These are fictional examples. In reality, like at the Battle of Cannae, for example, the Carthaginian force, led by Hannibal Barca, was outnumbered by the Romans by nearly 2:1 (roughly 40,000 Carthaginians against around 80,000 Romans). And yet the Carthaginians won by trapping the Romans in a double-envelopment and attacking them from all sides, preventing the Romans from concentrating their superior numbers, allowing Hannibal's forces to slaughter the Romans. Although Hannibal's forces may have outnumbered the Romans at the actual line of contact, no one claims that the Carthaginians had numerical superiority at Cannae.

Similarly, at Agincourt, the English were outnumbered by the French by approximately 2:1. The French were defeated because the English used terrain cleverly, forcing the French forces to attack down a narrow path surrounded by forest on both sides. This, combined with the superior firepower of English longbows, enabled the English to decimate the French, and win a major victory in the Hundred Years War. Once again, although the funnel effect of the terrain may have meant that the English enjoyed numerical superiority at the point of contact, Agincourt is widely regarded as an example of an underdog victory, where a smaller English army won a major victory against the odds against a much larger French foe.

At the battle of Narva, Charles XII of Sweden used a snowstorm to hide the approach of his 10,000 troops, suprising the 35,000 Russians laying siege to Narva and putting them to rout. Do you claim that the Swedes had numerical superiority over the Russians merely because some of the Russian troops could not see the Swedes until it was too late?

At the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson had 27 British ships, against Villenueve's combined Franco-Spanish fleet of 33. However, Nelson was able to maneuver his fleet such that it split Villenueve's line into thirds, allowing his fleet to defeat Villenueve piecemeal. Although Nelson had numerical superiority at specific, crucial points in the battle, overall Villenueve's fleet was larger, and Trafalgar is seen as a victory of British elan and seamanship, not numerical superiority.

The reason I bring up all these battles is because numerical superiority is but one part of victory, and, arguably, not even the most important part. Logistics, terrain, morale, and tactics all have parts to play as well. Redefining numerical superiority as you've done elides those factors, as you can always say, "Well, actually, at the point of contact, the victorious forces had numerical superiority over the vanquished." That's true, but it's in some ways as much of a tautology as, "The team that wins the game is the one that scores the most points." It doesn't inform any predictions about the future, nor does it indicate when you should be surprised by an outcome.

This concept stems back to Adam Smith, a man who lived with his mom all his life, never held a job other than in Academia, and lived in an England sustained by colonial commodities’ extraction. It makes sense, then, that to him, Economy looked like a Divine Mystery. He didn’t know how enterprises were planned, where goods came from, how they were processed, who’d buy them and why. That is to say, he wasn’t aware of the political planning behind raw goods’ acquisition, the orchestration and science behind manufacturing, the original realities and incentives of the places that made English surplus possible, nor the realities and incentives of the very concrete people who everyday made decisions at the bazar. Removed from all this, the market was indeed “a God” to him, and in the same situation, you’d probably have a similar perspective.

Have you actually read The Wealth of Nations? Smith was well aware of how the enterprises of his day were planned, where goods came from, how they were processed, and how markets worked. His argument proceeds from that intimate knowledge. Smith argued, that, counterintuitively to most people of his era, markets should be allowed to work, and that countries shouldn't engage in mercantilist policies to hoard "specie" (gold and silver). He argued that the true wealth of nations came from trade and industry, not shiny metals, and that the way to increase the wealth of a nation was to encourage the development of markets and commerce rather than mercantilist policies that accumulated shiny metal coins at the expense of trade. While Smith may have seen divine providence in the working of the market, that doesn't imply that he was unaware of the practicalities of trade, no more than Isaac Newton's belief in biblical numerology invalidates his ideas regarding the analysis of infinetesimals.

Furthermore, Smith's belief in the power of free markets and free exchange led him to be a staunch anti-colonialist. Smith was one of the first British writers to speak out against the depradations of the East India Company, arguing that the company was making money because it had the backing of the British monarchy, and therefore was able to engage in state-like looting via its private armies and navies, rather than making wealth from free exchange. He correctly identified that the East India Company would require ever increasing amount of subsidy from the state, which would have deleterious results for both the company and Great Britain.

You're free to use your own idiosyncratic definition of "numerical superiority", but then you shouldn't be surprised when your interlocutors are persistently confused as to how you can claim an army of 1000 has "numerical superiority" against an army ten times its size.

A thousand Frenchmen may have achieved local overmatch against the forces of the regime. But at that time, the Revolutionary forces most assuredly did not outnumber the entirety of the French military.

Who has the numerical advantage?

Alice, of course. Bob's army wins via superior cohesion and morale. By your logic there can be no victory against numerical odds, because you can always look closely and find specific points where the victorious side had numerical overmatch against the losing side.

The basic strategy of a revolution leverages an overwhelming numerical advantage to overcome the coercion produced by an existing power structure.

No it does not. Can you name one successful revolution where the revolutionaries had an "overwhelming numerical advantage"? In the American, French and Bolshevik revolutions the revolutionaries, at best, had parity with the forces opposing them. They succeeded not because they had overwhelming numerical advantage, but because they had advantages in coordination and cohesion that enabled them to strike while their opponents were still preparing.

With all of these anecdotes, you should ask yourself, what did people do before they had cell phones? Cell phones aren't that old! It's not like the 1990s and early 2000s were some pre-civilizational state where people just couldn't coordinate or make decisions for lack of instant communication across vast distances.

So to clarify, your position is that the US shouldn't impose national restrictions on datacenter development just because data centers are exceeding the capacity of local infrastructure in some places. Rather, we should allow those decisions to be made locally?

Even then, sometimes the assumption isn't pessimistic enough and users will complain about e.g. their cell phone's battery dropping immediately from 10% to 0% when they launch an app that causes the CPU to demand more current than the almost-dead battery can provide.