All of wilkox's Comments + Replies

wilkox10

The reason medical progress is so slow is largely the types of people who, when they hear a woman cured her own cancer and published the results to benefit others, heroically advancing the cause of humanity at risk to only herself, warn of the dire ethical problems with that.

Often those people call themselves ‘ethicists.’ No, seriously, that is a thing, and that situation somehow rose to the level of a writeup in Nature, which calls self-experimentation an ‘ethically fraught practice.’

I'm as contemptuous as anyone of most 'bioethics', but this does g... (read more)

wilkox100

Katelyn Jetelina has been providing some useful information on this. Her conclusion at this point seems to be 'more data needed'.

3CronoDAS
Thank you!
wilkox85

The epistemology was not bad behind the scenes, it was just not presented to the readers. That is unfortunate but it is hard to write a NYT article (there are limits on how many receipts you can put in an article and some of the sources may have been off the record).

I'd have more trust in the writing of a journalist who presents what they believe to be the actual facts in support of a claim, than one who publishes vague insinuations because writing articles is hard.

Cade correctly informed the readers that Scott is aligned with Murray on race and IQ.

... (read more)
wilkox2338

It seems like you think what Metz wrote was acceptable because it all adds up to presenting the truth in the end, even if the way it was presented was 'unconvincing' and the evidence 'embarassing[ly]' weak. I don't buy the principle that 'bad epistemology is fine if the outcome is true knowledge', and I also don't buy that this happened in this particular case, nor that this is what Metz intended.

If Metz's goal was to inform his readers about Scott's position, he failed. He didn't give any facts other than that Scott 'aligned himself with' and quoted someb... (read more)

8LGS
The epistemology was not bad behind the scenes, it was just not presented to the readers. That is unfortunate but it is hard to write a NYT article (there are limits on how many receipts you can put in an article and some of the sources may have been off the record). Cade correctly informed the readers that Scott is aligned with Murray on race and IQ. This is true and informative, and at the time some people here doubted it before the one email leaked. Basically, Cade's presented evidence sucked but someone going with the heuristic "it's in the NYT so it must be true" would have been correctly informed. I don't know if Cade had a history of "tabloid rhetorical tricks" but I think it is extremely unbecoming to criticize a reporter for giving true information that happens to paint the community in a bad light. Also, the post you linked by Trevor uses some tabloid rhetorical tricks: it says Cade sneered at AI risk but links to an article that literally doesn't mention AI risk at all.
wilkox10

The section on ‘How do you do it?’ looks like a generalised version of John Platt's Strong Inference, a method of doing science that he believed ‘makes for rapid and powerful progress’. The essence of Strong Inference is to think carefully about a scientific question (the goal) to identify the main competing hypotheses that have yet to be discriminated between (the blockers), and devise and perform experiment(s) that rapidly discriminate between them (taking responsibility to remove the blockers and actually perform the next step).

Strong inference consis

... (read more)
wilkox32

And, part of the point here is "it is very hard to talk about this kind of thing". And I think that if the response to this post is a bunch of "gotcha! You said this comment was bad in one particular way, but it's actually bad in an interestingly different way", that kinda feels like it proves Elizabeth right?

This seems like a self-fulfilling prophecy. If I wrote a post that said:

It's common for people on LessWrong to accuse others of misquoting them. For example, just the other day, Elizabeth said:

wilkox is always misquoting me! He claimed that I said the

... (read more)
5philh
I don't think this is a great analogy, but basically yeah. This sort of thing is why I included the last paragraph in my previous comment ("I do want there to be space for that kind of thing").
wilkox112

For several of the examples you give, including my own comments, your description of what was said seems to misrepresent the source text.

Active suppression of inconvenient questions: Martín Soto

The charitable explanation here is that my post focuses on naive veganism, and Soto thinks that's a made-up problem.

This is not a charitable or even plausible description of what Martín wrote, and Martín has described this as a 'hyperbolic' misrepresentation of their position. There is nowhere in the source comment thread that Martín claims or implies anything resem... (read more)

philh103

So I haven't reread to figure out an opinion on most of this, but wrt this specific point

I found it harder to evaluate whether they were misrepresented in these other ways, because like Stephen Bennett I found it hard to understand Martín’s position in detail.

I kinda want to flag something like "yes, that's the point"? If Martín's position is hard to pin down, then... like, it's better to say "I don't know what he's trying to say" than "he's trying to say [concrete thing he's not trying to say]", but both of them seem like they fit for the purposes of ... (read more)

wilkox20

This sounds like you're saying "I won't prescribe B12 until my patient gives up oreos" or even "I won't prescribe B12 until everyone gives up oreos", which would be an awful way to treat people.[1]

[...]

You probably mean "I don't think Elizabeth/anyone should spend time on veganism's problems, when metabolic issues are doing so much more aggregate harm."

 

I wouldn’t say either of these things. A quick and easy treatment like B12 replacement is not mutually exclusive with a long-term and difficult treatment like diet modification. (This is not an abstrac... (read more)

wilkox20

I absolutely agree. McDonalds and the other demons of the Western Diet cause much more harm, both in absolute terms and per capita. That was really my point; within the class of 'health misinformation and disinformation that causes harm', furphies about vegan nutrition are a comparatively minor problem.

2Elizabeth
This sounds like you're saying "I won't prescribe B12 until my patient gives up oreos" or even "I won't prescribe B12 until everyone gives up oreos", which would be an awful way to treat people. Even if you're right that oreos represent a larger problem, taking B12 pills is useful in its own right, and easier than giving up oreos[1]. I assume you don't mean that. You probably mean "I don't think Elizabeth/anyone should spend time on veganism's problems, when metabolic issues are doing so much more aggregate harm." But tractability applies even more on a population level.  People aren't eating oreos out of ignorance: they know they're bad. They eat them because taste is winning out over health.  It's impossible for a blog post to fix "oreos taste good" or "people care more about taste than health". But it's pretty easy theoretically possible for a blog post to fix ignorance of the benefits of some tests and supplements. When I see similarly tractable opportunities to help omnivores, I take them. Hell, I found a (vegan) cure for oreos tasting good (n=1). Finding it took years of self-experimentation (where the iron post took a few days, for more certainly).   AFAIK no one else has tried it, because it takes consistent effort over several months to see an effect on weight[2].  So no, I am not going to let McDonalds shitty advertising hold up alerting people to problems with simple diagnoses with simple solutions 1. ^ Especially by the time someone is in the doctor's office for oreo-related problems. The people who find oreos easy to give up have already done so.  2. ^ It also costs $5-$10/day, but I know people jumping through a lot of hoops to get semaglutide, so I'm pretty sure the issue here is the delay and uncertainty. 
wilkox53

You don't just have a level of access, you have a type of access. Your access to your own mind isn't like looking at a brain scan.

From my Camp 1 perspective, this just seems like a restatement of what I wrote. My direct access to my own mind isn't like my indirect access to other people's minds; to understand another person's mind, I can at best gather scraps of sensory data like ‘what that person is saying’ and try to piece them together into a model. My direct access to my own mind isn't like looking at a brain scan of my own mind; to understand a brain ... (read more)

3TAG
At this point, I can prove to you that you are actually in Camp #2. All I have to is point out that the kind of access you have to your mind is (or rather includes) qualia! The mystery relates entirely to the expectation that there should be a reductive physical explanation of qualia. The Hard Problem of Qualia Whilst science has helped with some aspects of the mind body problem, it has made others more difficult, or at least exposed their difficulty. In pre scientific times, people were happy to believe that the colour of an object was an intrinsic property of it, which was perceived to be as it was. This "naive realism", was disrupted by a series of discoveries, such as the absence of anything resembling subjective colour in scientific descriptions, and a slew of reasons for recognising a subjective element in perception. A philosopher's stance on the fundamental nature of reality is called an ontology. The success of science in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries has led many philosophers to adopt a physicalist ontology, basically the idea that the fundamental constituents of reality are what physics says they are. (It is a background assumption of physicalism that the sciences form a sort of tower, with psychology and sociology near the top, and biology and chemistry in the middle , and with physics at the bottom. The higher and intermediate layers don't have their own ontologies -- mind-stuff and elan vital are outdated concepts -- everything is either a fundamental particle, or an arrangement of fundamental particles) So the problem of mind is now the problem of qualia, and the way philosophers want to explain it is physicallistically. However, the problem of explaining how brains give rise to subjective sensation, of explaining qualia in physical terms, is now considered to be The Hard Problem. In the words of David Chalmers:- " It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subje
wilkox10

Apologies for the repetition, but I'm going to start by restating a slightly updated model of what I think is going on, because it provides the context for the rest of my comment. Basically I still think there are two elements to our disagreement:

  1. The Camp 1 vs Camp 2 disagreement. Camp 1 thinks that a description of the physical system would completely and satisfactorily explain the nature of consciousness and subjective experience; Camp 2 thinks that there is a conceptual element of subjective experience that we don't currently know how to explain in phys
... (read more)
wilkox10

I would not count "psychotic" here, since one is not necessarily directly acquainted with it (one doesn't necessarily know one has it).

Would it be fair to say then that by ‘mental states’ you mean ‘everything that the brain does that the brain can itself be aware of’?

I thought you saw the fact that beliefs are about something as evidence that they are easier to explain than experiences

I don't think there is any connection between whether a thought/belief/experience is about something and whether it is explainable. I'm not sure about ‘easier to explain’, bu... (read more)

1cubefox
Yeah, aware of, or conscious of. Psychosis seems to be less a mental state in this sense than a disposition to produce certain mental states. What you call "model" here would presumably correspond only to the the externally observable neural correlate of a belief, not to the belief. The case would be the same for a neural correlate of an experience, so this doesn't provide a difference between the two. Explaining the neural correlate is of course just as "easy" as explaining an utterance. The hard problem is to explain actual mental states with their correlates. So the case doesn't explain the belief/experience in question in terms of this correlate. It would be unable to distinguish between a p-zombie, which does have the neural correlate but not the belief/experience, and a normal person. So it seems that either the explanation is unsuccessful as given, since it stops at the neural correlate and doesn't explain the belief or experience, or you assume the explanandum is actually just the neural correlate, not the belief.
wilkox10

Mental states do not need to be "about" something, but it is pretty clear they can be.

I'm still a bit confused by what you mean by ‘mental states’. My best guess is that you are using it as a catch-all term for everything that is or might be going on in the brain, which includes experiences, beliefs, thoughts, and more general states like ‘psychotic’ or ‘relaxed’.

I agree that mental states do not need to be about something, but I think beliefs do need to be about something and thoughts can be about something (propositional in the way you describe). I don't... (read more)

1cubefox
I would not count "psychotic" here, since one is not necessarily directly acquainted with it (one doesn't necessarily know one has it). I thought you saw the fact that beliefs are about something as evidence that they are easier to explain than experiences, or that they at least more similar to utterances than to experiences. I responded that aboutness (technical term: intentionality) doesn't matter, as several things that are commonly regarded as qualia, just like experiences, can be about something, e.g. loves or fears. So accepting beliefs as explanandum would not be in principle different from accepting fears or experiences as explanandum, which would seem to put you more in Camp #2 rather than #1. I think the main disagreement is actually just one, the above: What counts as a simple explanandum such that we would not run into hard explanatory problems? My position is that only utterances act as such a simple explanandum, and that no subjective mental state (things we are directly acquainted with, like intentional states, emotions and experiences) is simple in this sense, since they are not obviously compatible with any causal explanation.
wilkox10

Huh, this is interesting. I wouldn't have suspected this to be the crux. I'm not sure how well this maps to the Camp 1 vs 2 difference as opposed to idiosyncratic differences in our own views.

In your view however, if I'm not misunderstanding you, beliefs are more similar to utterances than to experiences. So while I think beliefs are equally hard to explain as experiences, in your view beliefs are about as easy to explain as utterances. Is this a fair characterization?

This is a fair characterisation, though I don't think ease of explanation is a crucial po... (read more)

1cubefox
Mental states do not need to be "about" something, but it is pretty clear they can be. One can be just happy, but it seems one can also be happy about something. One certainly can wish for something, or fear that something is the case, or hope for it, etc. The form in the following is the same: the belief that x, the desire that x, the fear that x, the hope that x. Here x is a proposition. In case of e.g. loving x or hating x, x is an object, not a proposition, but again the mental state is about something. These states seem all hard to explain in a way that utterances aren't. The relevant difference here is the access. The "subjective" is exactly that which an agent is directly acquainted with, while the "objective" stuff is only inferred indirectly. It is unclear how one could explain one with the other. As I said, it is unclear how such a mechanical explanation of a thought or belief would look like. It is clear that utterances are caused by mouth movements which are caused by neurons firing, but it is not clear how neurons could "cause" a belief, or how to otherwise (e.g. reductively) explain a belief. It is not clear how to distinguish p-zombies from normal people, or explain why they wouldn't be possible.
wilkox30

Okay, so you are saying that in the first-person case, the evidence for having a headache is not itself the experience of having a headache, but the belief that you have the experience of having a headache.

Not quite. I would say that in the first-person case, the explanandum – the thing that needs to be explained – is the belief (or thought, or utterance) that you have the experience of having a headache. Once you have explained how some particular set of inputs to the brain led to that particular output, you have explained everything that is going on, in ... (read more)

1cubefox
I think this is the crucial point of contention. I find the following obvious: thoughts or beliefs are on the same subjective level as experiences, which is quite different from utterances, which are purely mechanical third-person events, similar to the movement of a limb. In your view however, if I'm not misunderstanding you, beliefs are more similar to utterances than to experiences. So while I think beliefs are equally hard to explain as experiences, in your view beliefs are about as easy to explain as utterances. Is this a fair characterization? The reason I think utterances are "easy" to explain is that they are physical events and therefore obviously allow for a mechanistic third-person explanation. The explanation would not in principle be different from explaining a simple spinal reflex. Nerve inputs somehow cause nerve outputs, except that for an utterance there are orders of magnitude more neurons involved, which makes the explanation much harder in practice. But the principle is the same. For subjective attitudes like beliefs and experiences the explanandum is not just a mouth movement (as in the case of utterances) which would be directly caused by nervous signals. It is unclear how to even grasp subjective beliefs and experiences in a mechanical language of cause and effect. As an illustration, it is not obvious why an organism couldn't theoretically be a p-zombie -- have the usual neuronal configuration, behave completely normally, do all the same utterances -- without having any subjective beliefs or experiences. (It seems vaguely plausible to me that for beliefs and experiences, a reductive, rather than causal, explanation would be needed. Yet the model of other reductive explanations in science, like explaining the temperature of a gas with the average kinetic energy of the particles it is made out off, doesn't obviously fit what would be needed in the case of mental states. But this is a longer story.)
wilkox40

You’re absolutely right that this is the more interesting case. I intentionally chose the past tense to make it easier to focus on the details of the example rather than the Camp #1/Camp #2 distinction per se. For completeness, I'll try to recapitulate my understanding of Rafael's account for the present-tense case ‘I have a headache right now’.

From my Camp #1 perspective, any mechanistic description of the brain that explained why it generated the thought/belief/utterance ‘I have a headache right now’ instead of ‘I don’t have a headache right now’ in resp... (read more)

4cubefox
Okay, so you are saying that in the first-person case, the evidence for having a headache is not itself the experience of having a headache, but the belief that you have the experience of having a headache. So according to you, one could be wrong about currently having a headache, namely when the aforementioned belief is false, when you have the belief but not the experience. Is this right? If so, I see two problems with this. * Intuitively it doesn't seem possible to be wrong about one's own current mental states. Imagine a patient complains to a doctor about having a terrible headache. The doctor replies: "You may be sure you are having a terrible headache, but maybe you are wrong and actually don't have a headache at all." Or a psychiatrist: "I'm sure you aren't lying, but you may yourself be mistaken about being depressed right now, maybe you are actually perfectly happy". These cases seem absurd. I don't remember any case where I considered myself being wrong about a current mental state. We don't say: I just thought I was feeling pain, but actually I didn't. * A belief seems to be itself a mental state. So even if you add the belief as an intermediary layer of evidence between the agent and their experience, then you still have something which the agent is infallible about: Their belief. The evidence for having a belief would be the belief itself. Beliefs seem to be different from utterances, in that the latter are mechanistically describable third person events (sound waves), while beliefs seem to be just as mental as experiences. So the explanandum, the evidence, would in both cases be something mental. But it seems you require the explanandum to be something "objective", like an utterance.
wilkox92

This is a clear and convincing account of the intuitions that lead to people either accepting or denying the existence of the Hard Problem. I’m squarely in Camp #1, and while I think the broad strokes are correct there are two places where I think this account gets Camp #1 a little wrong on the details.

According to Camp #1, the correct explanandum is still "I claim to have experienced X" (where X is the apparent experience). After all, if we can explain exactly why you, as a physical system, uttered the words "I experienced X", then there's nothing else to

... (read more)
3TAG
You don't just have a level of access, you have a type of access. Your access to your own mind isn't like looking at a brain scan. The Mary's Room thought experiment brings it out. Mary has complete access to someone elses mental state, from the outside, but still doesn't experience it from the inside.
5cubefox
But presumably everyone in camp 2 will agree that memories are not perfectly reliable and that memories of experiences are different from those experiences themselves. We could be misremembering. The actually interesting case is whether you can be wrong about having certain experiences now, such that no memory is involved. Say, you are having a strong headache. Here the headache itself seems to be the evidence. Which seems to mean you can't be mistaken about currently having a headache.
3Rafael Harth
Yeah, I agree with both points. I edited the post to reflect it; for the whole brain vs parts thing I just added a sentence; for the kind of access thing I made it a footnote and also linked to your comment. As you said, it does seem like a refinement of the model rather than a contradiction, but it's definitely important enough to bring up.
wilkox42

Surely you don't think that's the right moral category for ethical veganism?

I don't really understand what you're asking here. How would you describe the moral category you're referring to, and why do you think it doesn't or shouldn't apply to veganism?

3Elizabeth
McDonalds and sugary cereal advertisers are widely viewed as harmful if not evil for the way they confuse the epistemic environment in order to make money and others' expense. Calling something "no worse than fast food and sugary cereal advertisers" is an enormous moral and epistemic insult to it. 
wilkox96

Thoughts on why the post gave (me) the impression it did, in no particular order:

  • 'Trade-offs' is broad and vague, and the post didn't make a lot of detailed claims about vegan nutrition. This makes sense in the context of you trying to communicate the detailed facts previously, but coming to the post without that context made it hard to tell if you were just making an unobjectionable claim or trying to imply something broader.
  • Some statements struck me as technically true but hyperbolic. Examples:

You can get a bit of all known nutrients from plants and fort

... (read more)
4Elizabeth
If people are very convinced I'm wrong then asking them why seems like a great strategy to me. They might be right and that might have implications for my plans. The point of this post wasn't to convince anyone, it was to ask for evidence on a specific question.  I'm really glad we got to a more cooperative space and I hate to puncture that, but two weeks later I'm still kind of aghast you said "If you take out the references to veganism, this is just the current state of the world. People advertise their fast food restaurants and feed their children sugary breakfast cereals without caveats about the risk of heart disease or diabetes." Surely you don't think that's the right moral category for ethical veganism? 
wilkox40

That is a frustrating situation. As you note in the introduction this is a charged topic that tends to lead to poor discussions, so you deserve credit for wading in anyway.

Given the context I laid out, is there anything I could have done to create a more productive discussion with you, personally?

I'm not sure. The discussion in this comment thread (and others) has been productive in the sense that I now have a much better understanding of your position and the context. In terms of the original post, I don't know if a one-sentence summary would have changed... (read more)

5Elizabeth
Thank you for the empathy, this has been extremely challenging. I think something similar to "why the post gave you the impression it did" could be helpful, and I'm even more interested in what you think could be done to convey the important, true points with as little animosity-due-to-misreading as possible
wilkox50

Thanks, this and your comment here helped a lot to clarify your position and intentions. My initial impression was similar to Natália's, i.e. that you believed something more like point 3.

Re. point 2, by "widely recognised" (and similarly for "widespread" in point 3) I meant something like "widely recognised in relevant academic literature/textbooks/among experts" rather than "among people who have ever tried a vegan diet". My impression is that on this definition you wouldn't endorse point 2 either.

We may still disagree on the "importance" of point 1, alt... (read more)

7Elizabeth
I feel like I'm in a bit of a trap here. I don't think anyone thought "oh, Elizabeth's statement is obviously true but I will argue with her and make obviously false claims" while twirling a mustache. That's not how people work. But I also think my words were extremely clear, and if they're being misread this often there's a systemic problem in the readers.  I realize this is a big claim; frequent misunderstandings are by default the fault of the author. But a lot of people got it, and I don't know what I could have done to get a different outcome. You can argue the framing of the post was suspicious, and I can see why that would be true for this post and why it would make people overly aggressive in rebuttals. But what about when I was offering nutritional tests and vegan supplements? And that one was at least pretty overt, some private ones were mental jui-jitsu to which my only defense was stating my own opinions very plainly. Relatedly: this is not my first time asking for this evidence. Every time I posted installments of my nutrition testing program, someone would say "this sample size is too small" and I'd say "you are correct, do you know of anything better?", and nothing would come of it. It took this post for someone to send me the 7th Day Adventist data.  So if I focus on productively treating the object level problem, people push back in ways that can't be argued with because they're not epistemically cooperative. If I try to engage in a way that feels epistemically tractable, people get even angrier and impugn my motives more.  Given the context I laid out, is there anything I could have done to create a more productive discussion with you, personally?
wilkox1810

I don’t doubt the Faunalytics data. If anything the number seems surprisingly low, considering it comes from self-reporting among people who went on to quit veganism.

I’m not sure how to weigh ‘importance’ other than subjectively, but I’ll attempt to at least put bounds on it. As a floor, some number of people experience health issues that are important enough to them that they are motivated to quit veganism. As a ceiling, the health risks of veganism are less important than those of other harms related to diet – for example, dyslipidaemia or diabetes ... (read more)

3Olli Savolainen
I would like to endorse that last item, that there is a potential harm that is not widely known. It's not specific to veganism, but the risk is elevated for them. Oxalic acid is ubiquitous in plant-based foods. Absorbed oxalic acid can precipitate in the body as calcium oxalate. This most often damages the kidneys, but it can also cause joint pains and degeneration. The crystals are not as inflammatory as the crystals that cause gout, but they are much more persistent. People who have trouble with fat absorption are at an increased risk for getting too much oxalic acid from their diet, a condition called enteric hyperoxaluria / oxalosis. These include persons treated for obesity with baryatric surgery or old fashioned weight loss drugs, and sufferers of IBD. This is a growing demographic. Their problems with kidneys and joints can very easily be imputed to pre-existing conditions like diabetes, overweight or autoimmune disorders. The studies on oxalate content of foods are somewhat conflicting as to the precise amounts in each plant or foodstuff. It is not always clear what part is bound to e.g. calcium and how much is in a more readily absorbed form. Legumes seem to contain significant amounts. Rhubarb is a well known source, but how many people know that a larger serving of carrots, sweet potatoes or almonds can be just as dangerous? Processing methods have a big effect: instant coffee has manyfold higher levels than ground and percolated coffee. Oxalic acid also has some endogenous sources in the body, such as protein metabolism. It is a metabolite of both xylitol and ascorbic acid. Gut flora can both generate and consume oxalic acid, depending on the species. I haven't found any oxalate data on novel highly processed plant based foods like meat and dairy substitutes. Fermentation might push it either way. Many of the ingredients, like mushrooms, almonds, spinach, beetroot and coconut seem to have very high levels of oxalate to begin with.  Perhaps you can

This feels very epistemically cooperative, thank you.

The answer is primarily point 1,  although whether that's distinct from point 2 depends on the definition of "widely recognized" .  Which brings me to your question:

in which case I’m still confused why you wrote this post instead of just presenting this information

The answer is that I did present the information, and proactively provided help, and I got pushback that only made sense if people disagreed with "veganism is a constraint on a multidimensional problem". But they would never defend th... (read more)

wilkox71

I agree with this, though I would expand

there are plenty of points on this axis where people will seek help for heart-attacks but will be pessimistic about getting help with "vaguely feeling tired lately"

to note that heart attacks are on average a much more serious problem then vague fatigue, so the fact that people are more likely to see a doctor about the former is a good thing. People will generally self-select whether to seek medical help by the severity of the problem, and to the extent that they don't veganism is probably the least of their worries.

wilkox110

I'm confused- the issues you mention seem both important and, in most cases, extremely easy to fix. If there's a large population that is going vegan without the steps you mention (and my informal survey says there is), it seems high value to alert them to the necessity.


I suspect we have different intuitions as a matter of degree for ‘important’, ‘high value’, and ‘necessity’ here. Despite that, I think we would probably agree on a statement like ‘vegans who are not aware that their diet increases the risk of nutrient deficiencies would benefit from l... (read more)

The Faunalytics data says, at a minimum, 20% of vegans develop a health issue that's cured when they quit. Do you disagree with their data (please elaborate) or not consider that important (in which case, what is your threshold for importance)?

wilkox3418

I’ve been trying to figure out why I feel like I disagree with this post, despite broadly agreeing with your cruxes. I think it’s because it in the act of writing and posting this there is an implicit claim along the lines of:

Subtle nutritional issues that are specific to veganism can cause significant health harms, to a degree that it is worth spending time and energy thinking about this as ‘a problem’.

For context, I am both vegan and a doctor. Nutrient deficiencies are common and can cause anything ranging from no symptoms to vague symptoms to life-threa... (read more)

Beyond these well-known issues, is there any reason to expect veganism in particular to cause any health harms worth spending time worrying about?

I'm confused- the issues you mention seem both important and, in most cases, extremely easy to fix. If there's a large population that is going vegan without the steps you mention (and my informal survey says there is), it seems high value to alert them to the necessity.

Perhaps you expect this to be caught at regular physicals, but many people don't have those, or their doctors don't think to run the right tests ... (read more)

8Lukas Finnveden
I'm personally quite bad at noticing and tracking (non-sudden) changes in my energy, mood, or cognitive ability. I think there are issues that I wouldn't notice (or would think minor) that I would still care a lot about fixing. Also, some people have problems with executive function. Even if they notice issues, the issues might have to be pretty bad before they'll ask a doctor about them. Bad enough that it could be pretty valuable to prevent less bad issues (that would go untreated). (This could be exacerbated if people are generally unexcited about seeking medical help — I think there are plenty of points on this axis where people will seek help for heart-attacks but will be pessimistic about getting help with "vaguely feeling tired lately". Or maybe not even pessimistic. Just... not having "ask a dr" be generated as an obvious thing to try.)
wilkox30

Have you considered melatonin? Quoting gwern:

Melatonin allows us a different way of raising the cost, a physiological & self-enforcing way. Half an hour before we plan to go to sleep, we take a pill. The procrastinating effect will not work - half an hour is so far away that our decision-making process & willpower are undistorted and can make the right decision (viz. following the schedule). When the half-hour is up, the melatonin has begun to make us sleepy. Staying awake ceases to be free, to be the default option; now it is costly to fight the melatonin and remain awake.

I use it for exactly this reason and it works brilliantly.

0cata
No, I read that at some point but forgot completely about it. That sounds like a really good idea, and I'm going to arrange to try it.
wilkox160

This is like saying "if evolution wants a frog to appear poisonous, the most efficient way to accomplish that is to actually make it poisonous". Evolution has a long history of faking signals when it can get away with it. If evolution "wants" you to signal that you care about the truth, it will do so by causing you to actually care about the truth if and only if causing you to actually care about the truth has a lower fitness cost than the array of other potential dishonest signals on offer.

7Desrtopa
Poisonousness doesn't change appearance though. Being poisonous and looking poisonous are separate evolutionary developments. Truth seeking values, on the other hand, affect behavior as much as an impulse to fake truth seeking values, and fake truth seeking values are probably at least as difficult to implement, most likely more so, requiring the agent to model real truth seeking agents.
wilkox140

I've noticed many people who practise meditation have a strong belief in meditation and the more 'rational' core of Buddhist practices, but only belief in belief about the new age-y aspects. My meditation teacher, for example, consistently prefaces the new age stuff with "in Buddhist teachings" or "Buddhists believe" ("Buddhists believe we will be reincarnated") while making other claims as simple statements of fact ("mindfulness meditation is a useful relaxation technique").

wilkox20

I appreciate this. I genuinely didn't (still don't ) understand what lessdazed was trying to say, and it would be a really bad thing if downvoting ignorance became common practice.

1lessdazed
I will try again. Counterfactually, if the US budget hadn't included (pick expenditure), (unrelated expenditure that was't made) probably would not have been made, and (unrelated cut that was made) probably would have been made anyway. As the US engages in deficit spending, whatever program you think most important that wasn't funded, if Congress collectively agreed with you, it would have been funded regardless of other spending. An argument for a program is only weakly an argument against all other programs. If a program is actually bad, it is suspicious that the worst that can be said about it is that it isn't as worthy an expenditure of the most valuable unfunded thing - that's like arguing that someone is sickly because they can't lift more weight than the strongest weightlifter in their city. If someone is truly sickly, there really should be a better argument showing that than that particular measure of their strength.
wilkox30

It's important to avoid the if-not-for-the-worst-waste-of-money-in-the-budget-the-most-worthy-unfunded-program-would-have-been-funded argument.

Can you explain why? This seems like a perfectly normal and reasonable sort of argument about dividing a limited pool of resources wisely.

0[anonymous]
The way I understood it was that "the-worst-waste-of-money" (and possibly "the-most-worthy-unfunded-program" as well) is a label applied in retrospect. To fund the most worthy unfunded program, you'd need to unfund one of 100 programs. It's likely that of the 100 programs, one will turn out to be an abject failure, but it's hard to predict which one it will be ahead of time. Conversely, just because the unfunded program seems most worthy now, doesn't mean that earlier one could have predicted the need for it.
7Richard_Kennaway
In politics, the argument is perfectly normal and unreasonable. It means (borrowing the idea from novalis' link): "This program was the worst waste of money in the budget, because it was against my political views. It was only funded because of people abusing the process to advance political views different from mine. If it was not for this program, so many other programs could have been funded which agree with my political views and were only blocked for political reasons."
3pedanterrific
I'm not sure if this is really the way upvotes are supposed to be used, but I voted you up from -1 because I don't think "Can you explain why?" is a question that should be censured.
6Matt_Simpson
You assume that the government would divide the pool wisely. (Not that it necessarily wouldn't, but not that it necessarily would either.)
wilkox30

Perhaps sparklines would work for this. They compress the recent history of a measurement in a space-efficient way which can fit inline with text.

1shokwave
They would fit neatly next to the upvote / downvote buttons. However nicely they would fit, they should not be used, though. I am in the mind of the diagram about the effect Google's proxy is having on web content - to the extent that karma is not a perfect proxy for good content, sparklines will make it easier to identify that proxy and where it can be gamed.
wilkox110

This sounds a lot like the Scouting merit system, in a good way. I learned more life skills from Scouts then I ever did from public education.

7Raemon
I did learn things from scouting (I'm and Eagle Scout) but an awful lot of those things were "stuff I did to check off a box and then promptly forget about" rather than "stuff I did because I wanted to learn it an integrate it into my life." I am embarrassed at how little first aid I remember.
wilkox50

This doesn't seem to be an answer to Wei Dai's question.

3AdeleneDawner
I parse the given answer as "because the social status was worth more to me than a monetary discount". (Though 'because I didn't think of it' might be a more strictly accurate answer.)
wilkox50

I recently introduced a friend to HPMR and she went on to discover Less Wrong entirely of her own accord. She has explicitly cited it as sparking her interest in things like Bayesian inference, which she would never have considered learning about before.

wilkox00

The link "summary" and the link "Here is a little more expanded text" seem to point to the same place, in my browser at least.

wilkox90

From the linked McDonald's coffee case article:

In addition, they awarded her $2.7 million in punitive damages. The jurors apparently arrived at this figure from [the burn victim's lawyer's] suggestion to penalize McDonald's for one or two days' worth of coffee revenues, which were about $1.35 million per day.

Talk about a brilliant use of anchoring...

wilkox30

I may also explain to them that if defending oneself receives the exact same penalty that attacking someone gets it will usually be best to initiate the combat yourself.

This is excellent advice, with the caveat that the school's disciplinary penalty is probably not the only cost. Being known as "the kid who walks expressionlessly up to other kids and punches them in the testicles without warning" may be a significant penalty too. (This doesn't mean striking first is always a bad strategy, just that it needs to be done carefully).

0wedrifid
I was more referring to that time period when the bully was working himself with bluster right in the non-victim's face. :)
wilkox30

In any case, it is pretty clear that it is possible to hold rationality and religion in your head at the same time. This is basically how most people operate.

More generally, "In any case, it is pretty clear that it is possible to hold rationality and irrationality in your head at the same time. This is basically how most people operate." I'm no more surprised to hear about a religious rationalist than I am when I notice yet another of my own irrational beliefs or practices.

wilkox30

Mendeley is good for this, and specifically designed for managing a library of academic papers. It supports tagging and full text searches, as well as some half-baked "social" features which can be safely ignored. The most useful feature for me is that it can watch a directory for new papers, and add them to its library as well as my directory tree (author/year/paper). It can also maintain a bibtex file for the entire library which is handy for citations.

1lukeprog
Alas, Mendeley always crashes when I tell it to watch the directory on my NAS for new papers.
wilkox20

Good point. Reading my comment again, it seems obvious that I committed the typical mind fallacy in assuming that it really is a choice for most people.

0erikerikson
I'd take this differently. I would at least hope that you are claiming that there is, in fact, a choice, whether the subjective experience of the moment provides indication of the choice or not. Maybe stated differently you could be claiming that there is the possibility of choice for all people whether a person is aware or capable of taking advantage of that fact. That a person can alter his or her self in order to provide his or her self with the opportunity to choose in such situations. Loqi's feedback seems to me to be suggesting that individuals who do not have a belief that they have such a "possibility of choice" could have a more positive phenomenological experience of your assertion and as a result be more likely to integrate the belief into their own belief set and [presumably] gain advantage by encountering it. That is me asserting that Loqi does not appear to be rejecting your assertion but only suggesting a manner by which it can be improved.
wilkox100

Missionary work, including LDS, has a phenomenally low success rate. I don't recall it, but from memory a missionary might convert 1-2 people per year based on cold calls.

A one year doubling or tripling time doesn't strike me as "phenomenally low".

4Document
Conversion means conversion to an official church member, not another missionary, and conversion can be (and depending on who you ask, frequently is) reversed, for missionaries as well as new converts.
wilkox110

This was what confirmed Eliezer's skill as a writer in my mind. He resisted the (typical nerdish) impulse to vomit out pages of obsessively detailed explanations, instead leading the reader on with tantalising hints spaced far apart. It probably accounts for a lot of the book's notorious addictiveness.

wilkox30

"things that people say that really actionable beliefs even though they may not be clear on the difference"

This sounds interesting, but I can't parse it.

1wedrifid
That's because you are using an English parser while my words were not valid English.
wilkox80

In any case there really isn't any reason to be offended and especially there is no reason to allow the other person to provoke you to anger or acting without thought.

It seems really, really difficult to convey to people who don't understand it already that becoming offended is a choice, and it's possible to not allow someone to control you in that way. Maybe "offendibility" is linked to a fundamental personality trait.

8loqi
What constitutes a "choice" in this context is pretty subjective. It may be less confusing to tell someone they could have a choice instead of asserting that they do have a choice. The latter connotes a conscious decision gone awry, and in doing so contradicts the subject's experience that no decision-making was involved.
4Cayenne
It could be. It seems not just difficult but actually against most culture on the planet. Consider that crimes of passion, like killing someone when you find them sleeping around on you, often get a lower sentence than a murder 'in cold blood'. If someone says 'he made me angry' we know exactly what that person means. Responding to a word with a bullet is a very common tactic, even in a joking situation; I've had things thrown at me for puns! It does seem like a learn-able skill even so. I did not have this skill when I was child, but I do have it now. The point I learned it in my life seems to roughly correspond to when I was first trained and working as technical support. I don't know if there's a correlation there. In any case, merely being aware that this is a skill may help a few people on this forum to learn it, and I can see only benefit in trying. It is possible to not control anger but instead never even feel it in the first place, without effort or willpower. Edit - please disregard this post
wilkox00

Agreed, with the addendum that in this context there seems as much disagreement over the definition of "possible" as the definition of "omnipotent".

wilkox100

This bothered me too. If 'omnipotent' is defined as 'able to do things which can be done', we're all gods.

1jwhendy
I think it's more aptly described as "able to do that which is logically possible." Thus, the square circle paradox is generally deemed to be ruled out since it really is nonsense. I agree that the stone question is actually different. HERE's some discussion about that very thing...
1Gray
Not really. Something "can be done" if some possible being, which may not be actual, can perform it. If there's a 500 pound barbell in front of me, and I can't lift it, this doesn't mean that the barbell can't be lifted, only that I can't lift it. If you're omnipotent, then you can lift it. I guess I've always understood omnipotence as being so powerful that no possible being can be more powerful than you are.
8NancyLebovitz
Defining 'omnipotent' as 'able to do things which can be done' is an interesting move-- it makes me realize that my ideas about what can be done (especially by hypothetical extremely powerful beings) are very foggy. Religious people bump up against that when they try to see why some prayers apparently get answered and others don't.
wilkox00

The difference between activation energy and inertia is that you can want to do something, but be having a hard time getting started - that's activation energy. Whereas inertia suggests you'll keep doing what you've been doing, and largely turn your mind off. Breaking out of inertia takes serious energy and tends to make people uncomfortable.

I don't mean to nitpick, but this distinction isn't obvious to me. It seems like inertia is just a component of activation energy.

Great post regardless.

0handoflixue
Activation energy: It takes me about 15 minutes to get ready for exercise: I need to close down what I'm doing, change in to exercise clothes, and find a good spot for it. Inertia: Once I'm jogging, it's really easy to keep jogging. Especially when jogging is the fastest way to get back home =) End result: I find it much easier to do a single 30 minute jog, compared to three 10 minute jogs. If there were just activation costs, I'd probably want to do a single 10 minute jog. If there was just inertia, I'd probably want to do three 30 minute jogs.
wilkox30

This problem is compounded when the students feel obliged to stay in the class even if they're not getting anything out of it. The result is a room full of tired, frustrated students terrified of being "found out" or giving the wrong answer. I encourage my undergrad students to leave and work on a problem later if their brains just aren't up to the job, but they never do. It's not clear if this is because of years of authoritarian schooling, or if they just don't trust themselves to do the work outside of a classroom.

wilkox170

Thank you very much for doing this. You've clearly put a lot of effort into making it both thorough and readable.

Formulate methods of validating the SIAI’s execution of goals.

Seconded. Being able to measure the effectiveness of the institute is important both for maintaining the confidence of their donors, and for making progress towards their long-term goals.

wilkox20

I'm also not sure why the position of her eyes is supposed to be relevant to any of this.

Maybe something to do with the facial asymmetry JanetK mentions here?

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