All of Faustus2's Comments + Replies

Don't worry it no trouble :) Thank you, I see your reasoning more clearly now, and my thought of circularity is no longer there for me. Also I see the mental distinction between compression models and platonic abstracts.

For the sake of discussion I would like to clarify that I regard those 'structures' that might be described by different themes of abstract mathematics as the objects that are to be considered either platonic or not. So, platonism in regards to the abstract structures, not necessarily the instantiations of those structures (ie: the example 'P.D.E structure' could be represented equally well with either categories or sets as the lifeblood of each respective formulation). So I think I am in agreement as to the grouping of features into &a... (read more)

I like this mode of thinking, and its angle is something I haven't considered before. How would you interpret/dissolve the kind of question I posed in the answer to Pattern in the comments below?

Namely:

'My point is the process of maths is (to a degree) invented or discovered, and under the invented hypothesis, where one would adhere to strict physicalist-style nominalism, the very act of predicting that the solutions to very real problems are dependent on abstract insight is literally incompatible with that position, to the point where seeing it ... (read more)

8Shmi
Sorry, my spam filter ate your reply notification :( To "dissolve" the math invented/discovered question, it's a false dichotomy, as constructing mathematical models, conscious or subconscious, is constructing the natural transformations between categories that allow high "compression ratio" of models of the world. They are as much "out there" in the world as the compression would allow. But they are not in some ideal Platonic world separate from the physical one. Not sure if this makes sense. There might be a circularity, but I do not see one. The chain of reasoning is, as above: 1. There is a somewhat predictable world out there 2. There are (surjective) maps from the world to its parts (models) 3. There are commonalities between such maps such that the procedure for constructing one map can be applied to another map. 4, These commonalities, which would correspond to natural transformations in the CT language, are a way to further compress the models. 5. To an embedded agent these commonalities feel like mathematical abstractions. I do not believe I have used CT to define abstractions, only to meta-model them.

This is actually similar to a kind of reasoning i have undertaken, but I want to ask you what you make of the fact that such high level abstraction even has any kind of utility at all. Say one day we as all physicalists (assumption on my part) all sit down (in present day mind, but without any knowledge of abstract maths), and we do the same type of physical formal kind of thinking that Newton or Leibniz undertook and developed calculus, which gives us the underpinning of most of modern applied mathematics. We then see how the kind of geometrical reasoning... (read more)

2Pattern
I think we're on the same page. Your question is something like 'why do we live in world that's more like B than A?' Story A: [Physics] is a really cool bunch of fields! It's done all these really big things! It's all because we were able to take all this data, and (eventually) figure out a lot about our universe, at a bunch of different scales. We're still working on applying some of the information, and we're working hard to get more data (on really small things, and really big things). We're also putting a little effort into refining our existing theories more, but not much because we figure future changes in that area will be small, without more data, and the more abstract things are the less they apply to (and are useful in) reality. Story B: [Physics] is a really cool bunch of fields! It's done all these really big things! You'd think that we'd need lots of data to make all these discoveries, but somehow all the deep truths about the workings of the universe can be deduced if you think about numbers long enough. Weird, huh?

The goal is mainly to understand its relation to proof assistants, I have experience with it before as a purely logical study but i haven't tried to see it in this new context for myself. This book looks excellent though, thank you for your recommendation

0justinpombrio
Ah, then you'll want to read about the [https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00076024/document](Calculus of Constructions): Yeah, TAPL is the book on type systems. I'm not aware of competition.

I'll be there too. Can't wait :)

Thank you, I'm grateful for your time.

I appreciate the great feedback from all of you, thank you :) I do have another quick question, but it's of a lower priority. As of right now, I currently hold no degree. I've always been kind of Interested in the MIRI workshops, but I've always been nervous about signing up to one because: 1. I'm not sure if a degree would be necessary to keep up with the level of work people are to be involved in at the workshop and 2. In case my first point turned out to be true, I certainly wouldn't want a student who had no real formal (I've still learning computabili... (read more)

I would also like to know the answer to this question.

A quick comment, for the segment on tiling agents, on the MIRI site the recommended reading (not counting any MIRI papers) is 'a mathematical introduction to logic' by Enderton. But on this page, it instead recommends Chang and Keislers Model theory. Can this be taken to mean that both works are important recommended reading? Are they both of equal worth or should (or rather, could) one be prioritised over the other?

3So8res
The one at intelligence.org is the master copy. (Chang and Keisler is useful, but unnecessarily brutal for our purposes; Enderton alone is sufficient.)

I recommend 'neurophilosophy' by Patricia Churchland, but a really good general overview for theories on consciousness is the Blackwells companion to consciousness. Sorry for the long HTML, but there is a link for a pdf version here that might be of use to you (or anyone): http://cies-fsc.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/FSC09/ChangeBlindness/biblio.complémentaire/1405120193%20-%20Max%20Velmans%20-%20The%20Blackwell%20Companion%20to%20Consciousness%20%5B2007%5D.pdf

Hello to you all, I am Chris.

I live in England and attend my local High school (well, in England we call the senior years/curriculums a sixth form). I take Mathematics, Further mathematics, physics and philosophy. I actually happened upon Lesswrong two years ago, when I was 16, whilst searching for interesting discussions on worldviews. Although I had never really been interested in rationality (up until that point I hasten to add!), I had a seething urge to sort out my worldview as quickly as I could. I just got so sick of the people who went to sunday sc... (read more)

Dear God, that idea is beautiful!! My good sir, have you ever thought about creating this masterpiece you speak of? (I'm not pressuring you, I would just like to know) :)

Does anyone know if Yudkowsky will be attending?

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