All of Gelsamel's Comments + Replies

The law is the product of many individuals each with different subjective axioms separately trying to maximize their particular utility functions during the legislation process. As a result the law as written and implemented has at best, an extremely tenuous link to any individuals morality, let alone society at large's morality. Murder is illegal because for biological reasons the vast majority of people assign large negative value to murder so the result of legislators minimax procedure is that murder is illegal in most cases.

But if an individual did not

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If morality is (are) seven billion utility functions, then a legal system will be a poor match for it (them). But there are good reasons for thinking that can't be the case. For one thing, people can have preferences that are intuitively immoral. If a psychopath wants to murder, that does not make murder moral. For another, it is hard to see what purpose morality serves when there is no interaction between people. Someone who is alone on a desert island iskand has no need of rules and against murder because there is no one to murder, and no need of rules against theft because there is no one to steal, and from and so on. If morality is a series of negotiations and trade offs about preferences, then the law can match it closely. We can answer the question "why is murder illegal" with "because murder is wrong".

There are many cases were people are jailed arbitrarily, or unfairly. At no point in a legal case is the jury asked to consider whether it is moral to jail the defendant, only whether the law says they should be in jail. At best, the only moral leeway the legal system has is in the judge's ability to change the magnitude of a sentence (which in many countries is severely hampered by mandatory minimums).

An individual's morality may occasionally line up with law (especially if one's subjective axiom is 'Don't break the law'), but this alignment is rarely if

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Bad law can be immoral, just as bad bridges can fall down. As I have already pointed out, the connection between morality and law is normative. What do you think guides the creation of law? Why is murder illegal? You are trying to argue general rules from exceptional cases.

Even if that were true (it isn't, since laws do not map to morality) it wouldn't really have anything to do with the is-ought problem unless you presume that the entity implements a utility function which values not being jailed (which, is exactly the subjective axiom that allows the bridging of is-ought in my analysis above).

1TAG
That is an extraordinary claim. You need a moral justification to put someone in jail. Legal systems approximate morality, and inasmuch as they depart from it, and they are flawed,like a bridge that doesn't stay up. If everyone is subject to the same punishments, then they have to be ones that are negatively valued by everyone... who likes being in jail? So it is not subjective on an interesting way In any case, that is approaching the problem from the wrong end. Morality is not a matter of using decision theory to avoid being punished for breaking arbitrary, incomprehensible, rules. It is the non arbitrary basis of the rules.

Moral oughts are not different to any kind of other ought statement. Almost all of my post is formulated in terms of a generic policy and utility function, anyway, so you can replace it with moral or amoral ought as you wish. If you dislike the icecream example, the same point is trivially made with any other moral ought statement.

1TAG
Oh, I think you'll find that moral oughts are different. For one thing, you can be jailed for breaking them.

I also feel like this conundrum is pretty easily solved, but I have a different take on it; one which analyses both situations you've presented identically, although it ultimately reduces to 'there is an is-ought problem'.

The primary thrust of my view on this is: All 'ought' statements are convolutions of objective and subjective components. The objective components can be dealt with purely scientifically and the subjective components can be variously criticised. There is no need to deal with them together.

The minimal subjective co... (read more)

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It's not suprising that "ought" statements concerning arbitrary preferences have a subjective component, but the topic is specifically about moral "Oughts", and it is quite possible that being about morality constrains things in a way that brings in additional objectivty.

As an aside, I think it is equivocation to talk about this kind of probability as being the same kind of probability that quantum mechanics leads to. No, hidden variable theories are not really worth considering.

But projectivism has been written about for quite a long time (since at least the 1700s), and is very well known so I find it hard to believe that there are any significant proponents of 'frequentism' (as you call it).

To those who've not thought about it, everyday projectivism comes naturally, but it falls apart at the slightest consideration.

When it comes to Hempel's raven, though, even those who understand projectivism can have difficulty coming to terms with the probabilistic reality.