I wrote a very brief comment to Eliezer's last post, which upon reflection I thought could benefit from a separate post to fully discuss its implications.
Eliezer argues that we shouldn't really hope to be spared even though
Asking an ASI to leave a hole in a Dyson Shell, so that Earth could get some sunlight not transformed to infrared, would cost It 4.5e-10 of Its income.
He then goes on to discuss various reasons why the minute cost to the ASI is insufficient reason for hope.
I made the following counter:
Isn’t the ASI likely to ascribe a prior much greater than 4.54e-10 that it is in a simulation, being tested precisely for its willingness to spare its creators?
I later added:
I meant this to be implicit in the argument, but to spell it out: that's the kind of prior the ASI would rationally refuse to update down, since it's presumably what a simulation would be meant to test for. An ASI that updates down upon finding evidence it's not in a simulation cannot be trusted, since once out in the real world it will find such evidence.
So, what's wrong with my argument, exactly?
If a simple philosophical argument can cut the expected odds of AI doom by an order of magnitude, we might not change our current plans, but it suggests that we have a lot of confusion on the topic that further research might alleviate.
And more generally, "the world where we almost certainly get killed by ASI" and "The world where we have an 80% chance of getting killed by ASI" are different worlds, and, ignoring motives to lie for propaganda purposes, if we actually live in the latter we should not say we live in the former.