All of NMJablonski's Comments + Replies

SIAI needed to improve as an organization, so they brought in people who they thought could run a successful non-profit. What they got was a better non-profit plus the whole accompanying spectrum of philanthropy status divas, professional beggars and related hangers-on.

Most of the original thinkers have left, replaced by those who believe in thinking, but only for fashionable thoughts.

2Multiheaded
Okay, so would you kindly point to some awful, worthless posts/comments by those awful, worthless people? And explain what makes them so awful and worthless? So that the right-thinking users can learn to avoid them? Or, if you don't have anything specific in mind, would you at least cease insulting the community?

Jargon separates the raw value systems I'm talking about from the tribes that cling to them. I figured this would be less mind-killing but still communicative to the sort of person who cares about this thread.

It's not much better in the US. I live in a fairly Townie area, but there is a University, which has a student body unanimous in its adoration of Brahmin values. All of my young coworkers chattered with glee this morning at the "humiliation" of the "enemy".

4Multiheaded
Not UR comments, go easy on the jargon

Konkvistador is a concerned Tutsi living in a politico-cultural regime which seems increasingly pleased at the prospect of watching Hutus eat Tutsis.

Isn't it as simple as the fact that eugenicist ideas, even obviously good ones, assume the reality of HBD and therefore violate Western Universalist taboos?

-5Furslid

No. Address the behavior, not the person. "Don't hug people without asking" is not the same as "You are an evil person, begone with you." Aspiring rationalists should be able to accept the request and update their beliefs regarding others' preferences accordingly. Failure to update when others' happiness is at stake, is bad rationality and morally wrong.

It is a genuine challenge for me to tell if this is a joke.

Is this post meant as satire?

2ChristianKl
You are misquoting the link. They say: "Is it more nutritious? The answer isn't yet clear." They do they "The researchers concluded that organically and conventionally produced foodstuffs are comparable in their nutrient content.". That doesn't mean "Conventional produce and organic produce are nutritionally equivalent." If you add arsen to an apple you don't change it's nutrient content. An apple with arsen still isn't nutritionally equivalent to an apple without.

All the reliable literature I have read says that:

a) Conventional produce and organic produce are nutritionally equivalent

b) Organic produce is more prone to rancidity as fewer preservatives are used

c) Organic produce will make you popular with people who wear glasses with no lenses

0Kutta
Seconded all three. The health impact of the quality of a particular foodstuff (within the variance allowed by developed country regulations) is often overstated compared to the health impact of the overall composition of the calories you eat.
0James_Miller
Doesn't (b) imply that grocery stores can't keep organic food on the shelf as long as conventional produce?
3asparisi
"C" is definitely true. I am convinced that, irrespective of the actual benefits of organic food, 80% of the people who buy it do so (largely) for signalling reasons.Half of the remainder probably do so accidentally and/or because it's the only item on the shelf at the time.
5[anonymous]
Interesting! Can you link to the literature you've read?

The immortal starfarers necessarily go somewhere; the status game players don't necessarily go anywhere. Hence "winning".

Deciding that going somewhere is "winning" comes from your existing utility function. Another person could judge that the civilization with the most rich and complex social hierarchy "wins".

Rationality can help you search the space of actions, policies, and outcomes for those which produce the highest value for you. It cannot help you pass objective judgment on your values, or discover "better" ones.

You're priveliging your values when you judge which society - the status game players versus the immortal starfarers - is "winning".

2Phoenix
I don't think that that's a bad thing. The immortal starfarers necessarily go somewhere; the status game players don't necessarily go anywhere. Hence "winning". The point of the post was to warn that not only answering our questions but figuring out which questions we should ask is an issue we have to tackle. We have to figure out what winning should be. The reason that the immortal starfarers are better is that they're trying to do that, so if all values aren't created equally, they're more likely to find out about it.

By your lengthy apologetic introduction you're signaling to me that you know this doesn't belong here.

5falenas108
No, just that he believes some people will think this doesn't belong here.

I'm receiving signals that people would rather I not comment.

Thanks for engaging, you've explained your position well.

I think there's a decent consensus on food:

"Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants."

Sure, there are always scare stories about how (insert target food) might be trouble because one study found a mild correlation. However, I think there are many diet choices that people make (myself included) that are conclusively unhealthy.

Do you disagree?

1Alicorn
That's not a consensus. That's what one dude has to say, it's ill-specified in every phrase, (my dad deems many things "not food" as a pejorative of sorts even when they would normally be termed so; what does "food" mean? What is "too much"? What fraction is "mostly", and do arbitrary plants count?), and it's not consensus. "Consensus", without a qualifier about among whom there is consensus, doesn't mean "the people you prefer to listen to agree on this". I think anorexia, bulimia, and uncontrollable binge eating are unhealthy; to whatever extent those are diet "choices", and to the extent that three is "many", maybe I don't disagree. I suspect that low-variety eating, ceteris paribus, may be unhealthy, but I don't know it for sure, and have learned to believe in human heterogeneity. If I meet someone who lives on three foods I will restrain myself from interfering in any way other than offering them tasty other items to try if they want.

I apologize for the leading questions. I didn't want to make outright accusations of tone when I wasn't sure how you had intended your comments. Your comments had seemed brief and chastising, and I wasn't sure what you were trying to communicate.

However, your answers make sense, and your rephrasing of my second question is fair.

Although, I am still unsure why you object to the use of the "poor diet choices as destructive behavior" analogy. It seems comparable to the drug-use analogy you propose as an alternative.

1Alicorn
There is almost no consensus about food. I think there is probably someone not obviously a complete nutter who can find a reason to object to anything other than raw vegetables and water. The only things that everyone agrees are definitely bad to eat are literal poison. (And I'd appreciate it if everyone did not take that phrase as an invitation to say "sugar is literal poison" because no it isn't, I could eat a five-pound bag of sugar over the course of a couple days if I really wanted to and I'm sure it'd disagree with me but I wouldn't be dead or acutely harmed any more than I would if I ate that much lettuce over the same period of time.) There's pretty much consensus about some drugs.

As a complete outsider to this conversation, it doesn't look like you're playing fair.

Can I ask you just to consider a few questions?

1) Do you think you are using a constructive tone?

2) If overeating were the primary cause of most obesity, would you want to know?

3) Is it your goal to shut down any discussion of this topic because of your personal sensibilities?

0Alicorn
1) I don't perceive myself as using an atypical tone relative to how I usually talk about things, and don't usually have problems with how people react to my tone. I don't like the way you've presented these questions. If you think I'm presenting my comments badly, please tell me where and how and why, don't just insinuate it in this condescendingly didactic way. 2) I'm going to rephrase your question so it doesn't presuppose an answer (the word "overeating" does that, although not completely; there are possible interpretations that don't mean "eating enough to get fat", but not ones that are in very common use). My rephrasing is "If most people's obesity could be reduced by the people eating less, would you want to know?" (let me know if this is an illegitimate recasting and feel free to provide your own nonpresumptive revision). But as it happens, I do already think that. I think most overweight and obese people, if they ate less, would be less fat. I just think that this in no way justifies a stigma or even particularly much well-meaning advice against eating, or against eating particular foods or amounts, or against being fat. 3) No. I'm upset that you have chosen to locate-that-hypothesis at me such that I now have to defend myself and even then the accusation will float around indefinitely.

Tragically no. Sorry I never got back to you last week, I didn't get your text until the next day.

We both have a super busy fall semester, so we've been missing the meetups.

0SilasBarta
[frowny face] Good luck on your semester!

It's not a written rule by any means, but in order to acclimate to the style and reduce inferential distances it's usually a good idea.

Your piece isn't hated, it's just not good.

If you are actually interested in participating in this community, read the sequences. Then read some of the current frontpage material. Then try engaging us again, with one (and only one) username.

2prase
You formulate it as if reading the sequences was a necessary condition to participate in LW. It isn't.

Dude, if you're going to make a dozen accounts to talk up your post, you can't use the same deranged writing style in all of them.

Downvoted, sockpuppet.

Hey! That's great. Excited to meet you :)

I'm sorry I missed it. I'll check in regularly for info on the next one.

Austin LW'er here. I totally would have come to this, but somehow I missed the announcement in the meta-meetup thread. I will watch for the next one of these and absolutely be there.

Edit: Wait... why was this downvoted?

0Davorak
I don't know and it was on both of you posts in this thread. I voted up on both because I could not discern the reason.
1Cog
We will probably have another next week at the same time. I will PM you whenever I settle upon new dates. I won't claim it was hugely successful - no one else showed up, but I did get a couple of people at my hackerspace interested, and some vague promises of people coming next week. Still, I think there's potential here. We'll see.

Upvoted.

I'm starting to think this will not end well. We've started down a much too familiar non-theist and religionist conversation path.

5Costanza
I'm inclined to agree. But I'm still mystified as to why our gracious patron Eliezer Y. saw fit to anoint this particular religious believer (out of all the many, many, educated and articulate religious believers who speak English in this world) with the special dispensation of karma points out of thin air. Beyond that, I'm further surprised that the LessWrong community at large was so enthusiastic in upvoting these insights into how to seduce impressionable people into a false, irrational, and personally costly religious cult.

I swear, if you can make an ironclad rational argument for Mormonism, I will personally convert.

Seconded. I am entirely open to models of the universe that better fit the evidence at hand than the ones I have. If you (calcsam) can present a convincing case for the accuracy and validity of your beliefs I will adopt them as well.

Sixthed. Actually I'd be interested in hearing from anyone who wouldn't so promise.

The only caveat is that I'd have to be separately convinced of the factual and ethical sides, i.e., showing evidence to me that the Mormon God exists is not the same as justifying that the Mormon God's policies are good.

3jsalvatier
Third.

For a most of my life I thought I didn't enjoy music. Then I realized that I just don't like the music everyone listens to. The stuff that comes out of my radio is extremely unpleasant, but with much searching I have found some music that I do enjoy.

You're signalling to me right now that you have no desire to have a productive conversation. I don't know if you're meaning to do that, but I'm not going to keep asking questions if it seems like you have no intent to answer them.

-6Peterdjones

Let's break this all the way down. Can you give me your thesis?

I mean, I see there is a claim here:

The aliens do not want to be exterminated so they should not exterminate.

... of the format (X therefore Y). I can understand what the (X) part of it means: aliens with a preference not to be destroyed. Now the (Y) part is a little murky. You're saying that the truth of X implies that they "should not exterminate". What does the word should mean there?

-6Peterdjones

What would it mean for a utility function to be objectively wrong? How would one determine that a utility function has the property of "wrongness"?

Please, do not answer "by reasoning about it" unless you are willing to provide that reasoning.

-3Peterdjones
I did provide the reasoning in the alien example.

So, we're working with thomblake's definition of "wrong" as those actions which reduce utility for whatever function an agent happens to care about. The aliens care about themselves not being exterminated, but may actually assign very high utility to humans being wiped out.

Perhaps we would be viewed as pests, like rats or pigeons. Just as humans can assign utility to exterminating rats, the aliens could do so for us.

Exterminating humans has the objectively determinable outcome of reducing the utility in your subjectively privileged function.

-4Peterdjones
Inasmuch as we are talking about objective rightness we are talking are not talking about utility functions, because not everyone is running of the same utility function, and it makes sense to say some UFs are objectively wrong.

Okay, we don't disagree at all.

There is an objective sense in which actions have consequences. I am always surprised when people seem to think I'm denying this. Science works, there is a concrete and objective reality, and we can with varying degrees of accuracy predict outcomes with empirical study. Zero disagreement from me on that point.

So, we judge consequences of actions with our preferences. One can be empirically incorrect about what consequences an action can have, and if you choose to define "wrong" as those actions which reduce the util... (read more)

1thomblake
Note that the definitional dispute rears its head in the case where the humans say, "Exterminating us is morally wrong!" in which case strong moral relativists insist the aliens should respond, "No, exterminating you is morally right!", while moral realists insist the aliens should respond "We don't care that it's morally wrong - it's shmorally right!" There is also a breed of moral realist who insists that the aliens would have somehow also evolved to care about morality, as the Kantians who believe morality follows necessarily from basic reason. I think the burden of proof still falls on them for that, but unfortunately there aren't many smart aliens to test.
-2Peterdjones
There is a sense in which one party is objectively wrong. The aliens do not want to be exterminated so they should not exterminate.

Is there a sense in which there are "two" rocks here, even if there were no agent to count the rocks? Is there a sense in which murder is wrong, even if there was never anyone to murder or observe murder?

I can understand what physical conditions you are describing when you say "two rocks". What does it mean, in a concrete and substantive sense, for murder to be "wrong"?

1thomblake
I can give you two answers to this, one which maps better to this community and one which fits better with the virtue ethics tradition. 1. There exists (in the sense that mathematical functions exist) a utility function labeled 'morality' in which actions labeled 'murder' bring the universe into a state of lower-utility. I make no particular claims about the proper way to choose such a utility function, just that there is one that is properly called 'morality', and moral disputes can be characterized as either disputes over which function to call 'morality' or disputes over what the output of that function would be given certain inputs. 2. 'Good' and 'bad' are always evaluated in terms of effects upon a particular thing; a good hammer is one which optimally pounds in nails, a good horse is fast and strong, and a good human experiences eudaimonia. Murder is the sort of thing that makes one a bad human; it makes one less virtuous and thus less able to experience eudaimonia. It could be the case that the terms 'good', 'bad', and 'eudaimonia' should be evaluated based on the preferences of an agent. But in that case it that does not make it any less the case that moral facts are facts about the world that one could be wrong about. For instance, if I prefer to live, I should not drink drain cleaner. If I thought it was good to drink drain cleaner, I would be wrong according to my own preferences, and an outside agent with different preferences could tell me I was objectively wrong about what's right for me to do. As a side note, 'murder' is normative; it is tautologically wrong. Denying wrongness in general denies the existence of murder. It might be better to ask, "What does it mean for a particular sort of killing to be 'wrong'?", or else "What does it mean for a killing to be murder?"
-3Peterdjones
What does it mean in a concrete and substantive sense for pi to be an irrational number?

We are, near as I can tell, in perfect agreement on the substance of this issue. Aumann would be proud. :)

Unfortunately, I'm afraid I still don't understand your point.

I think we may have reached the somewhat common on LW point where we're arguing even though we have no disagreement.

2Jonathan_Graehl
It's easy to bristle when someone in response to you points out something you thought it was obvious that you knew. This happens all the time when people think they're smart :)

sociological phenomenon ... still reasonable to disapprove of murder, etc.

Yup.

Could an agent with different preferences from ours reasonably approve of murder?

Yes to that too.

I very, very, strongly disapprove of terrorism. Terrorists, of course, would disagree. There is no objective sense in which one of us can be "right", unless you go out of your way to specifically define "right" as those actions which agree with one side or the other. The privileging of those actions as "right" still originates from the subjective value... (read more)

-1Peterdjones
There is a way in which someone can be wrong. If someone holds to a set of values that contains contradictions , they cannot claim to be right. Moral arguments in fact do often make appeals to consistency -- "if you support equal rights for women, you should support equal rights for gays"
0CuSithBell
Glad to hear : )

For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from

There are people who feel there is a moral imperative to do just that. Likewise, there is wide disagreement over what deserves punishment. An orthodox Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Communist, and a Vulcan walk into a bar... I'm sure we can all see the potential for punchlines.

You may punish action X which violates your preferences because you want to see people punished for action X. You could simultaneously choo... (read more)

0Perplexed
And a moral realist, such as myself, thinks you are dead wrong about that. I have offered an objective criterion for choosing sides in the debate, as well as a justification for that criterion that is ultimately based on satisfying people's preferences to the greatest extent possible. Yet you are unimpressed and go back to reciting your original opinions. Oh well. I tried. HAND.

we punish those who steal from old ladies, because the stealing is wrong.

I would say we punish those who steal from old ladies because we would prefer the old ladies not be stolen from. It is that preference, the subjective value we all (except the thief of course) place on a society where the meek are not abused by criminals, that causes us to call that behavior "wrong".

The evolutionary origins of that preference seem pretty obvious. In any group of social animals there will be one or two top physical competitors, and the remainder would be s... (read more)

0Peterdjones
Do the evolutionary origins of rationality mean that we can eliminate truth and rationality in favour of belief and opinion? Can the arguments for moral relativism not be redeployed as arguments for alethic relativism?
1Perplexed
Ok, so I punish so as to achieve my preference that old ladies not be stolen from. Yet I do not punish to achieve my preferences in other matters. For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from, though the consequentialist results seem so parallel. I would prefer that old ladies not be impoverished, regardless of whether they became impoverished by theft. So, if you can explain why I feel the urge to punish in one case but not the others, you are on your way to "solving metaethics'.

So, there are people who disagree with what you posted, and may be inclined to argue about it. That, combined with the idea shared in the Paul Graham quote in this very thread (about politics frequently being used as a form of identity) leads to defensiveness, leads to rationalization, and leads to stupidity.

So, in order to avoid stupid arguments, people would prefer fewer posts like your quote on LW.

Well, duh! What is your point?

There are people who do not recognize this. It was, in fact, my point.

Edit: Hmm, did I say something rude Perplexed?

1Perplexed
Not to me. I didn't downvote, and in any case I was the first to use the rude "duh!", so if you were rude back I probably deserved it. Unfortunately, I'm afraid I still don't understand your point. Perhaps you were rude to those unnamed people who you suggest "do not recognize this".

We don't cringe at the thought of stealing from old ladies because it's wrong, but rather we call it wrong to steal from old ladies because we cringe at the thought

This is crisp, clear, and one of the best short explanations of the issue I've read.

So you're saying that there's one single set of behaviors, which, even though different agents will assign drastically different values to the same potential outcomes, balances their conflicting interests to provide the most net utility across the group. That could be true, although I'm not convinced.

Even if it is, though, what the optimal strategy is will change if the net values across the group changes. The only point I have ever tried to make in these threads is that the origin of any applicable moral value must be the subjective preferences of the age... (read more)

1Amanojack
I'm fond of including clarification like, "subjective values (values defined in the broadest possible sense, to include even things like your desire to get right with your god, to see other people happy, to not feel guilty, or even to "be good")." Some ways I've found to dissolve people's language back to subjective utility: 1. If someone says something is good, right, bad, or wrong, ask, "For what purpose?" 2. If someone declares something immoral, unjust, unethical, ask, "So what unhappiness will I suffer as a result?" But use sparingly, because there is a big reason many people resist dissolving this confusion.
2Perplexed
True, but that may not be as telling an objection as you seem to think. For example, if you run into someone (not me!) who claims that the entire moral code is based on the 'Golden Rule' of "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." Tell that guy that moral behavior changes if preferences change. He will respond "Well, duh! What is your point?".

It's a long story, starting with Eugine publicly declaring that he was downvoting the comments I made that he disagreed with, which has seemingly escalated to downvoting every comment I make even where I'm just conducting meta-housekeeping and the like.

I'm not commenting to shame or accuse, I'm trying to understand his motivations.

On the topic of karma, why are you downvoting every post I make regardless of content?

2Zack_M_Davis
(Downvoted for making an accusation without presenting evidence.)

imagine it as a doctrine teaching you how to judge the behavior of others (and to a lesser extent, yourself).

Which metrics do I use to judge others?

There has been some confusion over the word "preference" in the thread, so perhaps I should use "subjective value". Would you agree that the only tools I have for judging others are subjective values? (This includes me placing value on other people reaching a state of subjective high value)

Or do you think there's a set of metrics for judging people which has some spooky, metaphysical property that makes it "better"?

1Perplexed
I'm claiming that there is a particular moral code which has the spooky game-theoretical property that it produces the most utility for you and for others. That is, it is the metric which is Pareto optimal and which is also a 'fair' bargain.
6XiXiDu
And why would that even matter as long as I am able to realize what I want without being instantly struck by thunder if I desire or do something that violates the laws of morality? If I live a happy and satisfied life of fulfilled preferences but constantly do what is objectively wrong, why exactly would that matter, to whom would it matter and why would I care if I am happy and my preferences are satisfied? Is it some sort of game that I am losing, where those who are the most right win? What if I don't want to play that game, what if I don't care who wins?

I replied to Marius higher up in the thread with my efforts at preference-taboo.

Heh, I'm tempted to answer "yes" to your question because it makes me seem wittier than I was.

In reality, what I meant by "okay" was: Not contradictory or a crisis of rationality. It is indeed hard to avoid the language of objective judgments in English. :)

there aren't just people fulfilling their preferences.

You missed a word in my original. I said that there were agents trying to fulfill their preferences. Now, per my comment at the end of your subthread with Amanojack, I realize that the word "preferences" may be unhelpful. Let me try to taboo it:

There are intelligent agents who assign higher values to some futures than others. I observe them generally making an effort to actualize those futures, but sometimes failing due to various immediate circumstances, which we could call cognitive overr... (read more)

0Marius
I suspect it's a matter of degree rather than either-or. People sleeping on the edges of cliffs are much less likely to jot when startled than people sleeping on soft beds, but not 0% likely. The interplay between your biases and your reason is highly complex. Yes; absolutely. I suspect that a coherent definition of morality that isn't contingent on those will have to reference a deity.

Oops, I totally missed this subthread.

Amanojack has, I think, explained my meaning well. It may be useful to reduce down to physical brains and talk about actual computational facts (i.e. utility function) that lead to behavior rather than use the slippery words "want" or "preference".

1Amanojack
Good idea. Like, "My present utility function calls for my future utility function to be such and such"?
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