All of wafflepudding's Comments + Replies

That second paragraph was hard for me. Seeing "a)" and "b)" repeated made me parse it as a jigsaw puzzle where the second "a)" was a subpoint of the first "b)", but then "c)" got back to the main sequence only to jump back to the "b)", the second subpoint of the first "b)". That didn't make any sense, so I tried to read each clause separately, and came up with "1. You are never safe. 2. You must understand. 3. On an emotional basis..." before becoming utterly lost. Only after coming back to it later did I get that repeated letters were references to previous letters.

There are, apparently, certain Eastern philosophies that permit and even celebrate logical contradiction. To what extent this is metaphorical I couldn't say, but I recently spoke to an adherent who quite firmly believed that a given statement could be both true and false. After some initial bewilderment, I verified that she wasn't talking about statements that contained both true and false claims, or were informal and thus true or false under different interpretations, but actually meant what she'd originally seemed to mean.

I didn't at first know how to ar... (read more)

0TheAncientGeek
That would be Jain logic.

It seems to me that you are predicting the path of the pinball, but quickly enough that you don't realize you're doing it. It's such a fundamental axiom that if there is a clear downward path to a given position, this position will be reached, that it's easy to forget that it was originally reasoning about intermediate steps that led to this axiom. At most points the pinball can reach, it is expected to move down. At the next point, it's expected to move down again. You would inductively expect it to reach a point where it cannot move down anymore, and thi... (read more)

In case you're still active, I'm curious what your child's reasoning was for placing God in the pretend category. Like, did she know about Occam's Razor, or was she pattern matching God with other fantasies she's heard? I'm mostly curious because I don't think I've ever heard a perspective as undiluted as an Untheist's.

-3entirelyuseless
Since scotherns says that they explicitly taught her to distinguish real from pretend, there is little doubt that she gathered it from scotherns' own opinion, manifested by behavior and attittude, even if not explicitly stated. Especially since apparently she did not know that anyone believed in God, which means that she knew that scotherns did not.

You forgot about MetaOmega, who gives you $10,000 if and only if No-mega wouldn't have given you anything, and O-mega, who kills your family unless you're an Alphabetic Decision Theorist. This comment doesn't seem specifically anti-UDT -- after all, Omega and No-mega are approximately equally likely to exist; a ratio of 1:1 if not an actual p of .5 -- but it still has the ring of Just Cheating. Admittedly, I don't have any formal way of telling the difference between decision problems that feel more or less legitimate, but I think part of the answer might ... (read more)

Gotcha. So, assuming that the actual Isaac Newton didn't rise to prominence*, are you thinking that human life would usually end before his equivalent came around and the ball got rolling? Most of our existential risks are manmade AFAICT. Or you think that we'd tend to die in between him and when someone in a position to build the LHC had the idea to build the LHC? Granted, him being "in a position to build the LHC" is conditional on things like a supportive surrounding population, an accepting government, etcetera; but these things are ephemeral... (read more)

0hairyfigment
That's what I just said. You seem to have an alarming confidence in our ability to bounce back from ephemeral shifts. If there were actually some selection pressure against a completed LHC, then it would take a lot less than a repetition of this to keep us shifted away from building one.

Are you responding to "Unless human psychology is expected to be that different from world to world?"? Because that's not my position, I'd think that most things recognizable as human will be similar enough to us that they'd build an LHC eventually. I guess I'm not exactly sure what you're getting at.

0hairyfigment
I am strongly disagreeing with you. The cultures that existed on Earth for tens of millenia or more were recognizably human; one of them built an LHC "eventually", but any number of chance factors could have prevented this. Like I just said, modern science started with an extreme outlier.

I'd agree that certain worlds would have the building of the LHC pushed back or moved forward, but I doubt there would be many where the LHC was just never built. Unless human psychology is expected to be that different from world to world?

-1hairyfigment
...As I pointed out recently in another context, humans have existed for tens of thousands of years or more. Even civilization existed for millenia before obvious freak Isaac Newton started modern science. Your position is a contender for the nuttiest I've read today. Possibly it could be made better by dropping this talk of worlds and focusing on possible observers, given the rise in population. But that just reminds me that we likely don't understand anthropics well enough to make any definite pronouncements.

I am extremely satisfied with this description; I hadn't personally thought of it in such specific terms, and this would be a perfect way to say it. I'll admit I'm a bit confused why you would pay before but not after, considering that either one is done by a person to whom the prophecy is given 50% less often.

The kind of person who pays to fight an infallible prophecy is the same kind of person to whom infallible prophecies are given 50% less often. In this case.

Hmm, I didn't intend for the prophet to contradict himself. (Based on your comments and others, I seem to have tripped and fallen hard into the illusion of transparency.) Would you mind elaborating on the contradictory statement he makes? And, had he not said anything apparently contradictory, then would you have paid $100?

-1Pimgd
We've talked about this before, right? He claims there is a something that you cannot prevent in your future, like ever ever. Like "even if we chain you to the wall in a dungeon all locked up with locks"-ever. I don't know what happens if you suicide in the example; I guess the point is moot in that case. But! He has THE CURE! It only has a 50% chance of working, and if you pay $100, he will give you the cure. I detect a slight personal bias here; I treat Omega as "an entity" and this prophet as "a person, who may or may not be out to scam me"... but whatever, supposed to override that. We'll assume THE CURE is informational in nature, because if it was physical, there exist futures in which I slam the prophet to the ground and just take THE CURE without paying $100. Or I convince the prophet that, look, I don't have $100 on me right now, how about I give you just $50 for it? To which the prophet responds "it's okay, you can pay in installments". (This is why "Omega" solves a lot of problems, when you agree to pay $100, he will wire it for you. This prophet can't plausibly have hacked the worlds banking systems, Omega can. The prophet cannot withhold your income, Omega can.) At that point... well, yes, I'd pay by axiom. The prophet is trustworthy. Like, 100% trustworthy. That's the whole premise. Omega isn't, but if you want proof, he'll generate it for you. I could be wrong about this (one part of me says "Yes, you're wrong! Wrong wrong wrong wrong!" and the other says "Nah, this is fine"), but I think you'd be more likely to run into Omega-like entities than truly honest prophets, because we've had SO MANY people already claiming to be able to see the future (and failing; how many times has the world been supposed to end already?) that when a man comes up to me and says such a thing, the first I think is "scammer". More points (not all of them fair and most of them arguing against the example which is normally not the goal); Omega can generate proof so fast

Though, the anti-Laplacian mind, in this case, is inherently more complicated. Maybe it's not a moot point that Laplacian minds are on average simpler than their anti-Laplacian counterparts? There are infinite Laplacian and anti-Laplacian minds, but of the two infinities, might one be proportionately larger?

None of this is to detract from Eliezer's original point, of course. I only find it interesting to think about.

3rkyeun
They must be of exactly the same magnitude, as the odds and even integers are, because either can be given a frog. From any Laplacian mind, I can install a frog and get an anti-Laplacian. And vice versa. This even applies to ones I've installed a frog in already. Adding a second frog gets you a new mind that is just like the one two steps back, except lags behind it in computation power by two kicks. There is a 1:1 mapping between Laplacian and non-Laplacian minds, and I have demonstrated the constructor function of adding a frog.

And if the prophet is "honest and truly prophetic"?

0Pimgd
He makes a self-contradictory statement and loses credibility points. Like, a lot of them. Maybe not in general, but a lot of them for this specific topic.

Actually, I still stand by the "not contrived" part. (I think that's what drove me to believe it would be easy to understand.) The idea arose organically when I was thinking about what I would do if presented a prophecy like this, and whether it would be worth expending effort to fight it. On the other hand, there's no reason for Omega to play his game with you other than specifically to illustrate the point of CM.

Well, your confusion means my original goal has failed, and I suppose that's that. I am pretty sure this is equivalent to CM in the sense that only UDT wins -- I'd be happy to explain further if you'd like, but otherwise, thanks for your help!

4gjm
Not necessarily. It might just be that for some idiosyncratic reason I find standard CM particularly easy to make sense of or your version particularly hard. You should see what other people say.

You are on path 3, but the button is not disabled. The purpose of spending the $100 is to decrease the number of possible worlds where the prophet would come up and talk to you in the first place. You wouldn't end up destroying your timeline by making it inconsistent; ideally, this timeline was just never created because if it had been you would've spent the $100.

Out of curiosity, would you pay Omega in the counterfactual mugging? If you'd pay in CF but not here, that makes me worry that this formulation isn't similar.

0entirelyuseless
I would pay Omega in the counterfactual mugging, but I would not pay here. The reason is that in the counterfactual mugging case, I would want to be the sort of person who pays when they get offered a deal like that. Here, I would not want to be the sort of person who pays to fight an infallible prophecy. However, I would want to be the sort of person who pays to fight a non-infallible prophecy, so I would be happy to precommit to pay in non-infallible prophecy situations.
1Pimgd
I definitely would pay Omega. Here, I'm just going "that's one shady prophet".

Hmm… does some instance of utility get multiplied by the number of people who find it utilitous? Like, if there are twice as many humans, does that mean that one Babyeater baby eaten subtracts twice as much from group utility?

An omnipotent magicker decides to flip a coin, and the coin lands heads. Afterwards, the magicker changes every particle in the universe to what it would be had the coin landed tails -- including those in his own brain. Is it true that in the past, the coin landed heads, even though this event is epiphenomenal?

I realize that the magicker is violating the laws of entropy, and that in the real world there are no magickers. I also realize that for the purposes of anyone in the universe, the first coin flip doesn't and couldn't possibly matter, because it was epiphenomenal. But I'm still curious what the answer to my question is.

0hairyfigment
It may help to start with regular quantum mechanics/ Many Worlds. Because there, your scenario sounds like a world receiving amplitude from two different histories - actually many more, but let's start with them - there's the actually possible history in which the coin landed tails, and the magical one where it landed heads. Both contribute to the underlying result. Timeless physics sounds like it takes this one step further. In this view, both pasts exist as disconnected points in a timeless space. Eliezer's version (I think) has an implicit causal connection between the 'present' and the 'tails' past if we analyze them according to real physics, and another connection to 'heads' if we analyze them by magical physics.
0mamert
For the purposes of the universe, the first coin flip not only doesn't matter, it never existed. The magicker himself will claim - and show any amount of supporting evidence - that it landed tails. He will not even remember casting a spell, unless he'd have cast one in this case, too, but for a different reason (if he'd have cast anyway regardless of the toss outcome, he'd get looped, recalling himself making the toss, but not yet casting; or being confused why he recalls casting, but there is no change in the toss outcome). Time between the toss and casting, when things were different than they are now? What perspective would that need? Looking at the universe from outside the universe?

On (3), if Zombie Chalmers can't be correct or incorrect about consciousness -- as in, he's just making noise when he says "consciousness" -- does the same hold for his beliefs on anything else? Like, Zombie Chalmers also (probably) says "the sun will rise tomorrow," but would you also question whether these letters actually mean anything? In both the cases of the sun's rising and epiphenomenalism's truth, Zombie Chalmers is commenting on an actual way that reality can be. Is there a difference? Or, does Zombie Chalmers have no beliefs about anything? I'd think that a zombie could be thought to have beliefs as far as some advanced AI could.

[This comment is no longer endorsed by its author]Reply

This post is my first experience learning about noise in algorithms, so forgive me if I seem underinformed. Two points occurred to me while reading this comment, some clarification would be great:

First, while it was intriguing to read that input just below the perceptual threshold would half the time be perceived by bumping it above the threshold, it seems to me that input just above the threshold would half the time be knocked below it. So wouldn't noise lead to no gain? Just a loss in acuity?

Second, I'm confused how input below the perceptual threshold i... (read more)

4gjm
Suppose you have a motion-detector that looks once per second and notices a change when the chair moves by 0.1m within a second and is completely blind to smaller changes. Then a chair moving at 0.09m/s won't trigger it at all. Now suppose you add noise of amplitude +-0.01m. Then in most seconds you still won't see anything, but sometimes (I think 1/8 of the time, if that noise is uniformly distributed) the apparent movement will be above the threshold. So now if you do some kind of aggregation of the detector output over time you'll be able to tell that the chair is moving. Yes, the cost of this is that above the threshold your performance is worse. You'll need to take averages or something of the kind to make up for it. (But: when a detector has a threshold, it usually doesn't give perfectly accurate measurements just above the threshold. You may find that even above the threshold you actually get more useful results in the presence of noise.) Another example. Suppose you are trying to detect oscillating signals (musical notes, radio waves, ...) via an analogue-to-digital converter. Let's say its resolution is 1 unit. Then a signal oscillating between -0.5 and +0.5 will not show up at all: every time you sample it you'll get zero. And any small change to the signal will make exactly no difference to the output. But if you add enough noise to that signal, it becomes detectable. You'll need to average your data (or do something broadly similar); you'll have some risk of false positives; but if you have enough data you can measure the signal pretty well even though it's well below the threshold of your ADC. [EDITED to add:] It may be worth observing that there's nothing super-special about adding random stuff for this purpose. E.g., suppose you're trying to measure some non-varying value using an analogue-to-digital converter, and the value you're trying to measure is smaller than the resolution in your ADC. You could (as discussed above) add noise and average. Bu

In reading the Sequences, I feel weird about replying to comments because most of them are from seven years ago. Is it frowned upon to respond to something crazy old and possibly obsolete?

5[anonymous]
It seems like that's actually an acceptable practice; it's not unusual for "Recent Comments" to be on posts that are several years old.
Lumifer160

No, necroing is perfectly fine.

I love this series. Except, I have very particularly been in an argument where I said the phrase, "Hinduism is, by definition, a religion." Isn't agreement on common usage useful if you want to communicate efficiently? Maybe Wiggin shouldn't be used commonly, but one person defining Wiggin in a manner that contradicts the dictionary definition certainly doesn't do anyone any favors. And I think it's fine for common usage to define humans as mortal, as long as it consistently assumes that Socrates is inhuman when he goes on living forever.

I disagree. Agreeing on term definitions beforehand would solve all of these problems: The definition of religion is not "something that answers theological questions," therefore the By Definition argument is ineffective for proving that atheism is a religion. (Incidentally, if that were the definition of religion, then atheism would be a religion.) For Hinduism, if someone tried to tell me that it was not a religion, I would necessarily use the definition of religion to prove them wrong. If Hinduism did not fit the definition of religion, it would not be a religion.

This hurts my image of Freud. Of course, after I have a dream about skyscrapers, he can explain that it's connected to my love of my phallus, but could he predict my love of my phallus based on a dream about skyscrapers?

I believe that the vast majority of people in the dust speck thought experiment would be very willing to endure the collision of the dust speck, if only to play a small role in saving a man from 50 years of torture. I would choose the dust specks on the behalf of those hurt by the dust specks, as I can be very close to certain that most of them would consent to it.

A counterargument might be that, since 3^^^3 is such a vast number, the collective pain of the small fraction of people who would not consent to the dust speck still multiplies to be far larger t... (read more)

0Dacyn
The only people who would consent to the dust speck are people who would choose SPECKS over TORTURE in the first place. Are you really saying that you "do not value the comfort of" Eliezer, Robin, and others? However, your argument raises another interesting point, which is that the existence of people who would prefer that SPECKS was chosen over TORTURE, even if their preference is irrational, might change the outcome of the computation because it means that a choice of TORTURE amounts to violating their preferences. If TORTURE violates ~3^^^3 people's preferences, then perhaps it is after all a harm comparable to SPECKS. This would certainly be true if everyone finds out about whether SPECKS or TORTURE was chosen, in which case TORTURE makes it harder for a lot of people to sleep at night. On the other hand, maybe you should force them to endure the guilt, because maybe then they will be motivated to research why the agent who made the decision chose TORTURE, and so the end result will be some people learning some decision theory / critical thinking... Also, if SPECKS vs TORTURE decisions come up a lot in this hypothetical universe, then realistically people will only feel guilty over the first one.