I don't think there's a very good precise way to do so, but one useful concept is bid-ask spreads, which are a way of protecting yourself from adverse selection of bets. E.g. consider the following two credences, both of which are 0.5.
- My credence that a fair coin will land heads.
- My credence that the wind tomorrow in my neighborhood will be blowing more northwards than southwards (I know very little about meteorology and have no recollection of which direction previous winds have mostly blown).
Intuitively, however, the former is very difficult to change, whereas the latter might swing wildly given even a little bit of evidence (e.g. someone saying "I remember in high school my teacher mentioned that winds often blow towards the equator.")
Suppose I have to decide on a policy that I'll accept bets for or against each of these propositions at X:1 odds (i.e. my opponent puts up $X for every $1 I put up). For the first proposition, I might set X to be 1.05, because as long as I have a small edge I'm confident I won't be exploited.
By contrast, if I set X=1.05 for the second proposition, then probably what will happen is that people will only decide to bet against me if they have more information than me (e.g. checking weather forecasts), and so they'll end up winning a lot of money for me. And so I'd actually want X to be something more like 2 or maybe higher, depending on who I expect to be betting against, even though my credence right now is 0.5.
In your case, you might formalize this by talking about your bid-ask spread when trading against people who know about these bottlenecks.
I think you’re trying to point towards multimodal distributions ?
If you can decompose P(X) as P(X) = P(X|H1)P(H1) + ... + P(X|Hn)P(Hn), and the P(X|Hn) are nice unimodal distributions (like a normal distribution), you end up with a multimodal distribution.