All of SocratesDissatisfied's Comments + Replies

  1. You may be forgetting Canada, Australia and New Zealand. When a philosophical field is preeminent in the English speaking part of the developed world; and of significant (but secondary) importance in non-English speaking European countries; it's a pretty good bet that it's the largest school of Western philosophy (population of CANZUK+US > population of Western Europe - UK; and I would guess the distribution of funding/size of philosophical faculties would only amplify this trend).
  2. It strikes me as odd to say that Continental ideas couldn't usefully be "
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2alexgieg
Regarding 1 and 3, good points, and I agree. On 2, when I say formalizable, I mean in terms of giving the original arguments a symbolic formal treatment, that is, converting them into formal logical statements. Much of non-analytic philosophy has to do with criticizing this kind of procedure. For an example among many, check this recent one from a Neo-Thomistic perspective (I refer to this one because it's fresh on my mind, I read it a few days ago). On 4, maybe a practical alternative would be to substitute vaguer but broader relations, such as "agrees", "partially agrees", "disagrees", "purports to encompass", "purports to replace", "opposes", "strawmans" etc., to the more restricted notions of truth values. This would allow for a mindmap-style set of multidirectional relations and clusterings.

Hey Alex, thanks for your thoughts. My response would be as follows: 
 

  1. Analytic Philosophy is probably the preeminent field of philosophical enquiry in the developed world. So, even if Philosophy Web did prove constrained to Analytic Philosophy, it would still possess major epistemic value (the Hubble Telescope is only useful for astronomy, the Hadron Collider is only useful for particle physics, etc.; but that's not really a problem given the importance of those fields).
  2. Having said that, Philosophy Web ought to be able to capture a wide variety o
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2alexgieg
My comments: 1. That's actually not the case. Analytic Philosophy is preeminent in the US and, to some extent, the UK. Everywhere else it's a topic that one learns among others, and usually in a secondary and subsidiary manner. For example, I majored in Philosophy in 2009. My university's Philosophy department, which happens to be the most important in my country and therefore the source of that vast majority of Philosophy undergraduates and graduates who then go on to influence other Philosophy departments, was founded by Continental philosophers, and remains almost entirely focused on that, with a major French sub-department, a secondary German one, some professors focusing in Classic and (continental style) English philosophers. In the Analytic tradition there was exactly one professor, whose area of research was Philosophy of Science. 2. Formalization, of any kind, is mostly an Analytic approach. When one formalizes a Continental philosophy, it cease being the original philosophy and becomes an Analytic interpretation of that Continental philosophy, so not the original anymore. And there's a remarkable loss of content in such a translation. 3. They have "experiences" and "perceptions". Husserl's project, for instance, was to re-fund Philosophy in the manner of a science by insisting that the objects (in the proper Kantian meaning of the word) philosophers work upon be first described precisely so that, when two philosophers discuss about them, they're talking about precisely the same thing, so as to avoid divergences due to ambiguities in regards to the objects themselves. Phenomenology then, as Husserl understood it, was to focus on developing a full description of phenomena (perceived objects), to only afterwards philosophize about them. Phenomena, therefore, don't have opposites, since they're raw "objectively shared subjetive perceptual descriptions", never concepts. Heidegger was a student under Husserl, so much of his work consists in describing phen

Eliezer, to the extent that any epistemic progress has been made at all, was it not ever thus?

To give one example: the scientific method is an incredibly powerful tool for generating knowledge, and has been very widely accepted as such for the past two centuries.
But even a cursory reading of the history of science reveals that scientists themselves, despite having great taste in rationalist institutions, often had terrible taste in personal rationality. They were frequently petty, biased, determined to believe their own theories regardless of evidence, def... (read more)

RE 1: yes, but it’s a matter of degree. Technically every scientific theory is somewhat unfalsifiable (you can always invent saving hypotheses). But some are more falsifiable than others (some lend themselves to saving hypotheses, don’t make clear predictions in the first place, etc.) so falsifiability is still a useful criterion of theory choice. Likewise here with IB and needless jargon.

RE 2: This may just be my current writing style! I appreciate any constructive comments on how it might have been phrased better.

2Ericf
I read it as: Hedging invites attacks Confidence implies expertise And then the concluding sentence is missing: "Therefore, seemingly confident speakers are actually more likely to be bluffing" (this is widely, but not universally, known [#link "it is known" by Zvi])

Point taken and edited accordingly.

I knew there were more than two possibilities, and didn't say the two I highlighted were the only possibilities for that reason. But I concede that the original wording unnecessarily suggested this. 

Appreciate the feedback - and have edited that section accordingly to refer to Antifa only, versus BLM. 

My impression with them is that they have deeper historical roots than BLM, though their emergence into public consciousness is probably much more recent.