Full title: Is the Orthogonality Thesis Defensible if We Assume Both Valence Realism and Open Individualism?
An excerpt:
The cleanest typology for metaphysics I can offer is: some theories focus on computations as the thing that’s ‘real’, the thing that ethically matters – we should pay attention to what the *bits* are doing. Others focus on physical states – we should pay attention to what the *atoms* are doing. I’m on team atoms, as I note here: Against Functionalism.
My suggested takeaway: an open individualist who assumes computationalism is true (team bits) will have a hard time coordinating with an open individualist who assumes physicalism is true (team atoms) — they’re essentially running incompatible versions of OI and will compete for resources.
As a first approximation, instead of three theories of personal identity – Closed Individualism, Empty Individualism, Open Individualism – we’d have six. CI-bits, CI-atoms, EI-bits, EI-atoms, OI-bits, OI-atoms.
Whether the future is positive will be substantially determined by how widely and deeply we can build positive-sum moral trades between these six frames.
Doesn't the efficacy of open individualism depend on whether the number of intelligent agents is high enough to "interfere" with the resources of one another (overpopulation, and overpopulation is a basis for some fears for AI risk)