All of Shane's Comments + Replies

Shane00

In the example there are no debts. Savings in money terms are the dollars held, therefore the savings rate is unchanged. Savings in corn or cattle are unaffected by the change in money quantity.

Shane00

Why would the law of supply and demand not rest on marginal utility, rather than selfishness? Just because I have a selfish desire doesn't mean that I can satisfy the desire. Utility and means mix together with self interest to render choices regarding use of scarce resources.

Shane10

That is not an economic model or prediction of utility for the purpose. It will remain to be understood what happens to all other prices and production when this single adjustment is made. In addition, the question arises why the price is being adjusted. For example, what decisions were made and what conditions changed, either actually or by way of changes in understanding, which caused the prices to change?

Besides, your example is in reference to the law of supply and demand.

Shane00

Prices change based on the law of supply and demand.

Consider Bernanke’s recent comments about the control the Fed has over the economy.

“Like gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the extent that they are strictly limited in supply. But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the... (read more)

0Swimmy
The law of supply and demand is based on the selfishness assumption. Yes there is an argument that even upward-sloping demand curves will eventually slope downwards, but I can always find some margin or theoretical example for which it's not true over some interval.
Shane00

Swimmy, I think perhaps you are not following the argument regarding inflation.

If one created a simple model wherein everyone had x currency units today, and then tomorrow an additional quantity of costless new money was created, such that each person had 2x currency units, then inflation would serve no purpose. Each person's purchasing power would be unchanged.

What is the mathematical and logical error you see in that model?

0Swimmy
Prices have to change as well. The prediction that producers will change their prices is based on the selfishness assumption.
Shane00

Thanks for your remarks teageegeepea.

There is a difference between modeling and manipulating.

To model, is to create a framework that describes something.

To manipulate is to choose one or more elements among the known attributes of the model which can be controlled and then use that to coercively accomplish goals; then set the model up to "show good things are happening" based on the all wise management of the modeled system by the managers.

You note "a significant degree of accuracy". The point is that the degree of accuracy that can be attained is insufficient for the purpose.

Shane00

Thanks nateemmons. I appreciate the distinction being made.

My reason for mixing is the centrality of private property and the consequent violation of property rights, using the standard of theft or fraud, that follows manipulation of currency, favored business license or heavy taxation for the purpose of redistribution. My interest in the school of thought is less theoretical and more practical application; i.e. how the body of knowledge affects the decisions by government that we then have to live with.

The problem I have here is the ganging up on the ... (read more)

1Jonathan
If there was ever a Popperian refutation of the econometric/quant modelling of human behaviour we are surely living through that now. No matter how many people know that water is H2O, it will not affect the fact. Once we have people telling us they can plug in probabilities for human actions, we have the start of monumental folly. Every wise investor understands what Soros calls reflexivity. There is a role for math clearly but I find this post obsession about what to me seem fairly dull objections to the Austrian school miss their larger picture which seems to me overwhelmingly supported by current market experience. It should not be a surprise to note that some of the most successful money managers/traders I work with have a strong Austrian bias, at least in the understanding of the monetary system and its systemic flaws and the predictable response of government... all using shiny models of course. Ahem. I believe Mises said that socialism would fail at a time when the left (I do not imply Mises was thus on the right) was wowed over the success of Russia etc. and logically his theory would suggest money would be debased over time and that wealth would increasingly, and unjustly flow in Cantillon fashion to the earlier recipients of new money. Well, that to me means bankers, property developers, lawyers etc and this is so. Today we are seeing rates near zero and government supporting long bonds and it is no surprise, to an Austrian trader, that we are seeing enormous trading profits in these areas of investment banks. This is an example of the Cantillon effect. I would recommend we take the powerful parts from the Austrian theory and use them in real life. They surely work but it is also true that many who call themselves Austrians are of a 'perma-bear' disposition so be careful who you listen to. Look for form.
Shane00

Austrians believe that modeling for purposes of prediction is fruitless. Modeling for the purpose of control is unethical and oppressive because property rights are violated.

Other economists believe they can successfully model and manage an economy. They deal in numbers without taking into consideration human action at a level that has explanatory power. Monetarists, Keynesians, etc. ignore human action and generally treat the notion as unimportant. Austrians claim human action cannot be modeled, but knowledge of human action is required in order to mo... (read more)

0Paul Crowley
So if someone does successfully make a prediction about human behaviour, for example that a price increase will reduce sales, that falsifies the entire edifice of Austrian economics?
0nateemmons
I would be cautious saying "Modeling for the purpose of control is unethical and oppressive because property rights are violated" purely because I wouldn't want people to get the idea that Austrian Economists consider economics as normative. Austrian Economics may point out that the economic calculation problem shows that central planning is impossible, but it's libertarian political philosophy that talks about things being 'ethical' or 'unethical'. I think it's important to keep the distinction between economics and political philosophy very clear.
2teageegeepea
Models are used for prediction in all sorts of domains. Each of us has a mental model (or "theory of mind") of how others behave to a significant degree of accuracy. Economics often covers situations well outside the range of the evolutionary adaptive era for which our intuitive mental models don't work as well. If modeling were truly useless, it wouldn't matter if it was used "for the purpose of control" because it wouldn't get you anywhere. I wish Matthew Mueller's Post-Austrian Economics blog was still up, because he made a good point about the unfortunate entanglement of austrian economics with political libertarianism since Rothbard. This results in some of its adherents viewing people who think their method is flawed as political enemies. For the record, I still read sites like mises.org & Lew Rockwell (though to a lesser extent recently due to all the competing distractions on the internet and my banning from the comments section of the former) and appreciate the work they do in bringing economics to a wider audience even if they can exhibit the flaws they point out in Rand's circle.
Shane10

Human action can indeed be to some measure predicted.

For instance, if I conducted an experiment with 100 people wherein I presented each person with the opportunity to place their bare hand on a red hot burner on a stove, including leaving it there for one minute, I predict 100% would say no. I could even model that experiment.

However, this kind and degree of predictability is meaningless in the context of economic modeling.

What if the person who is being presented with the choice in the Allais Paradox just lost their mother to death, as well as losing... (read more)

Shane-20

Austrians recognize that there is an unquantifiable variable in economics, namely human action, which heavily influences economic outcomes. You want to insert an arbitrary (estimated) variable value, i.e. probability estimate, in a model to account for something that Mises claims cannot be accounted for based on experience and historical fact.

Since you seem to believe that the variable value can be known and quantified for modeling purposes, what is it? What are the attributes of the variable collection which represent human action in economics?

Mises cla... (read more)

2Swimmy
If human action could not be predicted, the results of experiments into the Allais Paradox, preference reversal, conjunction fallacy, and on and on, should be a random walk. Since they're not, human action can be to some measure predicted. If an Austrian believes all such research should be discounted by 100%, I'm taking issue with whatever prior gives that result. And no, using priors in the way I described is not circular reasoning. Recall Bayes' Rule for updating on evidence: P(H|E) = P(H)P(E|H)/P(E) To be as clear as possible, let's use the following example. We want to test the hypothesis "People act rationally and self-interested." As a definition for rationality, let's say people's STABLE preferences disallow intransitivity. Say I start with a prior for the hypothesis, P(H)=0.9. The likelihood that we see experimental evidence of intransitive preferences given this hypothesis must be fairly low, but there could always be experimental error, so P(E|H)=0.05. This estimate is where my priors come in as I described above. If I think it's equally likely for an experiment to show evidence of intransitivity as transitivity, even given my hypothesis, P(E|H)=0.5. I discount by my estimate that there will be experimental evidence of intransitive preferences regardless. P(E) = P(H1)P(E|H1) + P(H2)P(E|H2). Given P(Intransitivity results | People are rational) = 0.05, P(Intransitivity | People are irrational) = 0.95, we have, for the case of the believer P(E) = 0.05 0.9+0.1 0.95 = 0.14 and, for the case of the skeptic, 0.5 0.9+0.1 0.5 = 0.5. So, for the believer, evidence of intransitivity gives 0.90.05/0.14 = 0.32, and for the case of the skeptic, 0.9 0.5/0.5 = 0.9, ie, no updating. Mises argues that we can never have any evidence of intransitive preferences because preferences are not stable. Thus, the preference reversal evident in choosing Gamble 1 in Part 1 and Gamble 2 in Part 2 of the Allais Paradox can never be evidence of intransitive preferences. But, I arg
2Paul Crowley
I'm having a hard time following your argument. Everyone who is doing economics is working on the assumption that there are some useful regularities about human behaviour. None claim a model that perfectly predicts the behaviour of every individual. What distinction are you drawing here between the regularities that the Austrians assume about human behaviour, and the regularities that other economists assume?
Shane10

I understand this point, but the presupposition has a purpose beyond itself. It is not intended to exist as a statement of truth which cannot be refuted. Its purpose is to acknowledge the lowest step in the Austrian analysis for which we can describe our understanding. That point is the touchstone for what we cannot know and for that which we cannot go beyond because of the nature of the things in question.

The Austrian view observes certain outcomes which can be quantified and then works backward through regressions to describe what we can know about wh... (read more)

2Swimmy
And, come to think of it, no, I do not agree that the inflation example is a mathematical and logical truth, unless one assumes self-interest to actually mean selfishness. Otherwise, a banker may say, "I love all you little goofballs so much, I'm not going to raise the interest rate the full price of inflation. Go ahead and have some of my mone." Then the inflation would have an effect. But if self-interest is selfishness, then it's not an unknown variable, and I can think of many experimental results to confirm or disconfirm it.
0Swimmy
My argument is that the it's irrelevant whether the presuppositions can be known with certainty. You can attach a probability estimate to them, allowing for the uncertainty of your missing variables, discount the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics accordingly, and update your priors accordingly. If your unconditional probability assignment is such that the uncertainty influenced by those missing variables discounts all such evidence by 100%, I really want you to show your work.
Shane00

According to the about page, this group holds mathematical modeling in high esteem. A central idea being that the mind itself, individually and, by extension, groups of minds, can be mathematically described and modeled.

I would be interested to hear how one claims to correlate the results of a model to the workings of the mind. It sounds to me more like the result of industrious researchers mixed with computing power which is sufficient for the task of repeatedly tweaking a complex model until the product resembles an observed reality. Afterward, chos... (read more)

3Swimmy
I have little interest in creating a model of the economy so that I can control it with a magic government wand. I am a Public Choice libertarian. I have an interest in updating my beliefs according to the evidence. The problem is not that Mises and Rothbard have presuppositions, it is that they consider their priors immune to all inference. As soon as you invoke experience and evidence as justifications for their presuppositions, you have distanced yourself from their position, which is that no evidence could ever confirm or disconfirm their theory.