1. Defining the problem: The inverted spectrum
A. Attempted solutions to the inverted spectrum.
B. The “substitution bias” of solving the “easy problem of consciousness” instead of the “hard problem.”
2. The false intuition of direct awareness
A. Our sense that the existence of raw experience is self-evident doesn’t show that it is true.
B. Experience can’t reveal the error in the intuition that raw experience exists.
C. We can’t capture the ineffable core of raw experience with language because there’s really nothing there.
D. We believe raw experience exists without detecting it.
3. The conceptual economy of qualia nihilism pays off in philosophical progress
4. Relying on the brute force of an intuition is rationally specious.
Against these considerations, the only argument for retaining raw experience in our ontology is the sheer strength of everyone’s belief in its existence. How much weight should we attach to a strong belief whose validity we can't check? None. Beliefs ordinarily earn a presumption of truth from the absence of empirical challenge, but when empirical challenge is impossible in principle, the belief deserves no confidence.
Let me try to answer more succinctly. Dennett and I are concerned with different problems; Dennett's is a problem within science proper, while mine is traditionally philosophical. Dennett's conclusion is that "qualia" don't provide introspective access to the functioning of the brain; my conclusion is that our common intuition concerning the existence of qualia is incoherent.