All of quwgri's Comments + Replies

quwgri10

If we talk about the quote at the beginning, then its final conclusion seems to me not entirely correct.
What the vast majority of people mean by "emotions" is different from "rational functions of emotions". Yudkowsky in his essay on emotions is playing with words, using terms that are not quite traditional.
Fear is not "I calmly foresee the negative consequences of some actions and therefore I avoid them."
Fear is rather "The thought of the possibility of some negative events makes me tremble, I have useless reflections, I have cognitive distortions that ma... (read more)

quwgri30

There is one problem with this. It is not entirely clear whether an ordinary living person will talk about consciousness if he is brought up accordingly his whole life (not given any literature that mentions consciousness, never talking to him about qualia, et cetera...).

2Gunnar_Zarncke
Sure, but you could design the test in a way that makes this more likely, such as in a dialog with AI: person: "Ask me a question?"      AI: "What is a quorum?" person: "Wait, I think I remember this. Let me think." AI: "What is thinking?" person: "Thinking is what goes on in people's minds, e.g., before they speak, or even during. For example, I just noticed that I didn't know this and wanted to explore options before answering." AI: ... If the AI says: "Interesting, that is also what happens for me." then presumably it has consciousness.
quwgri10

Causal interactions? The answer is rather trivial. In order for the separate meaningless Planck moments of the brain's existence to be able to combine into "granules of qualia" that have integrity in time, they must be connected by something. It is usually assumed that there are causal relationships behind this, which can be likened to computational processes.

But many transhumanists, it seems to me, show some duality of thinking here. They agree that two adjacent computational cycles of the brain's work can be combined into one sensation. But they refuse t... (read more)

quwgri10

I don't quite understand how actual infinity differs from potential infinity in this context. Time in ToR is considered one of the dimensions of space. How can space be considered "potential infinity"? It subjectively looks like that to a forward-traveling observer. But usually we use the paradigm of objective reality, where everything is assumed to exist equally. Together with the past and the future, if we recall ToR again. Are we supposed to have a special case here, where we need to switch to the paradigm of subjective reality?

I am familiar with the id... (read more)

quwgri10

We can leave theology. It is not so important. I am more concerned with the questions of finitism and infinitism in relation to paradox of sets.

Finitism is logically consistent. However, it seems to me that it suffers from the same problem as the ontological proof of the existence of God. It is an attempt to make a global prediction about the nature of the Universe based on a small thought experiment. Predictions like "Time cannot be infinite", "Space cannot be infinite" follow directly from finitism. It turns out that we make these predictions based on ou... (read more)

2gilch
Finitism doesn't reject the existence of any given natural number (although ultrafinitism might), nor the validity of the successor function (counting), nor even the notion of a "potential" infinity (like time), just the idea of a completed one being an object in its own right (which can be put into a set). The Axiom of Infinity doesn't let you escape the notion of classes which can't themselves be an element of a set. Set theory runs into paradoxes if we allow it. Is it such an invalid move to disallow the class of Naturals as an element of a set, when even ZFC must disallow the Surreals for similar reasons? Before Cantor, all mathematicians were finitists. It's not a weird position historically. We do model physics with "real" numbers, but that doesn't mean the underlying reality is infinite or even infinitely divisible. My finitism is motivated by my understanding of physics and cosmology, not the other way around. Nature seems to cut us off from any access to any completed infinity, and it's not clear that even potential infinities are allowed (hence my sympathy with ultrafinitism). I have no need of that axiom. Quantum Field Theory, though traditionally modeled using continuous mathematics, implies the Bekenstein bound: a finite region of space contains a finite amount of information. There are no "infinite bits" available to build the real numbers with. However densely you store information, eventually, at some point, your media collapses into a black hole, and packing in more must take up more space. Physical space can't be a continuum like the "reals". It's not infinitely divisible. Measuring distance with increasing precision requires higher frequency waves, and thus higher energies, which eventually has enough effective mass to gravitationally distort the very space you are measuring, eventually collapsing into a black hole. Below a certain limit, distance isn't physically meaningful. If you assume an electron is a point particle with "infinitesimal"
quwgri1-4

"An infinite universe can exist."
"A greatest infinity cannot exist."
I think there is some kind of logical contradiction here. If the Universe exists and if it is infinite, then it must correspond to the concept of "the greatest infinity." True, Bertrand Russell once expressed doubt that one can correctly reason about the "Universe as a whole." I don't know. It seems strange to me. As if we recognize the existence of individual things, but not of all things as a whole. It seems like some kind of arbitrary crutch, a private "ad hoc" solution, conditioned by ... (read more)

2gilch
I'm hearing intuitions, not arguments here. Do you understand Cantor's Diagonalization argument? This proves that the set of all integers is "smaller" (in a well-defined way) than the set of all real numbers, despite the set of all integers being already infinite in size. And it doesn't end there. There is no largest set. Russell's paradox arises when a set definition refers to itself. For example, in a certain town, the barber is the one who shaves all those (and only those) who do not shave themselves. This seems to make sense its face. But who shaves the barber? Contradiction! Not all set definitions are valid, and this includes the universal one, which can be proved to not exist in many ways, at least in the usual ZFC (and similar). There are two ways to construct a universal object. Either make it a non-set notion like a "proper class", which can't be an element of a set (and thus can't contain itself or any other proper class), or restrict the axiom of comprehension in a way which results in a non-well-founded set theory. Cantor's Theorem doesn't hold for all sets in NF. The diagonal set argument can't be constructed (in all cases) under its rules. NF has a universal set that contains itself, but it accomplishes this by restricting comprehension to stratified formulas. I'm not a set theorist, so I'm still not sure I understand this properly, but it looks like an infinite hierarchy of set types, each with its own universal set. Again, no end to the hierarchy, but in practice all the copies behave the same way. So instead of strictly two types of classes, the proper class and the small class, you have some kind of hyperset that can contain sets, but not other hypersets, and hyper-hypersets that can contain both, but not other hyper-hypersets, and so forth, ad infinitum. Personally, I'm rather sympathetic to the ultrafinitists, and might be a finitist myself. I can accept the slope of a vertical line being "infinite" in the limit. That's just an artifact of ho
quwgri90

It seems to me that this is an attempt to sit on two chairs at once.
On the one hand, you assume that there are some discrete moments of our experience. But what could such a moment be equal to? It is unlikely to be equal to Planck's time. This means that you assume that different chronoquanta of the brain's existence are connected into one "moment of experience". You postulate the existence of "granules of qualia" that have internal integrity and temporal extension.
On the other hand, you assume that these "granules of qualia" are separated from each other ... (read more)

quwgri10

There are several different aspects to this that I have different attitudes towards.
The multi-agent theory of consciousness is plausible. In fact, it is almost tautological. Any complex object can be considered "multi-agent". "Agent" is not necessarily identical to "consciousness". Otherwise, you know, you get homunculus recursion.
But there is another side to the issue.
The idea "You should force your brain to create new characters. You should mentally talk to these new characters. This will help you solve your psychological problems."
There are not really m... (read more)

quwgri10

Good evening. Sorry to bring up this old thread. Your discussion was very interesting. Specifically regarding this comment, one thing confuses me. Isn't "the memory of an omniscient God" in this thought experiment the same as "the set of all existing objects in all existing worlds"? If your reasoning about the set paradox proves that "the memory of an omniscient God" cannot exist, doesn't that prove that "an infinite universe" cannot exist either? Or is there a difference between the two? (Incidentally, I would like to point out that the universe and even the multiverse can be finite. Then an omniscient monotheistic God would not necessarily have infinite complexity. But for some reason many people forget this.)

3gilch
The main idea here is that one can always derive a "greater" set (in terms of cardinality) from any given set, even if the given set is already infinite, because there are higher degrees of infinity. There is no greatest infinity, just like there is no largest number. So even if (hypothetically) a Being with infinite knowledge exists, there could be Beings with greater knowledge than that. No matter which god you choose, there could be one greater than that, meaning there are things the god you chose doesn't know (and hence He isn't "omniscient", and therefore isn't "God", because this was a required attribute.) I don't know how to interpret "all existing objects", because I don't know what counts as an "object" in your definition. Set theory doesn't require ur-objects (although those are known variations) and just starts with the empty set, meaning all "objects" are themselves sets. The powerset operation evaluates to the set of all subsets of a set. The powerset of a set always has greater cardinality than the set you started with. That is, for any given collection of "objects", the number of possible groupings of those objects is always a greater number than the number of objects, even if the collection of objects you started with had an infinite number to begin with. So no, this doesn't prove that an infinite universe cannot exist, just that there are degrees of infinities (and no "greatest" one). Naiive set theory leads to paradoxes when defining self-referential sets. The idea of "infinite" gods seem to have similar problems. There are various ways to resolve this. The typical one used in foundations of mathematics is the notion of a collection that is too large to be a set, a "proper class". ("Class" used to be synonymous with "set".) But later on in the discussion it was pointed out that this isn't the only possible resolution.
quwgri10

Pascal's Mugging.
The problem is that the probability "if I don't pay this person five dollars, there will be a zillion sufferings in the world" existed before this person told you about it.
This probability has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I pay this person five dollars, there will be a zillion sufferings in the world" has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I raise my right hand, the universe will disappear" has always existed.
Just as the probability "if I don't raise my right hand, the universe will disappear" has always existed.
You c... (read more)

quwgri10

This is a logical vicious circle. Morality itself is the handmaiden of humans (and similar creatures in fantasy and SF). Morality has value only insofar as we find it important to care about human and quasi-human interests. This does not answer the question "Why do we care about human and quasi-human interests?"

One could try to find an answer in the prisoner's dilemma. In the logic of Kant's categorical imperative. Cooperation of rational agents and the like. Then I should sympathize with any system that cares about my interests, even if that system is otherwise like the Paperclipmaker and completely devoid of "unproductive" self-reflection. Great. There is some cynical common sense in this, but I feel a little disappointed.

quwgri1-1

The holy problem of qualia may actually be close to the question at hand here.

What do you mean when you ask yourself: "Does my neighbor have qualia?"

Do you mean: "Does my neighbor have the same experiences?" No. You know for sure that the answer is "No." Your brains and minds are not connected. What's going on in your neighbor's head will never be your experiences. It doesn't matter whether it's (ontologically) magical blue fire or complex neural squiggles. Your experiences and your neighbor's brain processes are different things anyway.

What do you mean wh... (read more)

quwgri10

The results of these tests have a much simpler explanation. Let's say we played a prank on all of humanity. We slipped each person a jar of caustic bitter quinine under the guise of delicious squash caviar. A week later, we conduct a mass social survey: "How much do such pranks irritate you?" It is natural to expect that the people who tend to eat any food quickly, without immediately paying attention to its smell and taste, will show the strongest hatred for such things. This will not mean that they are quinine lovers. But it will mean that they mistakenly managed to eat some quinine before their body detected the substitution. Therefore, they became especially angry and became "quininephobes".

quwgri10

You seem like a very honest and friendly person, as do most of the people in this thread. I would just say, "What difference does it make whether it's a bug or a feature? Maybe the admins themselves haven't agreed on this. Maybe some admins think it's a bug, and some admins think it's a feature. It's a gray area. But in any case, I'd rather not draw the admins' attention to what's going on, because then their opinion might be determined in a way that's not favorable to us. We're not breaking any rules while this is a gray area. But our actions will become ... (read more)

quwgri10

The Hume's quote (or rather the way you use it) has nothing to do with models of reality. Your post is not about the things Scott was talking about from the very beginning.

Suppose I say "Sirius is a quasar." I am relying on the generally accepted meaning of the word "quasar." My words suggest that the interlocutor change the model of reality. My words are a hypothesis. You can accept this hypothesis or reject it.

Suppose the interlocutor says "Sirius cannot be considered a quasar because it would have very bad social consequences." Perhaps he is making a mi... (read more)

quwgri30

Sorry for the possible broken language.
I write through a online-translator.
The described world causes mixed impressions. The ability to get rid of the unsolicited influence of time is very valuable. But at the same time, there is an aspect of deceptiveness here. When reading, I felt the bitter laughter of a religious fundamentalist inside. You know, there are people who constantly accuse the modern Western technocratic civilization of hypocritical infantilism and of trying to forget about the existence of death.
"These naive hedonists try to forget about th... (read more)