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Here is the general form of my argument.

A person says, "X" is true of morality or of "moral judgments" in the public at large. This brings the talk of an objective morality to its knees. I answer that X is also true if science "or of "truth judgments" in the public at large. But it does not bring all talk of objectivity n science to its knees. Therefore, the original argument is invalid.

A case in point: whether somethis is moral depends on your definition of moral. But there is no objective way to determine the correct de... (read more)

-1Jack13y

Of course I never made such an argument, so this rebuttal is rather odd. Your point of course leads to the question: what does make science objective. I would argue for two candidates though some might say they are the same an I'm happy to here others. 1) Scientific theories make predictions about our future experiences, constraining them. When a scientific theory is wrong we have unexpected experiences which lead us to reject or revise that theory. 2) Science reveals the universe's causal structure which gives us power to manipulate one variable which in turn alters another. If we are unable to do this as our theory expects we reject or revise that theory. The process leads to ever-more effective theories which, at their limit, model objective reality. This it seems to me is how science is objective, though again, I'm happy to hear other theories. Now. What are the predictions a moral theory makes? What experiments can I run to test it? Whether or not Pluto is a planet might not have an "objective definition" (what ever that means) but it sure as heck has an objective trajectory through space that can be calculated with precision using Newtonian physics. You can specify a date and an astronomer can tell you Pluto's position at that date. But there is no objective method for determining what a person should and should not do in an ethical dilemma. No, my position is that all moral judgments are these kinds of projections. If there were ones that weren't I wouldn't be an anti-realist This is neither here nor there. Scientific observations are theory-laden and to some point under-determined by the evidence. But ethical theories are in no way constrained by any evidence of any kind. You mean "objective" and no it doesn't. It just denies that moral judgments are part of the world outside the mind. It does not deny that. I agree that values exist, I just think they're subjective. You're either using these words differently than I am or you're totally wrong. I'm

Less Wrong views on morality?

AlonzoFyfe13y-10

In which case, you will be making a point - not that there are different facts, but that there are different languages. Of course, language is an invention - and there is no natural law that dictates the definition of the word "astronomy".

It is merely a convention that we have adopted a language in which the term "astronomy" does not cover chemical facts. But we could have selected a different language - and there is no law of nature dictating that we could not.

And, yet, these facts about language - these facts about the ways we define ... (read more)

0mwengler13y

I think the fact that astronomy means astronomy and not chemistry among rational conversationalists is as significant as the fact that the chess piece that looks sort of like a horse is the one rational chess players use as the knight. I don't think there is anything particularly significant in almost all labels, they're positive use is that you can manipulate concepts and report on your results to others using them.

1Jack13y

I suppose that is true... but surely that doesn't render the word meaningless? In the actual world where words mean the things they mean and not other things that they could have meant in a world with different linguistic convention "astronomy" still means something like "the study of celestial bodies", right? Surely people asking for astronomical facts about airplanes, as if they were celestial bodies is a sign of confusion and ought to be gently corrected, no? Where in the world did you get the notion that I wanted science on its knees or that I thought it was? I'm as kinky as the next guy but I quite like science where it is. I'm completely bamboozled by this rhetoric. Do you take me for someone who believes God is required for morality or some other such nonsense? If so let me be clear: moral judgments are neither natural nor supernatura objectivel facts. They are the projection of an individuals preferences and emotions that people mistake for externally existing things, much as people mistake cuteness as an intrinsic property of babies when in fact it is simply the projection of our affinity for babies that makes them appear cute-to-us. That does not mean that there are not facts about moral judgments or that science is not on strong and worthy grounds when gathering such facts. My chief concern in my initial comment to which you replied was getting everyone straight on what the meta-ethical terminology means. People enjoy freelancing with the meanings of words like "objective", "subjective", and "relative" and it creates a terrible mess when talking about metaethics because no one know what anyone else is talking about. I didn't have any kind of straightforward factual disagreement with the original commenter, bracketing the fact that I was quite sure what their position was and if they in fact thought they had succeeded in solve a two-thousand old debate by discovering and objective foundation for morality when they had in fact just rediscovered moral subj

Less Wrong views on morality?

AlonzoFyfe13y00

Yes. Water is made up of two hydrogen and an oxygern atom is a different fact than the earth and venus are nearly the same size. It does not bring science to its knees.

-1Jack13y

And the next time someone says that there are astronomical facts about the chemical make-up of water I will correct them as well. Which is to say I don't know what your point is and can only imagine you think I am arguing for something I am not. Perhaps it's worth clarifying things before we get glib?

Less Wrong views on morality?

AlonzoFyfe13y20

If "objective" is "mind independent", then are facts ABOUT minds not objective? We cannot have a science that discusses, for example, how the pre-frontal lobe functions because no such claim can be mind-independent?

For every so-called subjective statement, there is an objective statement that says exactly the same thing from a different point of view. If I say, "spinich, yumm" there is a corresponding objective statement "Alonzo likes spinich" that says exactly the same thing.

So, why not just focus on the objective equivalent of every subjective statement? Why pretend that there is a difference that makes any difference?

3Jack13y

Because it makes a huge difference in our understanding of morality. "Alonzo expresses a strong distaste for murder" is a very different fact than "Murder is immoral" (as commonly understood), no? ETA: Of course, given that I don't think facts like "murder is immoral" exist I'm all about focusing on the other kind of fact. But it's important to get concepts and categories straight because those two facts are not necessarily intensionally or extensionally equivalent.

Less Wrong views on morality?

AlonzoFyfe13y-10

Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value. What evolutionary ethics will teach us is that our mind/brains are maleable. Our values are not fixed.

And the question of what we SHOULD value makes sense because our brains are malleable. Our desires - just like our beliefs - are not fixed. They are learned. So, the question arises, "Given that we can mold desires into different forms, what SHOULD we mold them into?"

Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. &q... (read more)

0mwengler13y

Its lunchtime so for fun I will answer some of your rhetorical questions. Unless GE Moore is either an alien or an artificial intelligence, he is telling us what we should value from a human brain that values things based on its evolution. How will he be able to make any value statement and tell you with a straight face that his valuing that thing has NOTHING to do with his evolution? My disposition to harm people is triggered approximately proportionally to my judgement that this person has or will harm me or someone I care about. My disposition doesn't speak, but neither does my disposition to presume based on experience that the sun will rise tomorrow. What does speak says about the second that being able to predict the future based on the past is an incredibly effective way to understand the universe, so much so that it seems the niverse's continuity from the past to the future is a feature of the universe, not just a feature of the tools my mind has developed to understand the universe. About my incoherent disposition to harm someone who is threatening my wife or my sister, I would invite you to consider life in a society where this disposition did not exist. Violent thieves would run roughshod over the non-violent, who would stand around naked, starving, and puzzled: "what can we do about this after all?" This sentence seems somewhat incoherent but I'll address what I think are some of the interesting issues it evokes, if not quite brings up. First, public open acceptance of homosexuality is a gigantic and modern phenomenon. If nothing else, it proves that an incredibly large number of humans DO NOT have any such genetic urge to kill homosexuals, or even to give them dirty looks when walking by them on the street for that matter. So if there is a lesson about concluding moral "oughts" from moral "is-es" here, it is that anybody who previously conclude that homicidal hatred of homosexuals was part of human genetic moral makeup was using insanely flawed meth

0Zetetic13y

First, I do have a couple of nitpicks: That depends. See here for instance. This depends on what you mean by "punish". If by "punish" you mean socially ostracize and disallow mating privileges, I can think of situations in which it could make evolutionary sense, although as we no longer live in our ancestral environment and have since developed a complex array of cultural norms, it no longer makes moral sense. In any event, what you've written is pretty much orthogonal to what I've said; I'm not defending what you're calling evolutionary ethics (nor am I aware of indicating that I hold that view, if anything I took it to be a bit of a strawman). Descriptive evolutionary ethics is potentially useful, but normative evolutionary ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy (as you've pointed out), and I think the Euthyphro argument is fairly weak in comparison to that point. The view you're attacking doesn't seem to take into account the interplay between genetic, epigenetic and cultural/mememtic factors in how moral intuitions are shaped and can be shaped. It sounds like a pretty flimsy position, and I'm a bit surprised that any ethicist actually holds it. I would be interested if you're willing to cite some people who currently hold the viewpoint you're addressing. Well, really it's more neuroscience that tells us that our values aren't fixed (along with how the valuation works). It also has the potential to tell us to what degree our values are fixed at any given stage of development, and how to take advantage of the present degree of malleability. Of course; under your usage of evolutionary ethics this is clearly the case. I'm not sure how this relates to my comment, however. I agree that it's pretty obvious that social reinforcement is important because it shapes moral behavior, but I'm not sure if you're trying to make a central point to me, or just airing your own position regardless of the content of my post.

0[anonymous]13y

Yay for my favorite ethicist signing up for LessWrong!

Less Wrong views on morality?

AlonzoFyfe13y10

I believe it is poosible to scientifically determine whether people generally have many and strong reasons to promote or inhibit certain desires through the use of social tools such as praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. I also believe that this investigation would make sense of a wealth of moral practices such as the three categories of action (obligation, prohibition, and non-obligatory permission), excuse, the four categories of culpability (intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent), supererogatory action, and. - of course - the role of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment.

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