What would be more persuasive is some evidence that AI is relatively more useful for making bioweapons than it is for doing things in general.
I see little reason to use that comparison rather than "will [category of AI models under consideration] improve offense (in bioterrorism, say) relative to defense?"
I'm glad I encountered this post! This comment is a bit of a brain dump, not much time taken to edit: A month or so ago I attempted a first pass at designing a semi-cooperative board game and it ended up having some pretty similar elements. I got bogged down in a complicated-to-work-in mechanic that allows games to become arbitrarily large which I won't go in to. I'm not attached to owning any of the ideas I was trying to work in and would love to see somebody do something clever with them (especially if I get to play better games as a result).
The most int...
The regulation is intended to encourage a stable equilibrium among labs that may willingly follow that regulation for profit-motivated reasons.
Extreme threat modeling doesn't suggest ruling out plans that fail against almighty adversaries, it suggests using security mindset: reduce unnecessary load-bearing assumptions in the story you tell about why your system is secure. The proposal is mostly relying on standard cryptographic assumptions, and doesn't seem likely to do worse in expectation than no regulation.
It is a subject matter expert.
I agree it would be nice to have strong categories or formalism pinning down which future systems would be safe to open source, but it seems an asymmetry in expected evidence to treat a non-consensus on systems which don't exist yet as a pro-open-sourcing position. I think it's fair to say there is enough of a consensus that we don't know which future systems would be safe and so need more work to determine this before irreversible proliferation.