All of Mo Putera's Comments + Replies

Venkatesh Rao surprised me in What makes a good teacher? by saying the opposite of what I expected him to say re: his educational experience, given who he is:

While my current studies have no live teachers in the loop, each time I sit down to study something seriously, I’m reminded of how much I’m practicing behaviors first learned under the watchful eye of good teachers. We tend to remember the exceptionally charismatic (which is not the same thing as good), and exceptionally terrible teachers, but much of what we know about how to learn, how to study, com

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Probably worth noting that there's lots of frames to pick from, of which you've discussed two: question, ideology, project, obligation, passion, central purpose, etc. 

1Alice Blair
I think that these are all pretty relevant ways to think about being an EA, but are mostly of a different fundamental type than the thing I'm pointing at. Let me get a bit more into the aforementioned math to show why this is approximately a binary categorization along the axis I was pointing at in this post. Say that there are three possible world states: * I live a normal life and sit on the couch a lot. I take care of my plants. * I'm a highly engaged EA for many years and do a lot of verifiably altruistic things. * I'm a serial killer. As a culture, on average, our values look something like: EA > gardener > murderer This is very reasonable and I don't think we can or should change this, as a community. I have some mental approximation of a utility function. One of the main differences between my internal representation and an actual utility function is that the point I choose as "zero utility" doesn't matter in the formalism, but very much matters to my emotions. If we set EA=0 utility, then the myopic point-maximizing part of my brain feels okay if I do EA things, but awful if I'm getting negative points by being either of the other options. This is the moral obligation frame, where things are only barely emotionally okay if you push as far up the preference ordering as possible. If we set gardener=0, then things feel emotionally okay if I just take the normal path. I'm not gaining or losing points. It's then positively great if I do EA things and still positively bad if I kill people. This is the moral opportunity frame, and I find it emotionally much better for me. I predict that this frame is better for community health as well, although I have only vibes and anecdata to back me up on this claim. There are several other points I have left unnamed: * murderer = 0: I really really don't want to be this culture for reasons that are hopefully obvious. * gardener<0<EA: this is just a less extreme moral obligation framework, where you don't need to

Scott is often considered a digressive or even “astoundingly verbose” writer.

This made me realise that as a reader I care about, not so much "information & ideas per word" (roughly speaking), but "per unit of effort reading". I'm reminded of Jason Crawford on why he finds Scott's writing good:

Most writing on topics as abstract and technical as his struggles just not to be dry; it takes effort to focus, and I need energy to read them. Scott’s writing flows so well that it somehow generates its own energy, like some sort of perpetual motion machine.

My fa... (read more)

Chinchilla scaling finally seems to be slowing

Interesting, any pointers to further reading?

The idea that Chinchilla scaling might be slowing comes from the fact that we've seen a bunch of delays and disappointments in the next generation of frontier models.

GPT 4.5 was expensive and it got yanked. We're not hearing rumors about how amazing GPT 5 is. Grok 3 scaled up and saw some improvement, but nothing that gave it an overwhelming advantage. Gemini 2.5 is solid but not transformative.

Nearly all the gains we've seen recently come from reasoning, which is comparatively easy to train into models. For example, DeepScaleR is a 1.8B parameter local mo... (read more)

Balioc's A taxonomy of bullshit jobs has a category called Worthy Work Made Bullshit which resonated with me most of all:

Worthy Work Made Bullshit is perhaps the trickiest and most controversial category, but as far as I’m concerned it’s one of the most important.  This is meant to cover jobs where you’re doing something that is obviously and directly worthwhile…at least in theory…but the structure of the job, and the institutional demands that are imposed on you, turn your work into bullshit.   

The conceptual archetype here is the Soviet ti

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4Thane Ruthenis
Potentially relevant: this thread about a massive software service that did useful work, but ultimately could've been outperformed (at 100x) by a small, easy-to-implement adjustment to the overarching system.
1Yates
First of all, thanks for the recommend reads, Mo.   The concept of cognitive decoupling is new to me, but after digesting it and the relevant materials, I actually found this concept resonate with me really well. But I am not sure if I want to call myself "elite" as in my opinion I just have a weirder way of looking at the world that most people I know. I problably do process information at a higher resolution and bandwidth as well but that had actually caused me significant pain throughout my life. Sometimes I would want all the noises to clear up and just relax and not constanly thinking like a crazy inference machine about all the relevant topics / critics when I am just watching a movie or TV show.  The most interesting thing I found is that even though heavy alcohol intoxication level do slow things down a bit but for some reason my damn head are always in alert mode even when my body was not coordinating anymore.    Anyways, sorry about the venting, really appreciate your share.   Sincerely, Yates.

It's the exponential map that's more fundamental than either e or 1/e. Alon Amit's essay is a nice pedagogical piece on this.

Thank you, sounds somewhat plausible to me too. For others' benefit, here's the chart from davidad's linked tweet:

Image
1Weaverzhu
I've found the original paper of this chart https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.11926v1 > We use prompted GPT-4o models to monitor a frontier reasoning agent, an agent in the same family as OpenAI o1 and o3-mini. During training, the agent discovered two hacks affecting nearly all training environments: The model is in the same family as o1 and o3-mini. Maybe o3 but not comfirmed.

What is the current best understanding of why o3 and o4-mini hallucinate more than o1? I just got round to checking out the OpenAI o3 and o4-mini System Card and in section 3.3 (on hallucinations) OA noted that 

o3 tends to make more claims overall, leading to more accurate claims as well as more inaccurate/hallucinated claims. While this effect appears minor in the SimpleQA results (0.51 for o3 vs 0.44 for o1), it is more pronounced in the PersonQA evaluation (0.33 vs 0.16). More research is needed to understand the cause of these results. 

as of ... (read more)

This is one potential explanation:

  • o3 has some sort of internal feature like "Goodhart to the objective"/"play in easy mode".
  • o3's RL post-training environments have opportunities for reward hacks.
  • o3 discovers and exploits those opportunities.
  • RL rewards it for that, reinforcing the "Goodharting" feature.
  • This leads to specification-hack-y behavior generalizing out of distribution, to e. g. freeform conversations. It ends up e. g. really wanting to sell its interlocutor on what it's peddling, so it deliberately[1] confabulates plausible authoritative-soun
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Importantly, I value every intermediate organism in this chain

An interesting and personally relevant variant of this is if the approval only goes one direction in time. This happened to me: 2025!Mo is vastly different from 2010!Mo in large part due to step-changes in my "coming of age" story that would've left 2010!Mo horrified (indeed he tried to fight the step-changes for months) but that 2025!Mo retrospectively fully endorses post-reflective equilibrium. 

So when I read something like Anders Sandberg's description here

There is a kind of standard arg

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Predictive coding research shows our brains use both bottom-up signals (intuition) and top-down predictions (systematization) in a dynamic interplay . These are integrated parts of how our brains process information. One person can excel at both.

Link is broken, can you reshare?

3Jonas Hallgren
Fixed the comment, thanks! (Here it is otherwise:) https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5390700/

I liked Gwern's remarks at the end of your link:

Successful applications to pixel art tend to inject real-world knowledge, such as through models pretrained on FFHQ, or focus on tasks involving ‘throwing away’ information rather than generating it, such as style transfer of pixel art styles.

Thus, if I wanted to make a Pokemon GAN, I would not attempt to train on solely pixel art scraped from a few games. I would instead start with a large dataset of animals, perhaps from ImageNet or iNaturalist or Wikipedia, real or fictional, and grab all Pokemon art of an

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Thomas Kwa's Effectiveness is a Conjunction of Multipliers seems relevant. He factors multipliers into judgment (sort of maps to your 'direction', or research taste I guess), ambition (which counts hard work as a driver), and risk appetite. Some domains seem to reward hard work superlinearly, probably worth looking out for those. You shouldn't skip leg day because you'd miss out on multipliers (that phrase came from SBF of all people). Also finding multipliers is hard and information-gathering is particularly valuable when it helps you find a multiplier an... (read more)

Mo Putera100

Saving mathematician Robert Ghrist's tweet here for my own future reference re: AI x math: 

workflow of the past 24 hours...
* start a convo w/GPT-o3 about math research idea [X]
* it gives 7 good potential ideas; pick one & ask to develop
* feed -o3 output to gemini-2.5-pro; it finds errors & writes feedback
* paste feedback into -o3 and say asses & respond
* paste response into gemini; it finds more problems
* iterate until convergence
* feed the consensus idea w/detailed report to grok-3
* grok finds gaping error, fixes by taking things in diffe

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Mo Putera530

These quotes from When ChatGPT Broke an Entire Field: An Oral History stood out to me:

On November 30, 2022, OpenAI launched its experimental chatbot. ChatGPT hit the NLP community like an asteroid.

IZ BELTAGY (lead research scientist, Allen Institute for AI; chief scientist and co-founder, SpiffyAI): In a day, a lot of the problems that a large percentage of researchers were working on — they just disappeared. ...

R. THOMAS MCCOY: It’s reasonably common for a specific research project to get scooped or be eliminated by someone else’s similar thing.

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2cubefox
I think the most interesting part of the Quanta piece is the discussion of the octopus paper, which states that pure language models can't actually understand text (as they only learn from form/syntax), and the bitter disputes that followed in the NLP community. From the abstract: Emily M. Bender, the first author, was also first author of the subsequent "stochastic parrot" paper: On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 🦜[1] (As a side note, Yudkowsky's broadly verificationist theory of content seems to agree with her distinction: if "understanding" of a statement is knowing what experience would confirm it, or what experience it would predict, then understanding cannot come from syntactic form alone. The association of words and sensory data would be necessary. Did Yudkowsky ever comment on the apparent incompatibility between evident LLM understanding and his anticipated experience theory?) Of course I assume that now it can hardly be denied that LLMs really do somehow understand text, even if they are merely trained on form. So the octopus paper argument must be wrong somewhere. Though at least in the Quanta piece, Bender doesn't acknowledge any update of that sort. In fact, in the last quote she says: ---------------------------------------- 1. First paper I have seen that uses an emoji in its title. ↩︎

Wow. I knew academics were behind / out of the loop / etc. but this surprised me. I imagine these researchers had at least heard about GPT2 and GPT3 and the scaling laws papers; I wonder what they thought of them at the time. I wonder what they think now about what they thought at the time.

I see, I stand corrected then.

Not really. Robert Anton Wilson's description is more on-point:

Let me differentiate between scientific method and the neurology of the individual scientist. Scientific method has always depended on feedback [or flip-flopping as the Tsarists call it]; I therefore consider it the highest form of group intelligence thus far evolved on this backward planet. The individual scientist seems a different animal entirely. The ones I've met seem as passionate, and hence as egotistic and prejudiced, as painters, ballerinas or even, God save the mark, novelists. My hop

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1lesswronguser123
I think you missed the point, a hope for something can be more or less bayes optimal, the fact that you're able to isolate a hypothesis in the total space of hypothesis after much prior evidence and research is itself a strong evidence to consider it seriously. Like yes the scientist feels that way, but that doesn't change the fact that science progresses, and scientists regularly hit the mark, in updating their beliefs. 

These quoted passages made me curious what cooperation-focused folks like David Manheim and Ivan Vendrov and others think of this essay (I'm not plugged into the "cooperation scene" at all so I'm probably missing out on most thinkers / commenters):

We proceed from the core assumption that stable human coexistence (a precondition for flourishing), particularly in diverse societies, is made possible not by achieving rational convergence on values, but by relying on practical social technologies – like conventions, norms, and institutions – to manage

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Mo Putera104

I was initially excited by the raw intelligence of o3, but after using it for mini-literature reviews of quantitative info (which I do a fair bit of for work) I was repeatedly boggled by how often it would just hallucinate numbers like "14% market penetration", followed immediately by linked citations to papers/reports etc which did not in fact contain "14%" or whatever; in fact this happened for the first 3 sources I spot-checked for a single response, after which I deemed it pointless to continue. I thought RAG was supposed to make this a solved problem? None of the previous SOTA models I tried out had this issue. 

Thought it would be useful to pull out your plot and surrounding text, which seemed cruxy:

At first glance, the job of a scientist might seem like it leans very heavily on abstract reasoning... In such a world, AIs would greatly accelerate R&D before AIs are broadly deployed across the economy to take over more common jobs, such as retail workers, real estate agents, or IT professionals. In short, AIs would “first automate science, then automate everything else.”

But this picture is likely wrong. In reality, most R&D jobs require much more than abstr

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Mo Putera265

I think this essay is going to be one I frequently recommend to others over the coming years, thanks for writing it.

But in the end, deep in the heart of any bureaucracy, the process is about responsibility and the ways to avoid it. It's not an efficiency measure, it’s an accountability management technique.

This vaguely reminded me of what Ivan Vendrov wrote in Metrics, Cowardice, and Mistrust. Ivan began by noting that "companies optimizing for simple engagement metrics aren’t even being economically rational... so why don't they?" It's not because "these ... (read more)

7TristanTrim
I like the phrase "Trust Network" which I've been hearing here and there. TRUST NO ONE seems like a reasonable approximation of a trust network before you actually start modelling a trust network. I think it's important to think of trust not as a boolean value, not "who can I trust" or "what can I trust" but "how much can I trust this" and in particular, trust is defined for object-action pairs. I trust myself to drive places since I've learned how and done so many times before, but I don't trust myself to pilot an airplane. Further, when I get on an airplane, I don't personally know the pilot, yet I trust them to do something I wouldn't trust myself to do. How is this possible? I think there is a system of incentives and a certain amount of lore which informs me that the pilot is trustworthy. This system which I trust to ensure the trustworthiness of the pilot is a trust network. When something in the system goes wrong, maybe blame can be traced to people, maybe just to systems, but in each case, something in the system has gone wrong, it has trusted someone or some process that was not ideally reliable. That accountability is important for improving the system. Not because someone must be punished, but because, if the system is to perform better in the future, some part of it must change. I agree with the main article that accountability sinks protect individuals from punishment for their failures are often very good. In a sense, this is what insurance is, which is a good enough idea that it is legally enforced for dangerous activities like driving. I think accountability sinks in this case paradoxically make people less averse to making decisions. If the process has identified this person as someone to trust with some class of decision, then that person is empowered to make those decisions. If there is a problem because of it, it is the fault of the system for having identified them improperly. I wonder if anyone is modelling trust networks like this. It seem
3Martin Sustrik
That's a nice shortcut to explain the distinction between "a process imposed upon yourself" vs. "a process handed to you from above".

This, in the end, was what motivated me to reintroduce "Critique Claude"/"Guide Gemini"/"Oversight o3".[3] That is, a secondary model call that occurs on context summary whose job it is to provide hints if the model seems stuck, and which is given a system prompt specifically for this purpose. It can be told to look for telltale signs of common fail-states and attempt to address then, and can even be given "meta" prompting about how to direct the other model.

Funnily enough this reminded me of pair programming.

I do think it'd be useful for the rest of us if you put them in a comment. :) 

(FWIW I resonated with your motivation, but also think your suggestions fail on the practical grounds jenn mentioned, and would hence on net harm the people you intend to help.)

Terry Tao recently wrote a nice series of toots on Mathstodon that reminded me of what Bill Thurston said:

1. What is it that mathematicians accomplish?

There are many issues buried in this question, which I have tried to phrase in a way that does not presuppose the nature of the answer. 

It would not be good to start, for example, with the question 

How do mathematicians prove theorems?

This question introduces an interesting topic, but to start with it would be to project two hidden assumptions: (1) that there is uniform, objective and firmly establ

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2cubefox
If Thurston is right here and mathematicians want to understand why some theorem is true (rather than to just know the truth values of various conjectures), and if we "feel the AGI" ... then it seems future "mathematics" will consist in "mathematicians" asking future ChatGPT to explain math to them. Whether something is true, and why. There would be no research anymore. The interesting question is, I think, whether less-than-fully-general systems, like reasoning LLMs, could outperform humans in mathematical research. Or whether this would require a full AGI that is also smarter than mathematicians. Because if we had the latter, it would likely be an ASI that is better than humans in almost everything, not just mathematics.

Out of curiosity, can you share a link to Gemini 2.5 Pro's response?

re: your last remark, FWIW I think a lot of those writings you've seen were probably intuition-pumped by this parable of Eliezer's, to which I consider titotal's pushback the most persuasive.

Mo Putera2-1

I saw someone who was worried that AI was gonna cause real economic trouble soon by replacing travel agents. But the advent of the internet made travel agents completely unnecessary, and it still only wiped out half the travel agent jobs. The number of travel agents has stayed roughly the same since 2008!

This reminds me of Patrick McKenzie's tweet thread

Technology-driven widespread unemployment ("the robots will take all the jobs") is, like wizards who fly spaceships, a fun premise for science fiction but difficult to find examples for in economic h

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7Said Achmiz
The obvious response, which I thought of as soon as I saw this, is indeed contained in multiple reply tweets: (McKenzie did not reply to either of these, for some reason.) If you don’t normalize for population, graphs and claims like this are profoundly misleading. (Similarly to normalizing geographic data for population density, correcting for inflation, etc.)

One subsubgenre of writing I like is the stress-testing of a field's cutting-edge methods by applying it to another field, and seeing how much knowledge and insight the methods recapitulate and also what else we learn from the exercise. Sometimes this takes the form of parables, like Scott Alexander's story of the benevolent aliens trying to understand Earth's global economy from orbit and intervening with crude methods (like materialising a billion barrels of oil on the White House lawn to solve a recession hypothesised to be caused by an oil shortage) to... (read more)

I'm not sure about Friston's stuff to be honest. 

But Watts lists a whole bunch of papers in support of the blindsight idea, contra Seth's claim — to quote Watts: 

  • "In fact, the nonconscious mind usually works so well on its own that it actually employs a gatekeeper in the anterious cingulate cortex to do nothing but prevent the conscious self from interfering in daily operations"
    • footnotes: Matsumoto, K., and K. Tanaka. 2004. Conflict and Cognitive Control. Science 303: 969-970; 113 Kerns, J.G., et al. 2004. Anterior Cingulate Conflict Monitoring
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Thanks, is there anything you can point me to for further reading, whether by you or others?

Mo Putera212

Peter Watts is working with Neill Blomkamp to adapt his novel Blindsight into an 8-10-episode series: 

“I can at least say the project exists, now: I’m about to start writing an episodic treatment for an 8-10-episode series adaptation of my novel Blindsight.

“Neill and I have had a long and tortured history with that property. When he first expressed interest, the rights were tied up with a third party. We almost made it work regardless; Neill was initially interested in doing a movie that wasn’t set in the Blindsight universe at all, but which merely u

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Seth Herd*140

Blindsight was very well written but based on a premise that I think is importantly and dangerously wrong. That premise is that consciousness (in the sense of cognitive self-awareness) is not important for complex cognition.

This is the opposite of true, and a failure to recognize this is why people are predicting fantastic tool AI that doesn't become self-aware and goal-directed.

The proof won't fit in the margin unfortunately. To just gesture in that direction: it is possible to do complex general cognition without being able to think about one's self and one's cognition. It is much easier to do complex general cognition if the system is able to think about itself and its own thoughts.

Reply3211

There's a lot of fun stuff in Anders Sandberg's 1999 paper The Physics of Information Processing Superobjects: Daily Life Among the Jupiter Brains. One particularly vivid detail was (essentially) how the square-cube law imposes itself upon Jupiter brain architecture by forcing >99.9% of volume to be comprised of comms links between compute nodes, even after assuming a "small-world" network structure allowing sparse connectivity between arbitrarily chosen nodes by having them be connected by a short series of intermediary links with only 1% of links bein... (read more)

Venkatesh Rao's recent newsletter article Terms of Centaur Service caught my eye for his professed joy of AI-assisted writing, both nonfiction and fiction: 

In the last couple of weeks, I’ve gotten into a groove with AI-assisted writing, as you may have noticed, and I am really enjoying it. ... The AI element in my writing has gotten serious, and I think is here to stay. ...

On the writing side, when I have a productive prompting session, not only does the output feel information dense for the audience, it feels information dense for me.

An example of th

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2Viliam
Most human fiction is only interesting to the human who wrote it. The popular stuff is but a tiny minority out of all that was ever written.

There's a version of this that might make sense to you, at least if what Scott Alexander wrote here resonates:

I’m an expert on Nietzsche (I’ve read some of his books), but not a world-leading expert (I didn’t understand them). And one of the parts I didn’t understand was the psychological appeal of all this. So you’re Caesar, you’re an amazing general, and you totally wipe the floor with the Gauls. You’re a glorious military genius and will be celebrated forever in song. So . . . what? Is beating other people an end in itself? I don’t know, I guess this is

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In my corner of the world, anyone who hears "A4" thinks of this:

Paper One Copy Paper A4 75 Gsm ( 500 Pc )

The OECD working paper Miracle or Myth? Assessing the macroeconomic productivity gains from Artificial Intelligence, published quite recently (Nov 2024), is strange to skim-read: its authors estimate just 0.24-0.62 percentage points annual aggregate TFP growth (0.36-0.93 pp. for labour productivity) over a 10-year horizon, depending on scenario, using a "novel micro-to-macro framework" that combines "existing estimates of micro-level performance gains with evidence on the exposure of activities to AI and likely future adoption rates, relying on a multi-sec... (read more)

Mo Putera110

(Not a take, just pulling out infographics and quotes for future reference from the new DeepMind paper outlining their approach to technical AGI safety and security)

Overview of risk areas, grouped by factors that drive differences in mitigation approaches: 

Refer to caption

Overview of their approach to mitigating misalignment: 

Refer to caption

Overview of their approach to mitigating misuse:

Refer to caption

Path to deceptive alignment:

Refer to caption

How to use interpretability:

GoalUnderstanding v ControlConfidenceConcept v Algorithm(Un)supervised?How context specific?
Alignment evaluationsUnderstandingAnyConcept
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I agree that virtues should be thought of as trainable skills, which is also why I like David Gross's idea of a virtue gym:

Two misconceptions sometimes cause people to give up too early on developing virtues:

  1. that virtues are talents that some people have and other people don’t as a matter of predisposition, genetics, the grace of God, or what have you (“I’m just not a very influential / graceful / original person”), and
  2. that having a virtue is not a matter of developing a habit but of having an opinion (e.g. I agree that creativity is good, and I try to res
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Mo Putera142

The link in the OP explains it:

In ~2020 we witnessed the Men’s/Women’s World Cup Scandal. The US Men’s Soccer team had failed to qualify for the previous World Cup, whereas the US Women’s Soccer team had won theirs! And yet the women were paid less that season after winning than the men were paid after failing to qualify. There was Discourse.

I was in the car listening to NPR, pulling out of the parking lot of a glass supplier when my world shattered again.3 One of the NPR leftist commenters said roughly ~‘One can propose that the mens team and womens team

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Scott's own reaction to / improvement upon Graham's hierarchy of disagreement (which I just noticed you commented on back in the day, so I guess this is more for others' curiosity) is 

Graham’s hierarchy is useful for its intended purpose, but it isn’t really a hierarchy of disagreements. It’s a hierarchy of types of response, within a disagreement. Sometimes things are refutations of other people’s points, but the points should never have been made at all, and refuting them doesn’t help. Sometimes it’s unclear how the argument even connects to the sor

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2Sniffnoy
Oh wow I'd forgotten about that!

I unironically love Table 2. 

A shower thought I once had, intuition-pumped by MIRI's / Luke's old post on turning philosophy to math to engineering, was that if metaethicists really were serious about resolving their disputes they should contract a software engineer (or something) to help implement on GitHub a metaethics version of Table 2, where rows would be moral dilemmas like the trolley problem and columns ethical theories, and then accept that real-world engineering solutions tend to be "dirty" and inelegant remixes plus kludgy optimisations to ... (read more)

0Donald Hobson
  There is a progression from philosophy to maths to engineering. But this sounds like your anxious to skip to the engineering. As the old addage goes. Engineering must be done. This is engineering. Therefore this must be done.  If the LLM is just spitting out random opinions it found on r/philosophy, how is this useful? If we want a bunch of random opinions, we can check r/philosophy ourselves.  This plan sounds like a rush to engineer something without the philosophy, resulting in entirely the wrong thing being produced.      Because the tricky thing here isn't making an algorithm to produce the right answer, but deciding what the right answer is.  Suppose I had an algorithm that could perfectly predict what Joe public would think about any ethics dilemma, given 1 minute to think. Is this algorithm a complete solution to meta-ethics.  No.
Mo Putera*00

Lee Billings' book Five Billion Years of Solitude has the following poetic passage on deep time that's stuck with me ever since I read it in Paul Gilster's post:

Deep time is something that even geologists and their generalist peers, the earth and planetary scientists, can never fully grow accustomed to. 

The sight of a fossilized form, perhaps the outline of a trilobite, a leaf, or a saurian footfall can still send a shiver through their bones, or excavate a trembling hollow in the chest that breath cannot fill. They can measure celestial motions and l

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Your writeup makes me think you may be interested in Erik Hoel's essay Enter the Supersensorium

1Jack
That's a lovely essay, I just read through it and it's given me a lot to think about. Dreaming is something that has influenced my thinking quite a bit having spent a bit too much time in my own head growing up.  The distincition between entertainment and art here is particularly salient, although I would imagine the pressure on both would still be present. For entertainment it would be pure engagement farming, how much attention can be captured. Meanwhile art would be about the commodization of expanding the mind, pithy insights made for people to easily consume and "expand" their mind in a safe manner with minimal effort. Vacuous for an entirely different reason than entertainment, and I'd say perhaps more dangerous as a result. "The only cure for bad fiction is good fiction"; but I might say that entertainment is neutral fiction, bad fiction can lead people's minds down terrible paths.

Nice reminiscence from Stephen Wolfram on his time with Richard Feynman:

Feynman loved doing physics. I think what he loved most was the process of it. Of calculating. Of figuring things out. It didn’t seem to matter to him so much if what came out was big and important. Or esoteric and weird. What mattered to him was the process of finding it. And he was often quite competitive about it. 

Some scientists (myself probably included) are driven by the ambition to build grand intellectual edifices. I think Feynman — at least in the years I knew him — was m

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Scott's The Colors Of Her Coat is the best writing I've read by him in a long while. Quoting this part in particular as a self-reminder and bulwark against the faux-sophisticated world-weariness I sometimes slip into: 

Chesterton’s answer to the semantic apocalypse is to will yourself out of it. If you can’t enjoy My Neighbor Totoro after seeing too many Ghiblified photos, that’s a skill issue. Keep watching sunsets until each one becomes as beautiful as the first... 

If you insist that anything too common, anything come by too cheaply, must be bor

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Just signal-boosting the obvious references to the second: Sarah Constantin's Humans Who Are Not Concentrating Are Not General Intelligences and Robin Hanson’s Better Babblers

After eighteen years of being a professor, I’ve graded many student essays. And while I usually try to teach a deep structure of concepts, what the median student actually learns seems to mostly be a set of low order correlations. They know what words to use, which words tend to go together, which combinations tend to have positive associations, and so on. But if you ask a

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2Davidmanheim
Thank you, definitely agree about linking those as relevant. I think one useful question is whether babbling can work to prune, and it seems the answer from reasoning models is yes.

This is great, thanks! Didn't think of the model-prompting-model trick.

I don't know either, but I think of Tracing Woodgrains' Center for Educational Progress and the growing Discord community around it as a step in this direction.

Mo Putera141

Good homework by Zitron on the numbers, and h... (read more)

1exmateriae
I was very disappointed with perplexity DR, it has the same name but it's definitely not the same product as OAI's DR. 
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