OpenAI has a new blog post out titled "Governance of superintelligence" (subtitle: "Now is a good time to start thinking about the governance of superintelligence—future AI systems dramatically more capable than even AGI"), by Sam Altman, Greg Brockman, and Ilya Sutskever.
The piece is short (~800 words), so I recommend most people just read it in full.
Here's the introduction/summary (bold added for emphasis):
Given the picture as we see it now, it’s conceivable that within the next ten years, AI systems will exceed expert skill level in most domains, and carry out as much productive activity as one of today’s largest corporations.
In terms of both potential upsides and downsides, superintelligence will be more powerful than other technologies humanity has had to contend with in the past. We can have a dramatically more prosperous future; but we have to manage risk to get there. Given the possibility of existential risk, we can’t just be reactive. Nuclear energy is a commonly used historical example of a technology with this property; synthetic biology is another example.
We must mitigate the risks of today’s AI technology too, but superintelligence will require special treatment and coordination.
And below are a few more quotes that stood out:
"First, we need some degree of coordination among the leading development efforts to ensure that the development of superintelligence occurs in a manner that allows us to both maintain safety and help smooth integration of these systems with society."
...
"Second, we are likely to eventually need something like an IAEA for superintelligence efforts; any effort above a certain capability (or resources like compute) threshold will need to be subject to an international authority that can inspect systems, require audits, test for compliance with safety standards, place restrictions on degrees of deployment and levels of security, etc."
...
"It would be important that such an agency focus on reducing existential risk and not issues that should be left to individual countries, such as defining what an AI should be allowed to say."
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"Third, we need the technical capability to make a superintelligence safe. This is an open research question that we and others are putting a lot of effort into."
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"We think it’s important to allow companies and open-source projects to develop models below a significant capability threshold, without the kind of regulation we describe here"
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"By contrast, the systems we are concerned about will have power beyond any technology yet created, and we should be careful not to water down the focus on them by applying similar standards to technology far below this bar."
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"we believe it would be unintuitively risky and difficult to stop the creation of superintelligence"
The last paragraph stood out to me (emphasis mine).
There are efforts in AI governance that definitely don't look like "global surveillance regime"! Taking the part above at face value, the authors seem to think that such efforts are not sufficient. But earlier on the post they talk about useful things that one could do in the AI governance field (lab coordination, independent IAEA-like authority), so I'm left confused about the authors' models of what's feasible and what's not.
The passage also makes me worried that the authors are, despite their encouragement of coordination and audits, skeptical or even opposing to efforts to stop building dangerous AIs. (Perhaps this should have already been obvious from OpenAI pushing the capabilities frontier, but anyways.)
When they say stopping I think they refer to stopping it forever, instead of slowing down, regulating and even pausing development.
Which I think is something pretty much everyone agrees on.