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All of tyrsius's Comments + Replies

No, it doesn't. I understand your analogy (parts vs the whole), but I do not understand how it relates to my point. I am sorry.

Is pleasure the proton in the analogy? Is the atom what we want? I don't follow here.

You are also making the argument that we want things that don't cause pleasure. Shouldn't this be, in your analogy, an atom without a proton? In that case yes, you need to find an atom without a proton before I will believe there is an atom without a proton. (This same argument works if pleasure is any of the other atomic properties. Charge, mass, ... (read more)

2Ghatanathoah12y

ArisKateris' analogy is: 1. The reasons we want things are atoms. 2. Pleasure is protons. 3. Atoms have more components than protons. 4. Similarly, we want things for more reasons other than the pleasure they give us. 5. Even if every time one of our desires is satisfied, we feel pleasure, doesn't mean that pleasure is the only reason we have those desires. Similarly, even if an atom always has protons, doesn't mean it doesn't also have other components. ArisKateris should have picked electrons instead of protons, it makes the analogy a little less confusing. Desires without pleasure are like atoms without electrons. These are called "positive ions" and are not totally uncommon. It personally seems obvious to me that we want things other than pleasure. For instance, I occasionally read books that I hate and am miserable reading because they are part of a series, and I want to complete the series. That's what I want, and I don't care if there's less pleasure in the universe because of my actions.

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y10

Your argument isn't making any sense. Whether they are valued because they cause pleasure, or cause pleasure because they are valued makes no difference.

Either way, they cause pleasure. Your argument is that we value them even though they don't cause pleasure. You are trying to say there is something other than pleasure, yet you concede that all of your examples cause pleasure.

For your argument to work, we need to seek something that does not cause pleasure. I asked you to name a few, and you named "Knowledge, memory, and understanding. Personal and ... (read more)

1ArisKatsaris14y

If I was debating the structure of the atom, I could say that "there's more to atoms than their protons", and yet I would 'concede' that all atoms do contain protons. Or I'd say "there's more to protons than just their mass" (they also have an electric charge), but all protons do have mass. Why are you finding this hard to understand? Why would I need to discover an atom without protons or a proton without mass for me to believe that there's more to atoms than protons (there's also electrons and neutrons) or more to protons than their mass? You had made much stronger statements than that -- you said "You think you want more than pleasure, but what else is there?" You also said "But saying we want more than pleasure? That doesn't make sense. " Every atom may contain protons, but atoms are more than protons. Every object of our desire may contain pleasure in its fullfillment, but the object of our desire is more than pleasure. Does this analogy help you understand how your argument is faulty?

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y10

All of your other examples are pleasure causing. Don't you notice that?

Again, getting my brain rewired is not in the original question. I would decline getting my brain rewired; that seems like carte blanche for a lot of things that I cannot predict. I would decline.

Survival of the community and children, knowledge, and understanding all bring me pleasure. I think if those things caused me pain, I would fight them. In fact, I think I have good evidence for this.

When cultures have a painful response to the survival of OTHER cultures, they go to war. When pe... (read more)

1ArisKatsaris14y

After you click "Reply", you can click on "Help" at the bottom right of the textbox and see the available formatting options. To add quotes you just need to place a "> " at the beginning of a line.

2ArisKatsaris14y

No, they cause pleasure because they're valued. * You are arguing that we seek things in accordance to and proportionally to the pleasure anticipated in achieving them. (please correct me if I'm getting you wrong) * I'm arguing that we can want stuff without anticipation of pleasure being necessary. And we can fail to want stuff where there is anticipation of pleasure. How shall we distinguish between the two scenarios? What's our anticipations for the world if your hypothesis is true vs if mine is true? Here's a test. I think that if your scenario held, everyone would be willing to rewire their brains to get more pleasure for things they don't currently want; because then there'd be more anticipated pleasure. This doesn't seem to hold -- though we'll only know for sure when the technology actually becomes available. Here's another test. I think that if my scenario holds, some atheists just before their anticipated deaths would still leave property to their offspring or to charities, instead of spending it all to prostitutes and recreational drugs in attempts to cram as much pleasure as possible before their death. So I think the tests validate my position. Do you have some different tests in mind?

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y10

If this is indeed Luke's intended offer, than I believe it to be a lie. Without the ability to introduced varied pleasure, an Orgasmium would fail to deliver on its promise of "maximal pleasure."

For the offer to be true, it would need to be a Personal Matrix.

2jhuffman14y

Some people think that extended periods of euphoria give up no marginal pleasure. I haven't found that to be the case - but perhaps if we take away any sense of time passing then it would work.

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y10

You are using a quite twisted definition of pleasure to make your argument. For most of us, the end of mankind causes great displeasure. This should factor into your equation. Its also not part of Luke's original offer. If you gave me that option I would not take it, because it would be a lie that I would receive pleasure from the end of mankind.

Killing a man's children has the same problem. Why to argue against me to you have to bring murder or death into the picture? Luke's original question has no such downsides, and introducing them changes the equatio... (read more)

5ArisKatsaris14y

Consider the package deal to include getting your brain rewired so that you would receive pleasure from the end of mankind. Now do you choose the package deal? I wouldn't. Can you explain to me why I wouldn't, if you believe the only thing I can want is pleasure? Giving additional examples, based on the same principle, isn't "moving the goalposts". Because the survival of your children and the community is the foremost example of a common value that's usually placed higher than personal pleasure. Knowledge, memory, and understanding. Personal and collective achievement. Honour. Other people's pleasure. As an automated process we receive pleasure when we get what we want, that doesn't mean that we want those things because of the pleasure. At the conscious level we self-evidently don't want them because of the pleasure, or we'd all be willing to sacrifice all of mankind if they promised to wirehead us first.

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y70

This machine, if it were to give you maximal pleasure, should be able to make you feel as if you are not alone.

The only way I can see this machine actually making good on its promise is to be a Matrix-quality reality engine, but with you in the king seat.

I would take it.

0loup-vaillant14y

Of course it would. My question is, to what extent would you mind being alone? Not feeling alone, not even believing you are alone, just being alone. Of course, once I'm plugged in to my Personal Matrix, I would not mind any more, for I wouldn't feel nor believe I am alone. But right now I do mind. Whatever the real reasons behind it, being cut off from the rest of the world just feels wrong. Basically, I believe I want Multiplayer Fun bad enough to sacrifice some Personal Fun. Now, I probably wouldn't want to sacrifice much personal fun, so given the choice between maximum Personal Fun and my present life, (no third alternative allowed), I would probably take the blue pill. Though it would really bother me if everyone else wouldn't be given the same choice. Now to get back on topic, I suspect Luke did want to talk about a primitive system that would turn you into an Orgasmium. Something that would even sacrifice Boredom to maximize subjective pleasure and happiness. (By the way, I suspect that "Eternal Bliss" promised by some beliefs systems is just as primitive.) Such a primitive system would exactly serve his point: do you only want happiness and pleasure? Would you sacrifice everything else to get it?

Not for the Sake of Pleasure Alone

tyrsius14y30

I feel like I am missing something. You separated pleasure from wanting.

I don't see how this backs up your point though. Unless the machine offered is a desire-fulfilling machine and not a pleasure machine.

If it is a pleasure machine, giving pleasure regardless of the state of wanting, why would we turn it down? You said we usually want more than just pleasure, because getting what we want doesn't always give us pleasure. If wanting and pleasure are different, then of course this makes sense.

But saying we want more than pleasure? That doesn't make sense. Y... (read more)

5ArisKatsaris14y

Where is the point of your confusion? Why do you assume people only want pleasure? If you give me a choice between living a perfectly pleasurable life for a hundred years, but the whole humankind dies horribly afterwards, and living an average life but the rest of humankind keeps surviving and progressing indefinitely -- I WANT THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND. That's because I don't want just pleasure. I want more than pleasure. No, even with perfect and certain knowledge, we would want more than pleasure. What's the hard thing to understand about that? We are built to want more than a particular internal state of our own minds. Most of us aren't naturally built for solipsism. Like e.g. a machine that kills a man's children, but gives him pleasure by falsely telling him they are living happily ever after and erasing any memories to the contrary. In full knowledge of this, he doesn't want that. I wouldn't want that. Few people would want that. Most of us aren't built for solipsism.

Welcome to Less Wrong! (2010-2011)

tyrsius14y20

Hi LW,

I joined this site not too long ago, but I missed this page and its request for an introduction. Better late than never, I guess.

I am 24, a Jr. Software Developer, and I live in Portland, OR. I was raised in a Baptist family, and left the Church during my junior year in high school over their stance on the Oregon Gay marriage bill. Once outside of the daily Sunday indoctrination, it took only a few short weeks to reason my way to atheism. I only wish I could have seen the truth sooner. I spent the next year or so on forums gaining a real variety of p... (read more)

1MixedNuts14y

In his Bloggingheads videos, he says "Eh-lee-eh-zer".

Seeing Red: Dissolving Mary's Room and Qualia

tyrsius14y20

Your later posts do a better job of describing your position here. I don't think we disagree.

Seeing Red: Dissolving Mary's Room and Qualia

tyrsius14y20

Only insofar as the definition of physical is limited to things you can find in books. I wholly reject such a definition.

@ Orthonormal. The conclusion seems to me to come very naturally from the thought experiment, if you allow for its assumptions. But that is what I think is silly, its assumptions. The thought experiment tries to define "all knowledge" in two different and contradictory ways.

If Mary has all knowledge, then there is nothing left for her to learn about red. If upon seeing red she learns something new, then she did not have all knowledge prior to seeing red.

It is their definition of knowledge, which is inconsistent, that leads to the entire thought experiment being silly.

4thomblake14y

If you want to call someone's attention, replying directly to their comment is a great way of doing that.

1orthonormal14y

The practical point is that, if not all knowledge reduces to mathematical patterns of physical objects (the sort of thing that we can organize and learn from textbooks), then the actual project of reductionists becomes futile at a really early stage- we'd have to give up on fully understanding even a worm brain, since we could never have the knowledge of its worm-qualia. I want to respond to your claim more thoroughly, but my response essentially consists of the second and third posts here. If you want to pick up this conversation on those threads, I'm all for it. Also, welcome to Less Wrong!

Seeing Red: Dissolving Mary's Room and Qualia

tyrsius14y30

This thought experiment always seemed silly to me. As if somehow the experience of the visual cortex reacting to "color" input was not a piece of knowledge.

If someone has a poor ability to mentally visualize 3-dimensional objects, and is shown a set of formula that will draw a specific and very odd object (learning everything but what the object actually looks like), and is only ever allowed to graph on paper, then of course when we finally hand them a physical model of the object we have given them new information.

I don't see this as any differe... (read more)

-2Peterdjones14y

The knowledge Mary has is all physical knowledge, where physical knowledge means the kind of thing that can be found in books. You deam the further, experiential knowledge she gains to be physical because sensory processing is physical, but that is a different sense of physical. If you think she learns something on exiting the room, and it seems you do, then you are conceding part of the claim, the part about the incompleteness of physical explanation, even if you insist that the epistemic problem doesn't lead to an dualistic metaphysics.

5orthonormal14y

I think you're mistaking the conclusion that the non-reductionist philosophers draw from the thought experiment. They're not generally substance dualists like Descartes. Instead, they claim that reductionism is false because it is epistemically incomplete, even within a purely physical world: a human (or an AI, or anything other than a bat) cannot ever understand the experience of being a bat, and therefore not all knowledge reduces to mathematical patterns of physical objects.

How and Why to Granularize

tyrsius14y10

I would be very interested in seeing a reading list for this map you have made, if you ever get that far.

4lukeprog14y

Here ya go. Not much there yet.

Intuition and Unconscious Learning

tyrsius14y80

Lukeprog, I always enjoy your articles. You are very diligent in keeping your references, which is much appreciated.