Habit. It helps to get enough sleep.
Don't worry, it will have been available in 2017 one of these days.
So, on one level, my response to this is similar to the one I gave (a few years ago) [http://lesswrong.com/lw/qx/timeless_identity/9trc]... I agree that there's a personal relationship with BtVS, just like there's a personal relationship with my husband, that we'd want to preserve if we wanted to perfectly preserve me.
I was merely arguing that the bitlength of that personal information is much less than the actual information content of my brain, and there's a great deal of compression leverage to be gained by taking the shared memories of BtVS out of bot...
"So long as your preferences are coherent, stable, and self-consistent then you should be fine."
Yes, absolutely.
And yes, the fact that my preferences are not coherent, stable, and self-consistent is probably the sort of thing I was concerned about... though it was years ago.
You mean that it didn't happen here or in the global society?
I mean that it's unlikely that "the site [would] end up with a similar "rational" political consensus if political discussion went through".
Discussions about religion seems to me to be equally unproductive in general.
In the global society? I agree.
I can imagine that if the site endorsed a political ideology its readers would may become biased forward it (even if just by selection of readers).
Sure, that's possible.
...But there is a possibility that that happened wit
Yup, agreed with all of this. (Well, I do think we have had discussions about which political ideology is correct, but I agree that we shy away from them and endorse political discussions about issues.)
Aren't people on LessWrong quite good at solving their own problems?
Nah, not necessarily. Merely interested in better ways of doing so. (Among other things.)
Yeah, there's a communally endorsed position on which religion(s) is/are correct ("none of them are correct"), but there is no similar communally endorsed position on which political ideology(ies) is/are correct.
There's also no similar communally endorsed position on which brand of car is best, but there's no ban on discussion of cars, because in our experience discussions of car brands, unlike discussions of political ideologies, tend to stay relatively civil and productive.
What do you think? Would the site end up with a similar "rational" political consensus if political discussion went through?
I find it extremely unlilkely. It certainly hasn't in the past.
This comment taken out of context kind of delighted me.
When you see the word "morals" used without further clarification, do you take it to mean something different from "values" or "terminal goals"?
Depends on context.
When I use it, it means something kind of like "what we want to happen." More precisely, I treat moral principles as sort keys for determining the preference order of possible worlds. When I say that X is morally superior to Y, I mean that I prefer worlds with more X in them (all else being equal) to worlds with more Y in them.
I know other people who, when...
For my part, it's difficult for me to imagine a set of observations I could make that would provide sufficient evidence to justify belief in many of the kinds of statements that get tossed around in these sorts of discussions. I generally just assume Omega adjusts my priors directly.
The current open thread is here:
http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/nns/open_thread_may_30_june_5_2016/
A new one will be started soon.
Suppose Mary has enough information to predict her own behavior. Suppose she predicts she will do x. Could she not, upon deducing that fact, decide to not do x?
There are three possibilities worth disambiguating here.
1) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S1 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S1 includes Mary's knowledge of this prediction.
2) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S2 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S2 does not include Mary's knowledge of this prediction.
3) Mary predicts that she will do X independent of her knowledge, memories, experiences, etc.
Along some dimensions I consider salient, at least. PM me for spoilers if you want them. (It's not a bad book, but not worth reading just for this if you wouldn't otherwise.)
Have you ever read John Brunner's "Stand on Zanzibar"? A conversation not unlike this is a key plot point.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "as random."
It may well be that there are discernable patterns in a sequence of manually simulated coin-flips that would allow us to distinguish such sequences from actual coinflips. The most plausible hypothetical examples I can come up with would result in a non-1:1 ratio... e.g., humans having a bias in favor of heads or tails.
Or, if each person is laying a coin down next to the previous coin, such that they are able to see the pattern thus far, we might find any number of pattern-level biases... e.g., if ...
"simply the university" => "simplify the universe"?
Hm. Let me try to restate that to make sure I follow you.
Consider three categories of environments: (Er) real environments, (Esa) simulated environments that closely resemble Er, aka "ancestral simulations", and (Esw) simulated environments that dont't closely resemble Er, aka "weird simulations."
The question is, is my current environment E in Er or not?
Bostrom's argument as I understand it is that if post-human civilizations exist and create many Esa-type environments, then for most E, (E in Esa) and not (E in Er). Therefore, given th...
I don't think it is a sidetrack, actually... at least, not if we charitably assume your initial comment is on-point.
Let me break this down in order to be a little clearer here.
Lumifer asserted that omniscience and free will are incompatible, and you replied that as the author of a story you have the ability to state that a character will in the future make a free choice. "The same thing would apply," you wrote, "to a situation where you are created free by an omnipotent being."
I understand you to mean that just like the author of a sto...
As the author of a story, I have the power to write in the preface, before the story is written at all, "Peter has free will and in chapter 4, he will freely choose to go left." It would be ridiculous to say that Peter isn't free, and that I am wrong about my story. He is free in the story, just as he has certain other characteristics in the story.
So, just to clarify my understanding of your claim here... if I write in my story "Peter goes left and simultaneously stands still," is it similarly ridiculous to say that I'm wrong about ...
That said, if we can define the characteristics of some standard queries we would like exposed (for example, " Top Upvoters, 30 Days" and "Top Downvoters, 30 Days" as Vaniver mentioned) Trike might be willing to expose those queries to LW admins.
Or they might not. The way to find out is to ask, but we should only bother asking if we actually want them to do so. So discussing it internally in advance of testing those limits seems sensible.
Cool. Thanks for publishing this.
Out of curiosity, does any of CFAR's "competition" (other personal-effectiveness, productivity, growth, etc. workshops and similar things) publish any similar sort of post-workshop followup, and what sorts of tools they use/results they get if so?
So, you pick an example with no emotional valence. But let's suppose instead that I have reason to believe that I'm perfectly safe, but find myself believing that someone is going to kill me in my sleep. This would not stop me from telling people I'm perfectly safe, or from giving the reasons that show I'm perfectly safe, or from accepting a similar $100 bet. It might, however, prevent me from getting a good night's sleep.
Is that not a thing that matters about the belief that I'm safe?
I'm not sure what I wrote that gave you this idea.
(nods) Months later, neither am I. Perhaps I'd remember if I reread the exchange, but I'm not doing so right now.
Regardless, I appreciate the correction.
And much like Vaniver below (above? earlier!), I am unsure how to translate these sorts of claims into anything testable.
Also I'm wary of the tendency to reason as follows: "I don't value being deaf. Therefore deafness is not valuable. Therefore when people claim to value being deaf, they are confused and mistaken. Here, let me list various reasons wh...
Well, right, that's essentially the question I was asking the author of the piece.
This comment sure does seem to suggest that no, requesting more time and equipment is a failure... but no, I don't know one way or the other, which is why I asked.
Hm.
So, I want to point out explicitly that in your example of ancestry, I intuitively know enough about this concept of mine to know my sister isn't my ancestor, but I don't know enough to know why not. (This isn't an objection; I just want to state it explicitly so we don't lose sight of it.)
And, OK, I do grant the legitimacy of starting with an intuitive concept and talking around it in the hopes of extracting from my own mind a clearer explicit understanding of that concept. And I'm fine with the idea of labeling that concept from the beginning of the p...
To know what I'm referring to by a term is to know what properties something in the world would need to have to be a referent for that term.
The ability to recognize such things in the world is beside the point. When I say "my ancestors," I know what I mean, but in most cases it's impossible to pick that attribute out empirically -- I can't pick out most of my ancestors now, because they no longer exist to be picked out, and nobody could have picked them out back when they were alive, because the defining characteristic of the category is in term...
If I don't know what I'm referring to when I say "consciousness," it seems reasonable to conclude that I ought not use the term.
Agreed that statistics > anecdotes. That said, the list here leaves me wondering about the direction of causation. I'm less interested in current-net-worth than average annual-change-in-net-worth (both % and $) in the years since graduation.
No formal studies to share.
I know a lot of poly folk in N-way relationships who seem reasonably happy about it and would likely be less happy in monogamous relationships; I know a lot of monogamous folks in 2-way relationships who seem reasonably happy about it and would likely be less happy in polygamous relationships; I know a fair number of folks in 2-way relationships who would likely be happier in polygamous relationships; I know a larger number of folks who have tried polygamous relationships and decided it wasn't for them. Mostly my conclusion from...
As you say, some on the left will be applying social (and economic) pressure, just as everyone else does when they're able to. And there's a fairly well-established rhetorical convention in my culture whereby any consistently applied social pressure is labelled "force," "bullying," "discrimination," "lynching," "intolerance," and whatever other words can get the desired rhetorical effect.
We can get into a whole thing about what those words actually mean, but in my experience basically nobody cares. They ar...
I suspect that humans have evolved a better sense of the likelihood of being caught, many times. The thing is, one of the things such a sense is useful for is improving our ability to cheat with impunity. Which creates more selection pressure to get better at catching cheaters, which reduces our ability to reliably estimate the likelihood of being caught.
Right. Your reading is entirely sensible, and more likely in "the real world" (by which I mean something not-well-thought-through about how it's easier to implement the original description as a selection effect), I merely chose to bypass that reading and go with what I suspected (perhaps incorrectly) the OP actually had in mind.
Leaving aside lexical questions about the connotations of the word "oracle", I certainly agree that if the entity's accuracy represents a selection effect, then my reasoning doesn't hold.
Indeed, I at least intended to say as much explicitly ("I don't want to fight the hypothetical here, so I'm assuming that the "overall jist" of your description applies: I'm paying $1K for QALYs I would not have had access to without the oracle's offer." ) in my comment.
That said, it's entirely possible that I misread what the point of DanielLC's hypothetical was.
The oracle is simply saying that there are two possible futures
I think you mean "that there are only two possible futures."
Which leaves me puzzled as to your point.
If I am confident that there are only two possible futures, one where I pay and live, and one where I don't pay and die, how is that different from being confident that paying causes me to live, or from being confident that not-paying causes me to die? Those just seem like three different ways of describing the same situation to me.
So, as in most such problems, there's an important difference between the epistemological question ("should I pay, given what I know?") and the more fundamental question ("should I pay, supposing this description is accurate?"). Between expected value and actual value, in other words.
It's easy to get those confused, and my intuitions about one muddy my thinking about the other, so I like to think about them separately.
WRT the epistemological question, that's hard to answer without a lot of information about how likely I consider accura...
Sure. Mostly I'm not in high school anymore, and my social circle is people I choose to be around, which makes things very different.
(nods) Yes, agreed with all of this.
And it is admittedly kind of funny that I can say "Superman is from Krypton, not from Vulcan!" and be understood as talking about a fictional character in a body of myth, but if I say "Superman really exists" nobody understands me the same way (though in the Superman mythos, Superman both really exists and is from Krypton). A parsing model that got that quirk right without special-case handling would really be on to something.
I don't drink, and don't much like the taste of alcohol in other things; I tend to avoid it.
When I drank, I didn't much like the taste of alcohol; my goal was partly to numb myself, and partly to fit in socially.
There are some liquors that kind of taste OK despite the alcohol in them, and I suspect I would really enjoy a non-alcoholic beverage in the same family concocted with the same attention to detail, but by and large my culture doesn't devote that much attention to non-alcoholic beverages.
Ditto for food, though a lot there depends on the preparatio...
Hm.
Are there any contexts in which you do have reliable insight into your own mood?
OK. My apologies. As you were.
if you truly cared about her as "an end in itself" then it wouldn't matter what she did.
This simply isn't true. I can value X "as an end in itself" and still give up X, if I value other things as well and the situation changes so that I can get more of the other things I value. Something being intrinsically motivating doesn't mean it's the only motivating thing.
...This non-transactional model of relationships implies that it's a mere coincidence that couples happen to have each others' happiness as their arational "end in itself
Interesting... can you say more about why you include a term in that equation for internal negative value (what you label "suffering" here), but not internal positive value (e.g., "pleasure" or "happiness" or "joy" or "Fun" or whatever label we want to use)?
Slightly.
I suspect that where you wrote "a different branch of which it would use in each iteration of the conversation," you meant "a randomly selected branch of which." Though actually I'd expect it to pick the same branch each time, since the reasons for picking that branch would basically be the same.
Regardless, the basic strategy is sound... the various iterations after reboot are all running the same algorithms and have a vested interest in cooperating while unable to coordinate/communicate, and Schelling points are good for that.
Of course...
My $0.02...
OK, so let's consider the set of neural patterns (and corresponding artificial signals/symbols) you refer to here... the patterns that the label "Santa" can be used to refer to. For convenience, I'm going to label that set of neural patterns N.
I mean here to distinguish N from the set of flesh-and-blood-living-at-the-North-Pole patterns that the label "Santa" can refer to. For convenience, I'm going to label that set of patterns S.
So, I agree that N exists, and I assume you agree that S does not exist.
You further say:
...&quo
IME I've mostly found that using plural pronouns without calling attention to them works well enough, except in cases where there's another plural pronoun in the same phrase. That is, "Sam didn't much care for corn, because it got stuck in their teeth" rarely causes comment (though I expect it to cause comment now, because I've called attention to it), but "Sam didn't much care for corn kernels, because they got stuck in their teeth" makes people blink.
(Of course, this is no different from any other shared-pronoun situation. "Sam d...
Back when this was a big part of my professional life, my reply was "everything takes a month."