All of 110phil's Comments + Replies

110phil00

Suppose 100 chickens are produced. And, suppose 100% of the population becomes vegetarian. The number of chickens produced will drop to zero.

100 fewer chickens demanded; 100 fewer produced. So, on average, between 1 and 100, the next marginal drop in chicken demand drops production by 1.

Which elicits the question: what is the pattern from 100 down to 0?

Suppose there's suddenly only one non-vegetarian left. At today's price, he would demand 1 chicken. Clearly, prices will have to rise if only 1 is produced instead of 100. He might, then, demand only... (read more)

110phil00

I don't think there's anything special about the tails.

Take a sheet of paper, and cover up the left 9/10 of the high-correlation graph. That leaves the right tail of the X variable. The remaining datapoints have a much less linear shape.

But: take two sheets of paper, and cover up (say) the left 4/10, and the right 5/10. You get the same shape left over! It has nothing to do with the tail -- it just has to do with compressing the range of X values.

The correlation, roughly speaking, tells you what percentage of the variation is not caused by random error. When you compress the X, you compress the "real" variation, but leave the "error" variation as is. So the correlation drops.

5Thrasymachus
I agree that range restriction is important, and I think a range-restriction story can become basically isomorphic to my post (e.g. "even if something is really strongly correlated, range restricting to the top 1% of this distribution, this correlation is lost in the noise, so it should not surprise us that the biggest X isn't the biggest Y.") My post might be slightly better for people who tend to visualize things, and I suppose it might have a slight advantage as it might provide an explanation why you are more likely to see this as the number of observations increases, which isn't so obvious when talking about a loss of correlation.
110phil390

I read the "heretical" statements as talking about truth replacing falsehood. I read the non-heretical statements as talking about truth replacing ignorance. If you reword the "truth" statements to make it clear that the alternative is not falsehood, they would sound much less heretical to me.

110phil80

One factoid says that your chance of death doubles for each 5 km/h above the limit you are. Another says that speeding factors into 40% of crashes.

Suppose the average speeder's risk is equivalent to 5 km/h over the limit (which seems low). Then only 25% of drivers must be speeding. Those 25% of drivers make up 40% of deaths, and the other 75% of drivers make up 60% of deaths. This keeps the ratio at 2.0, as required.

But non-speeders die too, when hit by speeders. The "40% of deaths had speeding as a factor" includes those non-speeders. T... (read more)

110phil60

"The Road and Traffic Authority of New South Wales claims that “speeding… is a factor in about 40 percent of road deaths.” Data from the NHTSA puts the number at 30%."

What does this mean, "is a factor"? If it means "at least one car was speeding," then it sounds like speeding might reduce the chance of a fatality. Suppose 40% of all drivers speed. Then, if speeding has no effect, the chance that neither driver is speeding is only 36%, which means speeding would be a factor in 64% of fatalities, not 40% or 30%.

Of course, ... (read more)

110phil10

"Provide reasons" helps for me. Many times I think something is obviously true, and when I start writing a blog post about it, where I have to explain and justify, I realize, mid-paragraph, that what I'm writing is not quite correct, and I have to rethink it.

Despite the fact that this has happened to me several times, my gut still doesn't quite say "it may not be that obvious, and you may be somewhat wrong." Rather, my gut now says, "the argument, written down, may not be as simple as you think."

So I feel like I still have a ways to go.

110phil10

Ah, OK.

That's a slightly different case, though, isn't it? The author is not saying "it's good news for Boston [fans]" because they now are right when they were wrong before, and now their map is more accurate. Rather, he's saying that it's good news for Boston [fans] because the state of the world in the "right" case means more future Boston success than the state of the world in the "wrong" case.

Suppose Bergeron was doing well instead of poorly, and the author argued that it's because the coach is playing him too much a... (read more)

1lessdazed
Great point Phil! I didn't see that, that is an important difference in the cases. I had mentally automatically interpreted your point "it's bad to be wrong. Therefore, if you're wrong, the best thing is to *stop being wrong*. And the way to stop being wrong is to change your mind." as a special case of his, "the state of the world in the 'was wrong/am right' case means more future success than the state of the world in the 'was wrong/still wrong' case."
110phil20

The point is well-taken that there are causes other than ego, and I could have mentioned that in the post.

I'm not sure what you're getting at with the hockey example, though.

0lessdazed
In the example, someone assumes that readers will not realize that a third party (The Bruins) having been wrong is good for them, even though there is no ego involved for most readers.
ahartell130

That's a lot better.
P.S. Great job taking your own advice. :)

110phil20

I like the castling analogy, might be able to use it someday.

110phil30

Nitpick: When you mentioned the 2-4-6 experiment, I didn't know what it was, so I clicked on the link and read about it. That was unnecessary, because you immediately explained it ... but, somehow, the wording of the narrative didn't signal that the explanation was coming.

Could be just me.

0crazy88
Fixed (I hope). Thanks.
110phil10

OK, fair enough.

It sounds to me, though, like it should be possible to somehow quantify the benefit of donating a kidney, on some scale, at least. Or do you think the benefit is so small, relative to one suicide, that my original argument doesn't hold?

7michaelkeenan
From Wikipedia:
110phil10

I guess it's an empirical question. A death creates two kidneys. Are there usually two people on a waiting list who need the kidneys and would otherwise die? If not, then perhaps I am indeed being too optimistic.

wedrifid180

I guess it's an empirical question.

Yes.

A death creates two kidneys. Are there usually two people on a waiting list who need the kidneys and would otherwise die?

Humans aren't lego. Yes, we can transplant but they don't always work and they don't always last indefinitely. We also don't just use them to flip a nice integer 'life saved' up by one. It's ok if the spare organ just increases someone's chances. Or extends a life for a while. Or drastically improves the quality of life for someone who was scraping by with other measures.

If I recall correct... (read more)

110phil40

Yes, I assumed that the breakup value of the organs was higher. That seems reasonable to me: two kidneys save two lives, one liver saves a third life, and so on. And only one life is lost, and that one voluntarily.

Also, my argument was not contingent on anyone being paid ... donating organs on the black market works too.

5wedrifid
House MD doesn't seem to get that sort of conversion rate from organs to lives saved. Am I generalising from fictional evidence or is your life saving equation absurdly optimistic. Ok, I admit, both.
110phil10

Right, that's true if you're connecting them randomly -- you have a 50% probability of getting it right either way.

But if your intent is to connect red to positive, and black to negative, and you do that fairly reliably but with some chance of a mistake, then there are twice as many chances to make an error, and your chance of getting it wrong by making an odd number of errors is higher (although not exactly twice as high, which I incorrectly implied).

110phil50

In recent years, portable battery boosters have become cheaper, which means you won't need jumper cables at all.

For $50ish, you get a battery in a sealed plastic case, with two "jumper-cable"-type alligator clamps, one red and one black. You flip the on switch, then clip the red onto your battery's positive terminal, and the black onto your battery's negative terminal. Then you start the car. Once the car is running, you remove the black connector, then the red connector, and you're done.

There are at least two advantages over jumper cables. F... (read more)

6Sniffnoy
But there are still only two ways to connect the four clamps, since cable color doesn't matter when they're acting purely as cables.
110phil80

Voted up, because, this post I understand.

110phil30

Nitpick: shouldn't the answer to the disease question be 1/50.95 (instead of 1/50)? One person has the disease, and 49.95 (5% of 999) are false positives. So there are 50.95 total positives.

0Matt_Simpson
Yeah, I rounded. Using Bayes' theorem, the probability is .196 or so, so that gives .98/50.
110phil80

"An alternative approach would be to allow such evidence at trial, and severely punish investigators who breach rights. ... However, a reluctance to punish high-status investigators means this approach could just result in more breaches of rights."

What if you allowed the convicted person to sue the investigators? That mitigates the reluctance to punish investigators -- or at least, the reluctance to begin proceedings against the investigators.

The convict could sue to get X years deducted from his sentence, and the investigator would have to serve a percentage of X depending on the egregiousness of the breach.

110phil20

Sorry, what is "NT"? I read this blog often enough that I feel like I should know, but I don't.

5Alicorn
"Neurotypical" - in context, not being significantly autistic.
110phil40

I wish there were some examples (other than the Soviet nails) ... if I had some better idea of what G and G* might actually represent, I'd be able to more easily get my head around the rest of the post.

2dlthomas
Call time (G) or calls taken (G) in a call center, where what they care about is customer satisfaction (G) (at least inasmuch as it serves profitability).
Morendil290

I'm surprised no one has yet brought up (G*) the LW karma system as a proxy for (G) contributing to "refining the art of human rationality".

3JamesAndrix
Products that are good for humanity, and products that are profitable
9JenniferRM
The health and/or beauty of a woman (G) and her scale reported weight (G*) which might be somewhat correlated under some circumstances, but are definitely not identical and can diverge rather sharply due to crazy diets.
Unnamed280

In education, this is one of the criticisms of high-stakes testing: you'll just get schools teaching to the test, in ways that aren't correlated to real learning (the test is G*, real knowledge/learning is G). People say the same thing about the SAT and test prep - kids get into better colleges because they paid to learn tricks for answering multiple choice questions. The Wire does a great job of showing the police force's efforts to "juke the stats" (e.g. counting robberies as larcenies) so that crime statistics (G*) look better even while cri... (read more)

0[anonymous]
Thanks,
6CronoDAS
Here's a few.
6Sniffnoy
Well there's a few described here, for instance: http://lesswrong.com/lw/le/lost_purposes/
110phil10

Ah, but now you're changing the argument! In the post, you argued that it's OK to interfere because people are being tricked (an argument for which I have some sympathy). Now, you're arguing that it's OK to interfere because the only purpose of the cards is to match borrowers with lenders. That, I dont agree with at all.

People choose a card for many different reasons. I can imagine people choosing to (perhaps falsely) signal their high wealth by choosing a high-rate card (their friends will assume they pay it off every month). They might choose the &q... (read more)

0David_J_Balan
Either those terms represent an efficient contract or they don't. The most obvious way that they wouldn't would be if they tricked you, and as a practical matter that is where most of the action is. Originally it sounded like you agreed that you were being tricked also, but in a milder sense. If you positively prefer those terms, then in your case they are efficient. But I rather doubt that these are really terms that you would have chosen. As for the issue of competition, that's not how it works. When Laibson presented the paper I referred to in the main post, my recollection is that he said that, while the credit card industry is quite competitive, the way that competition happens is that the companies use expensive promotions to identify myopic consumers. So competition doesn't benefit consumers, and in the end it doesn't even benefit the credit card companies! It's pure social waste.
1magfrump
The impression I got was that: (a) the universe OP is working in has the premise that creating efficient deals is why you should not regulate things (b) people are being tricked by dealmakers (c) regulating to stop people from being tricked does not deter efficient deals you are saying "I'm not being tricked"--that's a denial of assumption (b). It may be true that there exist people who are not being tricked and who benefit from the existence of tricks. On the other hand, that's not the point. The point is that enough people ARE being tricked, to their detriment, that regulating the tricks will increase total welfare. This is true regardless of whether or not you personally are being tricked. OP also cited a paper discussing how tricks aren't effected regularly by competition, so there is anecdotal evidence at least indicating that the government wouldn't actually charge you $1 a month regardless. A large part of your statement was addressing the factuality of (b) which is good, and I'm overall sympathetic to this objection, but you don't seem fully aware of that being your point, and I disagree with the point in general.
110phil30

Suppose the terms "if you are even one day late with a payment, your interest rate jumps to 29.99% forever" are in very large print on the contract, and the cardholder has to read it and initial it (or, perhaps, copy it out in full!) before the card is approved.

And suppose that consumers accept those terms even after understanding them.

Would that weaken your argument?

(The reason I ask: I am fully capable of paying off my balance every month. Sometimes I forget. When I forget, it costs me $80 in interest. I am capable of borrowing money at a ra... (read more)

3David_J_Balan
You're right that not every case is equally severe. But even in your relatively mild case, it's still a "gotcha." The term is there because the credit card company knows that people will sometimes not understand or will forget. It's got nothing to do with efficiently matching people who want to lend money with people who want to borrow money (which is one of the primary legitimate function of credit markets), it's got to do with figuring out how best to screw people over. Since there is no reason to believe that that contract got to be that way for any efficient purpose, there's no reason for any great reluctance to interfere with it through policy.
110phil40

I've done the same thing!

Perhaps you were assuming that your net wealth was a certain fixed amount, and that if the bill had been a $5 instead of a $1, it would have meant that there was $4 less at home or in the bank.

In that case, you're rooting only for having the right change on you, rather than having less money overall.

110phil270

I'd like to see an adult child hold a grudge and use the "my house, my rules" tactic against visiting parents.

"Dad, I appreciate you and Mom coming to visit all the way from Houston. But you weren't home by 10:30 as per the rules of this house, which I paid for. You're grounded for two days. I've taken your car keys. Also, Mom, if you want to live under this roof, even for a week, you'll stop using that Lady Grecian formula. No mother of mine is going out looking like a blonde harlot. And I don't care if your other 64-year-old friends are doing it."

Alicorn110

I don't think I'd ever quite pull this, but I am looking forward to the day when I can end an argument with my dad by kicking him out of my house.

110phil110

In the community of sports statistical analysis, the most-accepted hypothesis is that coaches are reluctant to try new strategies for rational reasons. If the new strategy succeeds, they get a bit of utility, but if the new strategy fails, they get fired -- and so lose a lot more utility.

Being a maverick has a negative expectation for the coach, even though it might have a positive expectation for the team.

This hypothesis makes a lot more sense to me than assuming that coaches are unaware of the result.

3David_J_Balan
But there has to be some irrationality in there somewhere. That is, if you place your job at risk by not buying IBM even when it is not the best choice, it has to be either that the person who gets to decide whether or not to fire you has wrong ideas, or that the people that person needs to satisfy have wrong ideas. So in the football example, if it's not the coaches, it has to be someone else, most likely the fans.
4wuwei
Yes. And since being a maverick has a similar negative expectation for most working people, it seems well-placed to explain the slow spread of good ideas more generally as well.
110phil150

The "Players whose names start with K tend to strikeout more" study, is, I believe, flawed. It's true that K names struck out more historically, but that's because K names (Kyle, Kevin, etc.) are much more common now, when strikeout rates are high, than they were in previous generations, when strikeout rates were low.

See:

http://sabermetricresearch.blogspot.com/2007/11/k-study-for-real_26.html

110phil00

This may be related ... a friend once said that when she half-wakes from a dream, if she rolls over and goes back to sleep, the dream ends. But if she doesn't roll over, the dream continues.

I believe this works for me, too. Perhaps it's not just a change in sight, but in touch too. Or perhaps in any of the senses.

110phil140

The man has done nothing shameful: (a) his life is his own; and (b) the insurance company bet, with its eyes open, that sufficient suicide-intenders would back down from their plans within two years that the policies would still be profitable. It lost its bet, but it was a reasonable bet.

The man has done nothing admirable, either; he has taken money from the shareholders of the insurance company, and given it to charity. Presumably this is something the shareholders could have done themselves, if they chose to. So from a libertarian standpoint, this is ... (read more)

What he should have done was contingently committed to selling his organs on the black market before committing suicide. Then, there would have been a net benefit to his death, instead of it being zero-sum, and his actions would have been admirable.

Does not follow - the breakup value of your organs is not necessarily greater than your organs working together. Just because someone gets paid doesn't mean that game is positive-sum.

Annoyance250

"So from a libertarian standpoint, this is not an admirable act -- he forced the shareholders to do something they didn't want to do."

No, he didn't. They wanted to offer a life insurance policy. I'm confident that they're not thrilled about having to pay out, but they're not being forced to do anything against their will - only to keep to the obligations they freely entered into.

The man has done nothing admirable, either; he has taken money from the shareholders of the insurance company, and given it to charity. Presumably this is something the shareholders could have done themselves, if they chose to. So from a libertarian standpoint, this is not an admirable act -- he forced the shareholders to do something they didn't want to do. Even though he did this through "voluntary" means.

This paragraph indicates that you believe that forcing people to do something they don't want to do is wrong.

What he should have done wa

... (read more)