Due partly to the choice of using 'value' as a speaker dependent variable, some of the terminology used in this article doesn't align with how the terms are used by professional metaethicists. I would strongly suggest one of:
1) replacing the phrase "moral internalism" with a new phrase that better individuates the concept.
2) including a note that the phrase is being used extremely non-standardly.
3) adding a section explaining the layout of metaethical possibilities, using moral internalism in the sense intended by professional metaethicists.
In metaethics, moral internalism, roughly, is the disjunction:
'Value' is speaker independent and universally compelling OR 'Value' is speaker dependent and is only used to indicate properties the speaker finds compelling
This seems very un-joint-carvy from a perspective of value allignment, but most philosophers see internalism as a semantic thesis that captures the relation between moral judgements and motivation. The idea is: If someone says something has value, she values that thing. This is very very different from how the term is used in this article.
I can provide numerous sources to back this up, if needed.
It may be worth commenting on the rights of computations-as-people here (Some computations are people). We would seek to respect the rights of AIs, but we also seek to respect the rights of the computations within the AI (and other complex systems) that are themselves sentient. This would also apply in cases of self-modification, where modified biological brains become sophisticated enough to create complex models that are also objects of ethical value.
Due partly to the choice of using 'value' as a speaker dependent variable, some of the terminology used in this article doesn't align with how the terms are used by professional metaethicists. I would strongly suggest one of:
1) replacing the phrase "moral internalism" with a new phrase that better individuates the concept.
2) including a note that the phrase is being used extremely non-standardly.
3) adding a section explaining the layout of metaethical possibilities, using moral internalism in the sense intended by professional metaethicists.
In metaethics, moral internalism, roughly, is the disjunction:
'Value' is speaker independent and universally compelling OR 'Value' is speaker dependent and is only used to indicate properties the speaker finds compelling
This seems very un-joint-carvy from a perspective of value allignment, but most philosophers see internalism as a semantic thesis that captures the relation between moral judgements and motivation. The idea is: If someone says something has value, she values that thing. This is very very different from how the term is used in this article.
I can provide numerous sources to back this up, if needed.
It may be worth commenting on the rights of computations-as-people here (Some computations are people). We would seek to respect the rights of AIs, but we also seek to respect the rights of the computations within the AI (and other complex systems) that are themselves sentient. This would also apply in cases of self-modification, where modified biological brains become sophisticated enough to create complex models that are also objects of ethical value.