Thank your for the astute response.
1.You say that the points are brutely distinguishable and later you say that they are indistinguishable, which nevertheless you hold to be different properties.
The points are brutely distinguishable, but the sets aren't.
...2.Why are the sets indistinguishable? Although I don't particularly understand what predicates you allow for brutely distinguishable entities, it seems possible to have X = set of all brutely distinguishable points (from some class) and Y = set of all brutely distinguishable points except one. It i
What makes you think there's some equivocation in my usage of "exists"? (Which is where taboo is useful.) If I were pushing the boundaries of the concept, that would be one thing. I'm not taking any position on whether abstract entities exist; what I mean by exist is straightforward. If the universe has existed for an infinite amount of time, the infinity is "actually realized," that is, infinite duration is more than an abstract entity or an idealization. If I say, the universe is terribly old, so old we can approximate it by regarding it as infinitely old, then I am not making a claim about the actual realization of infinity.
some quite smart people disagree on the meaning of this term
We have an apparently very deep philosophical difference here. Some "quite smart people" have offered different accounts of existence: Quine's, that we are committed to the existence of those variables we quantify over in our best theory, comes to mind. My use of "exists" is ordinary enough that most any reasonable account will serve. I think the intuition of "existence" is really extremely clear, and we argue about accounts, not concepts. Existence is very simple
M...
This is the worst answer possible, given that some quite smart people disagree on the meaning of this term, and it renders your post meaningless. Consider rereading Skill: The Map is Not the Territory for one possible answer.
If you're not sure of the "brute distinguishability" concept, I've conveyed something, because it is the main novelty in my argument.
Where can i find out what "near-type" means here?
It refers to "near-mode," which is jargon in construal-level theory for "construed concretely." So in context, it means direct and involving personal experience, as opposed to reading or discussing abstractly.
Robin Hanson applies construal-level theory speculatively in numerous posts at Overcoming Bias. A concise summary of construal-level theory can be found in my posting "Construal-level theory: Matching linguistic register to the case's granularity.".
What state of affairs is "correspondence theory is true" congruent with?
The concept of scientific truth--the concept used by scientists--is the state of affairs some correspondence theories purport to be congruent with.
That's an excellent argument if it's the case that correspondence theory is not the sort of thing allowed to have truth values under correspondence theory. Why do you say it's not?
Theories using Piercian concepts are today usually termed antirealist or instrumentalist.
Tabooing "truth", one can see that the theories really speak about (slightly) different concepts.
Then, you would merely choose which of the concepts is the one needed for a particular theoretical purpose. Right?
Wrong! The arguments go to the concepts' coherence. This is why it's philosophy, not lexicography.
For example, a correspondence theorist generally argues that the notion of an epistemological limit to which scientific findings converge need not exist and can never be established empirically. If correspondence theory is true, you aren't...
me: A "p-zombie" "behaves" the same way we do, but does a p-zombie believe it has qualitative awareness?
To be precise about the value of the belief/intuition concept in accounting for the illusion that qualia exist—one defect in the zombie thought experiment is that it prompts the attitude: maybe I can't prove that you're not a zombie, but I sure as hell know I'm not one!
The zombie experiment imposes a consistent outside view; it seems to deny the evidence of "personal experience" by fiat—because it simply doesn't address w...
Sophistry. It's madness to say that the blue isn't actually there. But this is tempting for people who like the science we have, because the blue isn't there in that model of reality.
If by blue you mean--as you do--the purely subjective aspect of perceiving the color blue (call that "blue"), then it's only madness to deny it exists if you insist on confusing blue with "blue." No one but a madman would say blue doesn't exist; no philosopher should be caught saying "blue" exists.
If you can show a causal role for pure experien...
You may be omitting or misunderstanding the role of the concept of belief in my account. The role of that concept is original in this account (and novel, to the best of my less-than-comprehensive knowledge).
A "p-zombie" "behaves" the same way we do, but does a p-zombie believe it has qualitative awareness? If it does, then there's no distinction between humans and p-zombies, but the antimaterialists who came up with the p-zombie thought experiment were of the persuasion that belief is as meaningless a concept for materialists as is qual...
Is your position the same as Dennett's position (summarized in the second paragraph of synopsis here)?
Let me try to answer more succinctly. Dennett and I are concerned with different problems; Dennett's is a problem within science proper, while mine is traditionally philosophical. Dennett's conclusion is that "qualia" don't provide introspective access to the functioning of the brain; my conclusion is that our common intuition concerning the existence of qualia is incoherent.
Is your position the same as Dennett's position (summarized in the second paragraph of synopsis here) ?
I agree with Dennett that qualia don't exist. I disagree that the concept of qualia is basically a remnant of an outmoded psychological doctrine; I think it's an innate idea.
Dennett can be criticized for ignoring the subjective nature of qualia. He shows, for example, that reported phenomenal awareness is empirically bogus in that it doesn't correspond to the contents of working memory. I'm concerned with accounting for the subjective nature of the qualia concept.
Dennett basically thinks qualia are empirically falsifiable; I think the concept is incoherent.
"If nothing exists, I want to know how the nothing works and why it seems to be so highly ordered."
If qualia are explained by our innate intuitions (or beliefs)—propositional attitudes—then two questions follow about "how it works":
What is the propositional content of the beliefs?
What evolutionary pressures caused their development?
I make some conjectures in another essay.
If one accepts the principle of identity of indistinguishable, then it follows that quarks or points must be distinguishable (since they can be non-identical)
I accept the principle, but I think it isn't relevant to this part of the problem. I can best elaborate by first dealing with another point.
There is no separate criterion for the identity of sets which leads to the conclusion that Q is identical to Q\Bob, so we do not have a contradiction
True, but my claim is that there is a separate criterion for identity for actually realized sets. It arises ...
Here's my interpretation of what you're saying: Let the set of all quarks be Q, and assume Q has infinite elements. Now pick a particular quark, let's call it Bob, and remove it from the set Q. Call the new set thus formed Q\Bob. Now, it's true that Q\Bob has the same number of elements as Q. But your claim seems to be stronger, that Q\Bob is in fact the same set as Q. If that is the case, then Q\Bob both is and isn't the set of all quarks and we have a contradiction. But why should I believe Q\Bob is identical to Q?
Because there is no difference betwee...
Only if your conscience exacts no penalties for lying.
I take issue with your translation at only a single point:
Having made this solemn vow, I now ask you to bring me an infinite set of quarks (note that I do not specify which quarks, for that would violate my vow!). You oblige, and provide me with a set called S.
My version contains a further constraint: When you ask me to bring you an infinite set of quarks, you instruct me to be as blind as you to the features that distinguish between quarks.
...The response to this argument is that because I've blinded myself to the differences between quarks, I've lost
Suppose I restate your argument for integers instead of quarks...
We don't need to assume there are infinitely many integers, only that integers are unlimited. Some Platonists may think that an infinite set of integers is realized, and I think the arguments does pertain to that claim.
...As I mentioned above, we can form infinite sets of integers that do not include all integers, for example the set of even numbers, so the argument cannot be valid when it's made about integers. What about the argument makes it valid for quarks but not for integers? I imagi
By default, sets are different. You can't argue "two sets are the same because they have the same cardinality and we don't know anything else about them"
Sets with different elements are different. But, unfortunately for actually realized infinities, you can argue that two sets with different elements are the same when those infinite sets are actually realized--but only because actually realized infinities are incoherent. That you can argue both sides, contradicted only by the other side, is what makes actual infinity incoherent.
You can't defea...
The key is the qualification "from the bare description, 'quarks.'"
To elaborate--JoshuaZ's comment brought this home--you can distinguish infinite sets by their cardinality or by their subset/superset relationship, and these are independent. The reasoning about quarks brackets all knowledge about the distinctions between quarks that could be used to establish a set/superset relationship.
Could you clarify this inference, please? How does the second sentence follow from the first?
Let me restate it, as my language contained miscues, such as "adding" elements to the set. Restated:
If there are infinitely many quarks in the universe, then I can form an infinite set of quarks. That set includes all the quarks in the universe, since there can be no set of the same cardinality that's greater and because, from the bare description, "quarks," I have no basis for establishing a subset/superset relationship (HT JoshuaZ) within ...
I think you responded before my correction, where I came to the same conclusion that my use of "more" was imprecise.
Added
I remember reading an essay maybe five years ago by Eliezer Yudkowsky where he maintained that the early Greek thinkers had been right to reject actual infinities for logical reasons. I can't find the essay. Has it been recanted? Is it a mere figment of my imagination? Does anyone recall this essay?
No, then there are the same number of quarks in both cases in the sense of cardinality.
Yes, I understand that; in fact, it was my express premise: "You can always add a finite number to an infinite set and not change the number of elements." That is, not change the number of quarks from one case to another.
Please read it again more carefully. My argument may be wrong, but it's really not that naive.
Added.
I see what you might be responding to: "So, there are more quarks than are contained in the set of all quarks." The second sentenc...
No, it's not. Maybe it blows your mind to imagine space stretching away without limit, but if space is there independent of you, and if it has no edge, and if it doesn't close back on itself, then it's an actually realized infinity.
The second independent clause is true, but if (as I contend) actually realized infinities are incoherent, the proper conclusion is that the three assumptions cannot all hold.
Of course, having one's mind blown doesn't prove the concept entertained in incoherent; I must demonstrate that the concept really contains a logical co...
moderators could be given the power
By whom?
I don't know why you retracted this. . .
I retracted it because when I wrote it I hadn't known Tegmarkism was part of Yudkowskian eclecticism. In that light, it deserves a less flippant response. While it strikes me as being as absurd as the ontological argument, for some of the same reasons, I can dispositively refute the ontological argument; so if they're really the same, I ought to be able to offer a simple, dispositive refutation of Tegmark. I think that's possible to, but it's instructive that the refutation isn't one that applies to the ontologica...
That the human "program" contains a coherent utility function seems to be an unargued assumption. Of course, if it doesn't contain one, the potential adequacy of a simple artificial implementation is probably even more doubtful.
Leaving aside the differences in moral justification, virtue ethics differs from rule utilitarianism in the practical sense that virtues tend to be more abstract than rules. For example, rather than avoiding unnecessary killing, becoming a kind person.
The association fallacy is indeed what Yvain invokes: "An association fallacy is an inductive informal fallacy of the type hasty generalization or red herring which asserts that qualities of one thing are inherently qualities of another, merely by an irrelevant association."
Key to demonstrating the association fallacy is identifying the intended association because only then can you go on to argue that it's irrelevant. Ignore this step and you are likely to fall into another fallacy: the straw-man argument.
The issue is tossing out the step where the reasons the archetypal example gives the category a negative connotation are checked against the example under consideration.
And my claim is that, in typical uses of the example arguments, the reasons that make the category negative—for the arguer—are precisely the reasons the arguer intends to advance. So, Yvain hasn't made a case that submergence in a verbal archetype is an important fallacy. And thinking that it is the key fallacy involved in these arguments promotes superficiality when considering arguments like the exemplars.
Almost 400 comments but not a word of discussion of the parsing Yvain provides for his seven examples! But if Yvain's parsing is wrong—as I think it is—then his analysis will serve to further bias our understanding of positions we disagree with and to forsake any charity in understanding these positions.
The question that is fairly asked of Yvain is what distinguishes his "worst argument" ("X is in a category whose archetypal member has certain features. Therefore, we should judge X as if it also had those features, even though it doesn't.&qu...
I do hope you cited the aphorism rather than taking credit for it as original. But seeing it repeated once again forced me for once to pay attention to its meaning: to find it vacuous. The point should be stated Don't confuse functional and mechanistic explanations. Organisms don't "execute" their adaptations, this being just another confusion of kinds of explanation, at least if taken literally. And organisms can be said to be fitness maximizers, once it is realized that functional generalizations are always riddled with exceptions.
You seem to be conflating the original schizophrenic state with the residual after the patients get antipsychotic medication: the latter may be readily amenable to reason; the former, the therapist would breach rapport with the patient, by challenging full delusions.
Medication is part of the standard treatment for schizophrenia--usually, the major part. Drawing conclusions about delusions from the residuals following treatment seems to shield you from what would be obvious had you observed unmedicated patients. Delusions aren't failures of Bayesian rationality: they involve, typically, accepting a few self-evident priors, and these are driven by intense affect.
then why read Hanson also? if they are colleagues and co-bloggers there must be something about EY that Robin thinks is first rate, no?
Not necessarily. Hanson might be a good thinker who is also a personal opportunist who'll do anything to enhance his status, where co-publishing with Yudkowsky helped put Hanson's blog on the map. Hanson could have "admired" Yudkowsky for his fan-club building capacities rather than for the high quality of his thinking.
LW is called a "community blog," but there's no information on how the "community" acts. Who adopts the new page? Is the vote binding? If so, on whom? Who pays for the fancy Reddit machinery on this blog? (Who refuses to pay for better machinery?)
Most people only invest themselves in conceiving changes in practices when they have some actual power to bring those changes to fruition. If the mere existence of a British monarch dampens popular enthusiasm for government, what's the effect of having an essentially autocratic "owner"...
It is possible, I suppose, that the thing that makes us conscious is different from the thing that makes us talk about consciousness -- but there's certainly no evidence for it, and it's a damned silly idea in any case.
True, but it seems to me almost trivially true that explaining why we talk about consciousness makes a theory positing that we "are conscious" otiose. What other evidence is there? What other evidence could there be? The profession of belief in mysterious "raw experience" merely expresses a cognitive bias, the acceptan...
You're reffering to the experiment itself; they're talking about the experiment within the experiment.
I was compelled to post that clarification after being primed for "helping behavior."
Conceiving of laws as rules activates all sorts of unconscious inferences stemming from the part of our brain that processes social rules, such as the intuitions that motivate nomic fundamentalism. So whether or not there is a genuine distinction between determination and description, there is certainly a cognitive difference in how we respond to those concepts.
That's question begging, in that the question is just what are those differences when applied to physics rather than sociology. The connotation of 'rule' that survives transfer to physics might b...
What do you think of Max Tegmark's answer, that it's because universes with every possible (i.e., non-contradictory) set of laws of physics exist
If I can be frank, this is insane. This is the ontological argument for god revisited. Possibility does not imply necessity, and to think it does means you can rationally posit entities by defining them: defining them into existence.
That doesn't commit us to infinities, just to a non-vicious circularity, of the Neurath's Boat variety.
Not my point. I'm saying whether actual infinities exist physically does not appear to be empirical (or else is resolved by empirical evidence we already have), and there are good rational grounds--endorsed by Yudkowsky, if I'm not mistaken--for rejecting actual infinities, grounds that already existed for the classical Greeks, who rejected the concept . The comparison was between the contention that qualia don't exist and the contention that absolute...
If I were an economist, I wouldn't be interested (at least not qua economist) in deductive systems that talked about quarks and leptons. I would be interested in deductive systems that talked about prices and demand. The best system for this coarser-grained vocabulary will give us the laws of economics, distinct from the laws of physics.
There's this difference between economics and physics. The axioms of economics don't come close to completely explaining prices and demand, and we don't expect them to, even in principle. It would be a miracle if they di...
What function describes your threshold as the negative values go below -1?
I think it's a cool font!
you can then think about exactly how your brain turns a sentence about consciousness into meaning and it will exactly mirror the actual process your brain used to turn the sentence into the meaning you experience.
We don't experience meanings. An organism without qualia could--without contradiction--grasp the meaning of a sentence.
Not at all the same. Yudkowsky points out that science can explain events and things in ways that a layman may not even conceive. Here, the question is whether it even makes sense to call qualia an event.
I just found it curious: I've addressed typography issues in a blog posting, "Emphasis by Typography."
I have to say I'm surprised by your tone; like you're accusing me of some form of immorality for not being attentive to readers. This all strikes me as very curious. I read Hanson's blog and so have gotten attuned to status issues. I'm not plotting a revolution ove... (read more)