I was intending to warn about the possibility of future perception of corruption, e.g. after a non-existential AI catastrophe. I do not think anyone currently working at safety teams is percieved as that "corrupted", although I do think there is mild negative sentiment among some online communities (some parts of twitter, reddit, etc.).

Basically (2), very small amounts of (1) (perhaps qualitatively similar to the amount of (1) you would apply to e.g. people joining US AISI or UK AISI)

AI safety researchers might be allocated too heavily to Anthropic compared to Google Deepmind

Some considerations:

• Safety researchers should want Google Deepmind (GDM) to have a robust and flourishing safety department. It seems plausible that GDM will be able to create "the smartest" models: they have lots of talent, and own lots of computers. (see e.g. https://epochai.org/data/notable-ai-models#computing-capacity)
• Anthropic (ANT) might run into trouble in the future due to not owning their own computers, e.g. if Amazon (or where ever they're renting their computers from) starts their own internal scaling competitor, and decides to stop renting out most of their compute.
• ANT has a stronger safety culture, and so it is a more pleasant experience to work at ANT for the average safety researcher. This suggests that there might be a systematic bias towards ANT that pulls away from the "optimal allocation".
• GDM only recently started a bay area based safety research team/lab (with members like Alex Turner). So if people had previously decided to work for ANT based on location, they now have the opportunity to work for GDM without relocating.
• I've heard that many safety researchers join ANT without considering working for GDM, which seems like an error, although I don't have 1st hand evidence for this being true.
• ANT vs GDM is probably a less important consideration than “scaling lab” (ANT, OAI, GMD, XAI, etc.) vs “non scaling lab” (USAISI, UKAISI, Redwood, ARC, Palisade, METR, MATS, etc. (so many...)). I would advise people to think hard about how joining a scaling lab might inhibit their future careers by e.g. creating a perception they are “corrupted” [edit: I mean viewed as corrupted  by the broader world in situations where e.g. there is a non-existential AI disaster or there is rising dislike of the way AI is being handled by coorperations more broadly, e.g. similar to how working for an oil company might result in various climate people thinking you're corrupted, even if you were trying to get the oil company to reduce emissions, etc. I personally do not think GDM or ANT safety people are "corrupted"] (in addition to strengthening them, which I expect people to spend more time thinking about by default).
• Because ANT has a stronger safety culture, doing safety at GDM involve more politics and navigating around buerearcracy, and thus might be less productive. This consideration applies most if you think the impact of your work is mostly through the object level research you do, which I think is possible but not that plausible. 

(Thanks to Neel Nanda for inspiring this post, and Ryan Greenblatt for comments.)

Hiliariously, it seems likely that our disagreement is even more meta, on the question of "how do you know when you have enough information to know", or potentially even higher, e.g. "how much uncertainty should one have given that they think they know" etc.

see my longer comment https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/A79wykDjr4pcYy9K7/mark-xu-s-shortform#8qjN3Mb8xmJxx59ZG

I think I disagree with your model of importance. If your goal is the make a sum of numbers small, then you want to focus your efforts where the derivative is lowest (highest? signs are hard), not where the absolute magnitude is highest.

The "epsilon fallacy" can be committed in both directions: both in that any negative dervative is worth working on, and that any extremely large number is worth taking a chance to try to improve.

I also seperately think that "bottleneck" is not generally a good term to apply to a complex project with high amounts of technical and philosophical uncertainty. The ability to see a "bottleneck" is very valuable should one exist, but I am skeptical of the ability to strongly predict where such bottlnecks will be in advance, and do not think the historical record really supports the ability to find such bottlenecks reliably by "thinking", as opposed to doing a lot of stuff, including trying things and seeing what works. If you have a broad distribution over where a bottleneck might be, then all activities lend value by "derisking" locations for particular bottlenecks if they succeed, and providing more evidence that a bottleneck is in a particular location if it fails. (kinda like: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model) For instance, I think of "deceptive alignment" as a possible way to get pessimal generalization, and thus a proabalistic "bottleneck" to various alignment approaches. But there are other ways things can fail, and so one can still lend value by solving non-deceptive-alignment related problems (although my day job consists of trying to get "benign generalization" our of ML, and thus does infact address that particular bottleneck imo).

I also seperately think that if someone thinks they have identified a bottleneck, they should try to go resolve it as best they can. I think of that as what you (John) is doing, and fully support such activities, although think I am unlikely to join your particular project. I think the questions you are trying to answer are very interesting ones, and the "natural latents" approach seems likely to shed at some light on whats going on with e.g. the ability of agents to communicate at all.

My vague plan along these lines is to attempt as hard as possible to defer all philosophically confusing questions to the "long reflection", and to use AI control as a tool to help produce AIs that can help preserve long term option value (including philosophical option value) as best as possible.

I seperately have hope we can solve "the entire problem" at some point, e.g. through ARC's agenda (which I spend most of my time trying to derisk and advance).