All of draq's Comments + Replies

draq00

No Universally Compelling Arguments contains a proof that for every possible morality, there is a mind with volition to which it does not apply. Therefore, there is no absolute morality.

There is no universally compelling argument for morality as much as there is no universally compelling for reality. You can change the physical perception as well. But it does not necessary follow that there is no absolute reality.

I also have to correct my position: CEV is not absolute morality. Volition is rather a "reptor" or "sensor" of morality I ... (read more)

draq00

Again, it's not that I don't care about anything. I just happen to have a few core axioms, things that I care about for no reason. They don't feel arbitrary to me -- after all, I care about them a great deal! -- but I didn't choose to care about them. I just do.

And you believe that other minds have different core believs?

Sure, and those are the claims I take the time to evaluate and debunk.

I think we should close the discussion and take some time thinking.

Please explain the relationship between G701-702 and G698-700.

"chance is low" or ... (read more)

0Pavitra
"Belief" isn't quite right; it's not an anticipation of how the world will turn out, but a preference of how the world will turn out. But yes, I anticipate that other minds will have different core preferences. Yes, okay.
draq00

Thanks for the rephrasing. I would amend:

  1. Weak scientific reductionist:
    c) concepts and theories in chemistry and biology are only useful high level approximations to physical models of the universe. They could be reduced to physical theories if b) does not apply.
0David_Allen
I find this confusing. Is this another condition or is this clarification? And I'm uncertain what you mean by "physical theories" in this context. EDIT: It appears to me that 4.a implies 4.b, and that 4.b and 4.c are simply clarifications of 4.a. If this is the case perhaps we could just drop the controversial 4.c?
draq00

Since I'm Pavitra, it doesn't really matter to me if G101 has a point; I care about it anyway.

So there is no normative rule that Pavitra (you) should care about G101. It just happens, it could also be different and it does not matter. That is what I call (moral) nihilism.

Don't you ever ask why you should care (about anything, incl. yourself caring about things)? (I am not suggesting you becoming suicidal, but on the other hand, there is no normative rule against it, so... hm... I still won't)

Their claims are basically noisy. If a large group of craz

... (read more)
0Pavitra
Again, it's not that I don't care about anything. I just happen to have a few core axioms, things that I care about for no reason. They don't feel arbitrary to me -- after all, I care about them a great deal! -- but I didn't choose to care about them. I just do. Sure, and those are the claims I take the time to evaluate and debunk. Please explain the relationship between G701-702 and G698-700.
draq00

I like gensyms.

G101: Pavitra (me) cares about something.

What is the point in caring for G101?

At a certain point, the working model of reality begins to predict what the insane will claim to perceive and how those errors come about.

What if you can't predict?

I advocate the G700 view, and assert that believing G698 or G699 interferes with believing G700.

That is not how your brain works (a rough guess). Your brain thinks either G698 or G699 and then comes out with a decision about either driving or not. This heuristic process is called optimism or pessimism.

0Pavitra
Since I'm Pavitra, it doesn't really matter to me if G101 has a point; I care about it anyway. Their claims are basically noisy. If a large group of crazies started agreeing with each other, that might require looking into more carefully. Not natively, no. That's why it requires advocacy.
draq00

Why should I care about G695? In particular, why should I prefer it over G696, which is the CEV of all humans with volition alive in 2010, or over G697, which is the CEV of myself?

So your point is there is no point in caring for anything. Do you call yourself a nihilist?

I then investigate the two unrelated phenomena individually and eventually come to the conclusion that there is one reality between all humans, but a separate morality for each human.

Would you call yourself a naive realist? What about people on LSD, schizophrenics and religious peopl... (read more)

0Pavitra
No, I care about things. It's just that I don't think that G695 (assuming it's defined -- see below) would be particularly humane or good or desirable, any more than (say) Babyeater morality. Certainly not -- hence "eventually". Science requires interpreting data. Edit: oh, sorry, forgot to address your actual point. At a certain point, the working model of reality begins to predict what the insane will claim to perceive and how those errors come about. Very well. Let us assume that (warning: numbers just made up) one in every 100,000 car trips results in a crash. The G698 view says "The chances of a crash are low." The G699 view says "The chances of a crash are high." The G700 view says "The chances of a crash are 1/1000000." I advocate the G700 view, and assert that believing G698 or G699 interferes with believing G700. I personally don't think the extrapolated volition of humanity coheres, but I have the impression that others disagree with me. I would be very surprised, however, if the extrapolated volition of all volitional entities cohered and the extrapolated volition of all volitional humans did not.
draq00

What do you think of Eliezer's idea of "coherent extrapolated volition of humankind" and his position that FAI should optimise it?

0jimrandomh
I think it is insufficiently detailed to identify a unique utility function - it needs to have specific extrapolation and reconciliation procedures filled in, the details of those procedures are important and affect the result, and a bad extrapolation procedure could produce arbitrary results. That said, programming an AI with any value system that didn't match the template of CEV (plus details) would be a profoundly stupid act. I have seen so many disastrously buggy attempts to define what human values are that I doubt it could be done correctly without the aid of a superintelligence.
draq10

What about the Baby-Eaters and the Super Happy People in the story Three Worlds Collide? Do they have anything you would call "humaneness"?

0Pavitra
No. Edit: Well, sort of. Some of their values partially coincide with ours. But one of the major themes of the story is that we should expect aliens to have inhumane value systems.
draq-10

Universal morality

You need to go read the sequences, and come back with specific counterarguments to the specific reasoning presented therein on the topics that you're discussing.

I don't think there is an easy way to make FAI.

Absolute morality is the coherent extrapolated volition of all entities with volition. Morality is based on values. In a universe where there are only insentient stones, there is no morality, and even if there are, they are meaningless. Morality exists only where there are values (things that we either like or dislike), or "... (read more)

0Pavitra
This sounds like a definition, so let's gensym it and see if it still makes sense. Why should I care about G695? In particular, why should I prefer it over G696, which is the CEV of all humans with volition alive in 2010, or over G697, which is the CEV of myself? No, that's my reason for breaking symmetry between them, for discarding the assumption that the explanation of the two phenomena should be essentially isomorphic. I then investigate the two unrelated phenomena individually and eventually come to the conclusion that there is one reality between all humans, but a separate morality for each human. There is a very great difference between hoping for the better and believing in the better. Nor are "better" or "worse" the only two options. Suppose you're getting into a car, and you're wondering whether you will get into a crash. The optimistic view is that you will definitely not crash. The pessimistic view is that you will definitely crash. Neither of these is right. You're constructing a universal CEV. It's not an already-existing ontologically fundamental entity. It's not a thing that actually exists. Consciously, sure. I just wanted to warn you against the human credulity bias.
0jimrandomh
No Universally Compelling Arguments contains a proof that for every possible morality, there is a mind with volition to which it does not apply. Therefore, there is no absolute morality.
draq00

If you read a physics or chemistry textbook, then you'll find a lot of words and only a few equations, whereas a mathematics textbook has much more equations and the words in the book are to explain the equations, whereas the words in a physics book are not only explaining the equations but the issues that the equations are explaining.

However, I haven't fully thought about reductionism, so do you have any recommendations that I want to read?

My current two objections:

1. Computational

According to our current physical theories, it is impossible to predict th... (read more)

draq10

When I use the word morality, then I certainly don't mean any rules of conduct.

What is your defintion of human morality?

0Pavitra
Often, when I stop to think about a decision, I find that my desire changes upon reflection. The latter desire generally seems more intellectually coherent(*), and across multiple instances, the initial desires on various occasions are generally more inconsistent with one another while the after-reflection desires are generally more consistent with one another. From this I infer the existence of a (possibly only vague, partially specified, or partially consistent) common cause to the various instances' after-reflection desires. This common cause appears to roughly resemble a bundle of heuristics that collectively approximate some sort of optimization criteria. I call the bundle of heuristics my "moral intuition" and the criteria they approximate my "morality". I suspect that other human's minds are broadly similar to mine in this respect, and that their moral intuitions are broadly similar to mine. To the extent they correlate, we might call the set of common trends "human morality" or "humaneness". (*) An example of intellectual coherence vs. incoherence: Right now, I'd like to go get some ice cream from the freezer. However, on reflection, I remember that there isn't any ice cream in the freezer at the moment, so walking over to the freezer would not satisfy the impulse that motivated the action.
draq-30

What if the coherent extrapolated volition is the death of all people, that is, the end of all volitions?

0Pavitra
I guess we should do that then? I strongly expect that it won't turn out that that's the right thing to do, though, and it's not what I had in mind when I said you'd kill everyone. I meant that the AI will care about the wrong thing, ignore human morality completely, and eat the world (killing everyone as an incidental side effect) even though it's wrong according to human morals.
draq-40

Physical and mathematical objects

Chemists and physicists tell us which mathematical objects we're made out of. The used to think it was integers, but it turns out it wasn't.

If the physical world can be fully reduced to mathematics, we don't need chemists and physicist to tell us which mathematical objects we're made out of. A mathematician would know that, unless there is something about an electron that can not be fully reduced to mathematics.

We use mathematics to describe physical objects, but physical objects are not mathematical objects. We use la... (read more)

2Pavitra
I usually try not to say this, but... From the FAQ: (Emphasis mine.) You need to go read the sequences, and come back with specific counterarguments to the specific reasoning presented therein on the topics that you're discussing. . . Choice of axioms? I can run controlled experiments to show that my perception of reality and your perception of reality have a common cause. I can close a box, and we will both report seeing it change state from open to closed. There is no such evidence of a common thing-that-morality-intuition-observes. If we imagine our minds as rooms, our reality-senses are windows overlooking a common garden; we can see each other's windows, and confirm that we see the same trees and flowers. But our morality-senses need not be true windows; for all we know, they might as well be tromp l'oeil. /---> my senses ---> my perception of reality ---\ reality --->| |---> consensus \--->your senses--->your perception of reality---/ /--- my morals ---\ evolution --->| |---> weak consensus \---your morals---/ Optimism and pessimism are incompatible with realism. If you're not willing to believe that the universe works the way that it does in fact work, then you're not qualified to work on potentially-world-destroying projects. And yet you seem to acknowledge that the output of the CEV function depends on whose volition it is asked to extrapolate. In what sense then is morality absolute, rather than relative to a certain kind of mind? (Incidentally, if you've been reading claims from Clippy that humane and paperclip-maximizing moralities are essentially compatible, then you should realize that e may have ulterior motives and may be arguing disingenuously. Sorry, Clippy.)
4jimrandomh
Mathematics is a broad field, with many specialties. A mathematician could only know which mathematical objects correspond to electrons if they studied that particular question. And our name for a mathematician who specializes in studying the question of which mathematical objects correspond to electrons is... Particle Physicist. It shouldn't, because this is a straw man, not the argument that leads us to conclude that there isn't a single absolute morality.
draq00

In that sense, everything could be a mathematical object, including qualia. We just haven't identified it.

Also, the concept of actual-but-still-unknown-X and previously-hypothesized-X can be applied to morality in terms of actual-but-still-unknown-norm and previously-hypothesized-norm.

draq-40

1a.

An electron is not a mathematical object. If it were, then we wouldn't need chemists and physicsts, but only mathematicians. A mathematical object does have any behaviour, as much as a word in a language does not have any behaviour.

Mathematics and logic are tautalogical systems with defined symbols and operations. We use mathematics to describe the physical world as much as we use language to describe the moral world (value system), e.g. in behavioural biology and psychology.

Would you agree that value system is as absolute as the physical world if we ... (read more)

2jimrandomh
You keep using that phrase, "intersubjective consensus". What does it mean, and how do you know that there is one with respect to morality?
9Pavitra
This is redundant, but the point is important and I don't want it to be overlooked because it's buried at the bottom of a long comment. If you do that, everyone will die.
6Pavitra
Chemists and physicists tell us which mathematical objects we're made out of. The used to think it was integers, but it turns out it wasn't. It has mathematical behavior. Words are not required to be well-defined. What distinction are you trying to make here? No, what follows from the hypothetical is that it would be possible to hold meaningful discussions about our normative theories, rather than just saying words. A theory can be rigorously well-defined and also wrong. The electron seems to be the mathematical object contained in (1). We will later discover that this is wrong. (1) still "exists" (to the extent that mathematical objects "exist" independently in the Platonic World of Forms, which they don't, but it's a fairly useful approximation most of the time), but (1) is less useful to us now, so we don't spend as much time talking and thinking about it. It has a utility function; that is, it acts so as to optimize some variable. A rock isn't a very clever faller; it doesn't really optimize in any meaningful sense. For example, a rock won't roll up a two-foot ridge in order to be able to fall two hundred feet down the cliff on the other side. Not quite, but a near miss. I'm a reductionist. Sure, qualia exist, in the same way that a car or a computer program exists. Qualia just don't have a separate, fundamental existence independent of the mere atomic mechanism of the neurons in the brain of the person experiencing the qualia. After the components of a car have been assembled, you don't need to perform a ritual blessing over it to infuse the mere mechanism of engine and drive shaft and so forth with the ineffable essence of car-ness. It's already fully possessed of car-ness, simply by virtue of the physical mechanisms that make it up. Likewise, I don't need an additional element -- spirit, soul, elan vital, ontologically intrinsic morality, whatever -- in order to infuse my brain with qualia. It's already fully possessed of qualia, simply by virtue of
2Sniffnoy
So you incorrectly identified what sort of mathematical object it is. That doesn't mean it isn't one, just that you made an identification prematurely (and perhaps were insufficiently careful with your language); you'll need to split off the concepts of actual-but-still-unknown-electron and previously-hypothesized-electron.
draq00

Sorry, I am developing my ideas in the process of the discussion and I probably have amended and changed my position several times thanks to the debate with the LW community. The biggest problem is that I haven't defined a clear set of vocabulary (because I haven't had a clear position yet), so there is a lot of ambiguity and misunderstanding which is solely my fault.

Here is a short summary of my current positions. They may not result in a coherent system. I'm working on that.

1. Value system / morality is science

Imagine an occult Pythagorean who believes t... (read more)

0Pavitra
1. Are we assuming this hypothetical occult Pythagorean is aware of historically post-Pythagorean pure-mathematical concepts like Conway's Game of Life? It seems to me that electrons and gravitational forces can be fully expressed in mathematics. Since the equations describing their behavior are known, can't the Pythagorean simply consider a mathematical object whose behavior is defined by those formulas? I suspect that we have different definitions of "understand", and that that is at the core of the debate. To me, understanding something is the same as being able to predict its behavior; you seem to have something additional in mind -- some sort of qualia, perhaps -- but I'm not sure what it is. I'm sorry, I've lost track of context on this one, and I can't figure it out even on rereading. What would be a scientific explanation, of what, under what circumstances? 2. It may interest you to know that I consider p-zombies as capable of having things that matter to them. This suggests a mismatch of definition, probably of "matter". I asked in order to determine whether, when you discussed whether a mind has such an understanding, whether you were making a distinction that mattered in reality, or if you were just talking about qualia. I don't believe in qualia, you see. This is, I think, the strongest and most interesting point you've put forward. It should be possible to establish a science of preference that can predict how people will choose on moral questions; once the models are sufficiently accurate, humanity should be able to formalize our definition of "good". (Assuming, of course, that an intersubjective consensus exists. It could be that we just disagree about a bunch of stuff.) 3. No they're not. Agreed. I think there's an important difference between sensory perception and moral perception that you're glossing over: sensory perception is perceiving something out there that exists to be perceived, while moral perception reports only on itself. If
draq00

Are you asking me to use a certain LW-inside vocabulary? In that case, a dictionary would be helpful. Which specific word or phrase is not clear to you?

Or are you holding a logical positivist position that some words or context does not have any meaning at all?

0Tyrrell_McAllister
The idea of rationalist taboo is not to use LW-inside vocabulary. On the contrary, one lesson of rationalist taboo is that we should be able to reduce LW-inside vocabulary to non-LW-inside vocabulary. If we can't do that, we're doing rationalism wrong.
draq00

You walk up to the fridge, get out a banana and eat it.

If I am Laplace's demon, I might be able to predict your doing (or not). But science does not explain what hunger and desire is, it can describe it using its own language, but the scientific language does not include any words to describe values. Hunger and desire have more qualities than just neuronal processes.

Anyway, the difference might be pointless, because Laplace's demon does not exist and we can't predict in principle anything more complicated than a dozen atoms, unless we have a fundamentally new theory of physics. In that case, the only thing we have left is normative/value theories that help us to predict someone's action.

0Pavitra
This is a multiple-choice reply. Does explaining what hunger and desire is have any external consequences -- can we do anything with that understanding that we couldn't otherwise -- or is the benefit purely a state of mind? 1. 2.
draq00

I did read the article "No Universal Argument" you linked to and couldn't find any convincing rebuttal to my arguments.

I just read "Making Beliefs Pay Rent" and if I got it right, then it says that science is good (and absolute) because it can predict things while normative theories don't. That is a good point.

My belief in an absolute morality gives me the foundation to enquire moral problems. I'll try to figure out what the "absoulute good" is and try to life my life according to that.

We can predict and explain the "d... (read more)

-1Pavitra
Just because I can't explain an idea doesn't mean I don't understand it. I usually try to explain things by providing a diff between the mind I'm trying to explain to and the idea I'm trying to explain; the diff between your mind and itself is null, so I don't have anything to offer as an explanation. What's the difference between being able to predict something and understanding it?
draq00

What I meant to say is "morality is absolute as reality." I hope that clears everything.

Given that I experience God or anything supernatural empirically and I can reasonably exclude that I am suffering from hallucinations, then it is more probable for me to believe that the phenomena was supernatural rather than an improbable quantum mechanical phenonemon. Maybe what I call God is actually Frud. Maybe God "is a tuna sandwich I once made that had a special property, it created the universe, past and future." I don't expect to realise all... (read more)

0David_Allen
Well draq, I'm removing myself from all threads of our conversation both current and proposed. I don't see enough benefit for me to go on. I can't be sure that you read my comments with enough care for you to understand and appropriately respond. You missed points that I made repeatedly and explicitly. I've pulled apart several of your ideas and demonstrated their problems. You didn't responded directly to my claims, you didn't show flaws in my reasoning. Generally in debate this means you conceded the point. You seldom answered my direct questions. This made it very difficult for me to understand your point of view. Instead your responses were indirect and included new claims or questions. These responses lead away from the topic at hand. You appeared to avoid any conversation that would actually shed light on your beliefs and allow them to be sorted into true/useful or false/harmful. From our conversation and your other comments I have concluded that you generally aren't distinguishing between stories and reality, and are resistant to doing so. This gives me low confidence in your ability to come to sound conclusions.
draq00

A sufficiently intelligent mind might deduce "Draq believes that the absolute morality is X", but not "the absolute morality is X".

Would you still agree with the argument if you substitute "morality" with "reality"?

As I repeatedly said, morality is as absolute or relative as reality. So if you don't believe in an absolute reality either, then I can't convince you, nor do I want to, since relativism/nihilism is a perfectly attainable position.

I just think that it is very arbitrary to say one exist and the other o... (read more)

2Pavitra
No. As I said, I believe that the core of our disagreement is that, where you believe that there is a single fundamental morality to the entire universe, I believe that there is a separate arguably-fundamental-ish morality to each person (glossing over people with incoherent preferences, etc.). I realize that I haven't really given any particular arguments for my position, so (assuming you didn't read the article I linked to) it's somewhat reasonable for you to think that we have a mere disagreement from first principles, with no particular reason to choose one position over the other. Suppose someone disagrees with you about what's morally right. Does that mean they're wrong? Do you think that your moral conception is fundamentally valid and their moral conception is merely the product of a malfunctioning brain? I just think that it is very arbitrary to say one has a fundamental existence and the other one is made up. How does your belief in an absolute morality constrain your anticipation; or, alternatively, what consequences does it have on your ethical decision-making? What evidence turns out differently, or what decisions will you make differently, as a consequence of morality being absolute rather than relative? I can't explain you to you. Point at your feet and say aloud, "You are here." I've tried to explain me to you; maybe that will help, if I'm sufficiently good at explaining and you're sufficiently good at understanding.
draq00

Using that defintion, morality isn't as absolute as physical reality.

Again, as I said, under your definition of absolute, which is that reality is absolute, I agree with your disapproval of my belief in absolute morality since morality is of a different quality than reality.

Our physical reality appears to be the common context that everything shares within our universe.

Your definition of absolute is plausible, but I do not share it. I think that mental phenomena exist independently from the physical world.

What makes me believe it? If I believe t... (read more)

0David_Allen
We are not connecting entirely on these points. I have in fact claimed explicitly that nothing is "absolute". I also said in my previous post: So I'm surprised that this point did not come across. To clarify, I am saying that physical reality appears to be the common context that everything shares within our universe. This context however only has meaning at a specific level of abstraction, the physical level. There are other levels of abstraction (contexts) for which reality has no meaning, just as there are contexts for which morality has no meaning. This is not the definition of absolute that I have been working with. I will restate it. Something that is "absolute" has meaning in all contexts. I don't think physical reality qualifies. If you reread my previous comments with that in mind we might come closer to a common understanding of this conversation. This is interesting, lets split this out to a new thread, I'll post a specific reply later. My argument holds for that case as well. For this to be done, the God hypothesis will need to be updated to make specific predictions and to exclude alternate explanations. As it stands the current hypothesis can't be tested scientifically. I have spent that time and I am familiar with the stories. However, attribution of specific outcomes to God in retrospect falls prey to the argument that I made. For example I can attribute the same outcomes to Frud.
0David_Allen
Actually, you would still be able to bring up ideas as comments in the open threads.
4grouchymusicologist
It really doesn't seem unreasonable to limit the ability to raise new topics for discussion to those who can, on balance, make useful contributions on other topics.
draq00

Relevance is a good point.

Changing or stop having desires damages my belief in an absolute morality as much as changing or stop having sensory perception damages my belief in an absolute reality.

My belief in an absolute morality is as strong or as weak as my belief in my absolute reality. It doesn't matter whether morality or reality really exists, but that we treat them similarly. It is slightly dissonant to conduct science as if it exists, but to become relativist when arguing about morality.

In the end, it is not what we should believe, but how our thi... (read more)

0Pavitra
Ah, I see where you're coming from. My thesis (and, I think, the general consensus position on this site) is this: One's morality is a feature of one's individual brain, rather than of physics. In particular, one should not expect that other people -- and, especially, nonhuman other minds -- will deduce the same absolute morality that you believe in, no matter how intelligent they are. (A sufficiently intelligent mind might deduce "Draq believes that the absolute morality is X", but not "the absolute morality is X".) Have you read No Universally Compelling Arguments?
draq00

Substitute "moral system" with "reality". Would you still agree with it?

draq00

So morality can't applied to all contexts, and so in that sense it can't be absolute.

I'm not sure how to answer this. What do you mean by "absolute".

In the same sense you used to deny the existence of absolute morality.

Does this make physical reality absolute to you?

Using that defintion, morality isn't as absolute as physical reality. Morality then only applies to self-reflective level-3 intelligence (cf that comment of mine).

But why do you believe that everything happens within the context of physical reality?

Let me present you the Cart... (read more)

0David_Allen
In the sense of "deny" as in "refuse to accept the truth of it", I did not deny the existence of absolute morality, I disproved it under a certain meaning of absolute. You have yet to show flaws in my reasoning or to counter with an alternate meaning of absolute where absolute morality is valid. Your original question "Is there anything absolute according to your defintion?". I need to rephrase this in terms of my definition of absolute; "Is there anything that has meaning in all contexts?". This is to avoid the confounding alternate senses of the word absolute. The answer is no. This is because I can always find or generate a specific context that does not provide meaning to anything proposed to have meaning in all contexts. For most cases I could simply use electrons as the context. For example, electrons don't have property X, or are not influenced by X. X is meaningless to electrons. For the few cases where this fails I could use algebra. Algebra doesn't contain a meaning for X. This allows us to get rid of the word absolute and to rephrase the problem as "Can the same morality be applied to all possible cases of level-3 intelligences.". For the common meaning of morality I think that this simply can't be done. As I've been saying, its all about context. Eliezer Yudkowsky's Baby Eating Aliens highlights clashing moralities. Ideally I don't hold beliefs about anything that happens outside of physical reality. If you notice beliefs of that nature point them out and I'll reconsider them. You should feel free to always assume that I don't believe that my claims apply outside the physical universe. I can't answer this question directly for several reasons. I don't know what would convince you. In your current context you may simply be unconvincible. Also, I've actually argued that nothing is absolute for a specific meaning of absolute, so I'm not inclined to now argue that physical reality is absolute. However, I will try to say something about the belief in
draq10

So we presume that all members of SIAI want to live forever? Maybe someone enjoys sex more than longevity.

1ata
Increasing your probability of living forever(/for a really really long time) still greatly increases your expected sex, assuming FAI can reverse castration.
draq00

I have edited my post in such a way that the terms are now more clear.

If moral system is a normative theory, then there are many.

If moral system is morality, then there is only one.

draq00

Is there anything absolute according to your defintion?

Are numbers absolute? I can think of a context, where numbers are meaningless. E.g. if I am talking about Picasso.

Is the physical reality absolute? I can think of a context where the physical reality isn't absolute. For example, if I am thinking of numbers.

0David_Allen
I'm not sure how to answer this. What do you mean by "absolute". Numbers are symbols defined within some context. Certainly we have words for numbers and so while talking about Picasso you could say "Picasso is three.". From the context of the speaker, the word "three" gains meaning from its definition in the English language, from its position in the sentence, from the conversation as a whole, and from the prior experiences of the speaker. A listener may come away with a completely different meaning when she hears that sentence, it would depend on her context. I would like to be clear on what you are asking. Perhaps you are thinking about numbers in terms like Plato's Theory of Forms? Our physical reality appears to be the common context that everything shares within our universe. For something to exist in our universe it must be physically manifest in some form. The numbers you are thinking are physically manifest. If you are thinking about numbers, the meaning of the numbers exist within the context of your mind's consciousness. Your consciousness is an abstraction running within the context of your brain. Your brain is implemented within the context of our physical reality. Ultimately some set of quarks in specific energy configurations are attributable to the numbers you are thinking, but the direct relationship would be hard to pin down. Context and content can be split arbitrarily, creating layers of abstractions. If you are performing calculations on numbers in your mind, from within the context of the math abstraction you are using, it doesn't matter if you are performing the calculation or a computer is. Meaning within that context is substrate independent. But that meaning still will ultimately need a physical representation for it to exist. Does this make physical reality absolute to you?
draq00

I feel that killing innocent children without any benefit is wrong. I reason about it, and within my normative system, it makes sense to believe that is absolute moral, and not just mere opinion.

I see through a telescope a bright spot in the sky. I think it is the planet Saturn. I reason about it and within my system of physical theories, it makes sense to believe that is absolute real, and not just mere opinion.

draq-30

1) The fact that we do not have a near-universal agreement now does not mean that we won't have one in future. It also does not mean that there is no one correct answer.

2) What you are saying is that currently we are not very precise, or not as precise as natural science. That doesn't mean that we are not going to be closer to the correct answer in the future.

3a) Analogously, if we compare different viewpoints about the natural world and looks for the common, then there is also very little we can agree on. Maybe only on a few parameters like colour, form a... (read more)

draq10

I believe in an absolute moral system as much as I believe in the rules of mathematics and other ideas. We can debate whether ideas (or the physical reality for that matter) exist in the absence of a mind, but I guess that is not the point.

As long as we have values, desires, dislikes and make judgements (which all of us do and which maybe is a defining characteristic of the human being beyond the biological basics) and if we want to put these values into a logical consistent system, we have an absolute moral system.

So if I stop having any desires and sto... (read more)

0jimrandomh
No, we have an absolute moral system per person. You can then take groups of those moral systems and combine them, in various different ways such as simulating what they would decide if they voted. However, you will get different results depending which combining procedure you use, and what sort of people you put into the combining procedure.
1Pavitra
Relevance is the right question. When dealing with purely abstract concepts like mathematics, it's useless to ask whether they exist. It's extraordinarily unlikely that any empirical evidence could persuade me that 1+1 does not equal 2, but I can realistically doubt whether the addition of natural numbers is a good model for counting clouds. Similarly, the question should not be whether the absolute moral system you believe in is true or valid or genuinely universal, but rather whether it accurately and precisely models how you judge and desire. Since you could stop having desires and making judgments without damaging your belief in your absolute moral system, it seems reasonable that you could alter them as well, or even that you have already done so. How sure are you that what you believe to be fundamentally morally right matches what you actually want?
draq-30

As you know, there are different "valid" set of theories regarding the physical reality: the biblical view, the theories underlying TCM, the theories underlying homeopathy, the theories underlying chiropractise and the scientific view. The scientific view is well-established because there is an intersubjective consensus on the usefulness of the methodology.

The methods used in moral discussions are by far not so rigidly defined as in science, it's called civil discourse. The arguments must be logical consistent and the outcomes and conclusions of... (read more)

0AlexMennen
What is it about killing innocent children without any benefits that means that a correct moral system cannot permit it? If it is a matter of opinion, then the moral system is not absolute. If it is something other than opinion, you have not identified what that thing is.
draq00

If I understand correctly what you are saying, then the answer is no.

Morality is the system of normative rules in contrast to the system of descriptive theories that we use to understand our physical world..

3AlexMennen
But there are many valid systems of normative rules. If there is an absolute morality, that means that one such system must be identified as special in some way. The thing that makes correct physics special over other possible descriptive theories is that, in this universe, it accurately predicts events. What about absolute morality makes it special as compared to other systems of normative rules?
draq-10

What form of evidence or argument would persuade you to change your mind on the usefulness/validity of falsification?

What form of evidence or argument would persuade you to change your mind on your understanding of the physical reality?

0Pavitra
If the people around me that I consider intelligent and respectable said consistently that ideas don't need to be falsifiable, and if the people who rejected the falsification criterion could do useful and miraculous things like inventing telephones far more often than the pro-falsification-ists could, then I would conclude that falsificationism was bunk. I don't understand the question. How is changing my mind on my understanding of the physical reality distinct from just changing my mind about any question at all?
0AlexMennen
Good point, actually. In matters of epistemology, it takes reasoning rather than physical evidence to evaluate hypotheses, except when physical evidence can help people see flaws in their reasoning.
draq00

Well, the absolute moral system I meant does encompass everything, incl. AI and alien intelligence. It is true that different moral problems require different solutions, that is also true to physics. Objects in vacuum behave differently than in the atmosphere. Water behaves differently than ice, but they are all governed by the same physics, so I assume.

A similar problem may have a different solution if the situation is different. An Edo-ero samurai and a Wall Street banker may behave perfectly moral even if they act differently to the same problem due to... (read more)

draq00

The absolute moral system I am talking about is as "absolute" as the physical world. Our perception of the reality ("the absolute physical world") is also a primarily instinct that humans evolved to make life easier.

The difference between level 2 and level 3 intelligence is, using an analogy, like the difference between an intelligence that acts on postulated theories of the physical world and an intelligence that discovers new physical theories.

2AlexMennen
So are you defining morality as the behavior must conducive to cooperation?
draq00

So you point is that I am wrong on bacteria. I agree, let's move on.

3nhamann
Agreed. I'm not sure there's much to gain from a taxonomy like yours, because there's too many details that have been abstracted away. Understanding intelligence is a difficult scientific problem, and we need a technical explanation of intelligence. It is not clear to me how one would extend what you've written into such an explanation.
draq-20

My post isn't supposed to be biologically accurate. Bacteria include a vast majority of organisms and I do them wrong if I depict them as crude and simple. As a part of my apology tour, I will start with my gut flora.

Replace "bacteria" with "secure hash algorithm".

8nhamann
My point is, if you're going to talk about bacteria in a way that characterizes them incorrectly, why talk about bacteria at all? You should do this in the post?
draq-20

I believe the problem is that while I believe in and presumed an absolute moral system, you don't.

Let's agree on a definition of morality/ethics, that it is what we should do to reach a desirable state or value, given that we both understand what "value" or "should" mean.

I think that morality exists as much as the physical world exist. If you believe that the physical reality is absolute, then there is no reason to doubt that there is a consistent absolute moral system. In our everyday life, we don't question the reality of the physical... (read more)

0David_Allen
There is no one single right answer, and yes it is quite confusing. The simple reason for this is that everything operates within a context. Context creates meaning; in the absence of context, there is no meaning. This is the context principle. The meanings for "should" and "desirable state/value" will have to be established within a context. Outside of that context those terms may have different meanings, or may be meaningless. By saying "Let's agree on a definition of morality/ethics" and "given that we both understand" you are attempting to establish a common context with the other commenters on LW. A common context provides shared meaning and opens a path for communication between disparate domains. You say: To me this implies that you believe in a moral system that can be applied to all contexts. Given your rough definition of morality: I can think of contexts where morality is meaningless. For example electrons don't have desires and don't respond to the idea of should. So morality can't applied to all contexts, and so in that sense it can't be absolute. In a previous post you seem to realize this to some extent: You say: By this, level-1 and level-2 intelligences operate in morality free contexts. They can't be moral or not-moral. If you observe a paperclip maximizer engaged in not-moral behavior, you are labeling the behavior as not-moral from within your context. The paperclip maximizer's behavior does not have an inherent quality of moral or not-moral. So what is your context for the "one single right answer"?
0Pavitra
What form of evidence or argument would persuade you to change your mind?
0Emile
Depends in which sense you mean a moral system to be "absolute". I would agree that there is probably an "absolute moral system" that all humans would agree on, even if we may not be able to precisely formulate it right now (or at least, a system that most non-pathological humans could be convinced they agree with). However, that doesn't mean that any intelligence (AI or alien) would eventually settle on those morals. That doesn't sound like a very good reason to believe something. (I would agree that there is probably a single right answer for humans)
2AlexMennen
What would it mean for there to be an absolute moral system? Sure, we have moral perception, but it's primarily instinct that humans evolved to make cooperation easier. Your level 2 and level 3 intelligences are not different.
draq00

I fully agree. There are many aspects of intelligence.

The reason I choose this categorization, given it is valid, is to highlight the aspect of intelligence that is relevant to ethics.

I think only a level-3 intelligence can be a moral agent. An intelligence that has an innate goal does not need to and cannot bother itself with moral questions.

draq00

Well that's the point. The intelligence itself defines the criterion. Choosing goals presumes a degree of self-reflection that a paperclip maximizer does not have.

If a paperclip maximizer starts asking why it does what it does, then there are two possible outcomes. Either it realises that maximizing paperclips is required for a greater good, in which case it is not really a paperclip maximizer, but a "greater good" maximizer, and paperclip maximising isn't the end to itself.

Or it realises that paperclip maximising is absolutely pointless and ther... (read more)

3Emile
In other words, if a paperclip maximizer isn't a paperclip maximizer, then it isn't a paperclip maximizer. According to what criterion would it determine what constitutes "better"? What you're describing isn't an agent that doesn't have a goal and decides on one. It's an agent that has something like a goal / a utility function / a criterion for "better" / morals (those are roughly equivalent here), and uses that to decide on sub-goals. I strongly recommend reading the metaethics sequence (if you haven't already).
draq00

Well, a paperclip maximizer has an identifiable goal. What is the identifiable goal of humans?

Well, "finding new algorithms" aka learning may itself be a kind of algorithm, but certainly of a higher-level than a simple algorithms aka instinct or reflex. I think there is a qualitative difference between an entity that cannot learn and an entity that can.