Against hard barriers of this kind, you can point to arguments like “positing hard barriers of this kind requires saying that there are some very small differences in intelligence that make the crucial difference between being able vs. unable to do the task in principle. Otherwise, e.g., if a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything that an IQ 101 agent can do, and a sufficient number of IQ 101 agents with sufficient time can do anything an IQ 102 agent can do, etc, then by transitivity you end up saying that a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything an IQ 1000 agent can do. So to block this sort of transition, there needs to be at least one specific point where the relevant transition gets blocked, such that e.g. there is something that an IQ X agent can do that no number of IQ X-minus-epsilon agent cannot. And can epsilon really make that much of a difference?”
Here’s an analogy, maybe. A sufficient number of 4yo’s could pick up any weight that a 5yo could pick up; a sufficient number of 5yo’s could pick up any weight that a 6yo could pick up … a sufficient number of national-champion weightlifters could pick up any weight that a world-record weightlifter could pick up.
So does it follow that a sufficient number of 4yo’s can pick up any weight that a world-record weightlifter could pick up? No! The problem is, the weight isn’t very big. So you can’t get a group of 50 4yo’s to simultaneously contribute to picking it up. There’s just no room for them to all hold onto it.
So here’s a model. There are nonzero returns to more agents working together to do a task, if they can all be usefully employed. But there are also rapidly-increasing coordination costs, and/or limitations to one’s ability to split a task into subtasks.
In the human world, you can’t notice a connection between two aspects of a problem unless those two aspects are simultaneously in a single person’s head. Thus, for hard problems, you can split them up a bit, with skill and luck, but not too much, and it generally requires that the people working on the subproblems have heavily-overlapping understandings of what’s going on (or that the manager who split up the problem in the first place has a really solid understanding of both subproblems such that they can be confident that it’s a clean split). See also: interfaces as scarce resources.
Joe's argument here would actually be locally valid if we changed:
a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything that an IQ 101 agent can do
to:
a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything that some number of IQ 101 agents can do eventually
We can see why this works when applied to your analogy. If we change:
A sufficient number of 4yo’s could pick up any weight that a 5yo could pick up
to
A sufficient number of 4yo’s could pick up any weight that some number of 5yo's could pick up
Then we can see where the issue comes in. The problem is that while a team of 4yo's can always beat a single 5yo, there exists some number of 5yo's which can beat any number of 4yo's.
If we fix the local validity issue in Joe's argument like this, it is easier to see where issues might crop up.
The memory and coordination issues are a reason why this sort of approach doesn't work as well for humans, but in the context of Carlsmith's post, AIs probably have much lower coordination costs and can be assumed to have similar memories/memory capacities (At least for the given training run.).
And here, a very useful empirical rule is that there's an exponential drop-off as you get less intelligent, but there aren't hard intelligence barriers to learning something, just less and less chance to learn something within a given time period.
This is what motivates some hope for the scalable oversight agenda: As long as you keep the capability gain small enough or you have enough trusted AI labor (probably both in reality), you can use trusted dumb labor to create a smarter AI system in limited quantities that is also trusted, then copy the new smarter AI to research the alignment problem, and repeat.
So unlike the amount of 4 year olds vs weightlifting case, where the 4 year olds have the issue of both not being as intelligent as adults, and also not being able to coordinate, here we only have the intelligence issue, and we know pretty well how far this scales in many scientific fields, where intelligence basically is always good, but there are no hard cutoffs/hard barriers to doing well (modulo memory capacity issues, which is a problem but also we can usually assume that time, not memory is the bottleneck to alignment via scalable oversight, especially in an intelligence explosion).
See these quotes from Carl Shulman here:
Yeah. In science the association with things like scientific output, prizes, things like that, there's a strong correlation and it seems like an exponential effect. It's not a binary drop-off. There would be levels at which people cannot learn the relevant fields, they can't keep the skills in mind faster than they forget them. It's not a divide where there's Einstein and the group that is 10 times as populous as that just can't do it. Or the group that's 100 times as populous as that suddenly can't do it. The ability to do the things earlier with less evidence and such falls off at a faster rate in Mathematics and theoretical Physics and such than in most fields.
Yes, people would have discovered general relativity just from the overwhelming data and other people would have done it after Einstein.
No, that intuition is not necessarily correct. Machine learning certainly is an area that rewards ability but it's also a field where empirics and engineering have been enormously influential. If you're drawing the correlations compared to theoretical physics and pure mathematics, I think you'll find a lower correlation with cognitive ability. Creating neural lie detectors that work involves generating hypotheses about new ways to do it and new ways to try and train AI systems to successfully classify the cases. The processes of generating the data sets of creating AIs doing their best to put forward truths versus falsehoods, to put forward software that is legit versus that has a trojan in it are experimental paradigms and in these experimental paradigms you can try different things that work. You can use different ways to generate hypotheses and you can follow an incremental experimental path. We're less able to do that in the case of alignment and superintelligence because we're considering having to do things on a very short timeline and it’s a case where really big failures are irrecoverable. If the AI starts rooting the servers and subverting the methods that we would use to keep it in check we may not be able to recover from that. We're then less able to do the experimental procedures. But we can still do those in the weaker contexts where an error is less likely to be irrecoverable and then try and generalize and expand and build on that forward.
Here's the link to all these quotes below:
So I expect coordination, and to a lesser extent interfaces to be a slack constraint for AIs by default (at least without AI control measures), compared to humans.
Against hard barriers of this kind, you can point to arguments like “positing hard barriers of this kind requires saying that there are some very small differences ... that make the crucial difference between [two things]. ... And can epsilon really make that much of a difference?”
Sorites fallacy/argument by the beard/heap paradox/continuum fallacy/fallacy of grey/etc.
The real answer to Sorites paradox for intelligence is that memory is an issue, and if a subject requires you to learn more information than can be stored in memory, you can't learn it no matter how much time you invest into the subject, and differing intelligences also usually differ in memory capacity.
However, assuming memory isn't an issue, than the answer to the question is that intelligence really is a continuum, and the better metric is rate of learning per time step say, since any difference in intelligence is solely a difference in time, so no hard barriers exists.
I think that memory will not be the bottleneck in an intelligence explosion for understanding AI, and instead time will be the bottleneck.
Introduction/summary
In my last post, I laid out my picture of what it would even be to solve the alignment problem. In this series of posts, I want to talk about how we might solve it.
To be clear: I don’t think that humans necessarily need to solve the whole problem – at least, not on our own. To the contrary, I think we should be trying hard to get help from sufficiently capable and trusted AIs.[1] And I think various paths that my last post would class as “avoiding” or “handling but not solving” the problem, rather than “solving it,” are important to consider too, especially in the near-term.[2]
I’ll discuss this more in future posts. Still, even if we ultimately need AIs to help us solve the problem, I expect it to be useful to have as direct a grip as we can, now, on what the full problem is, what makes it difficult, and what approaches are available for solving it. More on why I think this below.
A few other meta notes:
Partly because I think we ultimately want to get lots of AI help on this problem, my aim here isn’t to defend one specific “solution.” Rather, my main aim is to improve our thinking about the space of solutions overall (though I do give various takes on how promising different approaches seem, and what’s required for them to work). Maybe I’ll try something more ambitious in future.[3] But I’m not actually sure what level of ambition in this respect is appropriate, from our current position. And regardless: this is where I’m at so far.
As often in discussions of aligning/controlling advanced AI systems: I think it’s plausible that various of the AIs at stake in this discussion would be moral patients by default; and if they are, many if not all of the interventions I discuss raise serious ethical concerns. I’m leaving discussion of this issue to future work. But I want to keep acknowledging it regardless.[4]
Summary of the series
The series is in four parts. Here’s a summary of the posts that have been released thus far (I’ll update it as more come out).
Part 1 – Ontology
The first post (this one) lays out the general ontology I’ll use for thinking about approaches to solving the full alignment problem.
I start by reviewing my definition of what it would be to solve the full alignment problem (i.e., building superintelligent AI agents, without succumbing to the bad kind of AI takeover, and becoming able to elicit most of their beneficial capabilities). Most of the series focuses on avoiding takeover,[5] but I return to capability elicitation at the end.
I also briefly defend the usefulness of actually thinking about the full problem, at least for people who want the sort of high-level clarity about AI X-risk that I, personally, am seeking.
Diagram of motivation control and option control
An incentive structure safety case
I then flesh out the space of possibilities for option/motivation control in a bit more detail – in particular, distinguishing between what I call “internal” vs. “external” variables (roughly: the former are what a “black box” AI hides), and between “inspection” vs. “intervention” directed at a given variable.
Diagram of the overall ontology in the first post
Part 2 -- Motivation control
In the second post, I offer a more detailed analysis of the available approaches to motivation control in particular.
There four difficulties in a convoluted chart
Diagram of the options for transparency I consider
Diagram of the breakdown I use for thinking about motivation control
What does success look like?
Let’s start by recalling the standard we have to meet. It’s not:
Rather, it’s:
(Here I’m using the taxonomy from my last post pictured in the diagram below.)
This means that in thinking about the difficulty of alignment, we shouldn’t be thinking about the difficulty of giving the AI exactly the right values. And when we identify a putative difficulty, we should be careful, in particular, to say why we should expect this difficulty to lead to a failure on (1) or (2) above.
Note that (1), here, is higher-stakes than (2), in that failures on avoiding bad takeover are irrecoverable; whereas failures on desired elicitation generally offer more room for iteration and learning-from-your-mistakes (unless the desired elicitation was crucial for avoiding bad takeover, and/or if you can’t identify the mistakes in question). I also think that many of the considerations and approaches relevant to avoiding takeover apply fairly directly to capability elicitation as well. So I’m going to focus most of the discussion on avoiding takeover, and then circle back to capability elicitation at the end.
That said, I think the two are closely interrelated. In particular, I think the full challenge of (1) only arises in the context of (2) – otherwise, you could just keep the superintelligence locked up in a box. And I think our ability to elicit the capabilities of AI systems at a given level of capability is likely to be crucial to our ability to avoid takeover from even more capable AIs.
Re: (1), I’m also going to set aside strategies that involve allowing/assuming that there is going to be an AI takeover, but trying to ensure that this takeover is non-bad. As I discussed in my last post, I think these should be seen as very much a last resort.[7]
Is it even worth talking about the full problem?
Before diving in further, I want to address an objection that I encountered a few times in talking with people about this topic: namely, the objection that it’s not worth thinking in detail about solving the full alignment problem, because humans don’t need to solve this problem (and perhaps: shouldn’t be trying to solve the full problem). Rather, the thought goes, our central focus should be on safely reaching some earlier milestone – for example, becoming able to safely get earlier and less dangerous AI systems to help us.
I agree, here, that our central focus should be on safely getting to an earlier milestone. Indeed, in future posts, I’m hoping to discuss in more detail the array of possible milestones we might consider here, and to defend, in particular, the key role of using safe AI labor to improve the situation. Indeed, various of the approaches I consider here – especially under the heading of “option control” – depend critically on being able to bootstrap to superhuman qualities of cognitive labor (though: not necessarily via dangerous superintelligent agents).[8] And unless we get very lucky, I think attempting to tackle the full alignment problem without serious help from AIs is a loser’s game.
In this sense, I am talking, here, centrally about a particular “end goal,” and not about the path to getting there.[9] And it’s not, even, the only viable “end goal.” That is, as I discussed in my last post, it’s possible that the right strategy, even in the longer term, is either to “avoid” the alignment problem by not building superintelligent AI agents at all (but hopefully getting access to the benefits of superintelligence in some other way); to “handle but not solve” the alignment problem by building superintelligent AI agents but not fully eliciting their capabilities (and again, hopefully getting access to the benefits of the un-elicited capabilities via other means); or, indeed, to give up on some of the benefits of superintelligence for the sake of safety. And even if our aim is to fully solve the problem in the longer term, these other strategies might be a better near-term focus.
Still, I personally think it’s worth trying to have as direct a grip as we can, now, on the object-level issues at stake in fully solving the problem, and on the available approaches to addressing those issues. Or at least, I want this as part of my own aspiration to think clearly about existential risk from misaligned AI; and I expect it to be useful to others as well.
In particular, absent this kind of direct engagement, I think we risk talking overmuch about some undifferentiated “alignment problem,” which we plan to point our AIs at at some future date, without a clear enough sense of things like:
What’s more, many of the issues and approaches I’ll discuss in the context of superintelligent AI agents apply in a similar way to merely human-level-ish or somewhat-superhuman AI agents of the kind we will plausibly need in order to get the sort of help from AIs that I think we should be looking for. So I’m hopeful that the discussion will be useful in thinking about aligning less powerful systems as well – and I’m hoping to reference it in that context in future.
Preliminaries re: avoiding takeover
OK, back to the full alignment problem – and in particular, to avoiding takeover.
We’re assuming that we’re building superintelligent AI agents. What’s required to ensure that they don’t take over (in a context where we are also trying to elicit their beneficial capabilities)?
The ontology I’m using
To get at this question, I want to first briefly lay out the ontology I’m using for thinking about a superintelligent AI agent. Basically, there are four key components:
(Note: this ontology loads heavily on the fact that we’re assuming that the AI in question satisfies the agential pre-requisites I discuss here – i.e., that its making plans on the basis of models of a situationally-aware model of the world, evaluating those plans according to criteria, having its behavior driven coherently by these plans, etc. I’m not saying that all ML systems, or all intelligences, are well understood in this way. But I think the paradigm systems that we’re worried about from an alignment perspective are.)
Roughly speaking, the AI’s environment and its capabilities combine to produce its options – that is, what will actually happen if the AI does different things. The AI’s world model has a model of those options, including their predicted consequences. The AI’s motivations then evaluate those options using the AI’s model of them, and then the AI chooses its behavior on the basis of this evaluation.
Here’s a rough diagram, with the four fundamental components in blue:
Unless I specify otherwise, I’m also generally going to assume, at least to start, that the AI’s world model is reasonably accurate – and in particular, that its model of its options reflects with reasonable accuracy the true nature of its options and their consequences. This is an attempt to respect the degree of situational awareness (and intelligence more generally) we are assuming our AI agent has. Plus, it simplifies the discussion. That said, various of the approaches I discuss do involve attempting to mess with the accuracy of the AI’s world model.
A spectrum of motivation control and option control
If we set aside attempts to intervene on the AI’s world model, this leaves, roughly, three variables that combine to determine whether our AI attempts to take over: namely, its capabilities, its environment, and its motivations.[10]
I’ll further subdivide approaches to avoiding takeover according to a spectrum of: how much do they focus on ensuring that the options available to an AI have certain properties (where, per the diagram above, an agent’s options are determined by the combination of its capabilities and its environment), vs. how much do they focus on the AI’s motivations having certain properties. I’ll call the former focus “option control,” and the latter focus “motivation control.” Thus:
The limiting case of option control aims at ensuring no takeover in a manner robust to the AI having arbitrarily bad motivations. And the limiting case of motivation control aims at ensuring no takeover (or at least, no bad takeover) even if the AI has arbitrary options available – including options that involve improving its own capabilities radically. But I think it’s important not to miss the large intermediate space in between, in which an AI not taking over results from a combination of its motivations and its options. Indeed: at least with respect to more mundane bad actions, this is how we often achieve “alignment” between different humans. For example, an employee likely has some intrinsic motivations that make them averse to stealing from their employer; but the employer also takes some steps to make stealing difficult, and we take additional steps to ensure that the incentive landscape makes it undesirable.
Thus, in a diagram:
(Though: this diagram is a bit misleading, in that it seems to suggest that the central approach to “option control” is to limit the takeover paths that the AI has available, when in fact a more diverse range of interventions are available – i.e., rewarding the AI for cooperative behavior. More below.)
To see this distinction at work in practice, let’s consider its application to the framework for thinking about AI power-seeking I offered in a previous post.
Here, we can think of option control as holding fixed the AI’s motivations – that is, the criteria it will use to evaluate different plans – but trying to intervene on its options to ensure that its best benign option is more desirable than its favorite takeover plan. Possibilities for doing this (discussed in more detail below) include:
Making the empirical nature of the scenarios in which the AI tries and fails to take over less desirable by the lights of the AI’s motivations.[11]
Conversely, we can think of motivation control as holding fixed the AI’s options, but trying to intervene on the criteria the AI uses to evaluate those options, such that the AI views the best benign option as more desirable than its favorite takeover plan. Possibilities for doing this:
Per the ontology above, an agent’s options are determined by its capabilities and its environment, so option control can be further subdivided into capability control and environmental control. A few notes on this:
Also, and importantly, not all forms of environmental control need to implicate the sorts of freedom restrictions and potentially-coercive relationship that the word “control” can conjure. Thus, for example, as I noted above, creating a just and happy default situation for our AIs can itself count as “environmental control” in the relevant sense – i.e., it improves the empirical nature of the best benign alternative.[12]
Finally, I’ll note that certain sorts of approaches to AI safety retain a kind of agnosticism about whether they are doing motivation control or option control.
If you can do this: great.[13] Ultimately, though, if the AI in question is a superintelligent agent, I think you will need to have done some combination of controlling its options (or at least, its perceived options) and/or its motivations, even if you aren’t saying how.
Incentive structure safety cases
Here’s one way of thinking about ways option control and motivation control can combine to produce an AI agent that doesn’t choose a takeover option. I’ll call it an “incentive structure safety case.”
Here I’m borrowing some of the vibe from Hubinger’s “How do we become confident in the safety of a machine learning system?” but with a few modifications. Broadly speaking, Hubinger suggests that efforts to create safe machine learning systems should come with a “training story” about why the way you’re training this system will result in the relevant kind of safety. He further breaks down training stories into:
This seems like a potentially useful breakdown, but I’m going to modify it a bit. In particular:
I don’t want to assume that our story about safety rests entirely on the algorithm that the AI is implementing, or on its internal properties more broadly. Rather, I want to also leave room for its environment to play a key role.[14]
So, here’s a modified version, focused specifically on the way that option control and motivation control combine to produce safety from takeover. There are three parts:
Thus, in a diagram:
Thus, here are some heavily abbreviated examples of incentive structure safety cases. I’m not saying they’re good. But hopefully they give a flavor of the structure.
An example of a heavily “option control”-focused incentive structure story would be something like:
A (somewhat silly) example of a more heavily “motivation control”-focused incentive structure story would be something like this.
To be clear: I’m not sure ultimately how useful this kind of “incentive structure safety case” frame will be,[15] I don’t lean on it heavily in what follows, and I think the question of “what makes a safety case adequate in the context of an advanced AI system, especially once we’re leaning on some component of motivation control in particular” deserves much more attention than I’ve given it here. Still, even as a preliminary gesture, I like the way this framework highlights the need to talk about how an advanced AI agent’s options and motivations combine to produce safety (if, indeed, the motivations are playing a role). And it points at the fact that even fairly high degrees of control over the properties of an AI’s motivations (i.e., the sort of control at stake in e.g. being able to write a constitution or model spec that an AI will follow in a common-sensical way) isn’t yet enough on its own.
Here, I’m most going to focus on what possibilities are available for attempting to ensure that our AI’s motivations and options have any specific set of properties, period – that is, roughly, what sort of toolkit incentive implementation would be able to draw on. But I’ll return to incentive specifications and justifications a bit at the end.
Carving up the space of approaches to motivation and option control
Ok: what sorts of approaches are available to ensuring that our AI’s motivations and options have some desired set of properties?
To get an initial grip on the space of possibilities here, recall the ontology I gave above:
Internal vs. external variables
We can divide the variables here into two rough categories: what I’ll call “external” and “internal.”
(The AI’s “options,” here, emerge as a product of an internal variable – namely, the AI’s capabilities – and an external variable – namely, its environment.)
Thus, in a diagram:
As ever, this distinction is quite rough and ready – and if it gets too cumbersome, we don’t need to hold onto it. But it will be useful in thinking through some of the options I discuss in future posts, especially in the context of AI systems that remain, in various ways, “black boxes” – since the internal variables, roughly speaking, are ones inside the black box.
Note, though, that not all AI agents, even in the current paradigm, are black boxes of this kind. In particular: even if certain components of an AI’s agency remain black boxes, it can still be the case that the structure of the AI’s agency as a whole makes the variables I’ve labeled “internal” – e.g., its motivations, capabilities, and world model – transparent to at least some extent. An example of this might be: if the AI’s agency (in the sense that satisfies the agential prerequisites) is occurring centrally in the context of a human-interpretable scaffold or chain of thought that accurately represents its planning/reasoning (see my discussion of “open agency” in the next post), rather than in the context of an opaque forward pass.
Inspection vs. intervention
I want to further distinguish between two ways of relating to a given variable or set of variables: “inspection” and “intervention.”
We can apply (or attempt to apply) both inspection and intervention to both internal and external variables. Thus:
upweighting some of Claude’s internal activations to make it obsessed with the Golden Gate bridge (~kinda like a motivational intervention);[17]
I’ll put this in the diagram as well, indicating inspection with a badly-drawn eye icon, and intervention with a badly-drawn hand icon.
AI-assisted improvements
Finally, I want to note the possibility of using AI labor, and/of the fruits of AI labor (i.e., new AI-created technologies, new forms of economic abundance), to become able to do a given type of inspection or intervention much more effectively/efficiently than we can do it today. I’ll call this an “AI-assisted improvement.”
As I noted above, I think that getting various kinds of assistance from AI systems is likely to be a crucial aspect of any viable approach to aligning a superintelligence. In future, I’m planning to write more about some of the dynamics at stake. But the topic will come up often enough, here, that I think it’s worth a few preliminary comments.
First: people often talk about “automating alignment research”; but the “AI-assisted improvements” I have in mind here cover a broader space. That is, roughly speaking, “alignment research” refers most centrally to the sort of cognitive labor that e.g. humans on technical AI safety teams at AI labs are doing – i.e., thinking about alignment, designing experiments that will shed light on specific issues, implementing those experiments, interpreting them, communicating about the results, and so on. I do think we want AI assistance with this sort of thing – but I think it’s worth emphasizing just how much of what we might want AIs to help with isn’t of this flavor. For example, in the context of different techniques for getting high quality feedback and oversight for AI behavior, the AIs are functioning less as the analogs of alignment researchers, and more as the (more sophisticated) analogs of the human raters tasked with providing data to a preference model.[18] And in the context of techniques I’ll discuss in future posts for hardening an AI’s environment, the AIs are acting more like e.g. cybersecurity researchers and white-hat hackers than alignment researchers.
Second, and relatedly, plans for using AI-assistance to improve our approaches to the alignment problem come on a spectrum of “executability,” where “executable” means something like “we basically know how we would do this, even if we don’t have the required resources yet,” and “not-yet-executable” indicates something more like: we’re hand-waving about some hoped-for improvement in our ability to do something, but we’re very far from knowing what we’d actually do to achieve this.
Third: I think there is often a background concern, in the context of any proposal that involves utilizing AI labor to help align an AI, that the proposal in question will rest on some problematic circularity. That is, the thought is something like: if the issue you’re trying to solve is that you don’t trust AI_1, and you want AI_2 to help you with that, don’t you need to trust AI_2? And so, don’t you need to have already solved the “how to build an AI you trust” problem? But I think there are a wide variety of options for avoiding problematic types of circularity here. In particular:
Fourth, and relatedly: at times in what follows, I will specifically talk about the need for superhuman qualities of cognitive labor to be used in some approach to controlling the motivations and/or options of a superintelligent agent AI_1. But this doesn’t mean that getting access to that sort of cognitive labor requires another superintelligent AI agent, AI_2, with a capability profile and general dangerous-ness level comparable to AI_1. Or at least, this isn’t implied at a conceptual level. Rather, at least conceptually, there is an available possibility of bootstrapping to a given quality of superhuman cognitive labor – including the sort of superhuman cognitive labor that AI_1 can paradigmatically engage in – using AI systems that are less capable, agentic, etc than AI_1 itself (and thus, AI systems whose output is easier to trust). Some available techniques for this, using some AI_2 that is some combination of weaker/less dangerous than AI_1, include: using many copies of AI_2 to perform the task (including e.g. having them debate the issue, having them work on different components of the task, etc), running AI_2 for a longer time, incorporating humans and/or other trusted AIs into the process, etc.
Indeed, a lot of work done under the heading of “scalable oversight” falls roughly under the heading of “how do we bootstrap to superhuman qualities of oversight/feedback using components that are less dangerous than the thing we’re trying to oversee/provide feedback on.” I’m relatively optimistic that this sort of bootstrapping is possible, and I generally expect success in this regard to be extremely important.[19]
Now, one way this sort of bootstrapping could fail would be if there are certain kinds of superhuman task-performance that are qualitatively out of reach of even-somewhat-weaker systems. I.e., if there are tasks such that an AI of “IQ 1000” can do it, but no number of IQ 999 AI systems can do it even with much larger amounts of time and resources.
Against hard barriers of this kind, you can point to arguments like “positing hard barriers of this kind requires saying that there are some very small differences in intelligence that make the crucial difference between being able vs. unable to do the task in principle. Otherwise, e.g., if a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything that an IQ 101 agent can do, and a sufficient number of IQ 101 agents with sufficient time can do anything an IQ 102 agent can do, etc, then by transitivity you end up saying that a sufficient number of IQ 100 agents with sufficient time can do anything an IQ 1000 agent can do. So to block this sort of transition, there needs to be at least one specific point where the relevant transition gets blocked, such that e.g. there is something that an IQ X agent can do that no number of IQ X-minus-epsilon agent cannot. And can epsilon really make that much of a difference?”[20]
Though: note that this sort of argument also seems to imply that a sufficient number of mice, with sufficient time, should be able to invent general relativity, which seems wrong.
(Note: we need to exclude cheatsy cases like “organize all the mice into a turing machine that computes a superintelligence” and “the mice just flail around until they hit on the answer.” I think we can probably find a reasonably principled way to exclude such cases, though.)
Note, though, that even if you don’t think that some number of IQ 999 AIs with sufficient time can match the cognition performance of an IQ 1000 AI, you can still get additional juice, from the perspective of scalable oversight, from the difference in difficulty between evaluation and generation. I.e., maybe the large team of IQ 999 AIs can at least evaluate the output of an IQ 1000 AI to a sufficient degree.
Conversely, though: even if you’re optimistic in principle about large amounts of slightly-weaker AI labor substituting for slightly-better AI labor, in practice you can still quickly hit quantitative barriers (see Shlegeris here for some more discussion). For example: maybe enough humans could in principle evaluate something given enough time; but you definitely don’t have enough humans, or enough time (though cases with different types of AIs might be easier here, because it’s easier to copy the helper AIs, run them faster, etc).
In general, I’m not going to here try to dig in deeply on what sorts of AI assistance to expect to be what sorts of feasible. I do, though, want to make sure that certain kinds of people don’t immediately bounce off of any reference to using AIs to help with this problem on grounds like “in order to do that you would’ve already needed to solve the problem in question.” Maybe, ultimately, objections like that will bite fatally – but much more needs to be said.
I’ll denote the possibility of getting significant AI help with various option/motivation control approaches with a “plus” sign on the diagram. Thus:
OK: that was some initial set-up for how I’m thinking about the space of possible approaches to motivation control and option control. In the next post, I’ll move on to the approaches themselves, starting with motivation control.
Acknowledgements; I've benefitted from discussion about the issues in this series with tons of people over the years, but thanks especially to Ryan Greenblatt, Buck Shlegeris, Paul Christiano, Evan Hubinger, Collin Burns, Richard Ngo, Holden Karnofsky, Nick Beckstead, Daniel Kokotajlo, Ajeya Cotra, Tom Davidson, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Nate Soares, Lukas Finnveden, and Carl Shulman. The section on “Takeover-path restriction” draws heavily on work from Redwood Research, and the section on “Rewarding cooperation” draws heavily on unpublished work from Buck Shlegeris, Daniel Kokotajlo, Tom Davidson, and especially Lukas Finnveden.
Indeed, if we don’t have this kind of help by the time we’re building full-blown superintelligence, then various of the approaches I consider here, especially under the heading of “option control,” are not viable.
My last post calls it “avoiding the problem” if you don’t build superintelligent agents at all, and “handling but not solving the problem” if you build superintelligent agents, but don’t become able to elicit most of their beneficial capabilities.
Though: I do think it’s an open question what level of ambition it makes sense to have, re: identifying the best full solutions to the problem from our current position. And I’m most interested in informing our nearer-term orientation towards e.g. getting the AIs to help.
See here, here, here, and here for a few more comments from me; and here and here for some longer discussions from others.
Including: all forms of AI takeover. That is, for the reasons I discuss here, I don’t discuss approaches that assume the AIs are going to take over, but try to make this non-bad.
Obviously, one can dispute this as a definition of "solving the alignment problem," and claim on these grounds that the series isn't pointed at the real problem. I wrote a long post defending this particular conception of the problem -- and I do actually think it's the right thing to focus on. But I don't think it's worth getting hung up on terminology here, so if you want, feel free to think of this as the alignment-problem_joe.
To be clear: as I discussed in my last post, I think the best futures may well be “run by AIs” in some sense. But I think we want to choose to transition to these sorts of futures after having solved the alignment problem in the sense at stake here, and with the benefit of e.g. superintelligent advice in doing so.
The nature and amount of trust you need to have in the AIs performing the labor is, in my opinion, a distinct question; and note that the AIs producing this labor, even in the context of aligning a superintelligent agents, do not, themselves, necessarily need to be superintelligent agents.
Though as I discussed in my last post, it’s not the most final goal – i.e., it’s not “have things go well in general,” nor even “become able to safely align AI agents that are as-intelligent-as-physically-possible.” That’s on purpose.
Another way of carving this up would be to think of interventions on capabilities, environment, and world model as all feeding into an AI’s model of its options. I think it’s possible this is better, and may use this framing in future work.
Though I think we need to be very careful here, on both ethical and prudential grounds.
See the section on “rewarding cooperation” below for more on this.
Can you, though?
Hubinger could in principle capture this in the context of “training goal desirability,” but I want the role of the environment to be more center stage.
In principle, for example, you can skip talk about the “incentive specification,” and instead try just go straight from ‘we’re going to do blah” to “therefore no takeover.”
I'll think of constructing an AI from the ground up to fit a certain specification as a case of "intervention." Admittedly, though, the connotations and possibilities at stake in constructing an AI from the ground up vs. altering an existing AI may be important -- for example, in the context of trying to prevent adversarial dynamics from ever arising, vs. trying to eliminate them once they've arisen. Thanks to Owen Cotton-Barratt for discussion here.
Note: at one level, you could view “updating the AI’s weights via SGD to make it behave in a higher reward way” and “upweighting an internal activation to make Claude behave like Golden-Gate Claude” as similar sorts of interventions – i.e., the thing you actually changed is internal to the AI, and the way you know you’ve succeeded is via behavioral inspection. The difference, in my head, is that it feels like updates via SGD are just directly selecting for behavior – e.g., making a given sort of output more likely. Whereas the Golden Gate Claude example is proceeding more centrally via some hypothesized (even if still quite incomplete) understanding of how the model’s internal cognition is working (i.e., understanding at the level of “this feature represents the golden gate bridge”). Admittedly, though, this distinction seems especially blurry. If I had to resolve it one way or another, I’d re-classify Golden Gate Claude as a behavioral intervention, and reserve “internal intervention” for cases where the degree of understanding and control over an internal variable is more confident and direct.
Indeed, AIs are already used for this purpose.
I may write more about this aspect in the future, but skipping for now.
One model, suggested to me by Owen Cotton-Barratt, would be that the threshold occurs at the point where your thinking is so unreliable that errors accumulate faster than you can check/eliminate them. On this model, minds just above the threshold might still be extremely inefficient at performing the relevant tasks, because they need to engage in such intensive processes of error-correction.