All of Amanojack's Comments + Replies

This is just a manifestation of the general fact that it is impossible to specify a hypothetical fully without telling the entire story of how things got that way from the dawn of time. Speaking of hypotheticals is thus inherently loose. There is no way to avoid fallacies in most such exercises. Feigning rigor by calling specific cases "fallacies" is pretention.

It isn't just difficult to avoid these errors; it's impossible, and relegates the exercise to the merely cautiously suggestive, not a central method of philosophy.

I agree; wherever there is paradox and endless debate, I have always found ambiguity in the initial posing of the question. An unorthodox mathematician named Norman Wildberger just released a new solution by unambiguously specifying what we know about Omega's predictive powers.

truth=opinion

I'd phrase it as "truth is subjective," but I agree in principle. Truth is a word for everyday talk, not for precise discourse. This may sound pretty off-the-wall, but stepping back for a second it should be no surprise that holding to everyday English phrasing would interfere with our efforts to speak precisely. I'll put this more specifically below.

But if e.g. you get in an accident and you lose your leg, nobody will have offered you an opinion, but nonetheless it'll be true that you'll be missing a leg.

This is actually b... (read more)

Any time you have a bias you cannot fully compensate for, there is a potential benefit to putting instrumental rationality above epistemic.

One fear I was unable to overcome for many years was that of approaching groups of people. I tried all sorts of things, but the best piece advice turned out to be: "Think they'll like you." Simply believing that eliminates the fear and aids in my social goals, even though it sometimes proves to have been a false belief, especially with regard to my initial reception. Believing that only 3 out of 4 groups will like or welcome me initially and 1 will rebuff me, even though this may be the case, has not been as useful as believing that they'll all like me.

He's making some interesting points, and he gets extra credit in my view for taking so radical a view while usually remaining reasonable. I find his railing against prediction to be puzzling, but his semantic points and discussion of Ptolemaic explanations have given me a lot to think about.

I also noticed that even some of his friendly, reasoned posts were being downvoted to the same extreme negative levels, which seems unwarranted. He has posted too much without familiarizing himself with the norms here, but he shows sincerity and willingness to learn an... (read more)

You're making a ton of interesting points, but please succinctify (a lot!). I mean, let people reply and stuff. I feel sorry for you writing all that knowing almost no one will see it. It's obvious you're reading LW classic posts and making discoveries, and then immediately turning around and applying them, which is great. I just think you'd do well to steep yourself in the posting norms of this forum so you can participate in a more fruitful way. Again, I for one would like to hear well-reasoned radical views.

To be honest, you sound bitter or something, although given the difference of opinion being as radical as it is, that is pretty understandable (so are the downvotes, for the same reason). Maybe let it cool off for a bit. I have an interest in hearing what you think after you have spent more time here.

You remind me of Silas Barta, and I think we could use more people who radically disagree with major pieces of LW, because it is good practice if nothing else.

I think your position is just too radical here.

Ultimately all science has to eventually be used for prediction or it is useless except for aesthetic purposes. However, I do sympathize with what (I think) your main point was before, that prediction is no measure of a theory if the "theory" is just curve-fitting (it is, of course, a measure of the utility of the curve or equation that the data was fit to). That is really just common sense, though, so you may have meant something else.

This is a LessWrong idea two: play the why game, keep asking "why" all the way down. Can't find the post on this though :/

Whoah, thanks for this. I get what you're saying now: you oppose Ptolemaic explanations. I think these are good points - why's this sensible post being downvoted? Even if there is something wrong with the reasoning, these seem like good, interesting questions to me.

Theories don't explain- they predict. Consider gravity- Newton's law tells you the attraction between two masses, and it's mostly consistent with the mostly elliptical orbits that we observe the planets moving in.

The gravitational equation is effectively just* a summary of the observed data, so it is no surprise that it predicts. I believe Monkeymind finds this unsatsifactory, but I'm still not sure exactly how. Perhaps he defines theory differently. I'm a little curious what actually causes the Earth to pull on me, rather than, say, push me away. At th... (read more)

I would say the theory was poorly communicated, at best.

Luckily, you can choose to use a mechanism other than human intuition to understand the universe. Like mathematics, which seems to do a much better job, even in a way observable to humans. We have lots of devices (observable at human scales!) that do exactly what the mathematics said they would, like GPS.

I think there is a common miscommunication on this point. If something cannot be understood in the conventional human sense, can it be understood via math? It depends on what we mean by "understand." We can certainly catalog what we observe an... (read more)

Learning QM has been compared to learning to ride a bicycle. You don't do that by first defining your terms, you just get out there and do it, and it's hard to reduce the knowledge of how to ride a bike to definitions.

This may indeed be the case, but taking the outside view - if I didn't know you were talking about QM, but knew it was about some purported scientific theory - giving a free pass to the usual strict rationalist requirement to "define your terms clearly" would seem pretty dubious. There are a lot of ways to build whole systems out... (read more)

Your method of argumentation is a little unusual and perhaps a bit off-putting, but I don't know why all your posts are being systematically downvoted this low. It's clear from posts like this one that you're not merely trolling, but I think you're taking on too much at once. Also, your style is not very LessWrong friendly and you're posting a lot. Maybe slow it down a bit, get familiar with the lay of the land a bit more.

I, for one, would like to hear a bit more about your misgivings. You've said some interesting things so far that have got me thinking.

One can't really "explain" a particle. I would say, however, that if you cannot show the shape of the particle (how it occupies space), it is somewhat questionable to call it a "particle" in any classical sense that I'm familiar with.

Why shouldn't physics talk about concepts? Or first, what is your definition of "object" and "concept" - even just by examples.

Yes, it does take far more than just defining ones terms, but we must start there b4 we can go anywhere else! I don't mean a infinite number of now define that, now define that....just the KEY TERMS of one's hypothesis b4 moving on to the theory. Whatever the defs are they must be used CONSISTENTLY.

I agree that key terms need a definition. They have apparently all been defined before, but no one here has yet shown an interest in giving those (or any) precise definitions right now. I'm not sure why, especially given that this is LessWrong. I'd help you out on that, but I honestly don't know the precise definition that QM theorists use for wave. Surely someone must know?

If quantum mechanical models accurately describe what's happening, the fact that we can't picture it in our heads is not a problem.

I think there's a danger of equivocating here on the words "what's happening." In other words, which "what's happening" do the QM models describe?

I'll elaborate. If we observe X, do the QM models describe X, or do they describe the (so far unobserved) phenomena that may underly X?

• If the mathematical QM model merely describes X, it's hard to see how it is anything other than a very succinct cataloging

"I can't get a picture of this in my head" is not a rebuttal of a physical theory, because there's no reason that our heads must actually be equipped to create pictures of how the fundamental level of reality works.

Agreed, the basic structure of reality may be unvisualizable and otherwise incomprehensible to us. However, a theory is ostensibly a physical explanation, not merely a mathematical summary of the observed data. Reading over Monkeymind's posts, it seems the point he is making is that these theories sort of seem to "feel like&quo... (read more)

Taking the outside view - that is, forgetting this is a conversation about QM - this sounds a little hand-wavy. It seems natural to ask for precise definitions of basic terms in an article about QM, and for consistency in their usage.

I didn't say he was in the Bayesian camp, I said he had the Bayesian insight that probability is in the mind.

In the final quote he is simply saying that mathematical statements of probability merely summarize our state of knowledge; they do not add anything to it other than putting it in a more useful form. I don't see how this would be interpreted as going against subjectivism, especially when he clearly refers to probabilities being expressions of our ignorance.

I think you'll find the extreme cases (totalitarian economic controls vs. complete laissez faire) to be helpful to look at so as to challenge the way you're framing the spectrum.

Also, politics and economics go hand in hand, economics being - in terms of what it is usually actually used for - the study of how political actions affect the economy. For example, David Friedman argues that courts would produce better rulings if they were not run as a monopoly, and that the same is true with laws and regulations themselves. So at the limit it is not easy to sep... (read more)

Short: I, Pencil by Leonard E. Reed

Long: Economics in One Lesson by Henry Hazlitt

Very long: Socialism by Ludwig von Mises, or any of F.A. Hayek's work on spontaneous order

(All available in pdf form by googling, though some may be copyrighted)

For specific questions, the Mises forums will happily supply you with arguments and tailored links for any economic questions. Just be sure to ask for arguments on consequentialist grounds since the forum is idealogically extremely libertarian (but friendly).

If you're looking for something more mild of the John Stossel... (read more)

I have also found claims that one or a few simple ideas can solve huge swaths of the world's problems to be a sign of naivity, but another exception is when there is mass delusion or confusion due to systematic errors. Provided such pervasive and damaging errors do exist, merely clearing up those errors would be a major service to humanity. In this sense, Less Wrong and Misesian epistemology share a goal: to eliminate flawed reasoning. I am not sure why Mises chose to put forth this LW-style message as a positive theory (praxeology), but the content seems ... (read more)

Sure. He wrote about it a lot. Here is a concise quote:

The concepts of chance and contingency, if properly analyzed, do not refer ultimately to the course of events in the universe. They refer to human knowledge, prevision, and action. They have a praxeological [relating to human knowledge and action], not an ontological connotation.

Also:

Calling an event contingent is not to deny that it is the necessary outcome of the preceding state of affairs. It means that we mortal men do not know whether or not it will happen. The present epistemological situat

My point was to indicate that not all people who put stock in the "Austrian school" accept post-Misesians as competent intepreters. I meant, essentially: Mises had it right, but read his original work (not later Austrians) and you'll be able to tell whether I'm right.

I would have prefaced that with "in my opinion," but I thought that was obvious. (What else would it be?)

Block and Rothbard do not understand Austrian economics and are incapable of defending it against serious rationalist criticism. Ludwig von Mises is the only rigorous rationalist in the "school". His works make mincemeat of Caplan's arguments decades before Caplan even makes them. But don't take my word for it - go back and reread Mises directly.

You will see that the "rationalist" objections Caplan raises are not new. They are simply born out of a misunderstanding of a complex topic. Rothbard, Block, and most of the other "Austrian... (read more)

Debating with Block would turn any rationalist off of Austrian econ. No one got it comletely right except Mises himself. Actually not even him, but he was usually extremely rational and rigorous in his approach - more than any other economist I know of - albeit often poorly communicated.

In any case, any non-ideologically motivated rationalist worth their salt ought to be able to piece together a decent understanding of the epistemological issues by reading the first 200 pages of Human Action.

I've had the same experience. To me this suggests that although not all conscious thoughts are visual, they may all be sensual. That is, of the five senses.

Actually, this is tautological if "conscious thought" means a thought we are completely aware of, unless we can be 'aware' of something other than five-sense experience.

Eliezer can tell us how to visualize triangular lightbulbs, but not zero-dimensional objects. Which is more mysterious?

For that matter, amplitude of a wave...but what is waving? Where's the realism?

The question of "dualism" isn't even a real question. Science tells us that a certain wavelength of light will appear to us as green. But what really is the point of knowing that? Well, it gives us a set of instructions for how to make us experience green. But the instructions for how to produce the subjective experience are not themselves the experience. The notion that if we could just figure out how to make people experience green through some manipulation we will have learned something amazing is silly. We can already do that by showing a green flag or telling someone not to think of a green rabbit.

Plus we have a hard time conceiving of what it would be like to always be in a state of maximal, beyond-orgasmic pleasure.

When I imagine it I cannot help but let a little bit of revulsion, fear, and emptiness creep into the feeling - which of course would not be actually be there. This invalidates the whole thought experiment to me, because it's clear I'm unable to perform it correctly, and I doubt I'm uncommon in that regard.

Dictionaries tend to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up not hearing the word "good" used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves

The problem isn't that I don't know what it means. The problem is that it means many different things and I don't know which of those you mean by it.

an amoral hedonist

I have moral sentiments (empathy, sense of justice, indignation, etc.), so I'm not amoral. And I am not particularly high time-preference, so I'm not a hedonist.

preferences can also be defined to include un

This is the whole demonstrated preference thing. I don't buy it myself, but that's a debate for another time. What I mean by subjectively is that I will value one person's life more than another person's life, or I could think that I want that $1,000,000 more than a rich person wants it, but that's just all in my head. To compare utility functions and work from demonstrated preference usually - not always - is a precursor to some kind of authoritarian scheme. I can't say there is anything like that coming, but it does set off some alarm bells. Anyway, this is not something I can substantiate right now.

You're right, I think I'm confused about what you were talking about, or I inferred too much. I'm not really following at this point either.

One thing, though, is that you're using meta-ethics to mean ethics. Meta-ethics is basically the study of what people mean by moral language, like whether ought is interpreted as a command, as God's will, as a way to get along with others, etc. That'll tend to cause some confusion. A good heuristic is, "Ethics is about what people ought to do, whereas meta-ethics is about what ought means (or what people intend by it)."

The concept of truth is for utility, not utility for truth. To get them backwards is to merely be confused by the words themselves. It's impossible to show you've dispensed with any concept, except to show that it isn't useful for what you're doing. That is what I've done. I'm non-cognitive to God, truth, and objective value (except as recently defined). Usually they all sound like religion, though they all are or were at one time useful approximate means of expressing things in English.

How can he justify the belief that beliefs are justified by sense-experience without first assuming his conclusion?

I don't know what exactly "justify" is supposed to mean, but I'll interpret it as "show to be useful for helping me win." In that case, it's simply that certain types of sense-experience seem to have been a reliable guide for my actions in the past, for helping me win. That's all.

To think of it in terms of assumptions and conclusions is to stay in the world of true/false or justified/unjustified, where we can only go in... (read more)

Is this basically saying that you can tell someone else's utility function by demonstrated preference? It sounds a lot like that.

Why not just phrase it in terms of utility? "Justification" can mean too many different things.

Seeing a black swan diminishes (and for certain applications, destroys) the usefulness of the belief that all swans are white. This seems a lot simpler.

Putting it in terms of beliefs paying rent in anticipated experiences, the belief "all swans are white" told me to anticipate that if I knew there was a black animal perched on my shoulder it could not be a swan. Now that belief isn't as reliable of a guidepost. If black swans are really rare... (read more)

I agree with this, if that makes any difference.

I missed this:

If I tell you it will increase your happiness to hit yourself on the head with a hammer, your response is going to have to amount to "no, that's not true".

I'll just decide not to follow the advice, or I'll try it out and then after experiencing pain I will decide not to follow the advice again. I might tell you that, too, but I don't need to use the word "true" or any equivalent to do that. I can just say it didn't work.

A lot of people care about truth, even when (I suspect) they diminish their enjoyment needlessly by doing so, so no argument there. In the parent I'm just continuing to try to explain why my stance might sound weird. My point from farther above, though, is just that I don't/wouldn't care about "truth" in those rare and odd cases where it is already part of the premises that truth or falsehood will not affect me in any way.

Yeah, because calling it that makes it pretty hard to understand. If you just mean Collective Greatest Happiness Utilitarianism, then that would be a good name. Objective morality can mean way too many different things. This way at least you're saying in what sense it's supposed to be objective.

As for this collectivism, though, I don't go for it. There is no way to know another's utility function, no way to compare utility functions among people, etc. other than subjectively. And who's going to be the person or group that decides? SIAI? I personally think all this collectivism is a carryover from the idea of (collective) democracy and other silly ideas. But that's a debate for another day.

It is not the case that all beliefs can do is predict experience based on existing preferences. Beliefs can also set and modify preferences.

I agree, if you mean things like, "If I now believe that she is really a he, I don't want to take 'her' home anymore."

I think moral values are ultimate because I can;t think of a valid argument of the form "I should do because ".

Neither can I. I just don't draw the same conclusion. There's a difference between disagreeing with something and not knowing what it means, and I do seriously not k... (read more)

I never said they had to be "immediately useful" (hardly anything ever is). Untrue beliefs might be pleasing, but when people are arguing truth and falsehood it is not in order to prove that the beliefs they hold are untrue so that they can enjoy believing them, so it's not an objection either.