All of Unknowns's Comments + Replies

The main problem with this is that it says that human beings are extremely unlike all nearby alien races. But if you willing to admit that humanity is that unique you might as well say that intelligence only evolved on earth, which is a much simpler and more likely hypothesis.

If "being rational" means choosing the best option, you never have to choose between "being reasonable" and "being rational," because you should always choose the best option. And sometimes the best option is influenced by what other people think of what you are doing; sometimes it's not.

It actually is not very odd for there to be a difference like this. Given that there are only two sexes, there only needs to be one hormone which is sex determining in that way. Having two in fact could have strange effects of its own.

I think what you need to realize is that it is not a question of proving that all of those things are false, but rather that it makes no difference whether they are or not. For example when you go to sleep and wake up it feels just the same whether it is still you or a different person, so it doesn't matter at all.

Excellent post. Basically simpler hypotheses are on average more probable than more complex ones, no matter how complexity is defined, as long as there is a minimum complexity and no maximum complexity. But some measures of simplicity are more useful than others, and this is determined by the world we live in; thus we learn by experience that mathematical simplicity is a better measure than "number of words it takes to describe the hypothesis," even though both would work to some extent.

I agree that in reality it is often impossible to predict someone's actions, if you are going to tell them your prediction. That is why it is perfectly possible that the situation where you know the gene is impossible. But in any case this is all hypothetical because the situation posed assumes you cannot know which gene you have until you choose one or both boxes, at which point you immediately know.

EDIT: You're really not getting the point, which is that the genetic Newcomb is identical to the original Newcomb in decision theoretic terms. Here you're arg... (read more)

What if we take the original Newcomb, then Omega puts the million in the box, and then tells you "I have predicted with 100% certainty that you are only going to take one box, so I put the million there?"

Could you two-box in that situation, or would that take away your freedom?

If you say you could two-box in that situation, then once again the original Newcomb and the genetic Newcomb are the same.

If you say you could not, why would that be you when the genetic case would not be?

"I don't believe in a gene that controls my decision" refers to reality, and of course I don't believe in the gene either. The disagreement is whether or not such a gene is possible in principle, not whether or not there is one in reality. We both agree there is no gene like this in real life.

As you note, if an AI could read its source code and sees that it says "one-box", then it will still one-box, because it simply does what it is programmed to do. This first of all violates the conditions as proposed (I said the AIs cannot look at t... (read more)

In this case you are simply interpreting the original Newcomb to mean something absurd, because causality cannot "genuinely flow in reverse" in any circumstances whatsoever. Rather in the original Newcomb, Omega looks at your disposition, one that exists at the very beginning. If he sees that you are disposed to one-box, he puts the million. This is just the same as someone looking at the source code of an AI and seeing whether it will one-box, or someone looking for the one-boxing gene.

Then, when you make the choice, in the original Newcomb you... (read more)

Even in the original Newcomb you cannot change whether or not there is a million in the box. Your decision simply reveals whether or not it is already there.

No, it is not an evil decision problem, because I did that not because of the particular reasoning, but because of the outcome (taking both boxes).

The original does not specify how Omega makes his prediction, so it may well be by investigating source code.

You cannot assume that any of those things are irrelevant or that they are overridden just because you have a gene. Presumably the gene is arranged in coordination with those things.

Yes, as you can see from the comments on this post, there seems to be some consensus that the smoking lesion refutes EDT.

The problem is that the smoking lesion, in decision theoretic terms, is entirely the same as Newcomb's problem, and there is also a consensus that EDT gets the right answer in the case of Newcomb.

Your post reveals that the smoking lesion is the same as Newcomb's problem and thus shows the contradiction in that consensus. Basically there is a consensus but it is mistaken.

Personally I haven't seen any real refutation of EDT.

This is not an "evil decision problem" for the same reason original Newcomb is not, namely that whoever chooses only one box gets the reward, not matter what process he uses.

Hypothetical-me can use the same decisionmaking process as real-me also in genetic Newcomb, just as in the original. This simply means that the real you will stand for a hypothetical you which has the gene which makes you choose the thing that real you chooses, using the same decision process that the real you uses. Since you say you would two-box, that means the hypothetical you has the two-boxing gene.

I would one-box, and hypothetical me has the one-boxing gene.

This is like saying "if my brain determines my decision, then I am not making the decision at all."

It should be obvious that there is no difference between regular Newcomb and genetic Newcomb here. I examine the source code to see whether the program will one-box or not; that is the same as looking at its genetic code to see if it has the one-boxing gene.

This is like saying a 100% determinate chess playing computer shouldn't look ahead, since it cannot affect its actions. That will result in a bad move. And likewise, just doing what you feel like here will result in smoking, since you (by stipulation) feel like doing that. So it is better to deliberate about it, like the chess computer, and choose both to one box and not to smoke.

You are right that 100% correlation requires an unrealistic situation. This is true also in the original Newcomb, i.e. we don't actually expect anything in the real world to be able to predict our actions with 100% accuracy. Still, we can imagine a situation where Omega would predict our actions with a good deal of accuracy, especially if we had publicly announced that we would choose to one-box in such situations.

The genetic Newcomb requires an even more unrealistic scenario, since in the real world genes do not predict actions with anything close to 100... (read more)

I think this is addressed by my top level comment about determinism.

But if you don't see how it applies, then imagine an AI reasoning like you have above.

"My programming is responsible for me reasoning the way I do rather than another way. If Omega is fond of people with my programming, then I'm lucky. But if he's not, then acting like I have the kind of programming he likes isn't going to help me. So why should I one-box? That would be acting like I had one-box programming. I'll just take everything that is in both boxes, since it's not up to me."

Of course, when I examined the thing's source code, I knew it would reason this way, and so I did not put the million.

Re: the edit. Two boxing is strictly better from a causal decision theorist point of view, but that is the same here and in Newcomb.

But from a sensible point of view, rather than the causal theorist point of view, one boxing is better, because you get the million, both here and in the original Newcomb, just as in the AI case I posted in another comment.

Even in the original Newcomb's problem there is presumably some causal pathway from your brain to your decision. Otherwise Omega wouldn't have a way to predict what you are going to do. And there is no difference here between "your brain" and the "gene" in the two versions.

In neither case does Omega cause your decision, your brain causes it in both cases.

The general mistake that many people are making here is to think that determinism makes a difference. It does not.

Let's say I am Omega. The things that are playing are AIs. They are all 100% deterministic programs, and they take no input except an understanding of the game. They are not allowed to look at their source code.

I play my part as Omega in this way. I examine the source code of the program. If I see that it is a program that will one-box, I put the million. If I see that it is a program that will two-box, I do not put the million.

Note that determ... (read more)

In the original Newcomb's problem, am I allowed to say "in the world with the million, I am more likely to one-box than in the world without, so I'm going to one-box"? If I thought this worked, then I would do it no matter what world I was in, and it would no longer be true...

Except that it is still true. I can definitely reason this way, and if I do, then of course I had the disposition to one-box, and of course Omega put the million there; because the disposition to one-box was the reason I wanted to reason this way.

And likewise, in the genetic variant, I can reason this way, and it will still work, because the one-boxing gene is responsible for me reasoning this way rather than another way.

This is no different from responding to the original Newcomb's by saying "I would one-box if Omega put the million, and two-box if he didn't."

Both in the original Newcomb's problem and in this one you can use any decision theory you like.

This is confusing the issue. I would guess that the OP wrote "most" because Newcomb's problem sometimes is put in such a way that the predictor is only right most of the time.

And in such cases, it is perfectly possible to remove the correlation in the same way that you say. If I know how Omega is deciding who is likely to one-box and who is likely to two-box, I can purposely do the opposite of what he expects me to do.

But if you want to solve the real problem, you have to solve it in the case of 100% correlation, both in the original Newcomb's problem and in this case.

Sure there is a link. The gene causes you to make the choice, just like in the standard Newcomb your disposition causes your choices.

In the standard Newcomb, if you one-box, then you had the disposition to one-box, and Omega put the million.

In the genetic Newcomb, if you one-box, then you had the gene to one-box, and Omega put the million.

Yes, all of this is basically correct. However, it is also basically the same in the original Newcomb although somewhat more intuitive. In the original problem Omega decides to put the one million or not depending on its estimate of what you will do, which likely depends on "what kind of person" you are, in some sense. And being this sort of person is also going to determine what kind of decision theory you use, just as the gene does in the genetic version. The original Newcomb is more intuitive, though, because we can more easily accept that &qu... (read more)

Why? They one-box because they have the gene. So no reversal. Just as in the original Newcomb problem they choose to one-box because they were the sort of person who would do that.

What are you talking about? In the original Newcomb problem both boxes contain a reward whenever Omega predicts that you are going to choose only one box.

Under any normal understanding of logical influence, your decision can indeed "logically influence" whether you have the gene or not. Let's say there is a 100% correlation between having the gene and the act of choosing -- everyone who chooses the one box has the one boxing gene, and everyone who chooses both boxes has the two boxing gene. Then if you choose to one box, this logically implies that you have the one boxing gene.

Or do you mean something else by "logically influence" besides logical implication?

I have never agreed that there is a difference between the smoking lesion and Newcomb's problem. I would one-box, and I would not smoke. Long discussion in the comments here.

If you want to establish intelligent life on Mars, the best way to do that is by establishing a human colony. Obviously this is unlikely to succeed but trying to evolve microbes into intelligent life is less likely by far.

If I understand correctly how these images are constructed, it would be something like this: take some random image. The program can already make some estimate of whether it is a baseball, say 0.01% or whatever. Then you go through the image pixel by pixel and ask, "If I make this pixel slightly brighter, will your estimate go up? if not, will it go up if I make it slightly dimmer?" (This is just an example, you could change the color or whatever as well.) Thus you modify each pixel such that you increase the program's estimate that it is a baseb... (read more)

No, even if you classify these false positives as "no image", this will not prevent someone from constructing new false positives.

Basically the amount of training data is always extremely small compared to the theoretically possible number of distinct images, so it is always possible to construct such adversarial positives. These are not random images which were accidentally misidentified in this way. They have been very carefully designed based on the current data set.

Something similar is probably theoretically possible with human vision recognition as well. The only difference would be that we would be inclined to say "but it really does look like a baseball!"

Yes, I get the same impression. In fact, Eliezer basically said that for a long time he didn't sign up because he had better things to spend his money on, but finally he did because he thought that not signing up gave off bad signals to others.

Of course, this means that his present attitude of "if you don't sign up for cryonics you're an idiot and if you don't sign up your children you're wicked" is total hypocrisy.

It's going to depend on your particular translation. You might try searching for "refute", "refuted", "curing", "being cured". This is what it says in my version:

And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another.

"Only humans are conscious" should indeed have a lower prior probability than "Only physical systems specified in some way are conscious", since the latter must be true for the former to be true but not the other way around.

However, whether or not only humans are conscious is not the issue. Most people think that many or all animals are conscious, but they do not think that "all physical systems are conscious." And this is not because of the prior probabilities, but is a conclusion drawn from evidence. The reason people think... (read more)

This article is part of Eliezer's anti-religion series, and all of these articles have the pre-written bottom line that religion is horribly evil and cannot possibly have any good effects whatsoever.

In reality, of course, being false does not prevent a religion from doing some good. It should be clear to everyone that when you have more and stronger reasons for doing the right thing, you will be more likely to do the right thing, and when you have less and weaker reasons, you will be less likely to do it. This is just how motivation works, whether it is mo... (read more)

No, you are misinterpreting the conjunction fallacy. If someone assigns a greater probability to the claim that "humans are conscious and rocks are not" than to the claim that "humans are conscious", then this will be the conjunction fallacy. But it will also be the conjunction fallacy to believe that it is more likely that "physical systems in general are conscious" than that "humans are conscious."

The conjunction fallacy is basically not relevant to comparing "humans are conscious and rocks are not" to "both humans and rocks are conscious."

"Because we're going to run out relatively soon" and "Because it's causing global warming" are reasons that work against one another, since if the oil runs out it will stop contributing to global warming.

This is from Socrates in Plato's Gorgias.

Also, this would be better in the Open Thread.

I think you are mistaken. If you would sacrifice your life to save the world, there is some amount of money that you would accept for being killed (given that you could at the same time determine the use of the money; without this stipulation you cannot be meaningfully be said to be given it.)

Even adamzerner probably doesn't value his life at much more than, say, ten million, and this can likely be proven by revealed preference if he regularly uses a car. If you go much higher than that your behavior will have to become pretty paranoid.

Utilitarianism does not support anything in particular in the abstract, since it always depends on the resulting utilities, which can be different in different circumstances. So it is especially unreasonable to argue for utilitarianism on the grounds that it supports various liberties such as gay rights. Rights normally express something like a deontological claim that other people should leave me alone, and such a thing can never be supported in the abstract by utilitarianism. In particular, it would not support gay rights if too many people are offended by them, which was likely true in the past.

Yes, I would, assuming you don't mean statements like "1+1 = 2", but rather true statements spread over a variety of contexts such that I would reasonably believe that you would be trustworthy to that degree over random situations (and thus including such as whether I should give you money.)

(Also, the 100 billion true statements themselves would probably be much more valuable than $100,000).

I thought the comment was good and I don't have any idea what SanguineEmpiricist was talking about.

A sleeper cell is likely to do something dangerous on a rather short time scale, such as weeks, months, or perhaps a year or two. This is imminent in a much stronger sense than AI, which will take at least decades. Scott Aaronson thinks it more likely to take centuries, and this may well be true, given e.g. the present state of neuroscience, which consists mainly in saying things like "part of the brain A is involved in performing function B", but without giving any idea at all exactly how A is involved, and exactly how function B is performed at all.

Eliezer, here is a reasonably probable just-so story: the reason you wrote this article is that you hate the idea that religion might have any good effects, and you hope to prove that this couldn't happen. However, the idea that the purpose of religion is to make tribes more cohesive does not depend on group selection, and is absurd in no way.

It is likely enough that religions came to be as an extension of telling stories. Telling stories usually has various moralistic purposes, very often including the cohesiveness of the tribe. This does not depend on g... (read more)