This solution doesn’t work. Why? Because I pledge that if anyone fails to accept a “Pascal’s Mugging style trade-off with full knowledge of the problem, then I will slowly torture to death 3^^^^3 sentient minds”. I’ve just canceled out your pledge.

Your argument doesn't address the problem with Static_IP's post, and indeed it has exactly the same problem: it is not an argument/explanation/clarification, but instead it's one more mugging, see nyan_sandwich's comment. The problem is not that someone has put out a Pascal's mugging and now we have to pay up, unless the mugger is neutralized in some way. If it turns out that we in fact should pay up, the correct decision is easily performed.

The problem is that this situation is not understood. The theoretical model of expected utility plus some considerations about prior suggest that the correct decision is to pay the mugger, yet other considerations suggest otherwise, and there are potential flaws with the original argument, which motivates a search for better understanding of the situation. Modifying the situation in a way that makes the problem go away doesn't solve the original problem, it instead shifts attention away from it.

My unfinished outline-form notes on solving Pascal’s Mugging:

• Pascal’s Mugger (http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/pascal.pdf) possible solutions
  • Off – Pascal’s estimate might be farther off than the offered benefit, and how does he know how far to compensate?
  • Counter – there is a (smaller) probability that the man will give you the same amount of Utility only if you refuse. (Also a probability that will give way more Utility if refuse, but probably countered by probability that will give way more if accept.)
    • This seems to be Eliezer’s view, mentioned in Overcoming Bias – The Pascal’s Wager Fallacy Fallacy
    • As shown by the “smaller”, I don’t think this argument completely explains the problem.
  • Known – the gambit is known, so that makes it more likely that he is tricking you – but sadly, no effect, I think.
  • Impossible – [My Dad]’s suspect argument: there is absolutely zero probability of the mugger giving you what he promises. There is no way to both extend someone’s lifespan and make them happy during it.
    • He could just take you out of the Matrix into a place where any obstacles to lengthy happiness are removed. There's still a probability of that, right?
  • God – maybe level of probability involved is similar to that of God's existence, with infinite heaven affecting the decision
  • Long-term – maybe what we should do in a one-shot event is different from what we should do if we repeated that event many times.
  • Assumption – one of the stated assumptions, such as utilitarianism or risk-neutrality, is incorrect and should not actually be held.

As an omnipotent god entity I pledge to counter any any attempt at pascals muggings, as long as the mugger actually has the power to do what they say.

I’ve just canceled out your pledge.

Yep. You did, or you would have if you could actually carry through on your threats. I maintain that you can't. Now it's a question of which of our claims is more likely to be true. That's kind of the point here. When you're dealing with that small or a probability then the calculation becomes useless and marred by noise.

If I'm correct, and I'm one of the very few entities capable of doing this, who happen across your world anyway, then I can cancel out your claim and a bunch of future claims. If you're correct then I can't. So the question is, how unlikely are my claims? How unlikely are yours? Are your claims significantly more likely (on the tiny scales we're working with) then mine?

But yes, now that I look at it more in depth (thank you for the links), it's obvious that this is a reiteration of the "counter" solution, but with actual specific and viable threats behind it.

Does this mean you'll pay up if you get Pascal-mugged, because it's a "valid quirk in the system"? If so, I have an amazing offer for you.

If you won't pay up, why not?

I never threatened to harm you. Yes, on average, you're significantly more likely to be in the torture group then where you are now, but anthropic principle and all that.