All of Threedee's Comments + Replies

There is no explanation of HOW mass generates or causes gravity, similarly for the lack of explanation of how matter causes or generates forces such as electromagnetism. (Yes I know that some sort of strings have been proposed to subserve gravity, and so far they seem to me to be another false "ether".) So in a shorthand of sorts, it is accepted that gravity and the various other forces exist as fundamentals ("axioms" of nature, if you will accept a metaphor), because their effects and interactions can be meaningfully applied in explana... (read more)

0DSimon
I don't think "[T]heir effects and interactions can be meaningfully applied in explanations" is a good way of determining if something is "fundamental" or not: that description applies pretty nicely to aerodynamics, but aerodynamics is certainly not at the bottom of its chain of reductionism. I think maybe that's the "fundamental" you're going for: the maximum level of reductionism, the turtle at the bottom of the pile. Anyways: (relativistic) gravity is generally thought not to be a fundamental, because it doesn't mesh with our current quantum theory; hence the search for a Grand Unified Whatsit. Given that gravity, an incredibly well-studied and well-understood force, is at most questionably a fundamental thingie, I think you've got quite a hill to climb before you can say that about consciousness, which is a far slipperier and more data-lacking subject.

I apologize for being too brief. What I meant to say is that I posit that my subjective experience of qualia is real, and not explained by any form of reductionism or eliminativism. That experience of qualia is fundamental in the same way that gravitation and the electromagnetic force are fundamental. Whether the word ontological applies may be a semantic argument.

Basically, I am reprising Chalmers' definition of the Hard Problem, or Thomas Nagel's argument in the paper "What is it like to be a bat?"

1scav
You may posit that your subjective experience is not explained by reduction to physical phenomena (including really complex information processes) happening in the neurons of your brain. But to me that would be an extraordinary claim requiring extraordinary evidence. It seems to me that until we completely understand the physical and informational processes going on in the brain, the burden of proof is on anyone suggesting that such complete understanding would still be in principle insufficient to explain our subjective experiences.
1Dreaded_Anomaly
You should check out the recent series that orthonormal wrote about qualia. It starts with Seeing Red: Dissolving Mary's Room and Qualia.
4lessdazed
Do qualia describe how matter interacts with matter? For example, do they explain why any person says "I have qualia" or "That is red"? Would gravity and electromagnetism, etc. fail to explain all such statements, or just some of them? If qualia cause such things, is there any entropy when they influence and are influenced by matter? Is energy conserved? If I remove neurons from a person one by one, is there a point at which qualia no longer are needed to describe how the matter and energy in them relates to the rest of matter and energy? Is it logically possible to detect such a point? If I then replace the critical neuron, why ought I be confident that merely considering, tracking, and simulating local, physical interactions would lead to an incorrect model of the person insofar as I take no account of qualia? How likely is it that apples are not made of atoms?
0DSimon
I don't understand what you mean by this. Could you elaborate?

Without my dealing here with the other alternatives, do you Yvain, or does any other LW reader think that it is (logically) possible that mental states COULD be ontologically fundamental?

Further, why is that possibility tied to the word "soul", which carries all sorts of irrelevant baggage?

Full disclosure: I do (subjectively) know that I experience red, and other qualia, and try to build that in to my understanding of consciousness, which I also know I experience (:-) (Note that I purposely used the word "know" and not the word "believe".)

7lessdazed
It's just the history of some words. It's not that important. People frequently claim this. One thing missing is a mechanism that gets us from an entity experiencing such fundamental mental states or qualia and that being's talking about it. Reductionism offers an account of why they say such things. If, broadly speaking, the reductionist explanation is true, then this isn't a phenomenon that is something to challenge reductionism with. If the reductionist account is not true, then how can these mental states cause people to talk about them? How does something not reducible to physics influence the world, physically? Is this concept better covered by a word other than "magic"? And if these mental states are partly the result of the environment, then the physical world is influencing them too. I don't see why it's desirable to posit magic; if I type "I see a red marker" because I see a red marker, why hypothesize that the physical light, received by my eyes and sending signals to my brain, was magically transformed into pure mentality, enabling it to interact with ineffable consciousness, and then magicked back into physics to begin a new physical chain of processes that ends with my typing? Wouldn't I be just as justified in claiming that the process has interruptions at other points? As the physical emanation "I see red people" may be caused by laws of how physical stuff interacts with other physical stuff, we don't guess it isn't caused by that, particularly as we can think of no coherent other way. We are used to the good habit of not mistaking the limits of our imaginations for the limits of reality, so we won't say we know it impossible. However, if physics is a description of how stuff interacts with stuff, so I don't see how it's logically possible for stuff to do something ontologically indescribable even as randomness. Interactions can either be according to a pattern, or not, and we have the handy description "not in a pattern, indescribable by compres
6scav
Hmm. Unless I'm misunderstanding you completely, I'll assume we can work from the example of the "red" qualium (?) What would it mean for even just the experience of "red" to be ontologically fundamental? What "essence of experiencing red" could possibly exist as something independent of the workings of the wetware that is experiencing it? For example, suppose I and a dichromatic human look at the same red object. I and the other human may have more or less the same brain circuitry and are looking at the same thing, but since we are getting different signals from our eyes, what we experience as "red" cannot be exactly the same. A bee or a squid or a duck might have different inputs, and different neural circuitry, and therefore different qualia. A rock next to the red object would have some reflected "red" light incident upon it. But it has no eyes and as far as I know no perception or mental states at all. Does it make sense to say that the rock can also see its neighbouring object as "red"? I wouldn't say so, outside the realm of poetic metaphor. So if your qualia are contingent on the circumstances of certain inputs to certain neural networks in your head, are they "ontologically fundamental"? I'd say no. And by extension, I'd say the same of any other mental state. If you could change the pattern of signals and the connectivity of your brain one neuron at a time, you could create a continuum of experiences from "red" to "intuitively perceiving the 10000th digit of pi" and every indescribable, ineffable inhuman state in between. None of them would be more fundamental than any other; all are sub-patterns in a small corner of a very richly-patterned universe.

This is a more general question than just about Strategic Reliabilism. Obviously, many decisions occur in a social context in which the majority of other people do not necessarily, or even usually, behave based on rational strategies. Given that any strategy a rationalist chooses to use interacts with, or even depends on the irrational behavior of those other people, how can such irrationality be factored into a rationalist-based decision? Perhaps this question is a restatement of: Nothing is Foolproof!

1Will_Sawin
1. Determine what you want other people to do 2. Use your best understanding of human behavior, both rational and irrational, to guess what circumstances will cause them to do that 3. Determine how you might be able to cause those circumstances 4. Weigh that against the other costs & benefits of those actions.
Threedee-10

Is this too cryptic? :

Throw strikes. Home plate don't move. Satchel Paige

6wedrifid
(Additional note) It would have seemed less cryptic to me if the quote was formatted in a way that distinguished between your commentary, the quote itself and the quote author. I hadn't read your other contributions at the time so didn't realise that you didn't use a standard form. I did not realise that "Throw strikes. Home plate don't move." was the actual literal quote, as opposed to a cryptic reference in your own words to a quote that I was supposed to be familiar with. Also: -- wedrifid
1wedrifid
Yes. I'm familiar enough with the rules of baseball that I can infer the sport and affirm that throwing strikes is a Good Thing for a pitcher to do and acknowledge that the home plate does, in fact, stay put. I am not sufficiently familiar with Satchel Paige or enamoured of the sport that I can guess why I am supposed to be inspired. Google helped to clarify. It gave the full quote and put it in the context of what seems to be, shall we say, a KISS philosophy. -- Satchel Paige (Google also gives a Paige quote that is a real gem of a rationality insight. Thanks for the indirect link!)

Pragmatic rationality, perhaps? :

In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is. Yogi Berra

6ata
Reminds me of Sidney Morgenbesser's response when he was asked his opinion of pragmatism: "It's all very well in theory, but it doesn't work in practice."
5wedrifid
Grrr... At least with normal 'theory vs practice' quotes they stick to one (slightly broken) definition of theory in which 'theory' is (evidently) limited to oversimplified theories that don't fully account for specific details of practical execution. In this quote it conflates an encompassing definition of theory with the limited, specific caricature of the more typical theory/practice dichotomy presentations. Which is just all sorts of wrong. Stick to your colloquialisms Yogi Berra! Don't get stuck half way to technical clarity. It's just an insult to all sides!

Perhaps this precedes subsequent rationality:

Every great advance in science has issued from a new audacity of imagination. John Dewey

Knowing the risk, I quote this (given that I am a utilitarian pragmatist):

Truth is what works. William James

1Normal_Anomaly
Why is there a risk? Is it because of William James' reputation?
Threedee150

If you believe that feeling bad or worrying long enough will change a past or future event, then you are residing on another planet with a different reality system.

William James

0Snowyowl
Possible corollary: I can change my reality system by moving to another planet.

Outrage is fine if it leads to effective action. If it doesn't, it's just a hobby.

William T. Powers

6wedrifid
Like the spirit. Technically disagree with respect to future events. :)
Threedee210

There are a number of web sites that present such implicit and procedural knowledge. such as: http://www.ehow.com/ http://www.wikihow.com/Main-Page http://www.howcast.com/ http://www.howtodothings.com/

I might be useful to somehow select the most generally useful ones of these in one place.

0spriteless
stack exchange network too.
0lukeprog
I use these regularly. I like very much that I don't need to store all this stuff in my meat-brain, because it's all there on the web - even in video!

I haven't come across any of them except eHow. eHow is awful. Useless. Bad. I have ended up there unwittingly from google searches a half dozen times or so. Not once has it answered what I wanted to know. The information on their site is optimised to be written as quickly as possible while getting the best google rank possible, with no thought as to quality of information.

Threedee100

Generally, it is mainly chicken that one needs to be careful about, because it is sometimes contaminated with unhealthy bacteria, even when bought "fresh". A general procedure with all meat, and especially chicken, is to wash any surface that raw chicken comes in contact with when you are done preparing it and have started to cook it, then wash any utensils you used that touched the chicken, and wash you hands. To be extra cautious, you can do that for any raw meat. Raw meat should be refrigerated soon after purchase and now allowed to stand uncooked at room temperature for more than the time it takes to prepare it.

2PeerInfinity
Thanks for explaining that! But, um... I still have more questions... What is the procedure for washing the surfaces, the utensils, and my hands? How do I know when the meat is cooked enough to not qualify as raw? And for stir-frying raw meat, do I need to pause the stir-frying process to wash the stir-frying utensils, so that I don't contaminate the cooked food with any raw juices that happen to still be on the utensils?