Hemming problem?

It's always seemed bizarre to me how disconnected from the philosophical discourse the sequences are. It's a series of philosophical positions articulated in ways that make naming them, and thus exposing oneself to the counter-arguments to them, and the ongoing discussions they are a part of, EXTREMELY difficult. If someone would just go through the sequences and label the ideas with their philosophical names and cite some of the people they are associated with in the larger philosophical discourse it seems like a lot of the discussion here could be short-cutted by simply exposing the community to the  people who have already talked about this stuff. 

I just read fake frameworks and I still just feel like I'm being interpreted as asking a different question than I am asking. If the frameworks are ultimately fake then that's fine. I just want to know what the frameworks are and where they come from. I'm asking "Why do you believe what you believe?" and was expecting the answer to take the form of citations of cognitive/experimental psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology. Is that not the kind of answer I should be expecting?

While a summary would be ideal, I'm really looking for any specific source from any of those fields that the community would deem important and relatively trustworthy. I'm going to be at least mildly critical in my analysis and so I want to be sure that I'm not just strawmanning. Whatever the strongest arguments and sources rationalist can provide from these sources, they are the ones I want to spend my time working with. I'm trying to narrow this down to single sources because I want to do a critical analysis of a single source as an example of how to do ... (read more)

That's great, but synthesis of multiple sources begins with single sources and I'm trying to start at that level and build up. I'm not asking for a definitive source, just studies that rationalists think are important, supportive of their worldview, and reliable as far as single studies go. 

If philosophy(and psychology) is supposed to be based on the findings of cognitive science(and not the other way around, 
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vzLrQaGPa9DNCpuZz/against-modal-logics 

recursive justification hits rock bottom with a reflective proc... (read more)

I just read most  of the comments in this thread and despite a general agreement that LW philosophy and Quinean philosophy have a whole lot in common, no one even suggested reading up on his critics. The lens that sees it's own flaws is fine and good(although always a more difficult task than one might expect), but what about the lens that exposes itself to the eyes of others and asks them what flaws they see?

And, especially with the replication crisis, shouldn't we all be gaining some awareness of the philosophical assumptions that inform our experim... (read more)

“Where did I get it from? Was it by reason that I attained to the knowledge that I must love my neighbour and not throttle him? They told me so when I was a child, and I gladly believed it, because they told me what was already in my soul. But who discovered it? Not reason! Reason has discovered the struggle for existence and the law that I must throttle all those who hinder the satisfaction of my desires. That is the deduction reason makes. But the law of loving others could not be discovered by reason, because it is unreasonable.”

― Leo Tolstoy- Anna Karenina

I found myself reading this book today thought I'd remembered someone on Less Wrong posting about it. So here I am.

I think your critique misses some really valid critiques provided by Lakoff of the entire rationalist project.

The sections on Quinne, Kahneman and Taversky(around p. 471) and around pages 15 and 105 are particularly good. 

What your critique misses is that when you use the lens of cognitive science to critique Lakoff's philosophy is that the body of work you are drawing on is already saturated with and informed by the assumptions you are c... (read more)

This was a fascinating read. You may find an essay in my recent post history on the purported difference between "Greek" and "Hebrew" ways of thinking interesting.

I stumbled on this essay while reading a book that does a meta-analysis of Lakoff's "objectivism vs experientialism" and then proposes an integration as part of a larger integration project for general and domain language. It does so while also addressing implications for Machine translation and AI, but I'm neither a linguist nor an AI researcher so I find ... (read more)

I linked it above.

Hebrew vs Greek Essay. I have to apologize upfront for the source. It's actually from an appendix of an LDS/Mormon scripture study guide. The author is a Levinas scholar and professional philosopher. His main source is a book called Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek by Thorlief Bowman, but he's also heavily drawing on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.

https://www.amazon.com/Hebrew-Thought-Compared-Greek-Thorleif/dp/0393005348

In it, he makes some pretty audacious claims about how ancient Greek people "thought" based off the structure ... (read more)

This reminded me of an old essay I had laying around on the difference between the "Greek" and "Hebrew" ways of thinking about time. I'll post one section from it and I think you'll see the relevance.

Time and History

"One result of this difference in the Greek and Hebrew concepts of space is a difference in their concepts of time. For Greeks, space is fundamental to time; in fact, in an Indo European model of what it means to be, time is traditionally modeled on space, namely, as a series of points that follow one anoth... (read more)

I see the entire branch of philosophy known as normative ethics(deontology, consequentialist, virtue) as emerging out a need to codify a right and wrong that we already know. "By what measuring stick are you measuring your measuring stick?" You must already know what is right and what is wrong otherwise you would have no standard by which to judge ethical systems. This "phenomenological ethics" emerges out of our encounters with other people who we, as socially defined beings, feel a moral call towards(Levinas). The true moral question,... (read more)

Random lines of thought to explore:

Can we figure out how sacrificial magic works from available evidence(we've seen a lot of it recently) and could Harry use that new knowledge to solve his predicament? A principle similar to the potion making principle perhaps?

Harry had to go all the way down to timeless physics in order to do partial transfiguration. I know very little about the theory but could Harry apply that knowledge to somehow partially transfigure time itself or transfigure something not in his present?

If Harry can convince Voldemort to allow him... (read more)

Theory: Voldemort has let Harry keep his wand because he intends Harry to do something with it. In story we have plenty of evidence that you can't "mess with time". Think of prophecies as messages from the future instead of predictions and it's obvious. Voldemort knows this first hand(and maybe Harry will figure it out) so instead of trying to foil the prophecy or actively trying to force the prophecy to play out in the most beneficial way he can imagine, like he did with his first encounter with a prophecy, he is trying to make it so that proph... (read more)

Sooo it could show the coherent desires shared between all Tom Riddles?

Oops, he could just have Snape do it though or wake up someone else to do it.

Realization: Not only is it suspicious that Harry finally makes the Quirrell=Voldemort connection almost immediately after Snape hits him with an anti-Confundus spell but the fact that Quirrell hasn't obliviated Harry yet is positive proof that he intends Harry to know that Q=V for the time being. For what purpose?