All of Hul-Gil's Comments + Replies

Hul-Gil00

but I can't think of any where it was just better, the way that actual technologies often are

I find that a little irritating - for people supposedly open to new ideas, science fiction authors sure seem fearful and/or disapproving of future technology.

1Nornagest
Part of me thinks that that's encoded into the metaphorical DNA of the SF genre (or one branch of it) at a very basic level. It's been conventional for a while to think of SF as Enlightenment and the rest of spec-fic as Romantic, but the history of the genre's actually more complicated than that; Mary Shelley, for example, definitely fell on the Romantic side of the fence, and later writers haven't exactly been shy about following her lead. The treading-in-God's-domain motif is a powerful one, and it's the bedrock that an awful lot of SF is built on.
Hul-Gil140

Thanks. I read the whole debate, or as much of it as is there; I've prepared a short summary to post tomorrow if anyone is interested in knowing what really went on ("as according to Hul-Gil", anyway) without having to hack their way through that thread-jungle themselves.

(Summary of summary: Loosemore really does know what he's talking about - mostly - but he also appears somewhat dishonest, or at least extremely imprecise in his communication.)

5[anonymous]
Please do post it, I think it would help resolve the arguments in this thread.
Hul-Gil30

That doesn't help you if you need a car to take you someplace in the next hour or so, though. I think jed's point is that sometimes it is useful for an AI to take action rather than merely provide information.

Hul-Gil70

The answer is probably that you overestimate that community's dedication to rationality because you share its biases.

That's probably no small part of it. However, even if my opinion of the community is tinted rose, note that I refer specifically to observation. That is, I've sampled a good amount of posts and comments here on LessWrong, and I see people behaving rationally in arguments - appreciation of polite and lucid dissension, no insults or ad hominem attacks, etc. It's harder to tell what's going on with karma, but again, I've not seen any one pa... (read more)

Hul-Gil130

Can you provide some examples of these "abusive personal attacks"? I would also be interested in this ruthless suppression you mention. I have never seen this sort of behavior on LessWrong, and would be shocked to find it among those who support the Singularity Institute in general.

I've read a few of your previous comments, and while I felt that they were not strong arguments, I didn't downvote them because they were intelligent and well-written, and competent constructive criticism is something we don't get nearly enough of. Indeed, it is usuall... (read more)

6John_Maxwell
It seems like everyone is talking about SL4; here is a link to what Richard was probably complaining about: http://www.sl4.org/archive/0608/15895.html
8metaphysicist
The answer is probably that you overestimate that community's dedication to rationality because you share its biases. The main post demonstrates an enormous conceit among the SI vanguard. Now, how is that rational? How does it fail to get extensive scrutiny in a community of rationalists? My take is that neither side in this argument distinguished itself. Loosemore called for an "outside adjudicator" to solve a scientific argument. What kind of obnoxious behavior is that, when one finds oneself losing an argument? Yudkowsky (rightfully pissed off) in turn, convicted Loosemore of a scientific error, tarred him with incompetence and dishonesty, and banned him. None of these "sins" deserved a ban (no wonder the raw feelings come back to haunt); no honorable person would accept a position where he has the authority to exercise such power (a party to a dispute is biased). Or at the very least, he wouldn't use it the way Yudkowsky did, when he was the banned party's main antagonist.
Hul-Gil192

Well, he didn't actually identify dust mote disutility as zero; he says that dust motes register as zero on his torture scale. He goes on to mention that torture isn't on his dust-mote scale, so he isn't just using "torture scale" as a synonym for "disutility scale"; rather, he is emphasizing that there is more than just a single "(dis)utility scale" involved. I believe his contention is that the events (torture and dust-mote-in-the-eye) are fundamentally different in terms of "how the mind experiences and deals with [the... (read more)

1DPiepgrass
The loss of $100,000 (or one cent) is more or less significant depending on the individual. Which is worse: stealing a cent from 100,000,000 people, or stealing $100,000 from a billionaire? What if the 100,000,000 people are very poor and the cent would buy half a slice of bread and they were hungry to start with? (Tiny dust specks, at least, have a comparable annoyance effect on almost everyone.) Eliezer's main gaffe here is choosing a "googolplex" people with dust specks when humans do not even have an intuition for googols. So let's scale the problem down to a level a human can understand: instead of a googolplex dust specks versus 50 years of torture, let's take "50 years of torture versus a googol (1 followed by 100 zeros) dust specks", and scale it down linearly to "1 second of torture verses "6.33 x 10^90 dust specks, one per person" - which is still far more people than have ever lived, so let's make it "a dust speck once per minute for every person on Earth for their entire lives (while awake) and make it retroactive for all of our human ancestors too" (let's pretend for a moment that humans won't evolve a resistance to dust specks as a result). By doing this we are still eliminating virtually all of the dust specks. So now we have one second of torture versus roughly 2 billion billions of dust specks, which is nothing at all compared to a googol of dust specks. Once the numbers are scaled down to a level that ordinary college graduates can begin to comprehend, I think many of them would change their answer. Indeed, some people might volunteer for one second of torture just to save themselves from getting a tiny dust speck in their eye every minute for the rest of their lives. The fact that humans can't feel these numbers isn't something you teach by just saying it. You teach it by creating a tension between the feeling brain and the thinking brain. Due to your ego, I would guess your brain can better imagine feeling a tiny dust speck in its eye once per
0dxu
This argument does not show that putting dust specks in the eyes of 3^^^3 people is better than torturing one person for 50 years. It shows that putting dust specks in the eyes of 3^^^3 people and then telling them they helped save someone from torture is better than torturing one person for 50 years.
0AlexanderRM
"But with this dust speck scenario, if we accept Mr. Yudkowsky's reasoning and choose the one-person-being-tortured option, we end up with a situation in which every participant would rather that the other option had been chosen! Certainly the individual being tortured would prefer that, and each potentially dust-specked individual* would gladly agree to experience an instant of dust-speckiness in order to save the former individual." A question for comparison: would you rather have a 1/Googolplex chance of being tortured for 50 years, or lose 1 cent? (A better comparison in this case would be if you replaced "tortured for 50 years" with "death".) Also: for the original metaphor, imagine that you aren't the only person being offered this choice, and that the people suffering the consequences are out of the same pool- which is how real life works, although in this world we have a population of 1 googolplex rather than 7 billion. If we replace "dust speck" with "horribly tortured for 1 second", and we give 1.5 billion people the same choice and presume they all make the same decision, then the choice is between 1.5 billion people being horribly tortured for 50 years, and 1 googolplex people begin horribly tortured for 50 years.
3Eliezer Yudkowsky
Isn't this a reductio of your argument? Stealing $10,000,000 has less economic effect than stealing $100,000, really? Well, why don't we just do it over and over, then, since it has no effect each time? If I repeated it enough times, you would suddenly decide that the average effect of each $10,000,000 theft, all told, had been much larger than the average effect of the $100,000 theft. So where is the point at which, suddenly, stealing 1 more cent from everyone has a much larger and disproportionate effect, enough to make up for all the "negligible" effects earlier? See also: http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/
9Scott Alexander
Thank you for trying to address this problem, as it's important and still bothers me. But I don't find your idea of two different scales convincing. Consider electric shocks. We start with an imperceptibly low voltage and turn up the dial until the first level at which the victim is able to perceive slight discomfort (let's say one volt). Suppose we survey people and find that a one volt shock is about as unpleasant as a dust speck in the eye, and most people are indifferent between them. Then we turn the dial up further, and by some level, let's say two hundred volts, the victim is in excruciating pain. We can survey people and find that a two hundred volt shock is equivalent to whatever kind of torture was being used in the original problem. So one volt is equivalent to a dust speck (and so on the "trivial scale"), but two hundred volts is equivalent to torture (and so on the "nontrivial scale"). But this implies either that triviality exists only in degree (which ruins the entire argument, since enough triviality aggregated equals nontriviality) or that there must be a sharp discontinuity somewhere (eg a 21.32 volt shock is trivial, but a 21.33 volt shock is nontrivial). But the latter is absurd. Therefore there should not be separate trivial and nontrivial utility scales.
2Multiheaded
As a rather firm speck-ist, I'd like to say that this is the best attempt at a formal explanation of speckism that I've read so far! I'm grateful for this, and pleased that I no longer need to use muddier and vaguer justifications.
0OnTheOtherHandle
Another thing that seems to be a factor, at least for me, is that there's a term in my utility function for "fairness," which usually translates to something roughly similar to "sharing of burdens." (I also have a term for "freedom," which is in conflict with fairness but is on the same scale and can be traded off against it.) Why wouldn't this be a situation in which "the complexity of human value" comes into play? Why is it wrong to think something along the lines of, "I would be willing to make everyone a tiny bit worse off so that no one person has to suffer obscenely"? It's the rationale behind taxation, and while it's up for debate many Less Wrongers support moderate taxation if it would help a few people a lot while hurting a bunch of people a little bit. Think about it: the exact number of dollars taken from people in taxes don't go directly toward feeding the hungry. Some of it gets eaten up in bureaucratic inefficiencies, some of it goes to bribery and embezzlement, some of it goes to the military. This means if you taxed 1,000,000 well-off people $1 each, but only ended up giving 100 hungry people $1000 each to stave of a painful death from starvation, we as utilitarians would be absolutely, 100% obligated to oppose this taxation system, not because it's inefficient, but because doing nothing would be better. There is to be no room for debate; it's $100,000 - $1,000,000 = net loss; let the 100 starving peasants die. Note that you may be a libertarian and oppose taxation on other grounds, but most libertarians wouldn't say you are literally doing morality wrong if you think it's better to take $1 each from a million people, even if only $100,000 of it gets used to help the poor. I could easily be finding ways to rationalize my own faulty intuitions - but I managed to change my mind about Newcomb's problem and about the first example given in the above post despite powerful initial intuitions, and I managed to work the latter out for myself. So I think,
5Desrtopa
Assuming that none of them end up one cent short for something they would otherwise have been able to pay for, which out of a billion people is probably going to happen. It doesn't have to be their next purchase.
4Salivanth
You might be right. I'll have to think about this, and reconsider my stance. One billion is obviously far less than 3^^^3, but you are right in that the 10 million dollars stolen by you would be preferable to me than the 100,000 dollars stolen by Eliezer. I also consider losing 100,000 dollars less than or equal to 100,000 times as bad as losing one dollar. This indicates one of two things: A) My utility system is deeply flawed. B) My utility system includes some sort of 'diffiusion factor' wherein a disutility of X becomes <X when divided among several people, and the disutility becomes lower the more people it's divided among. In essence, there is some disutility for one person suffering a lot of disutility, that isn't there when it's divided among a lot of people. Of this, B seems more likely, and I didn't take it into account when considering torture vs. dust specks. In any case, some introspection on this should help me further define my utility function, so thanks for giving me something to think about.
Hul-Gil60

I think you're a good writer, in that you form sentences well, and you understand how the language works, and your prose is not stilted or boring. The problem I personally had, mostly with the previous two entries in this series, was that the "meat" - the interesting bits telling me what you had concluded, and why, and how to apply it, and how (specifically) you have applied it - seemed very spread out among a lot of filler or elaboration. I couldn't tell what you were eventually going to arrive at, and whether it'd be of use or interest to me. ... (read more)

Hul-Gil00

That's nicely done! Clear, concise, and immediately applicable. I think Frank himself is an intelligent person with good and interesting ideas, but the "meat" of these posts seems spread out among a lot of filler/elaboration - possibly why they're hard to skim. I wasn't even sure, for quite a while, what the whole series was really about, beyond "general self-improvement."

This latest article is much more "functional" than the previous two, though, so I think we're moving in the right direction.

One thing your comment brings t... (read more)

0Richard_Kennaway
I tuned out all that stuff about "the unconscious". How does Frank know that "our unconscious thinking is actually very powerful, very intelligent, and fairly sensible"? That it is "extremely powerful, doing massive amounts of computation very quickly"? And yet, "When they make a mistake they have no way of telling that they made a mistake"? Where does this come from? What does he mean by "the unconscious"? When he says "When I realize this disconnect and see how the information about underlying frequency was shifted as it passed through my sources, I unconsciously come to a better estimate of how often something happens", what is the word "unconscious" doing there? Looks like a description of something conscious.
Hul-Gil10

Upvoted both this and its parent, because the quoted bit of Strunk and White seems like good advice, and because the linked criticism of Strunk and White is lucid and informative as well as entertaining. I learned about two new but related things, one right after the other; my conclusions about Strunk and White swung rapidly from one position to the opposite in quick succession. Quite an experience! ("Oh look, there are these two folks who are recognized authorities on English, and they're presenting good writing advice. Strunk and White... must remember. Wait; here's a response... Oh - turns out not much of their advice is that good after all! Passive voice IS acceptable! Language Log... must remember.")

6Bugmaster
You might enjoy this post, as well: Don't put up with usage abuse. It's one of many, many posts on Language Log in which the authors thoroughly destroy the notion of prescriptivist grammar.
Hul-Gil40

If you pick the chance worldview, you are heavilly reliant on evolution to validate your worldview.

No, not at all. Evolution is one aspect of one field of one discipline. One can argue that existence came about by chance (and I'm not comfortable with that term) without referring to evolution at all; there are many other reasons to reject the idea of a designer.

See Desrtopa's reply, below, regarding chance and design and whether a designer helps here. S/he said it better than I could!

Hul-Gil60

I addressed this here, but I missed a few things. For one, I address the extremity of the hypotheticals in the linked post, but I didn't point out, also, that these things seem extreme because we're used to seeing things work out as if evolution were true. These things wouldn't seem extreme if we had been seeing them all along; it's precisely because evolution fits what we do find so well that evolution-falsifying examples seem so extreme. Fossil rabbits in the Precambrian would probably not seem so extreme to a creationist; it's what they'd expect to find... (read more)

-11Ghazzali
Hul-Gil80

That depends on how you define 'system'. Is 'system' the entire biological existence of earth? In that case, yes evolution would be a mathematical certainty eventually. But is system a specific species? In that case evolution would only occurr within those species.

He goes on to tell you exactly what systems: any with random heritable changes that can selectively help or hinder reproduction. This would mean both all life on earth that fits within that definition, and any particular species also under that umbrella.

It seems to me like you're trying to ma... (read more)

-9Ghazzali
Hul-Gil20

I feel like you're trying to say we should care about "memetic life" as well as... other life. But the parallel you draw seems flawed: an individual of any race and sex is still recognizably conscious, and an individual. Do we care about non-sentient life, memetic or otherwise? Should we care?

0timtyler
I don't know about 'should' - but many humans do act as though they care about their favoured memes. Catholicism, Islam, patriotism - there are many memes that are literally 'to die for'.
0Johnicholas
You're right, it's infeasible to care about individual memes (or for that matter, the vast majority of individual animals) the way we care about other humans. I don't have an answer to your question, I'm trying to break a logjam of humancentric ethical thinking. Forgive me for passing on my confusion here, but I'm not certain that consciousness/sentience, is anything more than 'recognizably human'. You and I have a common brain architecture and one of our faculties is picking that out from trees and rocks. Perhaps there are plenty of evolved, competent alien minds that would pose a challenge to our ape-like-me recognition systems simply because they're so alien. But if and when humans upload, then they will become effectively memes. We need to solve the question of how to care about non-sentient life, because a datafile could be you or me or a descendent.
Hul-Gil60

I would like to see the scientific community come up with more specific parameters as to what would be considered: A. minor damage to the theory, B. major hit on the theory, and C. evidence that would make the theory most likely untenable. We do this for almost every other science, except evolution.

I think we do this for evolution as much as any other part of science. In any, the judgment of the severity of a "hit" is possible if you understand the relevant concepts. An understanding of the concepts lets one see what separates minor issues fro... (read more)

Hul-Gil40

I'm aware this is from 2008, but I just can't let this stand in case one day an undecided visitor wanders past and reads GenericThinker's comment. (I also can't resist pointing out that his handle is rather appropriate.)

1.) Belief in God doesn't necessarily drive people to behave in a more moral way. Consider Muslim fundamentalist terrorists, for example.

2.) The question of God's existence is not unanswerable. The evidence for or against God is no more open to interpretation than any other evidence. If God affects the material universe, we can observe the ... (read more)

Hul-Gil50

I enjoyed Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom quite a bit! I'm glad Kevin7 posted this link.

However, the insanity portrayed as being beneficial and desirable in The Metamorphosis is too egregious to ignore - even if the rest of the story had made good on its promise of providing an interesting look at a posthuman world. (It doesn't. We don't even get to see anything of it.) At first, I thought "oh, great; more cached-thought SF"... but it was worse than that. I forced myself to finish it just so I could be sure the following is accurate.

Worse tha... (read more)

0grendelkhan
You may enjoy A Casino Odyssey in Cyberspace--it's based in part on the author's history of card-counting--but then, you might not, as the Casinos don't seem like a very Fun place to go.
Hul-Gil20

Ergo, whatever environmental influences shape personality come from outside the home, not inside.

How far apart were the different homes - in the same neighborhood? School district? I also wonder how different the parenting styles considered were; at the same economic level in the same town, for example, divisions in "style" might be minor compared to people elsewhere, of different means.

It doesn't seem plausible, but you assert the books have mountains of evidence and I am not curious enough to check myself, so I ultimately withhold judgment.

Hul-Gil00

The beauty of politics is that there is just enough uncertainty to make every position appear plausible to some portion of the public, even in those rare cases where there is definitive "proof" (however defined) that one particular position is correct. [emphasis added]

Well, that doesn't sound very beautiful.

-1gokhalea
its beautiful in its complexity. its amazing (not in a critical sense, but as an observer) that no can be definitely right in a valuable way about anything. As a reality of life that we must accept and deal with, i think its fascinating, a seemingly impenetrable issue.
Hul-Gil00

I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed. That sort of thing.

Can't that apply to hypotheticals? If you come to the wrong conclusion you're a horrible person, sort of thing.

I would probably call "moral reasoning" something along the lines of "reasoning about morals". Even using your above definition, I think reasoning about morals using hypotheticals can result in a judgment, about what sort of action would be appropriate in the situation.

Hul-Gil00

That's true. They could be wrong in different ways (or "different directions", in our example), which could be important for some purposes. But as you say, that depends on said purposes; I'm still uncertain as to the fallacy that dspeyer refers to. If our only purpose is determining some belief's level of correctness, absent other considerations (like in which way it's incorrect), isn't the one dimension of the "shades of grey" model sufficient?

Although -- come to think of it, I could be misunderstanding his criticism. I took it to mean... (read more)

Hul-Gil00

I'm trying to imagine the other dimension we could add to this. If we have "more right" and "less right" along one axis, what's orthogonal to it?

I initially felt this comment was silly (the post isn't saying every space can be reasonably modeled as one-dimensional, is it?), but my brain is telling me we actually could come up with a more precise way to represent the article's concept with a Cartesian plane... but I'm not actually able to think of one. False intuition based on my experience with the "Political Compass" graph, perhaps.

2dspeyer
I meant my comment more as a warning to readers than as a criticism of the article. When you've upgraded your mental model, don't stop and be satisfied -- see if there are more low-hanging upgrades. This is especially important if having recently improved your model biases you toward overconfidence (which I suspect is common). To address your actual challenge... Probability of correctness may actually be one dimensional. Though in practice it's worth keeping around what the big hunks of uncertainty are so you can update them easily if needed (i.e. P(my_understanding) = P(I_understood_what_I_read) P(the_author_was_honest) ... is easier to update if you later learn the author was a troll). Degrees of correctness are more complex. "The geography of the Earth is as shown on a Mercator map" and "The geography of the Earth is as shown on a Peters map" are both false. They are both useful approximations. Is one more useful than the other? That depends on what you want to do with it. There were other examples in the article besides correctness. "Every society imposes some of its values on those raised within it, but the point is that some societies try to maximize that effect, and some try to minimize it" and some maximize it with regard to their perspective on murder and minimize it with regard to their perspective on shellfish. "No one is perfect, but some people are less imperfect than others" and some people are imperfect in different ways from others, which are more or less harmful in different circumstances.
1dlthomas
Direction of divergence? Neither (1, 5) nor (5, 1) may be "more wrong" when the answer is (2, 2), but may still be quite meaningfully distinct for some purposes.
Hul-Gil30

It reminded me of that as well. Here is the full article; I'm glad it's online, because the errors he (and Yudkowsky, above) clears up are astonishingly prevalent. I've had cause to link to it many times.

Hul-Gil00

What do you think about Kabbalah?

40 is sometimes used, in the Torah, to indicate a general large quantity - according to Google. It also has associations with purification and/or wisdom, according to my interpretation of the various places it appears in the Bible as a whole. (There are a lot of them.)

Hul-Gil60

I would have liked some thoughts on/insight into the data posted as well; but all the same, summaries like this, that gather a lot of related but widely-dispersed information together, are very useful (especially as a quick reference or overview, or, as Jonathan says below, as a starting point for further research), and I definitely wouldn't mind seeing more of them.

Hul-Gil50

This suggests measuring posts for comment EV.

Now that is an interesting concept. I like where this subthread is going.

Interesting comparisons to other systems involving currency come to mind.

EV-analysis is the more intellectually interesting proposition, but it has me thinking. Next up: black-market karma services. I will facilitate karma-parties... for a nominal (karma) fee, of course. If you want to maintain the pretense of legitimacy, we will need to do some karma-laundering, ensuring that your posts appear that they could be worth the amount of ka... (read more)

3David_Gerard
It is clear we need to start work on a distributed, decentralised, cryptographically-secure Internet karma mechanism.
Hul-Gil00

(Since you two seem to be mostly using the mentioned IQ scores as a way to indicate relative intelligence, rather than speaking of anything directly related to IQ and IQ tests, this is somewhat tangential; however, Mr. Newsome does mention some actual scores below, and I think it's always good to be mindful when throwing IQ scores around. So when speaking of IQ specifically, I find it helpful to keep in mind the following.

There are many different tests, which value scores differently. In some tests, scores higher than about 150 are impossible or meaningle... (read more)

Hul-Gil00

The heuristic I generally use is "use parentheses as needed, but rewrite if you find that you're needing to use square brackets." Why? Thinking about it, I believe this is because I see parentheses all the time in professional texts, but almost never parentheticals inside parentheticals.

But as I verbalize this heuristic, I suddenly feel like it might lend the writing a certain charm or desirable style to defy convention and double-bag some asides. Hmm.

Hul-Gil00

No, that time passed when you merely had a single parenthetical inside a parenthetical. But when you have a further parenthetical inside the former two, is it then time to break out the curly brackets?

Hul-Gil20

I have found entirely the opposite; it's very strongly correlated with spelling ability - or so it seems from my necessarily few observations, of course. I know some excellent mathematicians who write very stilted prose, and a few make more grammatical errors than I'd have expected, but they can all at least spell well.

Hul-Gil30

Not only this, but you can be obviously wrong. We look at people trusting in spontaneous generation, or a spirit theory of disease, and mock them - rightfully. They took "reasonable" explanations of ideas, tested them as best they could, and ended up with unreasonable confidence in utterly illogical ideas.

I don't believe most of the old "obviously wrong" beliefs, like a spirit theory of disease, were ever actually systematically tested. Experimentation doesn't prevent you from coming to silly conclusions, but it can throw out a lot o... (read more)

Hul-Gil10

I was thinking of that; maybe some people equate leisure time with being directionless, and thus need externally-imposed goals?

Hul-Gil00

I was hoping someone would bring that up. You've already given the same answer I would, though: it's not necessarily an either/or scenario like Nozick's "experience machine" concept, so it's possible to have both heroin and pictures, in theory.

Hul-Gil00

See my post below; I think this is due to a.) a misunderstanding of the nature of happiness (a thought that chemically-induced happiness is different from "regular" happiness... which is also chemical), b.) a feeling that opium is incredibly dangerous (as it can be), and c.) a misunderstanding of how opium makes you feel - people can say "I know opium makes you happy" without actually feeling/knowing that it does so. That is, their mental picture of how they'd feel if they smoked opium doesn't correspond to the reality, which is - for most people - that it makes them feel much, much better than they would have imagined.

Hul-Gil-10

Most people I know believe that heroin (and similar mechanisms) get short-term happiness followed either by long-term unhappiness, or death.

That's the long and short of it, I think. There is no reason not to use heroin to obtain maximum utility (for one's self), if one a.) finds it pleasurable, b.) can afford it, and c.) is able to obtain pure and measured doses. (Or simply uses pharmaceuticals.) The perceived danger of heroin comes from its price and illegality (uncertain dosage + potentially dangerous impurities), which often results in penury, and ov... (read more)

0tog
Are pure and measured doses safe? What about the adverse consequences of addiction?
1TheOtherDave
Well, you're leaving out any discussion of goals I might have other than pleasure, and how well heroin helps me achieve those goals. One difference between heroin use and painting a picture is that the latter case causes there to be a picture, for example, and I might value the existence of the picture in addition to valuing my neurochemical state. But, sure, if I can do all the same stuff in the world as well or better while maintaining a heroin habit, then that's not relevant.
Hul-Gil70

I have experienced the same thing. I have apparently endless capacity for leisure, possibly because I have an endless number of interests and hobbies to pursue then drop then pick back up. I've never understood people who don't want this kind of life; do they really exist? Can people get bored with leisure?

3A1987dM
I guess some people can and other people can't, where by some I mean ‘a fraction most likely to be more than 5% and less than 95%’. (As for me, if I have nothing to do for a while I tend to just waste most of my time sleeping or aimlessly browsing the Web and similar addictive-but-not-so-fulfilling stuff, whereas if I'm very busy I spend what little spare time I have on actually fulfilling hobbies and socialising. So I do get bored with leisure, but that's just a result of akrasia and I guess if the next time I get a few spare months I beeminded (say) reading books/watching films/listening to albums/doing things I've always wanted to read/watch/listen/do but never got around to reading/watching/listening/doing, I wouldn't.) ETA: This guy did get bored with leisure, apparently.
6handoflixue
I'd suspect most people feel both stress from unemployment, and guilt when they are dependent on someone else (or possibly fear of losing this support). I can't really imagine a lot of situations where a person has months to themselves without triggering one of those two, so I'd expect most people aren't very good at evaluating the situation to begin with...
1thomblake
Yeah, I find that very confusing too. But then, if pursuing random projects is in "leisure", then I don't really see the distinction between that and "not leisure". Maybe some people just sit around and watch paint dry, given the chance?
0TheOtherDave
Yes.
Hul-Gil10

Great post! I'm going to use as much of it as I can.

I think it might be difficult to apply some of these, since I notice a good deal of my unhappiness is not affected by changes in thought or outward motions, and it can be hard to translate knowing you should try something into actually applying it. (But both of these can be mitigated: smiling, for instance, really does make me feel a bit happier even if I'm forcing the smile, and I'm sure there are plenty of articles about akrasia, here on LessWrong.)

Prefer experiential purchases; avoid materialistic g

... (read more)
Hul-Gil-10

I don't think so - acetic anhydride is really the only other reagent involved in the step we're considering, and an excess wouldn't be harmful in any way... except, possibly, making the product a bit uncomfortable to ingest, if too much acetic acid was left over. (An excess of acetic anhydride is commonly used so as to make sure all the morphine reacts; any excess will become acetic acid - i.e., vinegar - as well.) It's common for a little to be left over, giving heroin its characteristic (vinegar-y) smell, but I don't think it's dangerous.

So I'd say that there's no danger here... but lack of quality control in general is definitely a big problem indeed.

0inblankets
I don't know about other cities, but I've used heroin in NYC off and on for almost 5 years, and I can safely say that, although I attempted to control for nutrition etc., I almost always had some deleterious effects on my skin etc. from (presumably) additives, even using "pure" stuff. If you're taking something in intravenously, very pure is not pure enough.
Hul-Gil40

I think one reason might be that the vast majority of the decisions we make are not going to make a significant difference as to our overall success by themselves; or rather, not as significant a difference as chance or other factors (e.g., native talent) could. For example, take the example about not buying into a snake-oil health product lessdazed uses above: you've benefited from your rationality, but it's still small potatoes compared to the amount of benefit you could get from being in the right place at the right time and becoming a pop star... or ge... (read more)

Hul-Gil00

Was not my counterfactual scenario. It was someone else describing a counterfactual where ninjas are travelling by sea to a ninja-convention. My only contribution there was to (implicitly) assert that the counterfactualising operation that preserves the most probability mass to produce that scenario would not result in ninjas travelling on unarmed ships.

I edited that; I think the daimyos did have their own navies. I'm not actually certain about that, though, and I don't feel like looking it up. Maybe someone who knows more Japanese history can contribut... (read more)

0wedrifid
And in my experience the way people go about concocting such circumstances (in general, over all counterfactuals) matters a lot to me both in terms of how much respect I can maintain for them as a thinker and how much I can tolerate their presence. For the purpose of answering a specific question not all concocted circumstances are equal!
Hul-Gil00

Worse in what manner? In individual combat? A pirate crew vs. an association of ninjas?

From the comments I've read so far, I think the hypothetical situations you've used to determine that ninjas would win are grossly weighted in favor of ninjas. For example, you've already said it can't be any sea-based conflict (unless the ninjas are specially-trained sailor-ninjas on a navy ship, instead of being passenger ninjas booking passage on a merchant ship, as most would do if required to travel by sea if traveling by sea is incidental to their main function - ... (read more)

0wedrifid
Was not my counterfactual scenario. It was someone else describing a counterfactual where ninjas are travelling by sea to a ninja-convention. My only contribution there was to (implicitly) assert that the counterfactualising operation that preserves the most probability mass to produce that scenario would not result in ninjas travelling on unarmed ships. I had never really considered it before daenerys proposed the idea of actually considering the question. I don't particularly accept the charge "in an unspecified manner" but I certainly haven't gone into detail. It roughly pertains to how one reasons about counter-factual and hypothetical situations. One can either take the counterfactual as an excuse to make up whatever story suits your position or you can apply the counterfactualizing operation in a manner that preserves the most probability mass. I consider this question a valid diagnostic tool in that regard. In fact I went ahead and used it as such. I made this very meta-claim on facebook and when anyone disagreed I unfriended them. I call it either "evaporative cooling of styles of thinking in my chosen peers" or "being grumpy and getting rid of people who are likely to say annoying and wrong things in the future".
Hul-Gil40

This is interesting to me, since we seem to be in about the same position academically (though you're a bit ahead of me). What was responsible for such a huge increase in productivity, or can that not be summarized? I need to research more myself, but I do not think I will be able to afford or attend the minicamp, so anything you'd be able to share would be appreciated.

7AnnaSalamon
If you want to attend but can't afford the fees, please do apply anyhow, and check the "need scholarship" box. Even if it turns out that we can't admit you this year, we'll at least know there are people out there who want to attend but can't afford it, and we can possibly take this information to potential donors as the Center for Modern Rationality gets on its own non-profit feet.
1Academian
The particular changes I've made (like changing my advisor) have been very personalized for me, by me... but they have been fueled by a few root adjustments: 1) More curiosity about my life choices. Caused in part by being surrounded by a group of smart similar people doing very different things with their lives. 2) More willingness and desire to make up my mind more quickly and effectively about Big Life Decisions. Caused in part by Anna Salamon generating, on the spot, a steady stream of helpful questions for me that I could ask and answer to myself about career choices. I never came to any conclusions that she suggested (which I consider a good sign; I wouldn't expect someone else to know what I should do with my life from a few conversations), but she gave me a sense that more is possible in terms of how quickly a person can generate important, answerable questions. 3) More curiosity / motivation to experiment with productivity hacks, until I found some that work for me (Getting Things Done system + Pomodoro technique). Caused by being surrounded by productivity-obsessed people for a week with lots of cool ideas that helped me internalize a belief in the existence of popular productivity hacks that would work for me. 4) More desire to Be Successful (which I'd had very little of throughout most of my life), caused by feeling like I was part of a community that I cared about and who might benefit in some small way from my success.
Hul-Gil20

Right now I feel if I found some good papers providing evidence for or against meditation I would shift appropriately.

Are you familiar with the study (studies) about meditation and brain health? I've seen one or two crop up, but I've not read the actual studies themselves - just summaries. IIRC, it appears to reduce the effects of aging.

The other reason I consider meditation possibly worth pursuing is that it appears to be an effective "mindhack" in at least one respect: it can be used to reduce or eliminate unpleasant physical and mental sens... (read more)

Hul-Gil30

I think mysticism is inherently irrational, and thus seriously participating in "mysticism itself" is counter-productive if you wish you become more rational. But I say "seriously participating", because as you say, perhaps mystical aliefs can be used to produce useful mental states - as long as it is recognized that that's what you're doing, and you don't ascribe any special significance to the mystical aspects (i.e., you recognize that the same effect can probably be achieved without any such relics; it's just a matter of preference).... (read more)

1bogus
I agree with this as far as rational belief is concerned, and on a denotational level. But I'm not sure whether one can achieve the very tangible benefits of enacting rituals involving such "gods" as Pan, Wodan or Hermes/Thoth without alieving that the gods are really there at some level--if only as archetypes of one's unconscious psychology--so that one can relate to them on their own terms. As long as the "gods" are not literally considered as supernatural entities (whatever that might mean) believing in them needs not be any more irrational than believing in any other features of our psychology. But successfully channeling a god might require us to connote that belief in ways that will seem quite foreign to a rationalistic, logically-oriented mental stance.
Hul-Gil00

Thanks for this; it's detailed and doesn't shy from pointing out the Bad and the Ugly (though it seems like there isn't much of those!). One thing that made me curious, however:

the marginal return on playing Dominion online was negative past about the first 10% of my time spent

How did you determine this?

Edit: Oh, I see you explain this below.

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Hul-Gil20

That's a good quote! +1.

Unfortunately, for every rational action, there appears to be an equal and opposite irrational one: did you see bhousel's response?

Rationality is emotionless and mechanical. It's about making a reasonable decision based on whatever information is available to you. However, rational decisions do not involve morals, culture, or feelings. This is exactly what companies like Google and Goldman Sachs are being criticized for. [...] If I look down into my wallet and see no money there, and I'm hungry for lunch, and I decide to steal s

... (read more)
Hul-Gil00

This probably helps explain some of the more blatantly maladaptive aspects of religious law we know about

Can you expand on this a little? I'm interested to see what in particular you're thinking of.

Hul-Gil30

Since I have just read that "the intelligentsia" is usually now used to refer to artists etc. and doesn't often include scientists, this isn't as bad as I first thought; but still, it seems pretty silly to me - trying to appear deep by turning our expectations on their head. A common trick, and sometimes it can be used to make a good point... but what's the point being made here? Ordinary people are more rational than those engaged in intellectual pursuits? I doubt that, though rationality is in short supply in either category; but in any case, w... (read more)

6Eugine_Nier
This quote isn't just about seeming deep, it refers to a frequently observed phenomenon. I think two main reasons for it are that intellectuals are better at rationalizing beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons (there is even a theory that some intellectuals signal their intelligence by rationalizing absurd beliefs) and the fact that they're frequently in ivory towers where day to day reality is less available. Depends on which type of anti-intellectualism you're referring to.
Hul-Gil00

I think that point would make more sense than the point he is apparently actually making... which is that we must keep negative aspects of ourselves (such as pain) to remain "human" (as defined by current specimens, I suppose), which is apparently something important. Either that or, as you say, Yudkowsky believes that suffering is required to appreciate happiness.

I too would have been happy to take the SH deal; or, if not happy, at least happier than with any of the alternatives.

Hul-Gil180

Agreed. I was very surprised that Mr. Yudkowsky went with the very ending I, myself, thought would be the "traditional" and irrational ending - where suffering and death are allowed to go on, and even caused, because... um... because humans are special, and pain is good because it's part of our identity!

Yes, and the appendix is useful because it's part of our body.

0player_03
Perhaps the fact that it's the "traditional and irrational" ending is the reason Eliezer went with it as the "real" one. (Note that he didn't actually label them as "good" and "bad" endings.)
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