All of Jim Pivarski's Comments + Replies

I have heard of versions of many-worlds that are supposed to be testable, and you're probably referring to one of them. The one that I'm most familiar with ("classic many-worlds"?) is much more of a pure interpretation, though: in that version, there is no collapse and the apparent collapse is a matter of perspective. A component of the wavefunction that I perceive as me sees the electron in the spin-down state, but in the big superposition, there's another component like me but seeing the spin-up state. I can't communicate with the other me (or "mes," plu... (read more)

2TAG
The're are versions that are falsified, for all practical purposes, because they fail to.predict broadly classical observations -- sharp valued real numbers, without pesky complex numbers or superpositions. I mean mainly the original Everett theory of 1957. There have been various attempts to patch the problems -- preferred basis, Decoherence , anthropics, etc, -- so there are various non falsified theories. Merely saying that everything is a component of a big vector doesn't show that observers dont go into superposition with themselves, because the same description applies to anything which is in superposition..it's a very broad claim. What you call classic MWI is what I the have-your-cake-and-eat-it ... assuming nothing except that collapse doesn't occur, you conclude that observers make classical observations for not particular reason...you doing even nominate Decoherence or preferred basis as the mechanism that gets rid of the unwanted stuff. OK. I would call that single world decoherence. Many worlders appeal to Decoherence as well. If classic MW means Everetts RSI, it's already false.

Most of the interpretations aren't "pure" in the sense of being completely independent of empirical constraints. Decoherence is one that posits a physical process (unlike many worlds and quantum Bayesianism) that doesn't require new laws of physics (unlike objective collapse theories, including gravity mediated). It requires a collective effect from the environment, which is why I say it's like thermodynamics.

However, it isn't as well-understood as thermodynamics. I've read some papers in which the authors describe a simple, special-case example of an envi... (read more)

3Yair Halberstadt
Got it. So in a ways it's more like a mathematical conjecture than a philosophical theory. We posit a statistical result, we have some toy examples which provide us with some intuition for it, but right now we're not able to prove the general case. We hope to do so in the future, and people are actively working on doing so. Also isn't many worlds a straightforward interpretation of decoherence? Decoherence says that regions of large complex superpositions stop interfering with each other, and hence such regions will act classically, many worlds just says that the regions you're not in presumably still exist? Or are there some extra hoops there?

This sounds like it's using Russell's theory of descriptions, in that you're replacing "Colorless green ideas do Y" with "For all X such that X is a colorless green idea, X does Y." Not everyone agrees that this is a correct interpretation, in part because it seems that statements like "Dragons are attacking Paris" should be false.

I think it would be reasonable to say that "colorless green ideas" is not just a set of objects in which there are no existing members, but meaningless (for two reasons: "colorless" and "green" conflict, and ideas can't be colored, anyway). I think that was Chomsky's intention—not to write a false sentence, but a meaningless one.

I'm surprised that Scott Alexander's blog post didn't go for what I think is a more obvious connection between conservatism and conservationism: religious fundamentalism.

The way man acts these days... [shakes head, downcast] forswears a God-given charge to protect this God-given Earth. The way he chokes the air with smokestacks, plunders the oceans of her fishes, and paves the green hills flat with concrete—it sickens me. Gets me [thumps chest with mic] right through the heart. His vainglorious pride to try to change the natural order of things, the intric

... (read more)

This is both interesting and (I think) an important thing to know about science: plans and strategies are systematic, but discoveries sometimes are and sometimes aren't. In particle physics, the Omega baryon and Higgs boson were discovered in deliberate hunts, but the muon and J/psi were serendipitous. The ratio might be about half-and-half (depending on how you count particles).

Thinking about this, I have two half-answers, which may be leads as to why sweetener discovery might be discovered by serendipity, even though there are systematic searches for new... (read more)

This story from the perspective of the Thing did get into the notion of what it would be like to be an amorphous consciousness (and how odd it is that Earthlings aren't). It's still a little different, though, from the trajectory of being human and then realizing what it's like to be multi-human. A version with Pod People would be a different kind of story...

Cool! I'll read that one, too, thanks!

What I was thinking about with the pod people was their group mentality. (After all, it has long been considered a metaphor for communism.) I'd like to see someone imagine—or do it myself—the poddified people not as soulless outer shells of their former selves, but as themselves, "melted" into a group consciousness. As an example of something similar, the Buffy the Vampire Slayer episode, "The Wish" did an excellent job showing characters who remained themselves, but as evil versions of themselves, as vampires.

In the I... (read more)

But if that observer is in the universe, then there's more in the universe than just the circle.

I was examining this universe from the outside. We can't actually do that, though we act as though we do in the physical sciences. (One idea in the physical sciences that takes seriously the fact that experimenters are a part of the universe they observe is superdeterminism, and it's one of the possible loopholes for Bell's Inequality.)

Panpsychism! (Sort of!) But I guess that makes sense, since panpsychism is trying to make sense of divisibility of consciousness, too.

1Jim Pivarski
Panpsychism! (Sort of!) But I guess that makes sense, since panpsychism is trying to make sense of divisibility of consciousness, too.

Sorry that I didn't notice your comment before. You took it the one extra step of getting kinetic and rotational energy in the same units. (I had been trying to compare potential and rotational energy and gave up when there were quantities that would have to be numerically evaluated.)

Yeah, I follow your algebra. The radius of the ball cancels and we only have to compare  and . Indeed, a uniformly solid sphere (an assumption I made) rolling without sliding without change in potential energy (at the end of the ramp) has 29% rotational ener... (read more)

Sorry—I addressed one bout of undisciplined thinking (in physics) and then tacked on a whole lot more undisciplined thinking in a different subject (AI alignment, which I haven't thought about nearly as much as people here have).

I could delete the last two paragraphs, but I want to think about it more and maybe bring it up in a place that's dedicated to the subject.

It might not matter in the grand scheme of things, but my comment above has been on my mind for the last few days. I didn't do a good job of demonstrating the thing I set out to argue for, that effect X is negligible and can be ignored. That's the first step in any physics problem, since there are infinitely many effects that could be considered, but only enough time to compute a few of them in detail.

The first respondent made the mistake of using the challenger's intentions as data—she knew it was a puzzle that was expected to be solvable in a reasonable ... (read more)

3Jim Pivarski
Sorry—I addressed one bout of undisciplined thinking (in physics) and then tacked on a whole lot more undisciplined thinking in a different subject (AI alignment, which I haven't thought about nearly as much as people here have). I could delete the last two paragraphs, but I want to think about it more and maybe bring it up in a place that's dedicated to the subject.

This looks a lot like a typical high school/college freshman physics problem, and I guess the moral of the story is that it leads us to think that we should solve it that way. But if you were to work it out,

I think the ball's rotational energy would be a much smaller number than the gravitational potential energy of falling a few feet. The rotational energy of a solid sphere is , where  and  are the mass and radius of the ball and  is the angular velocity of rotation. Meanwhile, the gravitational potential energ

... (read more)
3Jim Pivarski
It might not matter in the grand scheme of things, but my comment above has been on my mind for the last few days. I didn't do a good job of demonstrating the thing I set out to argue for, that effect X is negligible and can be ignored. That's the first step in any physics problem, since there are infinitely many effects that could be considered, but only enough time to compute a few of them in detail. The first respondent made the mistake of using the challenger's intentions as data—she knew it was a puzzle that was expected to be solvable in a reasonable amount of time, so she disregarded defects that would be too difficult to calculate. That can be a useful criterion in video games ("how well does the game explain itself?"), it can be exploited in academic tests, though it defeats the purpose to do so, and it's useless in real-world problems. Nature doesn't care how easy or hard a problem is. I didn't do a good job demonstrating that X is negligible compared to Y because I didn't resolve enough variables to put them into the same units. If I had shown that X' and Y' are both in units of energy and X' scales linearly with a parameter that is much larger than the equivalent in Y', while everything else is order 1, that would have been a good demonstration. If I were just trying to solve the problem and not prove it, I wouldn't have bothered because I knew that X is negligible than Y without even a scaling argument. Why? The answer physicists give in this situation is "physics intuition," which may sound like an evasion. But in other contexts, you find physicists talking about "training their intuition," which is not something that birds or clairvoyants do with their instincts or intuitions. Physicists intentionally use the neural networks in their heads to get familiarity with how big certain quantities are relative to each other. When I thought about effects X and Y in the blacked-out comment above, I was using familiarity with the few-foot drop the track repre
3Measure
ω is just v/r (v = rω), and translational KE is ½mv² or ½mr²ω², so if rotational KE is ⅕mr²ω², then rotational KE is 10/35 or 29% of total KE. I guess if we assume the ball is rolling without slipping as it exits the track, then the ratio of translational KE to rotational KE is fixed regardless of what happened earlier in the drop, so maybe it doesn't matter after all.

Wow! That looks like a great book. Although one can find out by following the links you provided, I'd like to tell everyone here that the book is available for free on the author's website (PDF, epub, mobi).

They're similar-sounding questions, but different.

  • "Do I have a headache when I'm not noticing it?" is a question about the definition of a headache. One definition is in the physical reality-box: a headache is neurological state that can be detected by a scientific instrument. Another definition is in the subjective reality-box: a headache is what I feel—I'm the only one who can say whether or not I have a headache. Some people deny that subjective reality is a kind of reality, and for them, the only real thing that can be called a headache is the one that
... (read more)
3Dagon
I think they're very similar.  The primary question is 'how do you operationally define {"have a headache"'|"make a sound"}'?  The only conundrum is by changing definitions midway through.   Your second example of what it COULD be about is downstream of what it is actually about, but is ALSO the same (if you define "headache" analogously to "sound"), about the limits of induction and measurement. Your third is still about definitions, including the definition of identity.

Interesting: I've had the same thought and did the same experiment, though it wasn't a tooth removal, but some tooth-drilling that I was assured would not be touching a nerve. The normal anesthesia would have been local Novocaine, and I hate how Novocaine feels for the rest of the day. (So it was a choice between two sensations, over two different time periods.) Without the Novocaine, it was like a distant, dull pounding, like falling on a bone, which can be managed. I did this more than once, but my current dentist argued more strongly against it and I ac... (read more)

I understand the softness of categories, and I don't mind that you would use the available data to not put me in the Christian box. Some things that you don't see are that I engage in Catholic practices, like going to mass (which is precisely why I canned an earlier draft and I'm writing again now).

If I gave the impression that Jesus is an iteration in general improvement of morality, then I mischaracterized my belief and my community's: we believe that Jesus is God—whatever that means. I have to add the "whatever that means" because it seems like a doctri... (read more)

Thank you for this response! (I have a few more books to add to my reading list.) Your post from 13 years ago is a very good explanation, too.

Ironically, though:

Here's an experiment for everyone to try: think it good to eat babies. Don't merely imagine thinking that: actually think it.

I have heard of an indigenous Australian tradition in which children were carefully, reverently turned into a blood-soup and consumed by the community (read in a book years ago, but there's this online). And I do try to imagine what it's like to live in this way. (I don't thi... (read more)

A quibble: arguments against God in the gaps are arguments against God as an explanation of some physical phenomena. "Does the universe have a face?" (poetically speaking) is not a gap that could ever be discovered by experiment.

As you (and Yudkowsky, and eventually Hofstadter) rightly point out, there isn't a universally compelling foundation to logic or reasons for things in general. In Reality and reality-boxes, I called the unifying feature among the uses of the word "reality" as a "degree of undeniableness," since anything can be flat-out denied, it's... (read more)

I seem to be back to Emotivism when it comes to meta-ethics and I'm wondering if there's a way to be convinced otherwise.

One way — I do not here intend to speak for or against it — is to observe that there is a universal natural law written on our hearts, that it is impossible to not know (although it is possible to hide one's knowledge from oneself).

Here is J. Budziszewki (a Catholic, theologian, and scholar of Aquinas) on the subject:

However rude it may be these days to say so, there are some moral truths that we all really know—truths which a norma

... (read more)

Have you ever been stuck debugging code and made a breakthrough by explaining it to someone else, even if they weren't following what you're saying? I think that's happened here, so thanks for asking me the question!

The religious community I'm in is not keen on proving the physical reality of miracles, the way that some will put a lot of effort into explaining, for instance, how and why the sun stayed still in the sky when Joshua prayed for it. (My community would quickly call something like that mythological.) The miracles that my community does assert—I ... (read more)

Right, as far as I know. Years ago, someone confided in me (I'm not saying who) that they experienced a perceptual miracle: something they could see that no one else could see. That kind of miracle is consistent with physical facts—it's a subjective decision to conclude whether the vision is meaningful or not.

I once asked at that Faith and Reason study group "if angels have backs." That is, if Mary is seeing Gabriel talking to her, whether only as much as she needs to see is manifested—namely, the front. Everyone else was of the opinion that this was besid... (read more)

1Jim Pivarski
Have you ever been stuck debugging code and made a breakthrough by explaining it to someone else, even if they weren't following what you're saying? I think that's happened here, so thanks for asking me the question! The religious community I'm in is not keen on proving the physical reality of miracles, the way that some will put a lot of effort into explaining, for instance, how and why the sun stayed still in the sky when Joshua prayed for it. (My community would quickly call something like that mythological.) The miracles that my community does assert—I was wrong when I said that they don't assert any miracles—are not an affront to physical evidence, they're an affront to logic. Saying "affront to logic" makes it sound bad, but these are statements that are not supposed to be logical—that's not their social purpose. (Wrong "language game," as Wittgenstein put it.) The positions taken on Jesus's resurrection and the Eucharist, as described above, are not illogical but antilogical: they're constructed in such a way as to make analysis impossible, on purpose. We didn't just not notice that we're saying "the Eucharist is physically body and blood" and also "materially, it's bread," which is an obvious contradiction, in the same way that "Tell me you're X without telling me you're X," is an impossible imperative—it can't be the same "tell" in both cases. I've previously noticed this about the Trinity. Most of the early heresies were trinitarian, and it was the most reasonable-sounding theories that were rejected as heresies. One mainstream statement is, "The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, and the Spirit is not the Father, but the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God." That deliberately breaks the transitivity of the word "is," so it's not an equivalence relation. If you ask someone about the logic of that, they'll remind you it's a mystery, which puts it in a category of things that are not allowed to be figured out; they're inten

As a statement about "What is the most fundamental type of thing?", it can't be justified by deduction or an appeal to observation the way that a statement about a particular physical thing in the universe can be. Like, if you want to find out why phosphorescent rocks glow, you can look at them under microscopes, experiment with them chemically, apply theories of molecular structure taken from other observations, etc. But if you ask things like, "Do phosphorescent rocks glow for any reason at all?" "Is nature comprehensible?" "Does it all resolve to mathem... (read more)

You cannot avoid starting somewhere, but that doesn't mean you can start anywhere and reality will never tell you otherwise.

"Life force", God sustaining his creation, and animism were once common beliefs, but the more we looked at the world, the less work they did, and they faded from the scene. Not an unexplained leap, but an explained and gradual change: wherever the searchlight of inquiry reached, we never saw them. God in the ever-diminishing gaps, "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis".

I was answering a question, and I took it out of the comments stream to keep from derailing that stream. But perhaps doing that made it more visible, which is not what I had intended.

It seems that religion is just an off-limits topic here, regardless of whether it seems like it might be relevant in some conversation. At the very least, I'll never bring it up again.

6the gears to ascension
It's certainly not a favorite topic, but I think it's more how out of the blue this post feels. In any case, see https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/religion for some posts on the topic that haven't been severely downvoted.

I'm still Catholic. I was answering your question and it got long, so I moved it to a post: Answer to a question: what do I think about God's communication patterns?

I think it would be more correct to say that a focus on believing particular assertions is a fairly recent trend in religion, encompassing the past millennium or two, but really picking up in the last few centuries.

It happened in or between Christianity and Islam (as isusr points out), and they probably both influenced each other. For example, Protestant Christianity focuses a lot more on a holy book than Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity, but in a way that resembles Islam's veneration of the Quran: citing verses to prove points. Since then, Catholics ... (read more)

And even more deeply than door-to-door conversations, political and religious beliefs spread through long-term friend and romantic relationships, even unintentionally.

I can attest to this first-hand because I converted from atheism to Catholicism (25 years ago) by the unintended example of my girlfriend-then-wife, and then I saw the pattern repeat as a volunteer in RCIA, an education program for people who have decided to become Catholic (during the months before confirmation), and pre-Cana, another program for couples who plan to be married in the church ... (read more)

2Tim Freeman
If you are Catholic, or remember being Catholic, and you're here, maybe you can explain something for me. How do you reconcile God's benevolence and omnipotence with His communication patterns? Specifically: I assume you believe that the Good News was delivered at one specific place and time in the world, and then allowed to spread by natural means. God could have given everyone decent evidence that Jesus existed and was important, and God could have spread that information by some reliable means. I could imagine a trickster God playing games with an important message like that, but the Christian God is assumed to be good, not a trickster. How do you deal with this?

You might not be able to wiggle it enough to get what you want (depending on what you want), but you need to be able to wiggle it, yes.

Given the way "A causes B" is used in everyday speech and among philosophers, it seems that it needs to have some notion of "if A, then B" (with a possible addition of "is more likely"). To use "casual" to mean "deterministic" would be confusing—different enough, anyway, that this usage needs to be called out as unrelated, to avoid confusion. "Smoking causes cancer" is not deterministic (some smokers are lucky) and includes... (read more)

I had seen Tegmark's four multiverses before, but relating it to this is something I hadn't considered. The first level of multiverses, with different initial conditions but the same laws, is a lot like how I understand Pearl's ensemble of possible worlds.

As for the universe being a mathematical structure, that seems to be pretty much what physicists assume by default. The formulations of string theory that I've seen (casually—I've never worked in that area) replace the space-time manifold with a non-geometric matrix, making it math all the way down.

Even i... (read more)

If you replace "true" with "accurate," what does "accurate" mean?

I would have thought that "accurate" means that the distance between the model result and the true result is small, so it contains a notion of truth and a notion of distance.

I wasn't intending to take a side in utilitarianism/consequentialism; I just meant that, ultimately, a decision is made from intuition. It can't be deductive all the way down.

Okay, I take the word "should" to refer to a spectrum with ethics on one end (strong "should") and aesthetics on the other (weak "should"). It's possible that this is a wider use of the word "ethics" or "aesthetics" as others would have. Maybe those other things people are thinking about don't lie on a linear spectrum?

So, for example, when you're doing an algebra problem, "you should subtract the same amount from both sides of the equation, not just one side," is a choice to stay within the rules of algebra. Not doing so leads to less interesting results (... (read more)

4TAG
Despite what Hume says , it is fairly standard to derive instrumental "shoulds", such as how you should build a bridge or win at chess, from a mass of empirical and logical information. Ethical shoulds are often held to be a different matter.
2cubefox
Saying that one should do x rather than y seems to mean that act x is better than act y. In which case we can reduce an ought to an is. And what "good" or "better" means, seems to have do with maximizing expected utility. And there are arguably objective facts about what maximizes utility. E.g. murdering people is pretty bad for maximizing utility. So there seem to be objective facts about what is good. And therefore about what one should do.

This is a good example of needing to watch my words: the same sentence, interpreted from the point of view of no-free-will, could mean the complex function of biochemical determinism playing out, resulting in what the human organism actually does.

What I meant was the utility function of consequentialism: for each possible goal , you have some preference of how good that is , and so what you're trying to do is to maximize  over . It's presupposing that you have some ability to choose  instead of , althou... (read more)

1Viktor Riabtsev
Yeah, if you use religious or faith baised terminology, it might trigger negative signals (downvotes). Though whether that is because the information you meant to convey was being disagreed with, or it's because the statements themselves are actually overall more ambiguous, would be harder to distinguish. Some kinds of careful resoning processes vibe with the community, and imop yours is that kind. Questioning each step separatetly on it's merits, being sufficiently skeptical of premises leading to conclusions. Anyways, back to the subject of f and inferring it's features. We are definitely having trouble drawing out f out of the human brain in a systematic falsiable way. Whether or not it is physically possible to infer it, or it's features, or how it is constructed; i.e whether it possible at all, that subject seems a little uninteresting to me. Humans are perfectly capable of pulling made up functions out of their ass. I kind of feel like all the gold will go to first group of people who come up with processes of constructing f in coherent predictable ways. Such that different initial conditions, when iterated over the process, produce predictably similiar f. We might then try observe such process throughout people's lifetimes, and sort of guess that a version of the same process is going on in the human brain. But nothing about how that will develop is readily apparent to me. This is just my own imagination producing what seems like a plausible way forward.

Okay, I just did a deep-dive on the AI alignment problem and the Singularity on Wikipedia, and it will take me a while to digest all of that. My first impression is that it seems like an outlandish thing to worry about, but I am going to think about it more because I can easily imagine the situation reversed.

Among the things I came across was that Eliezer was writing about this in 1996, and predicted

Plug in the numbers for current computing speeds, the current doubling time, and an estimate for the raw processing power of the human brain, and the numbers m

... (read more)
1MSRayne
Figuring out what human values actually are is a pretty important part of the project. Though, we'd still have to figure out how to align it to them. Still, there is no end of use for applied meta-ethics here. You might also want to look into the Shard Theory subcommunity here - @TurnTrout and others are working on getting an understanding of how human values arise in the first place as "shards" of a much simpler optimization process in the human brain.

No, but I can see how it may be necessary. I guess I've been lucky that so far my interests have aligned with jobs that pay well enough for it to not be an issue—I'm sure some fields are more constrained than others. I didn't think that this would apply to programming, though. (That's my field, too.)

I don't know why I get these Less Wrong articles in my email, but I read this one because of a startling premise: choosing a job based on its monetary value as an investment. I don't suppose there's anything wrong with that, it's just a bit mind-blowing for me. Maybe culture shock? But if so, what culture is this?

Making judgments with limited information is a thing, and what you say about asymmetric loss functions makes total sense. (In other words, I'm on board with the point you were trying to make with this article.) It's just the idea of applying it to... (read more)

2Ruby
You are probably subscribed to curated emails (checkbox at signup), you can turn those off in your account settings if you wish.
4Raemon
Do you not choose jobs based (in part) on salary?
5Raemon
FYI you get emails because you once subscribed to our curated email list (presumably). The emails should have an unsubscribe button if you no longer want to receive them.