All of Oskar Mathiasen's Comments + Replies

Here are some relevant quotes by Eliezer from a discord discussion on dath ilan currency:
Note that i have skipped parts of the conversation between each paragraph
 

dath ilan does have an artificial currency used as a medium-of-exchange, meant to track the value of unskilled labor hours (note unskilled qualifier) as they're regularly auctioned in Taskrabbit-like markets about that, and this currency also serves as the notional definition of a medium of account because it fluctuates less than unskilled labor prices.

Nobody is supposed to be holding curren

... (read more)
1Greenless Mirror
Thanks for the info, I'm not active in the discord but will consider joining now, sounds interesting. As I understand it, the "NGDPLT-indexed inflationary unit of account" is not the "fraction system" I proposed, and in fact Eliezer thinks that using inflation-deflation is adequate because even utopian coordination and higher average intelligence are not enough for everyone in the economy to simply behave adequately. Now I wonder if the system can simply be so sane that deflation in particular will not have a negative effect and people will simply efficiently preserve jobs, set and accept prices, and market cap is stable and close to GDP, etc. If it is really possible to train people out of bias or create a system with lower structural bias so to say.

To the extent that purchases stay the same and we pay the cost domestically, that is indeed a tax paid by producers or consumers. Yes, it lowers their remaining capital, but is probably one of the least distortionary available taxes. In the terms described above, if you used the money to cut income tax rates, you’d probably be ahead.

Taxing something where the supply or demand is fixed is extremely efficient, and the extent to which purchases stay the same is exactly the extent to which supply or demand is inflexible. The economic inefficiency of a tax comes from the changes in behavior induced by the tax. The difference between a tariff and a sales tax, is that it induces you to buy native products.

Sorry I see now that i lost half a sentence in the middle. I agree that the notions of early/mid/late game doesn't map well to real life, and I don't think there is a good way to do so. I then (meant to) propose the stages of a 4X game as perhaps mapping more cleanly onto one-shot games

I think the most natural definitions are that early game is the part you have memorized, end game is where you can compute to the end (still doing pruning), and mid game is the rest.
So eg in Scrabble the end game is where there are no tiles or few enough tiles in the bag that you can think through all (relevant) combinations of bags.

I think perhaps the phases of a 4X game.

Explore: gain information that is relevant for what plan to execute 

Expand: Investment phase, you take actions that maximise your growth

Exploit: You slowly start depriotizing growth as the time remaining grows shorter.

Exterminate: You go for your win condition

2Raemon
The "early game is what you have memorized" makes sense for literal games, but doesn't actually help much with my current use-case, which is "and this translates into real life." (when I'm thinking about these in game-form, I'm generally thinking about one-shot gaming, where you're trying hard to win your first time playing a game, such that figuring out the early game is part of the challenge)

The arguments in the Aumann paper in favor of dropping the completeness axiom is that it makes for a better theory of Human/Buisness/Existent reasoning, not that it makes for a better theory of ideal reasoning.
The paper seems to prove that any partial preference ordering which obeys the other axioms must be representable by a utility function, but that there will be multiple such representatives.

My claim is that either there will be a dutch book, or your actions will be equivalent to the actions you would have taken by following one of those representative... (read more)

7[anonymous]
The words you've written here might seem coherent on a superficial reading, but the more you think about them, the less sense they make.  "Ideal reasoning", as you are using it, is a red herring. The process of reasoning we are interested in when we deal with the type of agentic set-up in front of us is one in which reason is a means to an end, namely the fulfillment of preferences, as can be viewed through the (purportedly sensible) maximization of the utility function. It does not act to constrain what those preferences must be, except in so far as (in a real-world setting, for instance) they allow the agent to attempt self-modification to avoid the loss of resources to scenarios like money-pumping due to violations of transitivity. Moreover, an agent is not required to self-modify in order to avoid circular-type inconsistencies; if it determines it will not be faced with money-pumping scenarios in real life, it can very well decide to not waste resources for an ultimately useless self-modification. That is to say, these types of inefficiencies in the preference ranking are necessary but not sufficient conditions for problems to appear. As such, incomplete preferences are no more violations of "ideal reasoning" than preferring black cats to orange cats are; it's simply something (close) to orthogonal to reasoning (i.e., optimization) processes.  Now, let's consider what Aumann actually wrote in his 1962 paper: Yes, this makes reference to humans, but that is for illustrative purposes only; as Aumann notes, humans do not satisfy completeness, just as they don't satisfy the other axioms of VNM theory. The relevant question is whether there is any fundamental rule of rationality that says they ought to, and as described above, there is not. This is true but misleading as written, because your writing does not explain what "utility function" means in this new context. It is not the same as the utility function described in the original question post, due to the fa

I don't understand how you are using incompleteness. For example, to me the sentence

"agents can make themselves immune to all possible money-pumps for completeness by acting in accordance with the following policy: ‘if I previously turned down some option X, I will not choose any option that I strictly disprefer to X.’"

Sounds like "agents can avoid all money pumps for completeness by completing their preferences in a random way." Which is true but doesn't seem like much of a challenge to completeness.

Can you explain what behavior is allowed under the f... (read more)

3[anonymous]
The following comments by @Said Achmiz are relevant here: 1, 2, 3; as well as @johnswentworth's post from 5 years ago on "Why Subagents?" In particular, the most direct answer to your question is the following:

It seems to me that FDT has the property that you associate with the "ultimate decision theory".

My understanding is that FDT says that you should follow the policy which is attained by taking the argmax over all policies of the utility from following that policy (only including downstream effects of your policy).

In these easy examples your policy space is your space of committed actions. In which case the above seems to reduce to the "ultimate decision theory" criterion.

2mako yass
I'm not sure I know what you mean by this, but if you mean causal effects, no, it considers all pasts, and all timelines. (A reader might balk, "but that's computationally infeasible", but we're talking about mathematic idealizations, the mathematical idealization of CDT is also computationally infeasible. Once we're talking about serious engineering projects to make implementable approximations of these things, you don't know what's going to be feasible.)
1Ape in the coat
It seems so to me too, but I expect that there may be some nuance that makes this particular precommitment and therefore FDT not so ultimate after all. But the point is that we can reduce FDT to CDT with precommitment, so if FDT is indeed ultimate decision theory, than so is CDT+P.

The assumptions made here are not time reversible as the macrostate at time t+1 being deterministic given the macrostate at time t, does not imply that the macrostate at time t is deterministic given the macrostate at time t+1.

So in this article the direction of time is given through the asymmetry of the evolution of macrostates. 

2johnswentworth
Yup. Also, I'd add that entropy in this formulation increases exactly when more than one macrostate at time t maps to the same actually-realized macrostate at time t+1, i.e. when the macrostate evolution is not time-reversible.

I think "book of X" can be usefully "translated" as beliefs about X.
The book of truth is not truth, just like the book of night is not night.

I think "book of names" can be read as human categoristion of animals (giving them name). Although other readings do seem plausible. 

You might be interested in John Harsanyi on the topic.
He argues that the conclusion achieved in the original position is (average) utilitarianism.

I agree that behind the veil one shouldn't know the time (and thus can't care differently about current vs future humans). This actually causes further problems for Rawls conception when you project back in time, what if the worst life that will ever be lived has already been lived? Then the maximin principle gives no guidance at all, and in positions of uncertainty it recommends putting all effort in preventing a new minimum from being set.

Answer by Oskar Mathiasen30

The concept of Kolmogorov Sufficient Statistic might be the missing piece. (cf Elements of information theory section 14.12)

We want the shortest program that describes a sequence of bits. A particularly interpretable type of such programs is "the sequence is in the set X generated by program p, and among those it is the n'th element"
Example "the sequence is in the set of sequences of length 1000 with 104 ones, generated by (insert program here), of which it is the n~10^144'th element". 

We therefore define f(String, n) to be the size of the smallest se... (read more)

Then you violate the accurate beliefs condition. (If the world is infact a random mixture in proportion which their beliefs track correctly, then fdt will do better when averaging over the mixture)

1Augs SMSHacks
True beliefs doesn't mean omniscience. It is possible to have only true beliefs but still not know everything. In this case, the agent might not know if the driver can read minds but still have accurate beliefs otherwise.

I don't think the quoted problem has that structure.

And suppose that the existence of S tends to cause both (i) one-boxing tendencies and (ii) whether there’s money in the opaque box or not when decision-makers face Newcomb problems.

But now suppose that the pathway by which S causes there to be money in the opaque box or not is that another agent looks at S

So S causes one boxing tendencies, and the person putting money in the box looks only at S.

So it seems to be changing the problem to say that the predictor observes your brain/your decision proced... (read more)

Cant you make the same argument you make in Schwarz procreation by using Parfits hitchhiker after you have reached the city? In which case i think its better to use that example, as it avoids the Heighns criticism.

In the case of implausible discontinuities i agree with Heighn that there is no subjunctive dependence.
 

Here is a quick diagram of the causation in the thought experiment as i understand it.
We have an outcome which is completely determined by your decision to one box/two box and the predictor decision of whether to but money in the one box.
T... (read more)

1omnizoid
You can make it with Parfit's hitchiker, but in that case there's an action before hand and so a time when you have the ability to try to be rational.   There is a path from the decision theory to the predictor, because the predictor looks at your brain--with the decision theory it will make--and bases the decision on the outputs of that cognitive algorithm. 

Denmark culled all mink due to worries about a covid strain in mink. It has only recently (January 1 2023) become legal to farm mink in Denmark again.

logical inductors are actually defined by the logical induction criterion. The market bit is there to prove that it is possible to fulfill the criterion.

Answer by Oskar Mathiasen21

There is also the somewhat boring answer that probability can refer to anything which obeys the axioms of probability.

Note that coop is a consumer cooperative not an employee cooperative.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumers%27_co-operative 
 

New report from Denmark called "Focusrapport about Covid-19 related hospitalizations during the Covid-19 pandemic"
https://www.ssi.dk/-/media/cdn/files/fokusrapport-om-covid-19-relaterede-hospitalsindlggelser-under-sars-cov-2-epidemien_06012022_1.pdf?la=da

It is sadly in danish, so i will give a translation of the main results section and some of the graphs.

Summary of main results:
Theme 1: 
* The older a patient is, the greater the likelihood that he or she will have a covid-19- related hospitalization of 12 hours or more. 
* The proportion of short ... (read more)

Updated numbers from today at: https://files.ssi.dk/covid19/omikron/statusrapport/rapport-omikronvarianten-10122021-ek56
Now with English translations.
Only significant change is that hospitalizations are up to 1.4% (18 cases).

There should be daily updates found her https://www.ssi.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2021
click the newest one and click "læs rapporten her" (read the report here). Which takes you to a page where you can download the rapport for that day
 

Repost from wordpress blog

status rapport from Denmark

 Key numbers: they give numbers of cases by day, and also give cases of omicron as a percentage of other cases. 

Of 785 cases in Danish citizens, 76.31% of omicron cases where in double vaxed, 7.13% in triple vaxed, compared to 73.69% double (probably also including triple) vaxed for covid in general. 14.14% unvaxed for omicron 22.93% for general (over the last 7 days)

 Rate of hospitalization is 1.15% for omicron (9 cases), and 1.85 in general. 

Everything is probably confounded by age ... (read more)

6Oskar Mathiasen
Updated numbers from today at: https://files.ssi.dk/covid19/omikron/statusrapport/rapport-omikronvarianten-10122021-ek56 Now with English translations. Only significant change is that hospitalizations are up to 1.4% (18 cases). There should be daily updates found her https://www.ssi.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2021 click the newest one and click "læs rapporten her" (read the report here). Which takes you to a page where you can download the rapport for that day  

Todays cumulative omicron cases is 398 

1cistrane
Exponential curves look linear at short intervals.

Repost from my wordpress comments:
Danish seroprevalance (from https://www.ssi.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2021/markant-stigning-i-den-fjerde-nationale-praevalensundersoegelse) seems to have been about 50% above commulative cases (from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/denmark/) by may 2020.

Commulative omicron cases in Denmark per SSI https://www.ssi.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2021
dec 3: 18 omicron cases
dec 5: 183 cases
dec 6: 261 cases

Oddly this looks linear (80 cases per day), but that is almost certainly random.
 

1Oskar Mathiasen
Todays cumulative omicron cases is 398 

The fact that the 2 numbers are equal is not always true, it is randomly true on this day.

1Insub
Yes that was my reasoning too. The situation presumably goes: 1. Omicron chooses a random number X, either prime or composite 2. Omega simulates you, makes its prediction, and decides whether X's primality is consistent with its prediction 3. If it is, then: 1. Omega puts X into the box 2. Omega teleports you into the room with the boxes and has you make your choice 4. If it's not, then...? I think the correct solution depends on what Omega does in this case. 1. Maybe it just quietly waits until tomorrow and tries again? In which case no one is ever shown a case where the box does not contain Omicron's number. If this is how Omega is acting, then I think you can act as though your choice affects Omircon's number, even though that number is technically random on this particular day. 2. Maybe it just picks its own number, and shows you the problem anyway. I believe this was the assumption in the post.

Yes.
I agree that the original post keeps going after removing differences in values because they don't remove differences in marginal value, which is what matters.
I am providing an example where properly removing the differences in marginal value results in no trade.

You are using a nonstandard definition of goods. Would you equally object to a market with only blueberries, apples and bananas on the basis that there is only one good available (fruits)?

The example world can be modified easily to use any utility function of the form a·red points + b·yellow points + c·blue points.

2Ericf
The whole point of making simplified models (economic or otherwise) is to reflect some underlying truth in a more grokkable form. But, if you remove the load bearing ideas when making the model it doesn't provide any insight. If all goods are perfect substitutes, then there is no trade. That's all your model is saying. And that's the same thing I was saying, though my previous post was less elegant about it. It doesn't matter what the production functions look like: they key factor is the perfect substituiton on the demand side. And, as you said, redefining a Red point as 1/a Red points doesn't change that conclusion.

Yes.
The comment was meant as a proof by example that you can have no trade in a world with comparative advantages, if everyone has the same marginal value of all products the result is no trade.
Diminishing marginal returns are indeed enough to make marginal values different between people.
 

2Ericf
Except, your example doesn't have comparative advantages because there is only one "good" available (points). There has to be some difference in value somewhere to have different goods. And note the slight of hand in the original post where Elizer goes from "people like all goods the same" to "oh, but somehow people like laptops more than apples" - if everyone really did like all things equally, there would be no trade because having "a basket of apples" would be the same as having "one apple."

People could trade making each others numbers bigger, it's just that it will never be beneficial for both.
Letting people increase others numbers by decreasing their own number doesn't change the results

Example world without trade.

Every person gets at birth assigned an array of 3 integers a blue number, a yellow number and a red number. Every person has 3 attributes: the speed they can increase a red number (by spending that amount of time counting out loud), the speed they can increase a blue number, and the speed they can increase a yellow number. They can increase their own numbers or anyone elses. (Note we are not assuming everyone has the same amount of red, blue and yellow points at birth or that they are all equally fast at producing them). Everyon... (read more)

1Ericf
Note that this world assumes away the fixed cost of living. In the real world, every person (even a computer simulated person) consumes and destroys some value to stay alive (either power lost to Entropy for a simulation, or food calories eaten and digested). Also, too, that world doesn't have any diminishing marginal returns: somehow my optimum action is increasing whichever score I'm best at, with no variety to my actions at all. This doesn't model real preferences well, where a score of 101 Red + 1 Yellow + 1 Blue would never equal to 1, 101, & 1 and 51, 51, 1. The very definition of things being different implies that they cannot be perfectly substituted for each-other at all quantities. If you relax either of those strange assumptions, you will see trade re-emerge.
3Richard_Kennaway
Am I misunderstanding your example, or is this a world in which transfer of goods is impossible? If no-one can give their points to anyone else, then trade has been ruled out by definition.

Two of the removed features are removed incompletely.
Differerences in preferences. What is important for trade is the marginal preference. So to remove this motivation to trade one mus assume the marginal value (both intrinsic and instrumental) to be equal for everyone for all goods, which i think can only happen in some very weird cases (eg all gods have no instrumental value and utility is a linear combination of the products).

The difference in peoples productive capacity (which doesn't by itself result in trade (it does when assuming diminishing margina... (read more)

3Oskar Mathiasen
Example world without trade. Every person gets at birth assigned an array of 3 integers a blue number, a yellow number and a red number. Every person has 3 attributes: the speed they can increase a red number (by spending that amount of time counting out loud), the speed they can increase a blue number, and the speed they can increase a yellow number. They can increase their own numbers or anyone elses. (Note we are not assuming everyone has the same amount of red, blue and yellow points at birth or that they are all equally fast at producing them). Everyone knows that there are no ways to become better at increasing your numbers. Everyone has the following utility function: red points + blue points + yellow points. This world has no trade! But it does have comparative advantages!

Does you intuition still hold in the [Least Convenient Possible World](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/neQ7eXuaXpiYw7SBy/the-least-convenient-possible-world) where costs of creating new beings is 0?

2antanaclasis
In a world where the fixed costs of creating a being with 0 utility are 0 (very unlike our world), and the marginal costs of utility are increasing (like our world), the best population state would be an ~infinite number of people each with a positive infinitesimal amount of utility relative to nonexistence. However, the characteristics of personhood and existence would need to be so drastically different in order for the 0 cost to create assumption to be true (or even close to true, even virtual minds take up storage space) that I don’t really think that the conclusion in that particular case teaches us anything much meaningful about universes like our own.

At least the big Brittish schools this doesn't clearly hold based on the experience of people i know. Granted the evidence i have is consistent with them only caring about silver or better.

Also my impression for the Russian schools was that not speaking Russian was a problem they were happy to work around (which certainly isn't true everywhere)

The Danish team leader (the closest source to these events i have talked to) seems to (personally) believe the cheating allegations in 2010 or at least that the evidence was insufficient. 
Also note their non participation in 2017 and 2018 for reasons not known to me and in 2020 likely because the event was online

The comparison to chess is maybe more accurate than you think.
See stuff like:
Beginnings: The first IMO was held in Romania in 1959. It was initially founded for eastern European member countries of the Warsaw Pact, under the USSR bloc of influence, but later other countries participated as well.[2] (source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mathematical_Olympiad)
Also classic geometry is (to my knowledge) taught more generally in many eastern European countries (and make up 1/6-1/3 of the imo).

Also the note about incentives being larger in North Ko... (read more)

1Zuper
A comparison to many Olympic sports also fits here as well.  Just look at the success of Bulgaria in weightlifting throughout the 80s and 90s.  Strong incentives, culture, coaching, and some cheating all played a role, just as I am guessing they do for IMO success.
1[anonymous]
I think that's the case anywhere; qualifying for IMO is a pretty big deal.

One possible way to get at the hack of ignoring unlikely possibilities in a reasonable way might be to do something similar to the "typical set" found in information theory. Especially as utility function maximization can be reformulated as relative entropy minimization. 
(Epistemic status: my brain saw a possible connection, i have not spent much time on this idea)

Here is the updated graph
 

on this one days with 0 cases are not excluded
 

Worth noting that there doesnt seem to be any significant differences in the ages of people who have the new and old variant 

Source https://www.ssi.dk/-/media/cdn/files/notat_engelsk_virusvariant090121.pdf?la=da 

Update with new numbers.

In the period from 28-12 to 02-01 we get the following numbers

Positive tests: 14408
sequenced tests: 1261 (8.8%)
B.1.1.7 cases: 36 (2.9%)

Which is slightly slower than a doubleing time of a week (a 1.8 multiplier per week with naive extension (i believe the naive method is likely to underestimate))

1Oskar Mathiasen
Here is the updated graph   on this one days with 0 cases are not excluded   Worth noting that there doesnt seem to be any significant differences in the ages of people who have the new and old variant  Source https://www.ssi.dk/-/media/cdn/files/notat_engelsk_virusvariant090121.pdf?la=da 

In this alternate universe the old testament is true, so it is a reference to the seventh day of creation where god rested (after having created the world)

3TheMajor
Good point, I'm likely misinterpreting nextstrain website then.
Answer by Oskar Mathiasen160

The countries that do the most sequencing (who also have a significant number of cases) is Denmark (10.9% of positives are sequenced) and the UK(5.61%).
The Danish data makes me slightly hopeful:
1. the virus has been found in Denmark.
2. But the numbers are surprisingly small, 9 confirmed cases by 20-12,  
3. The Danish government have not released statements regarding its effects on vaccines.
3-1. Denmark made such an announcement as soon as any evidence above baseline existed for cluster 5, so the lack of announcement is more significant than one might otherwise think.
4. Case numbers are not going up in Denmark

3Oskar Mathiasen
Update can be found here https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Qtett2vv34jhBZkCw/data-about-the-new-coronavirus-variant-b-1-1-7-from-denmark
1Andrew_Clough
One thing that makes this disease hard to reason about is the high k.  That is, most people infect a very small number of people but some people infect large numbers. When case numbers are less than a thousand we should't expect a strong signal regardless of the underlying infectivity of the new strain.  This is evidence against it being significant but I fear its not very strong evidence.
2Gunnar_Zarncke
I think a good indicator of whether the strain is picking up is Ireland which recently has done a good job containing the virus but is close to UK and they closed traffic between them only recently i.e. too late. If you eyeball this Our World in Data chart (sorry, can't embed pics im comments) you could guess that Ireland is about 10 days behind UK. For other countries like France or Germany, it is too early to say. I expect to see a clear signal (if there is one to be seen) by mid-January.
3blob
On 2: This reports that Denmark has found 33 cases of the new variant, out of 7800 analysed between Nov 14 and Dec 14. Source: https://www.ssi.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2020/statens-serum-institut-udgiver-opdaterede-tal-for-den-engelske-covid-19-virusvariant, English reporting: https://www.thelocal.dk/20201224/denmark
7orthonormal
Can't update on #4. Of course a rapidly growing new strain will have a negligible impact on total numbers early on; it's a question of whether it will dominate the total numbers in a few months.

Denmark seems to also not be an option.
(and switzerland is an option twice)

1Søren Elverlin
I'd also like to pre-order from Denmark

If i had to guess on the motives, the last time a similar game was played (non publically) the meta developed to be about self recognizing, this is likely a rule to avoid this.
Winning strategy was some key string to identify yourself, cooperate with yourselt, play 3 otherwise. (Granted number of iterations was low, so people might not have moved to be non cooperating strategies  enough (something like grim trigger))

You predict that it is more likely to have an ai which " that can perform nearly every economically valuable task more cheaply than a human, will have been created " than "will write a book without substantial aid, that ends up on the New York Times bestseller list. "

This seems weird as the first seems very likely to cause the second.

4Matthew Barnett
A language model making it onto the NYT's bestseller list seems like a very specific thing. High level machine intelligence is not.

They seem to forget to first condition on the fact that the threshold must be an integer. This narrows the possibility space to have size countable infinit rather than uncountable infinit. Meaning they need to do a completely different mahtematics, which gives the correct ressult