We recently saw a post in Discussion by ChrisHallquist, asking to be talked out of cryonics. It so happened that I'd just read a new short story by Greg Egan which gave me the inspiration to write the following: > It is likely that you would not wish for your...
Related to: Counterfactual Mugging, The Least Convenient Possible World MBlume said: > What would you do in situation X?" and "What would you like to pre-commit to doing, should you ever encounter situation X?" should, to a rational agent, be one and the same question. Applied to Vladimir Nesov's counterfactual...
It was considerably easier before the Dunblane massacre (1996).
That very much depends on what you choose to regard as the 'true nature' of the AI. In other words we're flirting with reification fallacy by regarding the AI as a whole as 'living on the blockchain', or even being 'driven' by the blockchain. It's important to fix in mind what makes the blockchain important to such an AI and to its autonomy. This, I believe, is always the financial aspect. The on-blockchain process is autonomous precisely because it can directly control resources; it loses autonomy in so far as its control of resources no longer fulfils its goals. If you wish, you can consider the part of the AI which verifies correct computation and interfaces with 'financial reality' as being its real locus of selfhood, but bear in mind that even the goal description/fulfilment logic can be zero-knowledge proofed and so exist off-chain. From my perspective, the on-chain component of such an AI looks a lot more like a combination of robotic arm and error-checking module.
That was pretty good, thanks.
There's an asymptotic approximation in the OEIS: a(n) ~ n!2^(n(n-1)/2)/(M*p^n), with M and p constants. So log(a(n)) = O(n^2), as opposed to log(2^n) = O(n), log(n!) = O(n log(n)), log(n^n) = O(n log(n)).
I want a training session in Unrestrained Pessimism.
As someone who moved to Israel at the age of 25 with very minimal Hebrew (almost certainly worse than yours), went to an ulpan for five months and then served in the IDF for 18 months while somehow avoiding the 3 month language course I certainly should have been placed in based on my middle-of-ulpan level of fluency:
Ulpan (not army ulpan, real ulpan) is actually pretty good at doing what it's supposed to. I had a great time - it depends on the ulpan but I haven't heard of a single one that would be psychologically damaging. Perhaps your experience with a less intensive system as a minor has coloured your views?... (read more)
Then perhaps my assessment was mistaken! But in any case, I wasn't referring to the broad idea of cryonics patients ending up in deathcubes, but of their becoming open-access in an exploitative society - c.f. the Egan short.
My attempt at a reply turned into an essay, which I've posted here.
We recently saw a post in Discussion by ChrisHallquist, asking to be talked out of cryonics. It so happened that I'd just read a new short story by Greg Egan which gave me the inspiration to write the following:
It is likely that you would not wish for your brain-state to be available to all-and-sundry, subjecting you to the possibility of being simulated according to their whims. However, you know nothing about the ethics of the society that will exist when the technology to extract and run your brain-state is developed. Thus you are taking a risk of a negative outcome that may be less attractive to you than mere non-existence.
I had little expectation... (read 920 more words →)
It is likely that you would not wish for your brain-state to be available to all-and-sundry, subjecting you to the possibility of being simulated according to their whims. However, you know nothing about the ethics of the society that will exist when the technology to extract and run your brain-state is developed. Thus you are taking a risk of a negative outcome that may be less attractive to you than mere non-existence.
Related to: Counterfactual Mugging, The Least Convenient Possible World
What would you do in situation X?" and "What would you like to pre-commit to doing, should you ever encounter situation X?" should, to a rational agent, be one and the same question.
Applied to Vladimir Nesov's counterfactual mugging, the reasoning is then:
Precommitting to paying $100 to Omega has expected utility of $4950.p(Omega appears). Not precommitting has strictly less utility; therefore I should precommit to paying. Therefore I should, in fact, pay $100 in the event (Omega appears, coin is tails).
To combat the argument that it is more likely that one is insane than that Omega has appeared, Eliezer said:
... (read 1976 more words →)So imagine yourself in the
The first image is a dead hotlink. It's in the internet archive and I've uploaded it to imgur.