All of framsey's Comments + Replies

I just wanted to mention that your last few posts have been very nice. You have clearly worked on exposition, and it has paid off.

I became interested in this sequence after your first post on mathematical ability, and I'm glad to see you factoring your ideas into digestible pieces and writing them up.

What do you think of the health effects of too much sitting? That seems to be a hot topic recently. http://www.mayoclinic.org/sitting/expert-answers/faq-20058005

5RomeoStevens
Breaking up long sitting periods with stretching and walking around is a safe bet, but the studies are actually less clear than the editorials on them would lead you to believe.

We think you're sick either because people get cancer, or they have 4 bodily humors which get imbalanced, or it's all due to malignant airs. We doctors haven't figured out which is the right paradigm, but rest assured as you die: probably one of the 3 paradigms is right!

There isn't this much disagreement over macro. Especially undergrad macro.

As I said originally: macro cannot agree on an explanation for any of the events I listed, and my examples fit your demand for examples.

And I explained how one could use the models taught in macro principles to think about each example.

3gwern
The undergrad macro you've already described as so simplified that it doesn't apply to real world situations and ignores the controversy between feuding schools which bars any kind of consensus. "With this undergrad course in the 4 humors, I hope that you will be able to use the basic principles of melancholy vs choleric etc to interpret the illnesses and personalities you see around you..." Whatever. I'm done. I provided the relevant examples, you acknowledge that there is indeed no consensus about them, and that's all that was needed.

Then it's not a theory capable of explaining the event at all.

Are you really claiming that a theory that restricts the possible causes of an event to three has not explained the event "at all"?

Under this definition, I agree that undergraduate macroeconomics cannot explain the real world. But surely this is a rather restrictive standard for "explanation"?

I would rather say that a theory that allows us to concentrate a lot of probability mass on Y upon observing an element in X, or to concentrate a lot of probability mass on X after observing an element in Y, is doing quite a bit of explanatory work!

4gwern
This isn't a case of 1 theory which predict the cause as being 3 different possible causes. We're talking 3 entire competing paradigms, and then yeah, pretty much. "We think you're sick either because people get cancer, or they have 4 bodily humors which get imbalanced, or it's all due to malignant airs. We doctors haven't figured out which is the right paradigm, but rest assured as you die: probably one of the 3 paradigms is right!" I sure as heck wouldn't go around saying "medicine has it all figured out". So. As I said originally: macro cannot agree on an explanation for any of the events I listed, and my examples fit your demand for examples.

If the state of the art...is that "there's no settled explanation" for Japan's Lost Decades...then how on earth could the simple models taught to undergraduates not have "huge problems" dealing with these "real world" events?

I don't see how this follows.

Suppose we teach a theory that says things in set X can be caused by things in set Y={A,B,C}. Then I say "there's substantial argument about whether major event x in X was caused by A or by B."

This does not mean the theory has "huge problems" dealing wit... (read more)

3gwern
Then it's not a theory capable of explaining the event at all. If all you can do is throw together a variety of heterogenous contradictory theories, you haven't explained an event. I'm reminded of Wittgenstein, now, on family resemblances - of course one could define "a game" as an indefinitely long disjunction of possibilities "a game is anything which is either Backgammon OR chess OR go OR Halo OR tossing a ball OR soccer..." but having giving this disjunction, in what sense has one actually conveyed what a game is? Same thing here. I believe that however we explain the Lost Decades, it will involve materialism and not souls. Do I have a perfectly satisfactory theory capable of explaining the Lost Decades? No, of course not.

You demanded examples where macro does not work well in the real world. I named 4

I demanded examples of models taught to undergrads that have "huge problems dealing with the real world." The same poster went on to say that these models are so dangerously wrong one must be intellectually inoculated against them!

You've given several examples where our knowledge is incomplete. I agree! And I hope that any economist would explicitly say that there's no settled explanation for the Great Depression, or the Great Recession, or Japan's Lost Decade. B... (read more)

5gwern
If the state of the art cutting edge economic research is that "there's no settled explanation" for Japan's Lost Decades (plural, since we're well into multiple decades, I think), then how on earth could the simple models taught to undergraduates not have "huge problems" dealing with these "real world" events?

Are complex macro models how the world actually works?

Nope! All models are huge simplifications.

What are our most successful macro models, and how successful have they been?

A controversial question!

The conventional approach in (academic) macro is to build (relatively) simple models that can match particular stylized facts. Thus we have lots of models that can predict certain patterns in the data, but don't pretend to explain everything. Some people think we shouldn't do anything beyond this! (See Caballero, Pretense of Knowledge Syndrome)

Other p... (read more)

0ChristianKl
How do you know?

What do you mean by 'content' here? The basic narrative each model tells about the economy?

Right. Plus most undergrad models have an analog in grad macro, i.e. the AD-AS model and the New Keynesian model, or Quantity theory of money and a basic cash in advance model.

The big difference between the models I learned in undergrad and the models I learned in grad school was that in undergrad, everything was static. In grad school, the models were dynamic

True in general. Some intermediate macro courses use a two-period framework to explore basic dynamics. Williamson's textbook does this.

Lumifer said (1) the state macroeconomics as a whole is bad, (2) what you learn in a principles course is not how the world actually works, and (3) macro models have huge problems dealing with the real world. These are extreme claims, and I think I was justified in calling him on them.

To your examples -- the AD-AS model (or IS-LM in older textbooks) can be used to think about business cycles in general, and the liquidity trap in particular, which covers most of your examples. The Great Depression needs discussion of monetary policy (gold standard, Friedma... (read more)

5gwern
You demanded examples where macro does not work well in the real world. I named 4: Japan remains a mystery to macro, and 'Abenomics' hasn't helped eluicidate it; the US crash was unexpected and falsified the 'Great Moderation', casting doubt on the entire structure of macro that didn't predict it; the Great Depression is only partially understood even if a lot of people think Friedman cracked it; and business cycles remain mysterious with panics and bubbles being not explanations but excuses. The growing influence of the macro views of Scott Sumner, who was a marginal figure at best a few years ago, offers another practical bit of evidence that macro is far from a settled science when it comes to contemporary economies. I'm sure it would. Doesn't mean it is right or that macro has a consensus view on each such as how to fix and prevent and predict them.

I would caution to be sceptical of undergrad-level economics, in particular macro. The usual models taught to students have huge problems dealing with the real world.

Name three.

6gwern
Contemporary Japan, and America; the Great Depression; business cycles in general. (I threw in a fourth one for free because I love the 'name three' heuristic even if you chose a really bad topic to use it in.)

I would say that undergrad and grad econ are very different methodologically (at least at most schools), but a lot of the content is the same.

Stephen Williamson's intermediate macro textbook tries to bring in a lot of grad-level models/concepts, albeit in a "toy" form.

1Matt_Simpson
What do you mean by 'content' here? The basic narrative each model tells about the economy? I think I agree with you. The big difference between the models I learned in undergrad and the models I learned in grad school was that in undergrad, everything was static. In grad school, the models were dynamic - i.e. a sequence of equilibria over time instead of just one.

It didn't occur to me either, but ironically it was the first thing my wife suggested when I told her about the marshmallow experiment yesterday (it came up in the context of that professor's comments about fat people, self control, and PhD programs recently). This post's timing was thus quite serendipitous.

It probably occurred to her because she is a doctor who works with primarily poor patients, many of whom are black and hispanic, and so is used to the associated mistrust when crossing cultural and socio-economic lines.

But this experiment ruled out the following:

  • It doesn't matter if a child is more trusting; only self control affects how long they wait

I agree, but I don't think anyone believed that nothing else matters to marshmallow eating.

We have to distinguish between the propositions:

(P1) A significant fraction of the variance in marshmallow eating among children observed in past experiments is explained by trustingness.

(P2) Inducing large changes in trustingness in children produces changes in marshmallow eating behavior.

This study supports (P2), but it is onl... (read more)

3PECOS-9
Agreed, but I think the reason this experiment is interesting is that it previously didn't occur to people (or at least to me) that trustingness is a possible alternative explanation of the classic marshmallow experiment, rather than self control. It was a blind spot.

I really don't see how this casts doubt on the original experiment. Suppose we express a child's decision as maximizing expected reward minus the cost of waiting, where the latter takes "self control" as a parameter. If we lower expected reward, (nearly) all the kids eat the marshmallow. If we raise expected reward (by reinforcing waiting twice), about half the kids wait. But still, 6/14 kids in the second group didn't wait, so clearly there's variance from another source.

One way to tease out this connection might be to compare the kids who waite... (read more)

1PECOS-9
The other source of variance could still be the children's "trustingness." The more trusting children could have a higher expected reward even after the kids are shown that the adults are reliable/unreliable. So the results are consistent with both of the following hypotheses: * More trusting children will wait longer and self control is not relevant * More trusting children will wait longer and children with more self control will wait longer But this experiment ruled out the following: * It doesn't matter if a child is more trusting; only self control affects how long they wait

I read the experiment with adults who renege on their promises some time ago, and my reaction was along the lines of "seriously, the kids would have to be idiots to take them at their words after all this."

There's no point in engaging one's ability to delay gratification for a reward that almost certainly isn't coming.

Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused.

But don't LW one-boxers think that decision ALGORITHMS are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused?

As an empirical matter, I don't think humans are psychologically capable of time-consistent decisions in all cases. For instance, TDT implies that one should one-box even in a version of Newcomb's in which one can SEE the content of the boxes. But would a human being really leave the other box behind, if the contents of the boxes were things they REALLY valued (... (read more)

1[anonymous]
Probably not, and thus s/he would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
0[anonymous]
Probably not, and thus they would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
0ChristianKl
I think it's hard because most human's don't live their lives according to principles. They care more about the lives of close friends than they care about their principles. In the end reprograming yourself in that way is about being a good stoic.

I'm going to make a meta-comment here.

I think that your ultimate goal should NOT be to convince your dad that you are right and he is wrong. If he eventually changes his mind, he's going to have to do that on his own. Debates just don't change participants' minds very often.

Instead, your goal should be to make him respect your beliefs as genuine.

Christians generally respect people who are genuinely seeking truth, in part because the Bible promises that "those who seek will find". The good news is that you ARE legitimately seeking truth, so you sh... (read more)

8saturn
On the other hand, I've seen Christians conclude that the fact that you haven't found Christianity is knock-down evidence that you're not legitimately seeking truth. One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.
4grouchymusicologist
A big +1 to this and it echoes in many respects my advice here to a similar question. What you hit upon here that I did not do in that comment is the importance of understanding the etiology of one's new belief.

I imagine that if polls showed that we were in a situation where strategic voting might be useful for people with certain preferences, the news media would report on it and people would learn about it.

I can see the headline now: "Mathematician says that if your preferences are 'A > B > C', you should vote 'B > A > C' in November!"

Such situations could be recognized by poll questions like "What is your preference ordering over these 3 candidates?" Candidate B's campaign would have a large incentive to publicize this information.

6bryjnar
I think the more important point is that you simply require too much information about too many people's preferences to be able to do that, except in rare cases. The amount of data you'd need would be tantamount to just knowing how everyone would vote. If you know that, then this sort of thing might be feasible, but that's a big ask!

In context: http://suntzusaid.com/book/4

I think the quote is an alternative translation of paragraph 15 in the link above:

"Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory."

It has an associated commentary:

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."

If you read it literally. I think Sun Tzu is talking about the benefit of planning.

0Shmi
I'm guessing that something got lost in translation,