You have just used Bayes to adjudicate between conflicting perspectives. There is no law stating that you can't continue using those conflicting models. Maybe you have some reason to expect that P(rain|all-available-knowledge) actually ends up slightly more accurate when you include knowledge about entrails. Then you should continue to incorporate your knowledge about entrails, but also keep updating on the weight of its contribution to the final result.
(If I made a mistake in the above paragraphs, first consider the likelihood that it's due to the difficulty of typing this kind of stuff into a text box, and don't just assume that I'm wrong.)
Part of the reason Chapman's article doesn't land for me at all is that he somehow fails to see that interoprating between different systems of meaning and subjectivity is completely amenable to Bayesian thinking. Nobody ever said that intuition is not an important part of coming up with a Bayes network. Both the structure of the network and the priors you put into the network can come from nowhere other than intuition. I'm pretty sure this is mentioned in the Sequences. I feel like Scott defends Bayesianism really well from Chapman's argument, and if you don't agree, then I suspect it's because Chapman and Scott might be talking past each other in some regards wherein you think Chapman is saying something important where Scott doesn't.
What Scott defends in that post isn't the notion of a completely consistent belief net. In Moat-and-Bailey fashion Scott defends claims that are less strong.
Chapman also wrote the more mathy followup post: https://meaningness.com/probability-and-logic
From Chapman model of the world Scott defends Bayesianism as a level 4 framework against other frameworks that are also level 4 or lower (in the Kegan framework). A person who's at the developmental stage of level 3 can't simply go to level 5 but profits from learning a framework like Bayesianism that gives ce... (read more)