There is one problem with this. It is not entirely clear whether an ordinary living person will talk about consciousness if he is brought up accordingly his whole life (not given any literature that mentions consciousness, never talking to him about qualia, et cetera...).
Causal interactions? The answer is rather trivial. In order for the separate meaningless Planck moments of the brain's existence to be able to combine into "granules of qualia" that have integrity in time, they must be connected by something. It is usually assumed that there are causal relationships behind this, which can be likened to computational processes.
But many transhumanists, it seems to me, show some duality of thinking here. They agree that two adjacent computational cycles of the brain's work can be combined into one sensation. But they refuse t...
I don't quite understand how actual infinity differs from potential infinity in this context. Time in ToR is considered one of the dimensions of space. How can space be considered "potential infinity"? It subjectively looks like that to a forward-traveling observer. But usually we use the paradigm of objective reality, where everything is assumed to exist equally. Together with the past and the future, if we recall ToR again. Are we supposed to have a special case here, where we need to switch to the paradigm of subjective reality?
I am familiar with the id...
We can leave theology. It is not so important. I am more concerned with the questions of finitism and infinitism in relation to paradox of sets.
Finitism is logically consistent. However, it seems to me that it suffers from the same problem as the ontological proof of the existence of God. It is an attempt to make a global prediction about the nature of the Universe based on a small thought experiment. Predictions like "Time cannot be infinite", "Space cannot be infinite" follow directly from finitism. It turns out that we make these predictions based on ou...
"An infinite universe can exist."
"A greatest infinity cannot exist."
I think there is some kind of logical contradiction here. If the Universe exists and if it is infinite, then it must correspond to the concept of "the greatest infinity." True, Bertrand Russell once expressed doubt that one can correctly reason about the "Universe as a whole." I don't know. It seems strange to me. As if we recognize the existence of individual things, but not of all things as a whole. It seems like some kind of arbitrary crutch, a private "ad hoc" solution, conditioned by ...
It seems to me that this is an attempt to sit on two chairs at once.
On the one hand, you assume that there are some discrete moments of our experience. But what could such a moment be equal to? It is unlikely to be equal to Planck's time. This means that you assume that different chronoquanta of the brain's existence are connected into one "moment of experience". You postulate the existence of "granules of qualia" that have internal integrity and temporal extension.
On the other hand, you assume that these "granules of qualia" are separated from each other ...
There are several different aspects to this that I have different attitudes towards.
The multi-agent theory of consciousness is plausible. In fact, it is almost tautological. Any complex object can be considered "multi-agent". "Agent" is not necessarily identical to "consciousness". Otherwise, you know, you get homunculus recursion.
But there is another side to the issue.
The idea "You should force your brain to create new characters. You should mentally talk to these new characters. This will help you solve your psychological problems."
There are not really m...
Good evening. Sorry to bring up this old thread. Your discussion was very interesting. Specifically regarding this comment, one thing confuses me. Isn't "the memory of an omniscient God" in this thought experiment the same as "the set of all existing objects in all existing worlds"? If your reasoning about the set paradox proves that "the memory of an omniscient God" cannot exist, doesn't that prove that "an infinite universe" cannot exist either? Or is there a difference between the two? (Incidentally, I would like to point out that the universe and even the multiverse can be finite. Then an omniscient monotheistic God would not necessarily have infinite complexity. But for some reason many people forget this.)
Pascal's Mugging.
The problem is that the probability "if I don't pay this person five dollars, there will be a zillion sufferings in the world" existed before this person told you about it.
This probability has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I pay this person five dollars, there will be a zillion sufferings in the world" has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I raise my right hand, the universe will disappear" has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I don't raise my right hand, the universe will disappear" has always existed.
You c...
This is a logical vicious circle. Morality itself is the handmaiden of humans (and similar creatures in fantasy and SF). Morality has value only insofar as we find it important to care about human and quasi-human interests. This does not answer the question "Why do we care about human and quasi-human interests?"
One could try to find an answer in the prisoner's dilemma. In the logic of Kant's categorical imperative. Cooperation of rational agents and the like. Then I should sympathize with any system that cares about my interests, even if that system is otherwise like the Paperclipmaker and completely devoid of "unproductive" self-reflection. Great. There is some cynical common sense in this, but I feel a little disappointed.
The holy problem of qualia may actually be close to the question at hand here.
What do you mean when you ask yourself: "Does my neighbor have qualia?"
Do you mean: "Does my neighbor have the same experiences?" No. You know for sure that the answer is "No." Your brains and minds are not connected. What's going on in your neighbor's head will never be your experiences. It doesn't matter whether it's (ontologically) magical blue fire or complex neural squiggles. Your experiences and your neighbor's brain processes are different things anyway.
What do you mean wh...
The results of these tests have a much simpler explanation. Let's say we played a prank on all of humanity. We slipped each person a jar of caustic bitter quinine under the guise of delicious squash caviar. A week later, we conduct a mass social survey: "How much do such pranks irritate you?" It is natural to expect that the people who tend to eat any food quickly, without immediately paying attention to its smell and taste, will show the strongest hatred for such things. This will not mean that they are quinine lovers. But it will mean that they mistakenly managed to eat some quinine before their body detected the substitution. Therefore, they became especially angry and became "quininephobes".
You seem like a very honest and friendly person, as do most of the people in this thread. I would just say, "What difference does it make whether it's a bug or a feature? Maybe the admins themselves haven't agreed on this. Maybe some admins think it's a bug, and some admins think it's a feature. It's a gray area. But in any case, I'd rather not draw the admins' attention to what's going on, because then their opinion might be determined in a way that's not favorable to us. We're not breaking any rules while this is a gray area. But our actions will become ...
The Hume's quote (or rather the way you use it) has nothing to do with models of reality. Your post is not about the things Scott was talking about from the very beginning.
Suppose I say "Sirius is a quasar." I am relying on the generally accepted meaning of the word "quasar." My words suggest that the interlocutor change the model of reality. My words are a hypothesis. You can accept this hypothesis or reject it.
Suppose the interlocutor says "Sirius cannot be considered a quasar because it would have very bad social consequences." Perhaps he is making a mi...
Sorry for the possible broken language.
I write through a online-translator.
The described world causes mixed impressions. The ability to get rid of the unsolicited influence of time is very valuable. But at the same time, there is an aspect of deceptiveness here. When reading, I felt the bitter laughter of a religious fundamentalist inside. You know, there are people who constantly accuse the modern Western technocratic civilization of hypocritical infantilism and of trying to forget about the existence of death.
"These naive hedonists try to forget about th...
If we talk about the quote at the beginning, then its final conclusion seems to me not entirely correct.
What the vast majority of people mean by "emotions" is different from "rational functions of emotions". Yudkowsky in his essay on emotions is playing with words, using terms that are not quite traditional.
Fear is not "I calmly foresee the negative consequences of some actions and therefore I avoid them."
Fear is rather "The thought of the possibility of some negative events makes me tremble, I have useless reflections, I have cognitive distortions that ma... (read more)