All of daedalus2u's Comments + Replies

Inklesspen's argument (which you said you agreed with) was was that my belief in a lack of personal identity continuity was incompatible with being unwilling to accept a painless death and that this constitutes a fatal flaw in my argument.

If there are things you want to accomplish and where you believe the most effective way for you to accomplish those things is via uploading what you believe will be a version of your identity into an electronic gizmo; all I can say is good luck with that. You are welcome to your beliefs.

In no way does that address Ink... (read more)

Yes. I would consider those states to be “unconscious”. I am not using “conscious” or “unconscious” as pejorative terms or as terms with any type of value, but purely as descriptive terms that describe the state of an entity. If an entity is not self-aware in the moment, then it is not conscious.

People are not self-aware of the data processing their visual cortex is doing (at least I am not). When you are not aware of the data processing you are doing, the outcome of that data processing is “transparent” to you, that is the output is achieved without... (read more)

I see this as analogous to what some religious people say when they are unable to conceive of a sense of morality or any code of behavior that does not come from their God.

If you are unable to conceive of a sense of purpose that is not attached to a personal sense of continued personal identity, I am not sure I can convince you otherwise.

But why you consider that my ability to conceive of a sense of purpose without a personal belief in a continued sense of personal identity is somehow a "flaw" in my reasoning is not something I quite understa... (read more)

Yes, if you are not aware of being conscious then you are unconscious. You may have the capacity to be conscious, but if you are not using that capacity, because you are asleep, are under anesthesia, or because you have sufficiently dissociated from being conscious, then you are not conscious at that moment.

There are states where people do “black-out”, that is where they seemingly function appropriately but have no memory later of those periods. Those states can occur due to drug use, they can also happen via psychogenic processes called a fugue state. ... (read more)

If a being is not aware of being conscious, then it is not conscious no matter what else it is aware of.

I am not saying that all consciousness entails is being aware of being conscious, but it does at a minimum entail that. If an entity does not have self-awareness, then it is not conscious, no matter what other properties that entity has.

You are free to make up any hypothetical entities and states that you want, but the term “consciousness” has a generally recognized meaning. If you want to deviate from that meaning you have to tell me what you mea... (read more)

It is your contention that an entity can be conscious without being aware that it is conscious?

There are entities that are not aware of being conscious. To me, if an entity is not aware of being conscious (i.e. is unconscious of being conscious), then it is unconscious.

By my understanding of the term, the one thing an entity must be aware of to be conscious is its own consciousness. I see that as an inherent part of the definition. I can not conceive of a definition of “consciousness” that allows for a conscious entity to be unaware that it is conscious.

Could you give me a definition of "consciousness" that allows for being unaware of being conscious?

perplexed, how do you know you do not have a consciousness detector?

Do you see because you use a light detector? Or because you use your eyes? Or because you learned what the word “see” means?

When you understand spoken language do you use a sound detector? A word detector? Do the parts of your brain that you use to decode sounds into words into language into meaning not do computations on the signals those parts receive from your ears?

The only reason you can think a thought is because there are neural structures that are instantiating that thoug... (read more)

GuySrinivasan, I really can't figure out what is being meant.

In my next sentence I say I am not trying to describe all computations that are necessary, and in the sentence after that I start talking about entity detection computation structures being necessary.

First an entity must have a “self detector”; a pattern recognition computation structure which it uses to recognizes its own state of being an entity and of being the same entity over time. If an entity is unable to recognize itself as an entity, then it can't be conscious that it is an entity

Yes, and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and 7 all require data and computation resources.

And to compare a map with a territory one needs a map (i.e. data) and a comparator (i.e. a pattern recognition device) and needs computational resources to compare the data with the territory using the comparator.

When one is thinking about internal states, the map, the territory and the comparator are all internal. That they are internal does not obviate the need for them.

perplexed, If detecting consciousness in someone else requires data and computation, why is our own consciousness special such that it doesn't require data and computation to be detected? No one has presented any evidence or any arguments that our own consciousness is special. Until I see a reasonable argument otherwise; my default will be that my own consciousness is not special and that everyone else's consciousness is not special either.

I appreciate that some people do privilege their own consciousness. My interpretation of that self-privileging is... (read more)

To be a car; a machine at a minimum must have wheels. Wheels are not sufficient to make a machine into a car.

To be conscious, an entity must be self-aware of self-consciousness. To be self-aware of self-consciousness an entity must have a "self-consciousness-detector" A self-consciousness-detector requires data and computation resources to do the pattern recognition necessary to detect self-consciousness.

What else consciousness requires I don't know, but I know it must require detection of self-consciousness.

My purpose in pointing this out was to say that yes, people today are making the same types of category errors as Kelvin was; the mistaken belief that some types of objects are fundamentally not comparable (in Kelvin's case living things and machines), in the example I used computations by a sensory neural network and computations by a machine pattern recognition system.

They are both doing computations, they can both be compared as computing devices; they both need computation resources to accomplish the computations and data to do the computations on. ... (read more)

Is there something wrong with my interpretation of Stockholm Syndrome other than it is not the “natural interpretation"? Is it inconsistent with anything known about Stockholm Syndrome, how people interact, or how humans evolved?

Would we consider it surprising if humans did have a mechanism to try and emulate a “green beard” if having a green beard became essential for survival?

We know that some people find many green-beard-type reasons for attacking and even killing other humans. Race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender, and so on ... (read more)

Yes, and some people today don't realize that the brain does computations on sensory input in order to accomplish pattern recognition, and without that computation there is no pattern recognition and no perception. Of anything.

I had read mysterious answers to mysterious questions. I think I do have an explanation that makes consciousness seem less mysterious and which does not introduce any additional mysteries. Unfortunately I seem to be the only one who appreciates that.

Maybe if I had started out to discuss the computational requirements of the perception of consciousness there would have been less objection. But I don't see any way to differentiate between perception of consciousness and consciousness. I don't think you can have one without the other.

nawitus, my post was too long as it is. If I had included multiple discussions of multiple definitions of consciousness and qualia, you would either still be reading it or would have stopped because it was too long.

With all due respect to Lord Kelvin, he personally knew of heavier than air flying machines. We now call them birds. He called them birds too.

We can't “know for sure” because consciousness is a subjective experience. The only way you could “know for sure” would be if you simulated an entity and so knew from how you put the simulation together that the entity you were simulating did experience self-consciousness.

So how does this hypothetical biologist calibrate his consciousness scanner? Calibrate it so that he “knows for sure” that it is reading consciousness correctly? His degree of certainty in the output of his consciousness scanner is limited by his degree of certainty in his calibratio... (read more)

I am talking about minimum requirements, not sufficient requirements.

I am not sure what you mean by "understand relevant features of its own source code".

I don't know any humans that I would consider conscious that don't fit the definition of consciousness that I am using. If you have a different definition I would be happy to consider it.

Yvain, what I mean by illusion is:

perceptions not corresponding to objective reality due to defects in sensory information processing used as the basis for that perception.

Optical illusions are examples of perceptions that don't correspond to reality because of how our nervous system processes light signals. Errors in perception; either false positives or false negatives are illusions.

In some of the meditative traditions there is the goal of "losing the self". I have never studied those traditions and don't know much about them. I do know ... (read more)

[Consciousness] :The subjective state of being self-aware that one is an autonomous entity that can differentially regulate what one is thinking about.

No, there are useful things I want to accomplish with the remaining lifespan of the body I have. That there is no continuity of personal identity is irrelevant to what I can accomplish.

That continuity of personaal identity is an illusion simply means that the goal of indefinite extension of personal identity is a useless goal that can never be achieved.

I don't doubt that a machine could be programmed to think it was the continuation of a flesh-and-blood entity. People have posited paper clip maximizers too.

This is my first article on LW, so be gentle.

I think the misconception is that what is generally considered “quality of life” is not correlated with things like affluence. People like to believe (pretend?) that it is, and by ever striving for more affluence feel that they are somehow improving their “quality of life”.

When someone is depressed, their “quality of life” is quite low. That “quality of life” can only be improved by resolving the depression, not by adding the bells and whistles of affluence.

How to resolve depression is not well understood. A large part of the problem is people who have never experienced depression, don't understand what it is and believe that things like more affluence will resolve it.

Suicide rates are a measure of depression, not of how good life is. Depression can hit people even when they otherwise have a very good life.

The framing of the end of life issue as a gain or a loss as in the monkey token exchange probably makes a gigantic difference in the choices made.

http://lesswrong.com/lw/2d9/open_thread_june_2010_part_4/2cnn?c=1

When you feel you are in a desperate situation, you will do desperate things and clutch at straws, even when you know those choices are irrational. I think this is the mindset behind the clutching at straws that quacks exploit with CAM, as in the Gonzalez Protocol for pancreatic cancer.

http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/?p=1545

It is actually worse... (read more)

This is how people with Asperger's or autism experience interacting with people who are neurotypically developed (for the most part).

I am not a dualist. I used the TM to avoid issues of quantum mechanics. TM equivalent is not compatible with a dualist view either.

Only a part of what the brain does is conscious. The visual cortex isn't conscious. The processing of signals from the retina is not under conscious control. That is why optical illusions work, the signal processing happens a certain way, and that certain way cannot be changed even when consciously it is known that what is seen is counterfactual.

There are many aspects of brain information processing that are like this.... (read more)

Except human entities are a dynamic object, unlike a static object like a book. Books are not considered to be “alive”, or “self-aware”.

If two humans can both be represented by TM with different tapes, then one human can be turned into another human by feeding one tape in backwards then feeding in the other tape frontwards. If one human can be turned into another by a purely mechanical process, how does the “life”, or “entity identity”, or “consciousness change” as that transformation is occurring?

I don't have an answer, I suspect that the problem is... (read more)

SilasBarta, yes, I was thinking about purely classical entities, the kind of computers that we would make now out of classical components. You can make an identical copy of a classical object. If you accept substrate independence for entities, then you can't “dissolve” the question.

If Ebborians are classical entities, then exact copies are possible. An Ebborian can split and become two entities and accumulate two different sets of experiences. What if those two Ebborians then transfer memory files such that they now have identical experiences? (I ap... (read more)

I am pretty new to LW, and have been looking for something and have been unable to find it.

What I am looking for is a discussion on when two entities are identical, and if they are identical, are they one entity or two?

The context for this is continuity of identity over time. Obviously an entity that has extra memories added is not identical to an entity without those memories, but if there is a transform that can be applied to the first entity (the transform of experience over time), then in one sense the second entity can be considered to be an olde... (read more)

I am disapointed. I have just started on LW, and found many of Roko's posts and comments interesting and consilient with my current and to be a useful bridge between aspects of LW that are less consilient. :(

I think this is correct. Using my formulation, the Bayseian system is what I call a "theory of reality", the timeless one is the "theory of mind", which I see as the trade-off along the autism spectrum.

Yes, thankyou just one problem

• too obvious

and

• too easy

I see the problem of bigotry in terms of information and knowledge but I see bigotry as occurring when there is too little knowledge. I have quite an extensive blog post on this subject.

http://daedalus2u.blogspot.com/2010/03/physiology-behind-xenophobia.html

My conceptualization of this may seem contrived, but I give a much more detailed explanation on my blog along with multiple examples.

I see it as essentially the lack of an ability to communicate with someone that triggers xenophobia. As I see it, when two people meet and try to communicate, they d... (read more)

Thanks, I was trying to make a list, maybe I will figure it out. I just joined and am trying to focus on getting up to speed on the ideas, the syntax of formating things is more difficult for me and less rewarding.

I disagree. I think there is the functional equivalent of a “social-co-processor”, what I see as the fundamental trade-off along the autism spectrum, the trading of a "theory of mind" (necessary for good and nuanced communication with neurotypically developing individuals and a “theory of reality”, (necessary for good ability at tool making and tool using).

http://daedalus2u.blogspot.com/2008/10/theory-of-mind-vs-theory-of-reality.html

Because the maternal pelvis is limited in size, the infant brain is limited at birth (still ~1% of women die per ... (read more)

For me, essentially zero, that is I would act (or attempt to act) as if I had zero credence that I was in a rescue sim.

Test for data, factual knowledge and counterfactual knowledge. True rationalists will have less counterfactual knowledge than non-rationalists because they will have filtered it out. Non-rationalits will have more false data because their counterfactual knowledge will feedback and cause them to believe things that are false are actually true. For example that Iraq or Iran was involved in 9/11.

What you really want to measure is the relative proportion of factual and counterfactual knowledge someone has, and in what particular areas. Then including are... (read more)

The issue that are dealt with in psychotherapy are fundamentally non-rational issues. Rational issues are trivial to deal with (for people who are rationalists). The substrate of the issues dealt with in psychotherapy are feelings and not thoughts.

I see feelings as an analog component of the human utility function. That analog component affects the gain and feedback in the non-analog components. The feedback by which thoughts affect feelings is slow and tenuous and takes a long time and considerable neuronal remodeling. That is why psychotherapy tak... (read more)

I have exactly the same problem. I think I understand where mine comes from, from being abused by my older siblings. I have Asperger's, so I was an easy target. I think they would sucker me in by being nice to me, then when I was more vulnerable whack me psychologically (or otherwise). It is very difficult for me to accept praise of any sort because it reflexively puts me on guard and I become hypersensitive.

You can't get psychotherapy from a friend, it doesn't work and can't work because the friendship dynamic gets in the way (from both directions). A good therapist can help a great deal, but that therapist needs to be not connected to your social network.

Human utility functions change all the time. They are usually not easily changed through conscious effort, but drugs can change them quite readily, for example exposure to nicotine changes the human utility function to place a high value on consuming the right amount of nicotine. I think humans place a high utility on the illusion that their utility function is difficult to change and an even higher utility in rationalizing false logical-seeming motivations for how they feel. There are whole industries (tobacco, advertising, marketing, laws, religions, ... (read more)

I happen to work with someone who was working on his PhD thesis at MIT and found this gigantic peak in his mass spec where C-60 was, but didn't pursue it because he didn't have time.

I would really like an answer to this question because it is the predicament that I am quite sure I find myself in. I can't get people to pay enough attention to even tell me where I am wrong. :(

When the ToMs don't match, I think it triggers xenophobia.

http://daedalus2u.blogspot.com/2010/03/physiology-behind-xenophobia.html

Effectively when people meet and try to communicate, they do a Turing Test, and if the error rate is too high, it triggers feelings of xenophobia via the uncanny valley effect. If you allow your ToM to change to accommodate and understand the person you feel xenophobia for, then the xenophobia will go away. If you don't, then the feelings of xenophobia remain. The decision to allow your ToM to change is what differentiates a non-racist from a racist.

I think this idea is essentially correct, but instead of near-mode vs far-mode, I think the balance is more between a "theory of mind" and a "theory of reality" which I have written about.

http://daedalus2u.blogspot.com/2008/10/theory-of-mind-vs-theory-of-reality.html

The only things that can be communicated are mental concepts. To communicate a concept, the concept needs to be converted into the communication data stream using a communication protocol that can be decoded at the other end of the communication link. The communication pro... (read more)

I think the 416,000 US military dead and their families would disagree that the war made them better off.

To me a reasonable utility function has to have a degree of self-consistency. A reasonable utility function wouldn't value both doing and undoing the same action simultaneously.

If an entity is using a utility function to determine its actions, then for every action the entity can perform, its utility function must be able to determine a utility value which then determines whether the entity does the action or not. If the utility function does not return a value, then the entity still has to act or not act, so the entity still has a utility function fo... (read more)

I agree if the utility function was unknown and arbitrary. But an AI that has already done 3^^^3 simulations and believes it then derives further utility from doing 3^^^3+1 simulations while sending (for the 3^^^3+1th time) an avatar to influence the entities it is simulating through intimidation and fear while offering no rationale for those fears and to a website inhabited by individuals attempting to be ever more rational does not have an unknown and arbitrary utility function.

I don't think there is any reasonable utility function that is consistent ... (read more)

I deduce you are lying.

If you were an AI and had simulated me for 3^^^3 times, there would be no utility in running my simulation 3^^^3+1 times because it would simply be a repetition of an earlier case. Either you don't appreciate this and are running the simulation again anyway, or you and your simulation of me are so imperfect that you are unable to appreciate that I appreciate it. In the most charitable case, I can deduce you are far from omnipotent.

That must be quite torturous for you, to have a lowly simulation deduce your feet of clay.