i'm not sure the simulacrum model is quite necessary to understand people's responses to information. particularly in the first 3, i think the responses can be explained by cognitive dissonance. in 1 & 3, the hearer holds the belief "i offer a good product" and is confronted with the information "someone is not satisfied with my product." in the gym example, the alternatives (skipping entirely, 10-minute self-warmup) are easily explained by "this person is busy." in 2, you perhaps hold the belief "i am a ...
Perhaps it is possible in practice/process to disentangle value alignment issues from factual disagreements. Double-crux seems optimal at reaching consensus on factual truths (e.g., which widget will have a lower error rate?) and would at least *uncover* Carl's crux, if everybody participates in good faith, and therefore make it possible to nonetheless discover the factual truth. Then maybe punt the non-objective argument to a different process like incentive alignment as you discuss.
I absolutely love this, and it leaves me wondering about the role of social in the sabbath. This post mentions early, "Most want more social events, but coordination is hard and events are work. Now there’s always Friday night," but the subject does not come up again. And yet with regard to the historical referent, sociality is baked deeply into the sabbath. For the orthodox version, the minyan rule (plus the no driving rule) requires that people live close together and that they see each other once a week.
On the one hand, community h...
reading all this has led me to think a lot about using MMOs as a testing ground for sociology
i think you are on the right track---a google scholar search reveals an enormous amount of social science conducted on virtual worlds including topics like teamwork, economics, and religion. don't know about governance systems though.
I find myself wondering about disagreements (or subcomponents of disagreements) where appealing to objective reality may not be possible.
It seems like this is a special case of a broader type of process, fitting into the more general category of collaborative decision-making. (Here I'm thinking of the 5 approaches to conflict: compete, collaborate, avoid, accommodate, and compromise).
In the explicit product-as-widget case, there may always be an appeal to some objectively frameable question: what will make us more money? But even this can ignit...
I read "At Home In The Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self Organization and Complexity" which is a very accessible and fun read---I am not a physicist/mathematician/biologist, etc, and it all made sense to me. The book talks about evolution, both biological and technological.
And the model described in that book has been quite commonly adapted by social scientists to study problem solving, so it's been socially validated as a good framework for thinking about scientific research.
Sure, though the question of "why is science slowing down" and "what should we do now" are two different questions. If the answer of "why is science slowing down" is simply because---it's getting harder.... then there may be absolutely nothing wrong with our coordination, and no action is required.
I'm not saying we can't do even better, but crisis-response is distinct from self-improvement.
It's worth considering the effects of the "exploration/exploitation" tradeoff: decreasing coordination/efficiency can increase the efficacy of search in problem space over the long run, precisely because efforts are duplicated. When efforts are duplicated, you increase the probability that someone will find the optimal solution. When everyone is highly coordinated, people all look in the same place and you can end up getting stuck in a "local optimum"---a place that's pretty good, but can't be easily improved without s...
Regarding the apparent non-scaling benefits of history: what you call the "most charitable" explanation seems to me the most likely. Thousands of people work at places like CERN and spend 20 years contributing to a single paper, doing things that simply could not be done by a small team. Models of problem-solving on "NK Space" type fitness landscapes also support this interpretation: fitness improvements become increasingly hard to find over time. As you've noted elsewhere, it's easier to pluck low-hanging fruit.
I assume by 'linear' you mean directly proportional to population size.
The diminishing marginal returns of some tasks, like the "wisdom of crowds" (concerned with forming accurate estimates) are well established, and taper off quickly regardless of the difficulty of the task---it's basically follows the law of large numbers and sample error (see "A Note on Aggregating Opinions", Hogarth, 1978). This glosses over some potential complexity but you're probably unlikely to do ever get much benefit from more than a few ...
Are you still in Chicago? There was recently a gathering at the Art Museum garden with ~30 people in attendance, and a few people were discussing trying to keep the momentum, myself included. If you are around, I would like to invite you to give it another go. Regardless of your current location, I'd be curious to hear more details about your particular experience in this locale.
E[x]=0.5
even for the frequentist, and that's what we make decisions with, so focusing on p(x) is a bit of misdirection. The whole frequentist-vs-bayesian culture war is fake. They're both perfectly consistent with well defined questions. (They have to be, because math works.)
And yes to everything else, except...
As to whether god plays dice with the universe... that is not in the scope of probability theory. It's math. Your Bayesian is really a pragmatist, and your frequentist is a straw person.
Great post!
sounds awesome!!